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SECRET AND PERSONAL  
DEDIP  
FM WASHINGTON  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 2788  
OF 032355Z NOVEMBER 86  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL CSCE VIENNA  
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO  
INFO PRIORITY MODUK

*MS*

*Good old Cap.  
COP.*

CSCE VIENNA FOR SECRETARY OF STATE

MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS.

MODUK (FOR PS/SOFS, DUS(P), ACDS (POL-NUC), DACU)

YOUR TELNO 1822 AND MY TELS NOS 2703, 2768, AND 2769: POST-REYKJAVIK ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS

SUMMARY

1. WEINBERGER ALIVE TO THE PROBLEMS FOR NATO EUROPE, AND PARTICULARLY THE UK, OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL TO ABOLISH BALLISTIC MISSILES. UNLIKE SHULTZ AND POINDEXTER, HE ACCEPTS THAT RECTIFYING THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE SHOULD BE A CONDITION FOR ANY SUCH PROPOSAL, AND THAT THIS WOULD REALISTICALLY REQUIRE SOVIET REDUCTIONS, NOT NATO CONVENTIONAL RE-ARMAMENT.  
DETAIL

2. I SAW WEINBERGER ON 3 NOVEMBER, AND TOOK HIM THROUGH ALL THE POINTS IN YOUR TUR, ADDING, IN THE CONTEXT OF PARAS 4 AND 5, AN ACCOUNT OF OPPOSITION QUESTIONS TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON 30 OCTOBER. THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL FOR THE ABOLITION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES WITHIN 10 YEARS CAUSED VERY SERIOUS POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN NATO EUROPE, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE UK; THESE PROBLEMS WOULD, I THOUGHT, BE HIGH ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S AGENDA FOR HER MEETING WITH WEINBERGER ON 14 NOVEMBER, AND HER TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT ON 15 NOVEMBER.

3. I FOUND WEINBERGER UNSURPRISED, AND RECEPTIVE TO MY ARGUMENTS. HE QUITE UNDERSTOOD THAT A PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE ONE OF THE MAJOR ELEMENTS OF NATO'S NUCLEAR DETERRENT EVOKED CONCERN AMONG THE EUROPEAN ALLIES. HE WAS CLEAR THAT THE DETERRENT EQUATION MUST ALWAYS BALANCE: IF THE NUCLEAR ELEMENT WERE IN SOME WAY REDUCED, CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE MUST BE PROPORTIONATELY ENHANCED. THIS WOULD MEAN EITHER GREATER CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE EFFORTS BY NATO, OR NEGOTIATED REDUCTIONS IN BOTH SIDES' CONVENTIONAL FORCES: SUCH REDUCTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE ASYMMETRICAL, BITING MORE HEAVILY ON THE RUSSIANS, GIVEN THEIR CURRENT CONVENTIONAL PREPONDERANCE. THE UK POLICY ON THE UK DETERRENT WAS THE BUSINESS OF THE UK ALONE. SOME IN WASHINGTON SAW IT AS A STUMBLING BLOCK, REAL OR POTENTIAL, TO AGREEMENTS WITH THE RUSSIANS: HE DID NOT, BUT COMBATTING

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THEIR ARGUMENTS REQUIRED HIS QUOTE CONSTANT VIGILANCE UNQUOTE. THE RUSSIANS HAD NOW DROPPED THEIR THIRD COUNTRY FORCE CONDITION IN RELATION TO INF: THE ADMINISTRATION MUST REMAIN EQUALLY FIRMLY OPPOSED

TO ANY SUCH CONDITION IN RELATION TO START. AS FOR THE REYKJAVIK PROPOSAL TO ABOLISH BALLISTIC MISSILES, OR THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO ABOLISH ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER THAT NO AGREEMENTS HAD BEEN REACHED IN REYKJAVIK. THE TASK OF VERIFYING SHARP

← INF REDUCTIONS, AND START REDUCTIONS OF EG 50 PER CENT, LET ALONE THE ABOLITION OF ALL OR ANY NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WOULD BE PARTICULARLY FORMIDABLE, AND VERIFICATION HAD HARDLY BEEN TOUCHED ON IN REYKJAVIK.

4. I PRESSED WEINBERGER ON WHETHER HE BELIEVED THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO SEEK A PARALLEL RECTIFICATION OF THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE IF THE PROPOSAL ON THE TABLE WERE THE ELIMINATION ONLY OF BALLISTIC MISSILES, NOT OF ALL OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE CONFIRMED THAT THIS WAS HIS STRONG VIEW. WHEN I ASKED WHETHER HE BELIEVED THAT US PUBLIC OPINION WOULD WILLINGLY SUPPORT GREATER CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE EFFORTS, AFTER NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, THAN THEY HAD ACCEPTED BEFORE SUCH AGREEMENTS, HIS ANSWER WAS THAT HE FEARED IT WOULD NOT. THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE COROLLARY AND COUNTER-PART FOR THE ABOLITION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES WOULD THEREFORE BE A WHOLLY VERIFIABLE PACKAGE OF ASYMMETICAL REDUCTIONS IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

