

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

PS
~~PS/LADY YOUNG EGGAR~~
 PS/MR RENTON
 PS/PUS
 MR DEREK THOMAS
 MR GOODALL
 MR RATFORD
 MR FALL.
 MR FEARN

MR POWELL, NO 10 DOWNING ST

MR D NICHOLLS, DUS(P) } MOD
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RESIDENT CLERK

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 2920

OF 172030Z NOVEMBER 86

INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MODUK

MY TELNO 2908: CAMP DAVID: ARMS CONTROL

1. MY TWO IFTS CONTAIN EXTRACTS FROM SPEECHES TO BE DELIVERED BY SHULTZ (IN CHICAGO) AND WEINBERGER (IN WASHINGTON) THIS EVENING. BOTH OCCASIONS WERE LONG-PLANNED, AND DRAFTS OF BOTH SPEECHES WERE PREPARED LONG AGO.

2. WE HAVE MADE EXTENSIVE EFFORTS TODAY WITH SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT, PENTAGON AND NSC OFFICIALS TO BRING BOTH TEXTS AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE INTO LINE WITH THE AGREED CAMP DAVID STATEMENT. IKLE IN OSD AND RIDGWAY IN STATE ACCEPTED A NUMBER OF AMENDMENTS TO EARLIER VERSIONS OF BOTH TEXTS TO REFLECT THE NEAR TERM NEGOTIATING PRIORITIES, AS IDENTIFIED AT CAMP DAVID, AND THE NEED FOR A STABLE BALANCE AT ALL TIMES. WE ALSO ARGUED (WITH OSD SUPPORT) FOR THE DELETION OF SHULTZ'S PASSAGE ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES AND WHAT HE CALLS THE CHALLENGES OF A LESS NUCLEAR WORLD - PARA G. IN MIFT. BUT THIS PASSAGE STANDS AND, DESPITE SOME GOOD BITS ELSEWHERE EG PARA F. IN MIFT), THE SHULTZ SPEECH OVERALL IS ON BALANCE UNHELPFUL.

3. WEINBERGER'S BY CONTRAST IS BETTER - SEE EXTRACTS IN MY SECOND IFT. HIS SUPPORT FOR THIRD COUNTRY STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, AND HIS VERY STRONG AND EXPLICIT STATEMENT OF COMMITMENT TO THE UK (AND US) TRIDENT PROGRAMME (PARA D. IN MY SECOND IFT) ARE VERY USEFUL.

4. THE TIMING OF BOTH SPEECHES IS UNFORTUNATE. THE TROUBLE WITH THE CONTENT IS NOT THAT (WEINBERGER ON TRIDENT APART) ANYTHING NEW IS BEING SAID, BUT RATHER THAT DRAFTS PREPARED PRE-CAMP DAVID HAVE NOT BEEN SUFFICIENTLY AMENDED FULLY TO REFLECT CAMP

4. THE TIMING OF BOTH SPEECHES IS UNFORTUNATE. THE TROUBLE WITH THE CONTENT IS NOT THAT (WEINBERGER ON TRIDENT APART) ANYTHING NEW IS BEING SAID, BUT RATHER THAT DRAFTS PREPARED PRE-CAMP DAVID HAVE NOT BEEN SUFFICIENTLY AMENDED FULLY TO REFLECT CAMP DAVID. (BUT IT IS WORTH RECALLING THAT THE FOUR POINTS FROM CAMP DAVID '84, THOUGH INSTANTLY DENOUNCED BY WEINBERGER, BECAME AGREED ADMINISTRATION POLICY BY SPRING '85. AND SHULTZ'S SPEECH TODAY CERTAINLY DOES NOT DENOUNCE CAMP DAVID '86.)

5. AT TODAY'S WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING, SPEAKES, PRESUMABLY REFLECTING DEBRIEFING ON CAMP DAVID FROM THE PRESIDENT OR REGAN, STRESSED THE RELEVANCE OF THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE TO NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS AND SAID QUOTE WE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE CONVENTIONAL FORCE BALANCE BEFORE WE WOULD AGREE TO LOWER OUR NUCLEAR FORCES UNQUOTE.

