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SECRET AND PERSONAL
DEDIP
FM WASHINGTON
TO DESKBY 030830Z FCO
TELNO 2783
OF 030122Z NOVEMBER 86

*This reaches
the same
conclusion as my
minute.
CSP.*

YOUR TELNO 1822: THE APPROACH TO CAMP DAVID

1. MY SERIES OF MEETINGS TO CARRY OUT THESE INSTRUCTIONS IS ALMOST COMPLETE: I SHALL ROUND IT OFF BY SEEING WEINBERGER ON 3 NOVEMBER. IT MAY THEREFORE BE USEFUL, BEFORE YOUR MEETING WITH SHULTZ IN VIENNA ON 5 NOVEMBER, AND AS PLANNING FOR CAMP DAVID PROCEEDS, TO TAKE STOCK ON HOW MATTERS STAND HERE ON THE MAJOR POST-REYKJAVIK PROBLEM, I.E. THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL TO ABOLISH BALLISTIC MISSILES WITHIN 10 YEARS.
2. I SEE THREE KEY ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM.
3. FIRST, THOUGH IT APPARENTLY EMERGED IN RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV'S PRESENTATION ON SDI, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE PROPOSAL WAS GENUINELY MEANT, NOT TACTICAL. IT SPRINGS FROM THE SAME FUNDAMENTALIST STREAK IN REAGAN'S THINKING WHICH PRODUCED SDI: I.E. HIS DEEP-ROOTED CONVICTION THAT QUOTE THERE MUST BE A BETTER WAY UNQUOTE THAN MAD TO KEEP THE PEACE. AND HE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY LIKE TO INITIATE - AND I STRONGLY SUSPECT PROPOSED TO GORBACHEV (AT LEAST MOMENTARILY) IN REYKJAVIK - THE ABOLITION WITHIN A DECADE NOT JUST OF BALLISTIC MISSILES BUT OF ALL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THAT IS WHAT SHULTZ SAID, AT THE KEFLAVIK PRESS CONFERENCE ON 12 OCTOBER (MY TELNO 2615), HAD BEEN TABLED. AS THE DUST SETTLED THE OFFICIAL US LINE BECAME, AND REMAINS, THAT THE PROPOSAL CONCERNS ONLY BALLISTIC MISSILES - BUT WHEN THE PRESIDENT FLUFFS HIS LINES, AS IN BRIEFING CONGRESS ON 14 OCTOBER, OR IN VARIOUS CAMPAIGN SPEECHES SINCE, AND REFERS TO ELIMINATING ALL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS, OR EVEN ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THAT IS THE REAL REAGAN SPEAKING. SO THE PROBLEM FOR THE ALLIES IS EQUALLY REAL.
4. IT IS OF COURSE SIMILAR TO THE PROBLEM WHICH CONFRONTED US BEFORE CAMP DAVID '84. THEN ONE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MAJOR ACHIEVEMENTS WAS TO BRING THE PRESIDENT TO ACCEPT THAT THE AIM OF SDI RESEARCH SHOULD BE TO MAINTAIN, NOT DIMINISH, DETERRENCE. SINCE DETERRENCE IS A FUNCTION NOT JUST OF HARDWARE BUT ALSO OF SOVIET CONVICTION THAT THE HARDWARE WOULD ACTUALLY BE USED IF NECESSARY, HE NOW NEEDS TO BE CONVINCED THAT CND-TYPE RHETORIC FROM THE WHITE HOUSE DAMAGES IT, AND HENCE ALLIANCE SECURITY. HOWEVER MORALLY ADMIRABLE, HIS SENTIMENTS ARE POLITICALLY NAIVE; AND IF HE CANNOT, IN HIS HEART, ACCEPT NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, IT IS BEST THAT HE SHOULD NOT SPEAK FROM THE HEART. AND BEST THAT SHULTZ SHOULD NOT CONCLUDE, AS HIS SAN FRANCISCO SPEECH ON 31 OCTOBER DID, THAT QUOTE

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IT MAY BE THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE STRATEGY OF MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION THAT HAS SHAPED OUR DEFENCE POLICY FOR DECADES, ARE PART OF THE OLD WAY OF THINKING. WE HAVE TO START TO WRAP OUR MINDS ROUND NEW INTERPRETATIONS AND TO BUILD NEW REALITIES UNQUOTE.

