

Prime Minister

Attached is a speech made today (Friday) by Norma Tebbitt on our election campaign. The controversial sentences are singled out below.

P 23/10.

STEPHEN

Christine rang to tell you about a speech which the Chairman has made today. There has been some press interest in the following bit:

"As politicians always say, there is no cause for complacency. We will have many lessons to learn for the next time. Not least that too many cooks can always spoil the broth, especially if some of them are intent on trying their own recipes without telling the chef." (p16)

He also said

"The biggest weakness of the campaign was the failure to appoint a Director of Communications." (p15)

The Chairman was speaking on communications tactics throughout the Election campaign to a Political Communications Conference at the University of Essex.



SHANA

23.10.87





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RT HON NORMAN TEBBIT CH MP

14.30 hrs, Friday
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Extracts from a speech by the Rt Hon Norman Tebbit CH MP (Chingford), Chairman of the Conservative Party, at a Political Communications Conference at the University of Essex, on 23rd October 1987.

IN PLANNING OUR CAMPAIGN, JUST LIKE THE OTHER PARTIES
WE HAD TO MAXIMISE OUR STRENGTHS, MINIMISE OUR WEAKNESSES - AND
DO THE REVERSE TO OUR OPPONENTS.

BUT OF COURSE OUR STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES WERE VERY
DIFFERENT TO THOSE OF OUR OPPONENTS. IN MANY CASES THEY WERE
MIRROR IMAGES.

IN CONSEQUENCE OUR CAMPAIGN STARTED EARLIER AND
EMPHASISED THE PAST EIGHT YEARS IN A WAY THAT WAS NOT OPEN TO
THE OTHER PARTIES.

MR KINNOCK FOR EXAMPLE, WAS THE THIRD LABOUR LEADER IN
THREE ELECTIONS AND HE WAS TRYING TO SELL POLICIES WITH AT LEAST
A VERY DIFFERENT GLOSS IF NOT A DIFFERENT SUBSTANCE TO MR FOOT
AND MR CALLAGHAN.

/.. We had a

WE HAD A RECORD ON WHICH TO FIGHT AS WELL AS PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE.

SO OUR ELECTION CAMPAIGN BEGAN AS SOON AS I ENTERED CENTRAL OFFICE.

I CAME TO ONE KEY DECISION, ABOUT WHICH LITTLE HAS BEEN WRITTEN VERY EARLY ON, AND IN ADVANCE OF OUR OPINION RESEARCH. THAT RESEARCH CONFIRMED MY INTUITIVE VIEW - THAT IN THE EIGHT OR NINTH YEAR OF GOVERNMENT THE ELECTORATE MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO RESPOND TO THAT OLD CRY OF 'TIME FOR A CHANGE'.

I THEREFORE CONCLUDED THAT WE HAD TO OFFER A POLICY OF CHANGE AND TO STRENGTHEN OUR IMAGE OF A RADICAL GOVERNMENT, MANAGING CHANGE, KNOWING WHERE IT WAS GOING AND WHAT IT WAS DOING.

AGAIN OUR RESEARCH SHOWED THIS WAS ATTRACTIVE TO VOTERS AND CONFIRMED MY BELIEF THAT WE COULD GAIN AT LEAST RESPECT AND OFTEN SUPPORT FROM PEOPLE WHO DID NOT ENTIRELY AGREE WITH OUR POLICIES IF THEY SAW US AS KNOWING OUR OWN MINDS, PURPOSEFUL AND ON THE MOVE.

THAT WAS NOT THE IMAGE WE PRESENTED WHEN I BECAME CHAIRMAN IN SEPTEMBER 1985.

I ALSO CONCLUDED THAT WE WERE MORE LIKELY TO LOSE SUPPORT TO THE ALLIANCE THAN TO LABOUR, SO OUR MOST LIKELY HAZARD WAS A HUNG

PARLIAMENT IN WHICH LABOUR WOULD TAKE OFFICE IN ANOTHER LIB-LAB DEAL
OF SOME KIND.

OUT OF THOSE CONCLUSIONS WAS BORN NOT JUST THE POLITICAL
CAMPAIGN OF THE FINAL FOUR WEEKS BUT THE PREVIOUS TWENTY MONTHS.

LIKE CECIL PARKINSON BEFORE ME - AND OUR OPPONENTS TOO -
I CARRIED OUT MY AUDIT OF THE CONSTITUENCIES IN WHICH THE ELECTION
WOULD BE LOST OR WON.