6. PLEASE ADVANCE TO POWELL (NO. 10).

ACLAND

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ORWBAN 7831

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AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY

~~THIS COPY IS FOR~~ DELIVERY, SCHEDULED FOR APPROXIMATELY 5:30 P.M.
(CST) OF 6:30 P.M. (EST) MONDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1986. NOT TO BE
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ADDRESS BY

THE HONORABLE

GEORGE P. SHULTS

SECRETARY OF STATE

BEFORE THE

INTERNATIONAL HOUSE OF CHICAGO

AND

THE CHICAGO SUN-TIMES FORUM

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

NOVEMBER 17, 1986

**NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ARMS CONTROL
AND THE FUTURE OF DETERRENCE**

Questions for the Future

I have come here to the University of Chicago to talk about nuclear weapons, arms control and our national security. These issues have been given special timeliness by the President's recent meeting with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik. In years to come, we may look back at their discussions as a turning point in our strategy for deterring war and preserving peace. It has opened up new possibilities for the way in which we view nuclear weapons and their role in ensuring our security.

We now face a series of questions of fundamental importance for the future: How can we maintain peace through deterrence in the midst of a dash to the development of offensive nuclear weapons? How can we negotiate a more stable strategic balance at substantially lower levels of offensive forces? How can we use new defensive technologies to contribute to that stability? How can the West best seek to reduce its reliance on offensive nuclear weapons without running new risks of instability arising from conventional imbalances?

These are exceptionally difficult and complex issues. They go to the heart of our ability as a democratic nation to survive in a world threatened by totalitarianism and aggression. These questions should engage the best minds in American society -- and that is why I have come to speak to this particular audience. But I caution you from the beginning. This won't be an easy speech, or a short one. I'll ask that you listen carefully, and hopefully reflect at greater length on the text of my remarks.

Forty-four years ago, and about 200 yards from where I am now standing, mankind generated its first self-sustained and controlled nuclear chain reaction. Enrico Fermi's crude atomic pile was the prototype for all that followed -- both reactors to generate energy for peaceful uses, and weapons of ever-increasing destructiveness. Seldom are we able to mark the beginning of a new era in human affairs so precisely.

I'm not here tonight to announce the end of that era. But I will suggest that we may be on the verge of important changes in our approach to the role of nuclear weapons in our defense. New technologies are compelling us to think in new ways about how to ensure our security and protect our freedoms. Reykjavik served as a catalyst in this process. The President has led us

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to think seriously about both the possible benefits -- and the costs -- of a safer strategic environment involving progressively less reliance on nuclear weapons. Much will now depend on whether we are far-sighted enough to proceed towards such a goal in a realistic way that enhances our security and that of our allies.

It may be that we have arrived at a true turning point. The nuclear age cannot be undone or abolished; it is a permanent reality. But we can glimpse now, for the first time, a world freed from the incessant and pervasive fear of nuclear devastation. The threat of nuclear conflict can never be wholly banished, but it can be vastly diminished -- by careful but drastic reductions in the offensive nuclear arsenals each side possesses. It is just such reductions -- not limitations in expansion, but reductions -- that is the vision President Reagan is working to make a reality.

Such reductions would add far greater stability to the U.S.-Soviet nuclear relationship. Their achievement should make other diplomatic solutions obtainable, and perhaps lessen the distrust and suspicion that have stimulated the felt need for such weapons. /⁵ Many problems will accompany drastic reductions: problems of deployment, conventional balances,

verification, multiple warheads, and chemical weapons. The task ahead is great but worth the greatest of efforts. /F

This will not be a task for Americans alone. We must engage the collective effort of all of the Western democracies. And as we do, we must also be prepared to explore cooperative approaches with the Soviet Union, when such cooperation is feasible and in our interests.

The Evolution of our Thinking About Nuclear Weapons

Let me start by reviewing how our thinking has evolved about the role of nuclear weapons in our national security.

In the years immediately after Fermi's first chain-reaction, our approach was relatively simple. The atomic bomb was created in the midst of a truly desperate struggle to preserve civilization against fascist aggression in Europe and Asia. There was a compelling rationale for its development and use.

