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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 November 1986

ARMS CONTROL: EUROPEAN COORDINATION

Thank you for your letter of 19 November enclosing draft messages from the Prime Minister to European Heads of Government about her recent meeting with President Reagan at Camp David.

The Prime Minister is content to send messages but has asked for a number of amendments to be made. I enclose a revised text of the message to Chancellor Kohl and should be grateful if you could ensure that the other messages are also revised to bring them into line with this text.

You will see in particular that much of paragraph 1, paragraph 2 and paragraph 5 of your draft have been deleted. This is because the Prime Minister believes that the issues concerned are best discussed with the Americans present in the Alliance rather than in various European cabals, although this does not of course apply where there are already existing bodies such as WEU.

BF // The messages, as amended, should be despatched as soon as possible.

(C. D. POWELL)

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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etc

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 November 1986

Dear Charles,

Arms Control: European Coordination

Thank you for your letter of 7 November, enclosing a message from Chancellor Kohl to the Prime Minister.

/ As requested, I enclose a draft reply which draws upon the Prime Minister's meeting with President Reagan at Camp David on 15 November. The message also takes the opportunity to sound a warning against trying to move back from accepting a zero-zero INF solution in Europe and 50% reductions in strategic systems. The French are beginning to suggest that both zero-zero on INF and even the 50% cuts are no longer acceptable, because of changed security circumstances. We want to ensure that the Germans do not follow this sort of approach, although at present there is no sign of Kohl doing so.

/ The Foreign Secretary considers that it would also be appropriate for the Prime Minister to send a short message to other EC Heads of Government. I enclose a draft. This omits any reference to our concern about back-tracking on INF: at this stage the subject is probably too delicate for a round-robin message to EC Heads of Government. A separate draft message to Fitzgerald is enclosed, which omits any reference to internal NATO business. / For ease of reference I also enclose a copy of the text which the Prime Minister issued in Washington.

The drafts are in the form of telegrams, which we will issue if the Prime Minister is content.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

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OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification CONFIDENTIAL	Caveat	Precedence IMMEDIATE
ZCZC TC CAVEAT FM TO TELNO OF AND TO	1 ZCZC 2 CONFIDENTIAL 3 4 FM FCO 5 TO IMMEDIATE BONN 6 TELNO 7 181700Z NOVEMBER 86 8 9 PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON 10 11 Following is text of a message from the Prime Minister to 12 Chancellor Kohl. Please arrange early delivery, together with 13 text of press statement (Washington telno 2904, verbatim series 14 65). 15 16 "Thank you for your message at the beginning of November inviting 17 participation at the meeting of European allies in Bonn on 11 18 November. [As you know, I welcomed the idea, and I was glad to 19 learn that much common ground was identified, not least between 20 our two respective teams. I hope that this can act as a basis 21 for further European exchanges, notably in WEU. In that context 22 I was also encouraged by the apparent progress registered last 23 week in Luxembourg. 24 25 At the same time we cannot afford to slacken our efforts to 26 engage our US allies in a deeper dialogue on these key security 27 issues.] 28 29 You will by now have seen the outcome of my meeting with		
[A large section of the form is redacted with diagonal hatching lines.]			
YYYY MAIN ADDITIONAL NNNN			Catchword: President
	File number VJ6AAW	Dept ECD(P)	Drafted by (Block capitals) J C J RAMSDEN
			Telephone no 233 3125
	Authorised for Initials Date/time despatch by:		
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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 2 President Reagan on 15 November. I am confident that he now
 3 understands ^{more fully} the nature and basis of European concerns about the
 4 ~~visionary~~ proposals discussed at the Reykjavik meeting. ~~This is~~
 5 ~~welcome progress, which~~ ^{we shall} We will need to ~~consolidate~~ ^{in the months ahead} in the months
 6 ~~ahead by~~ ^{pressing} pressing the message ^{of our concerns} home with the Americans, ~~the~~
 7 ~~Russians and our own people.~~ ~~In that context I hope you will~~
 8 ~~agree that~~ ^{the} statement President Reagan and I endorsed (of
 9 which I enclose a copy) represents a valuable re-affirmation of
 10 NATO's fundamental strategy. ~~I believe~~ ^{used} It can be ~~exploited~~ to
 11 good effect over the next few months, and notably during the NATO
 12 Ministerial meetings next month. ~~I intend to press for this and~~
 13 ~~hope I can count on you to give these efforts your assistance.~~
 14
 15 ~~At the same time,~~ ^{Bar} we must be careful not to appear to be moving
 16 ~~away~~ ^{back} from those proposals which we have endorsed in the past;
 17 and on which progress towards agreement could be made without
 18 needing to resolve the entire range of issues. ~~That is of~~
 19 ~~course~~ ^{so} particularly relevant in the case of INF, where we should
 20 all continue to press the Russians to adopt a more logical and
 21 consistent position, but without changing our own. ~~I am sure~~
 22 ~~you would agree.~~
 23 ~~As you know, I attach the highest importance to close~~
 24 ~~coordination between us on these matters. We must continue to~~
 25 ~~stress the indivisibility of the Alliance as a whole. But it~~
 26 ~~is important to ensure that the European allies approach both~~
 27 ~~specifically European questions and wider Alliance questions~~
 28 ~~with a sound understanding of each other's positions. We will need to~~
 29 ~~ensure that our consultation arrangements reflect these aims.~~
 30
 31
 32 I also discussed the situation in the Middle East with President
 33 Reagan. I expressed appreciation for the United States action on
 34 Syria and explained the measures which our own Foreign Ministers

The President stressed to me the need for effective nuclear deterrence, and his determination to proceed with the modernization of our united States existing ballistic & strategic ballistic missiles. So far this is so delicate that even after reading it 3 times, I have only a hazy view of what it means.

As a result of Reykjavik and it was a background of strength. He also it was useful but he also acknowledge it with nuclear weapons could not be dealt with in isolation - must be

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 before is at all times.

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2 had agreed to take on 10 November. I outlined our own approach
3 to the Middle East peace process, noted our concern at the
4 continued stalemate and urged him to look at ways to give fresh
5 impetus to the search for a peaceful settlement. He agreed ^{on the need for movement} ~~in~~
6 ~~principle~~ ^{that} ~~although without indicating~~ that any early moves are
7 in prospect from Washington.

8
9 On Iran, the President made ~~it~~ ^{clear} that the United States does
10 not pay ransom for hostages. I of course confirmed that that was
11 the United Kingdom's policy too. We agreed that an end to the
12 Gulf war and better relations between Iran and the West were
13 highly desirable, but that we should remain strictly impartial as
14 between Iran and Iraq.

15
16 We also discussed the situation in Southern Africa following the
17 tragic death of President Machel. We agreed that a peaceful
18 national dialogue in South Africa was essential, and that we
19 should continue to look for ways of persuading President Botha to
20 create a ~~suitable~~ climate in which genuine political dialogue
21 could start.

22
23 I look forward to discussing all these issues with you when we
24 next meet."

25
26 HOWE

27
28
29 YYYY

30 MAIN

31 ACDD

32 ECD(P)

33 SAfD

34 NENAD

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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1 <<<<

2 MED

3 WED

4 Soviet Department

5 PS

6 PS/Mr Renton

7 Mr Derek Thomas

8 Mr Fall

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