5. SECOND, IT IS GENERALLY ACCEPTED HERE THAT TO ABOLISH THE BALANCE OF TERROR WITHOUT CREATING A SUBSTITUTE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE WOULD BE GRAVELY DESTABILISING. BUT THOSE (EG IN THE PENTAGON AND STATE) WHO REALISE HOW DIFFICULT THE LATTER DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE FORMER WILL HAPPEN: AND THOSE IN POWER WHO WOULD LIKE THE FORMER TO HAPPEN ARE DISMISSIVE OF THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE LATTER: SEE, FOR EXAMPLE, WHAT THE PRESIDENT SAID TO ME ON 27 OCTOBER (MY TELNO 2734). SHULTZ IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THAT TO MATCH THE RUSSIANS IN CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES WOULD BE COSTLY, BUT CLAIMS (17 OCTOBER) THAT QUOTE THERE'S JUST NO REASON IN ECONOMICS WHY WE HAVE TO RESTRICT OURSELVES SO MUCH UNQUOTE. NOT IN ECONOMICS PERHAPS, BUT CERTAINLY IN POLITICS: AND IT IS THE POLITICS OF THE PROPOSITION WHICH NEED FURTHER EXAMINATION WITH HIM AND THE PRESIDENT.

6. SPECIFICALLY, WHILE THEY NEED NO PERSUADING OF THE MILITARY FACTS OF CURRENT CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE, THEY NEED TO BE BROUGHT TO ACCEPT THE POLITICAL FACT THAT WITHDRAWAL OF THE US NUCLEAR GUARANTEE, OR EVEN THE THREAT OF SUCH WITHDRAWAL, IS AS LIKELY TO PRODUCE FINLANDISATION AS RE-ARMAMENT IN EUROPE. AND THEIR ASSUMPTION THAT US PUBLIC OPINION WOULD UNDER FUTURE PRESIDENTS SUPPORT A NEW US REARMAMENT PROGRAMME, GREATER THAN THE ONE WHICH THE 99TH CONGRESS TURNED DOWN, THOUGH IT WAS ADVOCATED BY THE MOST POPULAR PRESIDENT THIS CENTURY, NEEDS TO BE PROBED. IS IT PLAUSIBLE THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WOULD AGREE TO SPEND MORE ON DEFENCE, AFTER NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, THAN THEY BAULKED AT BEFORE SUCH AGREEMENTS? SHULTZ APPEARS TO THINK SO, BUT INFORMED OPINION IN THE MEDIA AND ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS CERTAINLY THINK NOT AND IF NOT, CONVENTIONAL BALANCE MUST REALISTICALLY BE SOUGHT NOT BY REARMAMENT BUT BY NEGOTIATION AND AGREEMENT WITH THE RUSSIANS: AND ANY PROPOSAL, IN NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR FORCES, WHICH WOULD DIMINISH NUCLEAR DETERRENCE MUST IN LOGIC, AND IN POLITICS, BE LINKED TO PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES. GIVEN CURRENT LEVELS OF OVERKILL ON BOTH SIDES, 50 PER CENT CUTS IN STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE FORCES CLEARLY DO NOT ENTAIL THIS NECESSARY LINK: BUT ABOLITIONIST PROPOSALS CLEARLY DO.

7. THIRD, HOWEVER, AND MOST AWKWARD OF ALL, WHILE MOST US OFFICIALS WOULD ACCEPT A NECESSARY LINK TO CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN RELATION TO PROPOSALS TO ABOLISH ALL STRATEGIC WEAPONS - AND SHULTZ INDEED DID SO IN HIS SPEECH IN SAN FRANCISCO ON 31 OCTOBER - FEW AGREE THAT THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE IS RELEVANT TO THE OFFICIAL VERSION OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL - IE THE ABOLITION ONLY OF STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES. THE OFFICIAL LINE IS THAT THE NUCLEAR DETERRENCE PROVIDED BY CRUISE AND BOMBS WOULD SUFFICE. THAT

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PROPOSITION IS NOW BEING EXAMINED BY THE CHIEFS OF STAFF, BUT GIVEN THE POLITICAL PRESSURES ON THEM, AND THEIR TOTAL SCEPTICISM ABOUT WHETHER THE RUSSIANS WOULD EVER IN FACT AGREE TO GIVE UP ICBMS, I WOULD NOT BANK ON THEIR MAKING A STAND, AND REJECTING IT. THE PRESIDENT'S CAMPAIGN SPEECHES IMPLICITLY ASSUME THAT THE PROPOSITION IS SELF-EVIDENT: IN HIS WEEKLY RADIO BROADCAST ON 1 NOVEMBER HE CONFIRMED AGAIN, WITH NO CAVEAT ABOUT CONVENTIONAL FORCES, THAT QUOTE WE'RE READY TO MOVE FORWARD ...ON SCRAPPING ALL BALLISTIC MISSILES ON BOTH SIDES IN THE NEXT DECADE UNQUOTE.