TO SELECT THOSE CONSTITUENCIES WE CARRIED OUT A WIDER AND
DEEPER AUDIT THAN HAD BEEN MADE IN THE PAST.

NOT JUST MAJORITIES, NOR SHARES OF THE POLL, BUT ASSESSMENTS
OF SOCIAL CHANGE AND STRENGTH OR WEAKNESSES OF ORGANISATION AND
INDEED CANDIDATES OR MEMBERS.

AND IT IS NOW WIDELY KNOWN, THAT RESULTED IN THE CATEGORISATION
OF SEATS WITHIN THE EXTREMES OF THOSE WE WOULD WIN OR LOSE ONLY IN A
LANDSLIDE OF UNPRECEDENTED DIMENSIONS BUT WHICH CENTRED UPON THOSE WHICH
WE WOULD HAVE TO CARRY TO ACHIEVE A SATISFACTORY WORKING MAJORITY -
A FIGURE I TOOK TO BE IN EXCESS OF 50. BEYOND THAT WERE THE SEATS
WE WERE DEFENDING TO MAINTAIN OUR 140 PLUS MAJORITY AND THOSE WHICH
WE WERE SEEKING TO GAIN - SUCH AS RYEDALE, FULHAM, ISLE OF WIGHT,
CAMBRIDGE NORTH EAST, FOR EXAMPLE.

/.. Each of those

EACH OF THOSE SEATS WAS THEN STRENGTHENED IN TERMS OF ORGANISATION AND EQUIPMENT TO ENSURE THAT IF THE MARGINS WERE NARROW THEN WE WOULD HAVE MAXIMISED OUR CHANCES OF CARRYING THE DAY.

BUT THAT, OF COURSE WAS ONLY PART OF OUR ORGANISATIONAL PREPARATIONS - AND ORGANISATION WAS ONLY PART OF THE OVERALL SCHEME OF THINGS.

THE WHOLE SCHEME WAS SET OUT IN WHAT HAS BECOME KNOWN AS 'THE WAR BOOK'.

THE DETAILS OF THAT WERE NOT ALL BROUGHT TOGETHER UNTIL CHRISTMAS 1986 - SOME 15 MONTHS AFTER I TOOK OVER AT CENTRAL OFFICE AND FIVE OR SIX MONTHS BEFORE THE ELECTION.

THE DETAILS IN HERE RUN TO THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS BOTH OF THOSE EMPLOYED WITHIN CENTRAL OFFICE AT THAT TIME, AND OTHERS, INCLUDING VOLUNTEERS, WHO WOULD BE DRAFTED IN, WHO WOULD BE ASSIGNED TO EACH TASK SET OUT IN THE BOOK.

MORE IMPORTANTLY, IT SETS OUT THE STRATEGY AND TONE OF BOTH THE CAMPAIGN AND THE RUN-UP TO IT AND OF COURSE, THE CONSIDERATIONS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE TIMING OF THE ELECTION.

BY CHRISTMAS '86 - INDEED WELL BEFORE IN MY VIEW, THE POSSIBLE ELECTION DATES HAD SELECTED THEMSELVES LEAVING A SHORT LIST

1.. of Spring,

OF SPRING, EARLY SUMMER OR LATE AUTUMN '87 AND SPRING OR EARLY
SUMMER '88.

THE WAR BOOK SET OUT ALL THE KNOWN DATA, DRAWS ATTENTION
TO THE UNKNOWNNS AND REMINDS US THAT THERE MIGHT WELL BE UNKNOWN
UNKNOWNNS.

LET ME ILLUSTRATE WHAT I MEAN.

BANK HOLIDAYS, RELIGIOUS FESTIVALS AND THE LIKE ARE KNOWN
DATA. THE TREND OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND INFLATION REASONABLY PREDICTABLE
DATA, THE MONTHLY TRADE FIGURES ARE UNKNOWN. BUT THEN, JUST SUPPOSE
WE HAD GONE FOR POLLING DAY ON 29TH OCTOBER - THE STOCK MARKET CRASH
WOULD HAVE BEEN A PERFECT EXAMPLE OF AN UNKNOWN UNKNOWN!

IN POLITICS - JUST AS IN ANYTHING - IT DOES NO HARM TO
BE LUCKY!

IN MY VIEW THE TIMING OF AN ELECTION IS AS IMPORTANT AS
THE FINAL CAMPAIGN - AND IN '87 AS IN '83 WE GOT IT RIGHT.

BUT LET ME RETURN TO THE POLITICAL THEME.

AFTER EIGHT YEARS IN GOVERNMENT WE HAD TO STAND ON OUR
RECORD.