← 5. I ENQUIRED ABOUT THE CURRENT JCS STUDY ON WHETHER SUFFICIENT NUCLEAR DETERRENCE COULD BE PROVIDED BY RESIDUAL AIR-BREATHING SYSTEMS. WEINBERGER WAS A LITTLE CAGEY: THE JCS HAD JUST STARTED ON A VERY MAJOR STUDY. THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE WORKING ON DEFENSIVE MEASURES AGAINST CRUISE MISSILES, EG QUOTE LOOK-DOWN UNQUOTE RADARS. THEY ALREADY HAD A BIG LEAD IN AIR DEFENCE. OF COURSE THE INTRODUCTION ON THE US SIDE OF STEALTH TECHNOLOGY MIGHT HELP. BUT THE JCS, AND HE, WERE WORRIED ABOUT THE NEED TO MAINTAIN EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE AT EVERY STAGE IN ANY CONCEIVABLE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - QUOTE THE DETERRENCE EQUATIONS MUST ALWAYS BALANCE UNQUOTE. SO IT WAS NECESSARY NOT ONLY TO MAKE JUDGEMENTS ABOUT THE RELATIVE FUTURE EFFECTIVENESS OF OFFENSIVE/DEFENSIVE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING AIR-BREATHING SYSTEMS: IT WAS ALSO NECESSARY TO MAKE JUDGEMENTS ABOUT THE LIKELIHOOD OF ACHIEVING VERIFIABLE ASYMMETICAL CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS IN THE RIGHT TIME SCALE, AND ABOUT CONGRESS'S LIKELY WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT INCREASED CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE EFFORTS. HE SAW NO WAY OF GUARANTEEING THAT CONGRESS WOULD BE SUFFICIENTLY WILLING.

← 6. I SAID THAT AN ARGUMENT I HEARD AROUND TOWN WAS THAT THE UK TRIDENT PROGRAMME WAS IN NO WAY THREATENED BY THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL, FOR (A) IT SEEMED UNLIKELY THAT, GIVEN THEIR LEAD IN ICBMS, THE RUSSIANS WOULD AGREE TO THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL LIMITED ONLY TO BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND (B) ONE MUST NEGOTIATE FROM STRENGTH, AND HENCE MUST MAINTAIN MODERNISATION PROGRAMMES UNTIL AGREEMENTS WERE REACHED. I SAID THAT THESE ARGUMENTS BETRAYED SOME LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE UK POLITICAL SCENE. WEINBERGER AGREED: SIMILAR ARGUMENTS

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IN RELATION TO US STRATEGIC MODERNISATION PROGRAMMES BETRAYED A SIMILAR LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF CONGRESSIONAL OPINION: IT WOULD BE VERY MUCH HARDER TO SECURE FULL SUPPORT ON THE HILL FOR NECESSARY MODERNISATION IF ABOLITION WERE IN THE AIR.

7. WEINBERGER RAISED ONE SDI POINT. AT CAMP DAVID IN 1984 THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT HAD AGREED THAT SDI-RELATED DEPLOYMENT WOULD, GIVEN TREATY OBLIGATIONS, BE A MATTER FOR NEGOTIATION. SOME IN EUROPE HELD THAT THIS IMPLIED THAT THE US ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD HAVE A VETO OVER EVENTUAL SDI DEPLOYMENT. THEY WOULD NOT, AND AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE AT GLENEAGLES HE HAD HAD TO SAY SO. I SAID THAT WE FOR OUR PART ENVISAGED A FIRE-BREAK, AFTER RESEARCH BUT BEFORE DEPLOYMENT, AND THAT THIS WAS OF COURSE IN LINE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE ABMT. WEINBERGER AGREED, BUT POINTED OUT THAT AT REYKJAVIK THE SOVIET REFUSAL TO AGREE THAT THE US WOULD BE FREE TO DEPLOY AFTER 10 YEARS HAD PROVED A STICKING POINT. THE US COULD NOT, AND THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT, CONCEDE ON THIS POINT, AND HE HOPED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT BE PRESSED, BY HIS ALLIES, TO DO SO.

## CONCLUSION

8. THIS WAS A RATHER MORE ENCOURAGING TALK, AT LEAST BY COMPARISON WITH MY RECENT SESSION WITH POINDEXTER. CLEARLY+ WEINBERGER WILL NOT BE LEANING ON THE JCS TO COME UP WITH CONCLUSIONS, IN THEIR CURRENT STUDY, CONVENIENT TO THE WHITE HOUSE. HIS REPEATED CONFIRMATION THAT, AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED, ANY PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE BALLISTIC MISSILES WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE RECTIFICATION OF THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE, AND THAT THIS WOULD HAVE TO ENTAIL SOVIET CONVENTIONAL REDUCTIONS, WAS SOMEWHAT REASSURING.

9. BUT OF COURSE WEINBERGER IS VERY LOYAL TO THE PRESIDENT. I AM NOT WHOLLY CONFIDENT THAT HE IS PUTTING THIS POINT AS FIRMLY TO THE WHITE HOUSE AS HE PUT IT TO ME, OR THAT HE WOULD STICK TO IT IF THE PRESIDENT REJECTED IT. CERTAINLY THE PRESIDENT, IN HIS ELECTION CAMPAIGN SPEECHES, REGULARLY REPEATS THE ABOLITION PROPOSAL WITHOUT ADDING ANY CAVEAT ABOUT CONVENTIONAL FORCES. BUT IT WOULD PROBABLY DO NO HARM IF ON THIS OCCASION, UNLIKE IN 1984, WEINBERGER CONTRIVED TO SECURE A PLACE IN THE US TEAM AT CAMP DAVID ON 15 NOVEMBER. HIS PERENNIAL SCEPTICISM ABOUT ARMS CONTROL MAY AT THIS JUNCTURE BE HELPFUL TO US.

ACLAND  
ORWAN 7517

LIMITED  
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PS  
PS/MR RENTON  
PS/PUS  
MR HOUSTON  
MR THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
MR GILLMORE

COPIES TO:-  
MR MALLABY CABINET OFFICE  
MR C POWELL NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
SIR P CRADOCK NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
PS/S OF S MOD  
DUS(P) MOD  
ACDS (POL/NUC) MOD  
HD/DACU MOD

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We have  
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