But since 1945 -- and particularly since America lost its monopoly of such weapons a few years later -- we have had to adapt our thinking to less clearcut circumstances. We have

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been faced with the challenges and the ambiguities of a protracted global competition with the Soviet Union. Nuclear weapons have shaped, and at times restrained, that competition; but they have not enabled either side to achieve a decisive advantage.

Because of their awesome destructiveness, nuclear weapons have kept in check a direct U.S.-Soviet clash. With the advent in the late 1950's of intercontinental-range ballistic missiles -- a delivery system for large numbers of nuclear weapons at great speed and with increasing accuracy -- both the United States and the Soviet Union came to possess the ability to mount a devastating attack on each other within minutes.

The disastrous implications of such massive attacks led us to realize, in the words of President Kennedy, that "total war makes no sense." And as President Reagan has reiterated many times: "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought" -- words that the President and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed on in their Joint Statement at Geneva a year ago.

Thus, it came to be accepted in the West that a major role of nuclear weapons was to deter their use by others -- as well as to deter major conventional attacks -- by the threat of

their use in response to aggression. Over the years, we sought through a variety of means and rationales -- beginning with "massive retaliation" in the 1950's up through "flexible response" and "selective nuclear options" in the 1970's -- to maintain a credible strategy for that retaliatory threat.

At the same time, we also accepted a certain inevitability about our own nation's vulnerability to nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. When nuclear weapons were delivered by manned bombers, we maintained air defenses. But as the ballistic missile emerged as the basic nuclear delivery system, we virtually abandoned the effort to build defenses. After a spirited debate over anti-ballistic missile systems in the late 1960's, we concluded that -- on the basis of technologies now twenty years old -- such defenses would not be effective. So our security from nuclear attack came to rest on the threat of retaliation and a state of mutual vulnerability.

In the West, many assumed that the Soviets would logically see things this way as well. It was thought that once both sides believed that a state of mutual vulnerability had been achieved, there would be shared restraint on the further growth of our respective nuclear arsenals.

The ABM Treaty of 1972 reflected that assumption. It was seen by some as elevating mutual vulnerability from technical fact to the status of international law. That Treaty established strict limitations on the deployment of defenses against ballistic missiles. Its companion Interim Agreement on strategic offensive arms was far more modest. SALT I was conceived of as an intermediate step towards more substantial future limits on offensive nuclear forces. It established only a cap on the further growth in the numbers of ballistic missile launchers then operational and under construction. The most important measures of the two sides' nuclear arsenals -- numbers of actual warheads and missile throw-weight -- were not restricted.

But controlling the number of launchers without limiting warheads actually encouraged deployment of multiple warheads -- called MIRVs -- on a single launcher. This eventually led to an erosion of strategic stability as the Soviets -- by proliferating MIRVs -- became able to threaten all of our Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles with only a fraction of their own. Such an imbalance makes a decision to strike first seem all the more profitable.

During this postwar period, we and our allies hoped that American nuclear weapons would serve as a comparatively cheap offset to Soviet conventional military strength. The Soviet Union, through its geographic position and its massive mobilized conventional forces, has powerful advantages it can bring to bear against Western Europe, the Mideast and East Asia -- assets useful for political intimidation as well as for potential military aggression. The West's success or failure in countering these Soviet advantages has been, and will continue to be, one of the keys to stability in our postwar world.

Our effort to deter a major Soviet conventional attack through the existence of opposing nuclear forces has been successful over the past four decades. It gave the industrialized democracies devastated by the Second World War the necessary "breathing space" to recover and thrive. But there has also been recurring debate over the credibility of this strategy, as well as controversy about the hardware required for its implementation.

Over time, we and our allies came to agree that deterrence required a flexible strategy combining both conventional and nuclear forces. This combined strategy has been successful in avoiding war in Europe. But our reliance for so long on nuclear weapons has led some to

forget that these arms are not an inexpensive substitute -- mostly paid for by the United States -- for fully facing up to the challenges of conventional defense and deterrence.

