

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

1450/13

46

ECZC

BPLNAN 2706

DD 131500Z FCOLN

SECRET

FM BONNN TO FCOLN

131400Z NOV

GRS 420

Mr POWELL

SECRET

DEDIP

FM BONN

TO DESKBY 131500Z FCO

TELNO 961

OF 131400Z NOVEMBER 86

PERSONAL FOR FALL, PRIVATE SECRETARY AND POWELL (10 DOWNING ST)

ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY.

SUMMARY

1. CONTINUED GERMAN CONCERN THAT REAGAN MAY PAY INSUFFICIENT ATTENTION TO EUROPEAN SECURITY INTERESTS. SUGGESTION OF EARLY MEETING BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER, KOHL, AND EITHER MITTERRAND OR CHIRAC.

DETAIL

2. TELTSCHIK TOLD ME TODAY THAT SINCE KOHL'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON THE CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE HAD BEEN THINKING FURTHER ABOUT THE POSSIBLE RISKS FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY AS THE SUPER-POWER DIALOGUE CONTINUED. FROM A LONG CONVERSATION WITH POINDEXTER TELTSCHIK HAD GATHERED THAT REAGAN DID NOT THINK HE HAD BEEN LED INTO A TRAP IN REYKJAVIK: HE BELIEVED THAT THE TALKS THERE HAD BEEN SERIOUS AND THAT THE CHEMISTRY BETWEEN HIMSELF AND GORBACHEV WAS VERY GOOD. (THE OPPOSITE, TELTSCHIK COMMENTED, OF WHAT KARPOV HAD TOLD HIM.) THE SUPERPOWER DIALOGUE WAS EVIDENTLY GOING TO CONTINUE, AND TELTSCHIK'S FEAR WAS, THAT, IF REAGAN SAW A CHANCE OF AN AGREEMENT, HE WOULD GO FOR IT, WITH LITTLE REGARD TO EUROPEAN INTERESTS. THE WAY IN WHICH THE SUPER-POWER DIALOGUE IN GENEVA POST-REYKJAVIK, WITHOUT CONSULTATION WITH THE EUROPEAN ALLIES, WAS A PORTENT.

3. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT THE CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE HAD BEEN THINKING (MY TELNO 926) ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EARLY MEETING OF THE THREE HEADS OF STATE/GOVERNMENT OF THE UK, FRG AND FRANCE IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE IN A VERY VISIBLE AND EVEN SPECTACULAR WAY THE CONCERN OF THE THREE MOST IMPORTANT ALLIES ABOUT THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF THE US-SOVIET DIALOGUE. TELTSCHIK REALISED THAT THERE WOULD BE A MASSIVE ROW WITH ITALY AND A PROBLEM ABOUT WHO SHOULD REPRESENT FRANCE: BUT WITH SO MUCH AT STAKE THESE DISADVANTAGES MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE. AS TO DATES, TELTSCHIK ENVISAGED A MEETING BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR, OR IN THE FIRST HALF OF JANUARY 1987.

4. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT THE GERMANS WOULD WANT TO SEE THE RESULT OF THE WEU MINISTERIAL MEETING BEFORE MAKING UP THEIR MINDS WHETHER TO PUSH THIS IDEA, AND IF SO HOW. HE RATHER SURPRISED ME BY SAYING THAT HE THOUGHT WEU CAPABLE OF MUCH GREATER THINGS. (WE SHALL FOLLOW THIS UP SEPARATELY AFTER THE MINISTERIAL.)

COMMENT

5. AS THE SUGGESTED DATES INDICATE, THERE IS AN ELECTIONEERING ELEMENT IN THIS. TELTSCHIK MAY BE HOPING THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WILL TAKE UP THE IDEA, SO THAT ANY HARD FEELINGS IN ROME WOULD BE DIRECTED MORE AGAINST BRITAIN THAN AGAINST THE FRG. (IF THE AIM IS ESSENTIALLY A ONCE-OFF THEATRICAL GESTURE, WHY EXCLUDE THE ITALIANS?) I HAVE WARNED POWELL THAT THE SUBJECT MAY BE MENTIONED IF AND WHEN KOHL TELEPHONES THE PRIME MINISTER BEFORE SHE SETS OFF FOR WASHINGTON.

BULLARD

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