

GRS 300

*Phase 1.4*

# Confidential

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FM WASHINGTON  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELNO 2715

OF 242100Z OCTOBER 86

INFO PRIORITY MODUK

INFO ROUTINE BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW

YOUR TELNO 1843: GENEVA MST

1. ACTION TAKEN, AS IN PARA 8 OF OUR TELNO 2710, WITH HOLMES (STATE). HOLMES CONFIRMED THAT THE SOVIET GENEVA NEGOTIATORS HAD CLEARLY YET TO RECEIVE ANY RELEVANT NEW INSTRUCTIONS POST-REYKJAVIK. THE PRESSURE TO PROVIDE THE US TEAM WITH NEW INSTRUCTIONS ON DEFENCE/SPACE, INCLUDING THE PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES WITHIN 10 YEARS, WAS ENTIRELY WASHINGTON-GENERATED. IN PARTICULAR SHULTZ FELT THAT ALL THE US PROPOSALS AIRD IN REYKJAVIK SHOULD BE QUICKLY DEPLOYED IN GENEVA. BUT HOLMES CONFIRMED THAT NO DECISIONS ON THIS HAD YET BEEN TAKEN. OUR APPROACH WAS TIMELY, AND WOULD BE REPORTED TO SHULTZ FORTHWITH.

2. WE HAVE ALSO SPOKEN TO PERLE (OSD) AND COCKELL (LEHMAN'S NSC SUCCESSOR). PERLE WAS INCLINED TO AGREE WITH OUR FIRST THREE SUGGESTIONS: HIS DOUBT ABOUT THE FOURTH (IE INCLUDING IN ANY EARLY US STATEMENT IN GENEVA A REFERENCE TO THE NEED TO CORRECT THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE IN PARALLEL WITH ELIMINATING BALLISTIC MISSILES), WAS THAT THIS WOULD IMPLY THAT NUCLEAR DETERRENCE WOULD BE DEFECTIVE IF PROVIDED ONLY BY AIR-BREATHING SYSTEMS. WE SAID THAT THIS WAS INDEED THE UK VIEW.

3. COCKELL MERELY TOOK NOTE, CONFIRMING THAT OUR APPROACH WAS WELL-TIMED. DECISIONS WERE IMMINENT, AND HE WOULD AT ONCE REPORT OUR REPRESENTATIONS TO POINDEXTER.

ACLAND

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ORWBAN 7333

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

LIMITED  
ACDD  
DEFENCE D  
SOVIET D  
NEWS D  
NAD  
EED  
WED  
PLANNING STAFF  
RES D  
INFO D  
PUSD  
NED  
CSCE UNIT  
POD

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RENTON  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
MR RATFORD  
MR DAUNT  
MR FEARN  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
MR SLATER  
MR BARRINGTON  
MR GILLMORE

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