Sources of Strategic Instability

// The United States and our allies will have to continue to rely upon nuclear weapons for deterrence far, far into the future. That fact, in turn, requires that we maintain credible and effective nuclear deterrent forces. ✓

But a defense strategy that rests on the threat of escalation to a strategic nuclear conflict is, at best, an unwelcome solution to ensuring our national security. Nuclear weapons, when applied to the problem of preventing either a nuclear or conventional attack, present us with a major dilemma. They may appear a bargain -- but a dangerous one. They make the outbreak of a Soviet-American war most unlikely; but they also ensure that should deterrence fail, the resulting conflict would be vastly more destructive -- not just for our two countries, but for mankind as a whole.

Moreover, we cannot assume that the stability of the present nuclear balance will continue indefinitely. It can

deteriorate and it has. We have come to realize that our adversary does not share all of our assumptions about strategic stability. Soviet military doctrine stresses warfighting and survival in a nuclear environment, the importance of numerical superiority, the contribution of active defense, and the advantages of pre-emption.

Over the past fifteen years, the growth of Soviet strategic forces has continued unabated -- and far beyond any reasonable assessment of what might be required for rough equivalency with U.S. forces. As a result, the Soviet Union has acquired a capability to put at risk the fixed land-based missiles of the U.S. strategic triad -- as well as portions of our bomber and in-port submarine force and command and control systems -- with only a fraction of their force, leaving many warheads to deter any retaliation.

To date, arms control agreements along traditional lines -- such as SALT I and II -- have failed to halt these destabilizing trends. They have not brought about significant reductions in offensive forces, particularly those systems that are the most threatening to stability. By the most important measure of destructive capability -- ballistic missile warheads -- Soviet strategic forces have grown by a factor of four since

the SALT I Interim Agreement was signed. This problem has been exacerbated by a Soviet practice of stretching their implementation of such agreements to the edge of violation -- and sometimes, beyond. The evidence of Soviet actions contrary to SALT II, the ABM Treaty and various other arms control agreements is clear and unmistakable.

At the same time, technology has not stood still. Research and technological innovation of the past decade now raise questions about whether the primacy of strategic offense over defense will continue indefinitely. For their part, the Soviets have never neglected strategic defenses. They developed and deployed them even when offensive systems seemed to have overwhelming advantages over any defense. As permitted by the ABM Treaty of 1972, the Soviets constructed around Moscow the world's only operational system of ballistic missile defense. Soviet military planners apparently find that the modest benefits of this system justify its considerable cost, even though it would provide only a marginal level of protection against our overall strategic force. It could clearly be a base for the future expansion of their defenses.

For well over a decade -- long before the President announced three years ago the American Strategic Defense

Initiative -- the Soviet Union has been actively investigating much more advanced defense technologies, including directed energy systems. If the U.S. were to abandon this field of advanced defensive research to the Soviet Union, the results ten years hence could be disastrous for the West.

The President's Approach: Seeking Greater Stability

President Reagan believes we can do better. He believes we can reverse the ever-increasing numbers and potency of nuclear weapons that are eroding stability. He believes we can and should find ways to keep the peace without basing our security so heavily on the threat of nuclear escalation. To those ends, he has set in motion a series of policies which have already brought major results.

✓ / First, this Administration has taken much-needed steps to reverse dangerous trends in the military balance by strengthening our conventional and nuclear deterrent forces. We have gone forward with their necessary modernization.)L

Second, we have sought ambitious arms control measures -- not agreements for their own sake, but steps which could seriously contribute to the goal of stabilizing reductions in

offensive forces. In 1981, the President proposed the global elimination of all Soviet and American longer-range INF nuclear missiles. Not a freeze or token reductions, as many urged at the time, but the complete elimination of this class of weapons.

The following year, at Eureka College, the President proposed major reductions in strategic offensive forces, calling for cuts by one-third to a level of 5000 ballistic missile warheads on each side. Again, this was a major departure from previous negotiating approaches -- both in the importance of the weapons to be reduced and in the magnitude of their reduction. Critics claimed he was unrealistic, that it showed he was not really interested in arms control. But the President's call for dramatic reductions in nuclear warheads on the most destabilizing delivery systems has been at the core of our negotiating efforts. The Soviets have finally begun to respond to the President's approach, and are now making similar proposals.

