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TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELNO 1884

OF 301700Z OCT 86

INFO ROUTINE MODUK, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, ROME
INFO SAVING UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK, TOKYO, PEKING, THE HAGUE
INFO SAVING BRUSSELS

MODUK FOR PS/SOFS, DUS(P), DACU, DPS

YOUR TELNO 2754 (NOT TO ALL): KAMPELMAN'S CALL ON MR RENTON

1. KAMPELMAN CALLED ON MR RENTON TODAY, AND WILL SEE THE SECRETARY OF STATE TOMORROW.
2. MR RENTON WELCOMED THE PROGRESS IN A NUMBER OF AREAS AT REYKJAVIK AND PAID TRIBUTE TO THE SHULTZ BRIEFING OF THE NAC. IT WAS NOW NECESSARY TO BUILD ON THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS. WE SUPPORTED THE 50 PER CENT CUT IN STRATEGIC ARMS. BUT, MR RENTON EMPHASISED, THERE WERE VERY CONSIDERABLE UK CONCERNS, FOR BOTH DEFENCE AND POLITICAL REASONS, ABOUT THE TEN-YEAR TIMESCALE FOR ELIMINATING ALL BALLISTIC MISSILES.
3. IN RESPONSE, KAMPELMAN NOTED THAT THE CONCEPT WAS CLOSELY RELATED TO THE PRESIDENT'S OWN PERSONAL COMMITMENT (WHICH HE FELT HAD ALREADY BEEN INDICATED TO THE ALLIES PRE-REYKJAVIK) TO PURSUING THE ELIMINATION OF ALL SUCH MISSILES. THE TIME-PERIOD OF TEN YEARS WAS ADMITTEDLY NEW AND AN IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE. THE US HAD PERHAPS UNDER-ESTIMATED SOVIET READINESS TO SIGN UP TO THE UTOPIA OF TOTAL ELIMINATION, WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN A MISCALCULATION. THE IMPORTANT THING, HOWEVER,

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WAS TO DECIDE WHERE WE WENT NOW. KAMPELMAN WAS GLAD OUR CONCERNS HAD ALREADY BEEN COMMUNICATED TO THE US. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THIS SHOULD CONTINUE TO HAPPEN. EVERY OPPORTUNITY SHOULD BE TAKEN TO IMPRESS ON THE PRESIDENT THE FORCE OF UK (AND OTHER ALLIED) ARGUMENTS. THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE READY TO LISTEN WITH AN OPEN MIND.

4. THIS WOULD BE ESPECIALLY TRUE AT CAMP DAVID WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE EXPECTED TO DISCUSS HER POSITION IN DETAIL. KAMPELMAN BELIEVED THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE READY TO BE SYMPATHETIC TO THIS. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO RECOGNISE THE PRESIDENT'S DETERMINATION TO ADVANCE HIS OWN VISION WHILE HE HAD THE POWER TO DO SO. ACCIDENTS OR MISCALCULATIONS WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS COULD NOT BE WHOLLY RULED OUT AND IT WAS TIME THE WESTERN WORLD EXAMINED IN DEPTH THE IMPLICATIONS.

5. KAMPELMAN CONFIRMED THAT THE US OBJECTIVE NOW AND AT REYKJAVIK WAS SOLELY CONCERNED WITH BALLISTIC MISSILES. HE COULD NOT CONCEIVE OF THE US GOING BEYOND THAT. EQUALLY, THE RUSSIANS CLEARLY BELIEVED THAT THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THESE WEAPONS ALONE WOULD OPERATE TO WESTERN ADVANTAGE. THE JOINT CHIEFS WERE WORKING ON THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH AN OUTCOME AND THESE STUDIES SHOULD HAVE BEEN COMPLETED BY THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE US. A TEN-YEAR TIMESCALE HAD BEEN DICTATED BY THE SOVIET INSISTENCE ON THAT LENGTH FOR THE EXTENSION OF THE ABM TREATY WITHDRAWAL PERIOD. THE ACTUAL PROPOSAL HAD EMANATED FROM THE DOD REPRESENTATIVE AT REYKJAVIK (? PERLE) AS A WAY OF RESOLVING THE TWO ISSUES. THE PRESIDENT HAD ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THEN THAT THE ELIMINATION OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE CONDITIONAL ON A CONVENTIONAL/CHEMICAL BALANCE AND RESOLUTION OF EAST-WEST CONFLICT. MR RENTON UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE FOR US AND THE EUROPEAN ALLIES OF THIS CONDITION APPLYING EQUALLY TO THE ELIMINATION OF ALL BALLISTIC MISSILES.

6. ON THE SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING IN VIENNA, KAMPELMAN SAID THE US WERE TRYING TO ARRANGE MEETINGS ON BOTH 5 AND 6 NOVEMBER. THE AGENDA WOULD COVER BOTH CSCE ISSUES AND THE POST-REYKJAVIK SCENE. KAMPELMAN THOUGHT THE RUSSIANS WERE STILL LOOKING FOR A WASHINGTON SUMMIT IN EARLY 1987. HE FELT AN EFFORT WOULD BE MADE

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IN VIENNA TO GET THIS BACK ON TRACK, BUT DOUBTED THERE WOULD BE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF GENEVA ISSUES EXCEPT PERHAPS INF. DELINKAGE OF THIS FROM SDI WAS NOT GUARANTEED BUT CERTAINLY POSSIBLE.

7. ON SRINF, THE US BELIEVED GORBACHEV AT REYKJAVIK HAD ACCEPTED MUTUAL CEILINGS (IE A US RIGHT TO MATCH). BUT THE RUSSIANS WERE NOW TALKING ABOUT A FREEZE ON BOTH SIDES, IE AT CURRENT LEVELS.

8. ON SDI ITSELF, THERE WERE TWO FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES: WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN AFTER THE TEN YEAR PERIOD SEMI-COLON AND THE EXTENT OF PERMISSIBLE RESEARCH IN THE MEANTIME. THE FORMER ISSUE WAS EASIER TO HANDLE, ON THE BASIS OF THE US PROPOSAL FOR NO BREAKOUT OVER THE DECADE, FOLLOWED BY A REVERSION TO THE PREVIOUS ABM TREATY OBLIGATION, IE NO REQUIREMENT FOR SOVIET ENDORSEMENT OF POTENTIAL US DEPLOYMENT. BUT THE LATTER REMAINED A FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE AND THERE HAD BEEN NO MOVEMENT ON EITHER SIDE. HOWEVER, KAMPELMAN DESCRIBED IT AS A SOLUBLE PROBLEM SO LONG AS THERE WAS A WILL TO SOLVE IT SEMI-COLON FORMULAE EXISTED TO DO SO.

9. REFERRING TO HIS TALKS IN PARIS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL, KAMPELMAN REPORTED THAT MITTERRAND HAD SHOWN NO INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT. THE BASIC PROBLEM REMAINED D'ABOVILLE. KAMPELMAN HAD UNDERLINED THE STRENGTH OF THE PRESIDENT'S FEELINGS. THE US WERE NOT LOOKING FOR A VICTORY, BUT EQUALLY THE FRENCH WOULD NEVER BE IN A POSITION TO CLAIM ONE. HE HAD DISCUSSED, WITHOUT ENDORSING IT, THE LATEST SWISS IDEA. MR RENTON INDICATED THAT WE WERE THINKING ALONG SIMILAR LINES OURSELVES.

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US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

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