8. SUCH STATEMENTS, AND THEIR THEIR EFFECTS ON THE UK POLITICAL SCENE ARE OF COURSE THE CORE OF THE PROBLEM FOR US. WE COULD TRY TO TACKLE IT BY EXPLAINING HERE THE DETAILS OF THE REASONING WHICH LED HMG (A) TO DECIDE IN THE 60'S TO ABANDON A STRATEGIC BOMBER FORCE IN FAVOUR OF A BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCE AND (B) TO CONCLUDE IN 1979/80 THAT UK POLARIS MUST BE REPLACED WITH ANOTHER BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM, NOT A CRUISE OPTION. BUT I VERY MUCH DOUBT IF THIS WOULD MAKE MUCH IF ANY IMPACT. OUR BEST CHANCE OF GETTING THE PRESIDENT EITHER TO PIPE DOWN OR TO AGREE TO ATTACH THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE CONDITION EVEN TO THE LIMITED (OFFICIAL) VERSION OF HIS PROPOSAL LIES IN PERSONAL EXPLANATION, AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL, OF THE POLITICAL EFFECT IN THE UK OF HIS CURRENT RHETORIC AND REPEATED PROPOSAL. IF HE WERE PERSONALLY PERSUADED THAT BY INADVERTENTLY UNDERCUTTING THE TRIDENT ACQUISITION POLICY HE INCREASES THE RISK OF A CHANGE IN UK DEFENCE POLICY, WHICH WOULD MEAN NOT ONLY NO TRIDENT, BUT ALSO NO US BASES IN THE UK, HE MIGHT CHANGE HIS TUNE.

9. THIS LAST POINT IS PERHAPS PUT BEST IN THE TETE-A-TETE MEETING AT CAMP DAVID. BUT I WOULD SEE CONSIDERABLE ADVANTAGE IN YOUR PREPARING THE GROUND WITH SHULTZ IN VIENNA, PERHAPS MAKING SOME OF THE POINTS IN PARAS 4, 6 AND 8 ABOVE. IF TIME ALLOWS THERE ARE ALSO ARMS CONTROL POINTS TO BE MADE TOO: ON THE SALT LIMITS, AN ISSUE WHICH IS LIKELY TO SURFACE AGAIN BEFORE LONG, ON THE FORUM FOR CONVENTIONAL REDUCTIONS TALKS, ON NUCLEAR TESTING, AND, OF COURSE, ON LRINF/SRINF. BUT I THINK WE SHOULD LEAVE SHULTZ IN NO DOUBT THAT WHILE WE REMAIN KEEN TO SEE RAPID PROGRESS ON EG INF, OUR PRIMARY PREOCCUPATION IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF REYKJAVIK (AND AT CAMP DAVID) IS TO MAINTAIN ALLIED COHESION AND NATO'S DETERRENT STRATEGY, THREATENED BY THE EMERGENCE, WITH NO PRIOR CONSULATION, OF THE REYKJAVIK 10 YEAR ABOLITION IDEA. IT WOULD BE GOOD IF HE WERE TO GRASP, AND TRY TO INDICATE TO THE PRESIDENT, BEFORE CAMP DAVID, JUST HOW POLITICALLY AWKWARD ALL THIS IS FOR HMG.

10. FANCIFUL THOUGH IT MAY SEEM, IT IS NOT BEYOND THE BOUNDS OF POSSIBILITY THAT THE PRESIDENT MIGHT AT CAMP DAVID TRY TO SQUARE THE CIRCLE, MAINTAINING HIS PROPOSAL TO ABOLISH BALLISTIC MISSILES BUT SOLVING OUR PROBLEM, BY OFFERING THE PRIME MINISTER STEALTH TECHNOLOGY, OR STEALTH BOMBERS, INSTEAD OF TRIDENT. I HAVE HEARD NO

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WHISPERS OF ANY SUCH SUGGESTION, (AND HAVE SEEN NO SIGN THAT THE U S TRIDENT PROGRAMME MIGHT BE SLOWED DOWN): I ALSO RECOGNISE THAT SUCH AN OFFER WOULD NOT SOLVE OUR PROBLEM, NOT LEAST BECAUSE THE UK TRIDENT PROGRAMME IS ALREADY SO FAR ADVANCED. BUT IT MIGHT BE AS WELL TO HAVE CONSIDERED IN ADVANCE WHAT THE BEST RESPONSE MIGHT BE IF THE IDEA WERE TO SURFACE.

11. ADVANCE COPIES TO GALSWORTHY, GOODALL, PAKENHAM AND POWELL (NO 10) PLEASE.

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ORWBAN 7506

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