Finally, the President also set out to explore whether it would be possible to develop an effective defense against ballistic missiles, the central element of current strategic offensive arsenals. To find that answer, he initiated in 1983

the SDI program -- a broad-based research effort to explore the defensive implications of new technologies. It is a program that is consistent with our obligations under the ABM Treaty. He set as a basic goal the protection of the United States and our Allies against the ballistic missile threat.

Since then, we have been seeking both to negotiate deep reductions in the numbers of those missiles, as well as to develop the knowledge necessary to construct a strategic defense against them. It is the President's particular innovation to seek to use these parallel efforts in a reinforcing way -- to reduce the threat while exploring the potential for defense.

Reykjavik: A Potential Watershed in Nuclear Arms Control

All of these efforts will take time to develop, but we are already seeing their first fruits. Some became apparent at Reykjavik. Previously, the prospect of 30, let alone 50, percent reductions in Soviet and American offensive nuclear arsenals was considered an overly ambitious goal.

At Reykjavik, the President and General Secretary Gorbachev reached the basis for an agreement on a first step of 50

percent reductions in Soviet and American strategic nuclear offensive forces over a five year period. We agreed upon some numbers and counting rules -- that is, how different types of weapons would count against the reduced ceilings.

For INF nuclear missiles, we reached the basis for agreement on even more drastic reductions, down from a current Soviet total of over 1400 warheads to only 100 on longer-range INF missiles worldwide on each side. This would represent a reduction of more than 90 percent of the Soviet SS-20 nuclear warheads now targetted on our allies and friends in Europe and Asia. There would also have to be a ceiling on shorter-range INF missiles, the right for us to match the Soviets in this category, and follow-on negotiations aimed at the reduction in numbers of these weapons.

Right there is the basis for an arms control agreement that doesn't just limit the future growth of Soviet and American nuclear arsenals, but which actually makes deep and early cuts in existing force levels. These cuts would reduce the numbers of heavy, accurate, multiple-warhead missiles that are the most threatening and the most destabilizing. These ideas discussed at Reykjavik flowed directly from the President's longstanding proposals. They are a direct result of his vision of major

offensive reductions as a necessary step to greater stability.

At Reykjavik, the President and the General Secretary went on to discuss possible further steps towards enhanced stability. ^A The President proposed to eliminate all ballistic missiles over the subsequent five years. Mr. Gorbachev proposed to eliminate all strategic offensive forces. They talked about these and other ideas, including the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. The very scope of their discussion was significant. ^B The President and the General Secretary set a new arms control agenda at Reykjavik, one that will shape our discussions with the Soviets about matters of nuclear security for years to come.

^M Make no mistake about it. Tough, and probably drawn-out, negotiations will still be required if we are to nail down any formal agreement on offensive force reductions. ^N For example, the Soviets are now linking agreement on anything with agreement on everything. But the fact that we now have such reductions clearly on the table has only been made possible by:

- our steps to restore America's military strength;
- our firm and patient negotiating efforts over the past five years;

-- the sustained support of our Allies; and not the least,

-- by our active investigation into strategic defenses.

The prospect of effective defenses, and our determined force modernization program, have given the Soviet Union an important incentive to agree to cut back and eventually eliminate ballistic missiles. Within the SDI program, we judge defenses to be desirable only if they are survivable and cost-effective at the margin. Defenses that meet these criteria -- those which cannot be easily destroyed or overwhelmed -- are precisely the sort which would lead Soviet military planners to consider reducing, rather than continuing to expand, their offensive missile force.

But only a dynamic and ongoing research program can play this role. And for their part, the Soviets are making every effort to cripple our program. Thus, there were major differences over strategic defenses at Reykjavik. The President responded to Soviet concerns by proposing that, for ten years, both sides would not exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and would confine their strategic defense programs to research, development and testing

activities permitted by the ABM Treaty. This commitment would be in the context of reductions of strategic offensive forces by 50 percent in the first five years and elimination of the remaining ballistic missiles in the second five years, and with the understanding that at the end of this ten year period, either side would have the right to deploy advanced defenses, unless agreed otherwise.

