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If need be I am anti-prepare for George



Prime Minister

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
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MO 11/9/4L

5th November 1986

Mr. Younger asks me to make clear that he does NOT want to come, and that it is much better if you go alone.

But when you see Weinberger, you might urge him to have a word with the President before the

Dear Charles, Camp David meeting the next day.  
POST REYKJAVIK

we for some... can't... But... several other... think... CDP 7/11: no.

Mr Weinberger telephoned the Defence Secretary late yesterday afternoon. He recalled their discussion at Gleneagles in which Mr Younger had put to him the problems to which the proposal to abolish ballistic missiles within 10 years gave rise. Mr Weinberger said that this proposal was a source of great concern to him too. He was taking every opportunity to make the point that zero must not be reached without "something else coming up". He had often used the phrase that Mr Younger himself had put to him, that a world without such weapons might be the ideal but it was a different world; it would have to differ in many important respects from the real world in which we now lived. He asked whether Mr Younger would be accompanying the Prime Minister on her visit to Washington. The trouble was that on the US side "many of those interested in getting an agreement at all costs" could be present. He thought Mr Shultz might well be there. It was very important that defence should also be represented. The "critical proposal" at Reykjavik had emerged in the absence of defence representation. He added, however, that in his view an agreement was a good deal further off than many seemed to think.

CDP b/x.

Mr Younger said that while he would for his own part be quite prepared to come, he understood that the meeting was to be strictly one-to-one between the President and the Prime Minister. Moreover the Prime Minister would not require any assistance in making her points persuasively to the President. Weinberger readily acknowledged this; if the meeting was to remain one-to-one then he would be less anxious; but he doubted whether it would turn out that way.

It is clear from this that the points which Mr Younger, and Sir Anthony Acland, have made to Mr Weinberger about Reykjavik have indeed fallen on fertile soil; and that Mr Weinberger is anxious about the balance of the President's team for Camp David and sees Mr Younger's presence as a means of ensuring that the

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SECRET



DOD is not excluded. Mr Younger does not in any way wish to press to come, but it would seem to be much in our interest that the US for their part should field a balanced team.

I am copying this to Tony Galsworthy in the FCO and to Trevor Woolley in the Cabinet Office.

*Yrs sincerely,*  
*John Howe.*

(J F HOWE)  
PS/S of S

SECRET



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*Faint handwritten text or initials.*