But at Reykjavik, the Soviet Union wanted to change existing ABM Treaty provisions to restrict research in a way that would cripple the American SDI program. This we cannot accept.

Even after the elimination of all ballistic missiles, we will need insurance policies to hedge against cheating or other contingencies. We don't know now what form this will take. An agreed-upon retention of a small nuclear ballistic missile force could be part of that insurance. What we do know is that the President's program for defenses against ballistic missiles can be a key part of our insurance. A vigorous research program will give the U.S. and our allies the options we will need to approach a world with far fewer nuclear weapons -- a world with a safer and more stable strategic balance, one no longer dependent upon the threat of mutual annihilation.

Next Steps with the Soviets

o / In the short-term, our task is to follow up on the progress arising out of the Reykjavik discussions. For our part, we are energetically seeking to do so. Our negotiators in Geneva have instructions to pick up where the two leaders' exchanges left off. We have formally tabled our proposals, based on progress at Reykjavik, and we are ready to discuss them.

To give additional impetus to that process, I met with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Vienna at the beginning of this month to continue our exchanges -- not just on arms control, but on the full agenda of U.S.-Soviet issues, including those regional and human rights problems which are so critical to building trust and confidence between our two nations.

Our negotiating efforts -- and the President's own discussions with the General Secretary -- have been based on years of analysis of these issues and on our frequent exchanges with the Soviets. The Reykjavik meeting, for instance, was preceded by extensive preliminary discussions with the Soviets at the expert-level in Geneva, Moscow and Washington. We have

had our senior negotiators and best advisors at all of these sessions -- as well as at our most recent encounter in Vienna.

So we have been well prepared to move. But whether we can achieve concrete results now depends on the Soviets. General Secretary Gorbachev has spoken positively of the need to capitalize on the "new situation" created by Reykjavik. But at Vienna two weeks ago, the Soviets seemed primarily interested in trying to characterize SDI in the public mind as the sole obstacle to agreement. Mr. Shevardnadze was quick to accuse us of backsliding from the Reykjavik results, and to label our Vienna meeting "a failure" because of our unwillingness to accede to their demands to cripple SDI. We will doubtless hear more such accusations over the coming weeks.

91 So all of this will take time to work out. But that's to be expected in negotiating with the Soviets. We are serious about our objectives, and we are determined to hold firmly to them. We have a clear sense of how our two nations might be able to move towards greater strategic stability. We are ready to move quickly to that end, but are also prepared to be patient.

The Challenges of a Less Nuclear World

The longer-term implications of the Reykjavik discussions may prove even more challenging for us. Thus far in the nuclear age, we have become accustomed to thinking of nuclear weapons in terms of "more bang for the buck" -- and of the high price for any possible substitute for these arms. But to my mind, that sort of book-keeping approach risks obscuring our larger interests. We should begin by determining what is of value to us, and then what costs we are prepared to pay to attain those ends.

The value of steps leading to a less-nuclear world is clear -- potentially enhanced stability and less chance of a nuclear catastrophe. Together with our allies, we could enjoy a safer, more secure strategic environment.

S/ But we would not seek to reduce nuclear weapons only to increase the risks of conventional war, or more likely, of political intimidation through the threat of conventional attack. Therefore, a central task will be to establish a stable conventional balance as a necessary corollary for any less-nuclear world. TT

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How would a less-nuclear world, one in which ballistic missiles have been eliminated, work? What would it mean? It would not mean the end of nuclear deterrence for the West. /v
With a large inventory of aircraft and cruise missiles, the United States and NATO would retain a powerful nuclear capability. In a sense, we would return to the situation of the 1950's, when strategic bombers served as our primary nuclear deterrent force. But there would be an important difference in the 1990's and beyond. Our aircraft would now be supplemented by a host of new and sophisticated technologies as well as cruise missiles launched from the air and sea. It would be a much more diverse and capable force than in previous decades.

In such circumstances, both the United States and the Soviet Union would lose the capacity provided by ballistic missiles to deliver large numbers of nuclear weapons on each others' homelands in less than thirty minutes time. But Western strategy is, in fact, defensive in nature, built upon the pledge that we will only use our weapons, nuclear and conventional, in self-defense. Therefore, the loss of this quick-kill capability -- so suited to preemptive attack -- will ease fears of a disarming first strike.

C/ For our friends and allies in Europe and Asia, the elimination of Soviet ballistic missiles -- including not just the Soviet Union's strategic ballistic missiles and its many SS-20's, but also the shorter-range missiles for which we currently have no deployed equivalent³ -- would remove a significant nuclear threat. / D

But it would also have non-nuclear military benefits as well. Today, the Soviet Union has ballistic missiles with conventional and chemical warheads targetted on NATO airfields, ports and bases. The elimination of ballistic missiles would thus be a significant plus for NATO in several respects.

The nuclear forces remaining -- aircraft and cruise missiles -- would be far less useful for first-strike attacks, but would be more appropriate for retaliation. They would be more flexible in use than ballistic missiles. The slower-flying aircraft can be recalled after launch. They can be re-targetted in flight. They can be re-used for several missions. We currently have a major advantage in the relative sophistication of our aircraft and cruise missiles; the Soviets have greater numbers and are striving hard to catch up in quality. They have given far more attention to defense, where we have a lot of catching up to do. But our remaining nuclear

forces would be capable of fulfilling the requirements of the Western alliance's deterrent strategy.

The West's Advantages in a Less-Nuclear World

The prospect of a less-nuclear world has caused concern in both Europe and America. Some fear that it would place the West at a grave disadvantage. I don't think so.

In any competition ultimately depending upon economic and political dynamism and innovation, the United States, Japan and Western Europe have tremendous inherent advantages. Our three-to-one superiority in GNP over the Warsaw Pact, our far greater population, and the Western lead in modern technologies -- these are only partial measures of our advantages. The West's true strength lies in the fact that we are not an ideological or military bloc like the Warsaw Pact -- we are an alliance of free nations, able to draw upon the best of the diverse and creative energies of our peoples.

But dramatic reductions in nuclear weapons and the establishment of stronger conventional defenses will require a united Alliance effort. In light of the President's discussions in Reykjavik, we must join with our Allies in a

more systematic consideration of how to deal with a less-nuclear world. To my mind, that sort of process of joint inquiry is healthy for the Alliance, particularly since we remain firmly agreed on the basics -- the Alliance's fundamental principle of shared risks and shared burdens on behalf of the common defense.

All of these steps -- deep reductions of nuclear weapons, a strong research program in strategic defense, improvements in conventional defenses, and negotiations with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact -- will have to be closely synchronized. This will require a carefully-coordinated political strategy on the part of the Alliance to deal with these interrelated aspects of the larger problem of stability and Western security. We will begin a preliminary discussion of just such an approach during my next meeting with my NATO counterparts in Brussels at the December session of the North Atlantic Council.

Conclusion

This is a full and complex agenda for all of us to consider. Is it ambitious? Yes. Unrealistic? No. I think that, on the basis of the progress made at Reykjavik, substantial reductions in Soviet and American nuclear forces

are possible, and they can be achieved in a phased and stabilizing way.

But we need to think hard about how to proceed. We are taking on a difficult task as we seek to create the conditions in which we can assure the freedom and security of our country and our allies without the constant threat of nuclear catastrophe.

And, of course, our work to achieve greater strategic stability at progressively lower levels of nuclear arms is only part of our larger effort to build a more realistic and constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. ^v We cannot pursue arms control in isolation from other sources of tension. ^x We will continue to seek a resolution of the more fundamental sources of political distrust between our nations, especially those in the areas of human rights and regional conflicts.

Progress -- whether in science or foreign affairs -- often has to do with the reinterpretation of fundamental ideas. That's no easy task. It requires challenging conventional wisdom. And often we find that gaining new benefits requires paying new costs.

Just as what happened 44 years ago in that squash court under old Stagg Field opened up both new horizons and new dangers, so we now see new possibilities for protecting our security -- as well as new risks if we don't manage them well. So it is up to us -- working together with both allies and adversaries -- to ensure that we use these new opportunities to achieve a more stable and secure peace.