THE OPPOSITION PARTIES HAD TO TRY TO OBLITERATE THEIRS.

/.. In September

IN SEPTEMBER '85 WE WERE LAGGING BADLY IN THE POLLS.

MORI: EVENING STANDARD 30 SEPTEMBER 1985

CON	30
LAB	33
ALL	35

SOME VIGOROUS DEFENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES IN
THE LATE AUTUMN HELPED PUT US IN A BETTER POSITION BY THE TURN OF
OF THE YEAR.

MORI:	DECEMBER 1985
CON.	35
LAB.	35
ALL.	28

HOWEVER, WESTLAND, LIBYA, RANGE ROVER AND SUNDAY TRADING
HIT THE GOVERNMENT WHERE IT HURT MOST.

I AM CONVINCED THAT A PARTY SUFFERS MOST, NOT WHEN IT
CONFIRMS ITS NEGATIVE IMAGE IN THE EYES OF ITS DETRACTORS, BUT WHEN
IT DAMAGES ITS POSITIVE IMAGE IN THE EYES OF ITS ADMIRERS.

LET ME EXPLAIN.

THE UNPOPULARITY OF THE CALLAGHAN GOVERNMENT AMONGST
CONSERVATIVE SUPPORTERS WAS PREDICTABLE.

ITS DEFEAT WAS NOT BECAUSE A LABOUR GOVERNMENT IS EXPECTED
TO BE GOOD AT HANDLING THE ECONOMY, NOR BECAUSE IT WAS SPLIT AND

/.. squabbling. All

SQUABBLING. ALL THAT IS EXPECTED. BUT THE STRONG SUIT OF A LABOUR GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE ITS ABILITY TO GET ON WITH THE UNIONS AND TO DELIVER THE 'CARING ISSUES', THE NHS AND ALL THAT.

SO THE WINTER OF DISCONTENT, THE STRIKES, THE CLOSURE OF HOSPITALS AND SCHOOLS WAS EVEN MORE DAMAGING TO A LABOUR GOVERNMENT THAN IT WOULD HAVE BEEN TO A CONSERVATIVE ONE

SIMILARLY, CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENTS CAN, AND DID, RIDE OUT TEACHERS' STRIKES, BUT THE WESTLAND AFFAIR AND THE OTHER PROBLEMS IN EARLY '86 WERE DOUBLY DAMAGING BECAUSE THEY DISAPPOINTED THE PUBLIC EXPECTATION OF UNITY AND COMPETENCE IN CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENTS.

THIS WAS NO SURPRISE TO US. BUT IT DID MEAN WE HAD TO WORK ALL THE HARDER.

SO ON MY RETURN FROM HOSPITAL IN FEBRUARY 1986 WE BEGAN TO PLAN THE POLITICAL BUILD UP.

IT HAD TWO PARTS: THE ATTACK ON THE OPPOSITION, AND THE REBUILDING OF CONFIDENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT.

I SAW LABOUR AND SOCIALISM AS THE PRIME ENEMY BUT THE ALLIANCE AS MOST LIKELY TO WEAKEN US ENOUGH TO LET LABOUR IN.

SO WHILST KEEPING UP SOME BRISK FIRE AGAINST LABOUR WE SET OUT TO HIT THE ALLIANCE REALLY HARD.

/. . That needed

THAT NEEDED SOME THOUGHT.

CONSERVATIVE INCLINED VOTERS WERE MORE LIKELY TO DEFECT TO OWEN AND THE SDP THAN STEEL AND THE LIBERALS.

THE REVERSE WAS TRUE FOR LABOUR VOTERS.

CLEARLY OUR TARGET HAD TO BE STEEL AND THE LIBERALS AND BY DISCREDITING THEM TO DISCREDIT THE ALLIANCE.

OUR TORQUAY CENTRAL COUNCIL IN THE SPRING OF '87 GAVE A PLATFORM FOR BOTH THE PRIME MINISTER AND ME TO DELIVER ATTACKS ON THE ALLIANCE AND PARTICULARLY THE LIBERALS. WE WERE CRITICISED - BUT WE WERE RIGHT.

AS SHE TOLD A MEETING OF CONSERVATIVE AGENTS RECENTLY AT BLACKPOOL WE NEVER DID, BECAUSE WE HAD FOUND THAT OUR SPEECHES ALWAYS DOVETAILED AND NEVER CLASHED.

} ??

SO ON THAT OCCASION AT TORQUAY PERHAPS THE ATTACKS SEEMED ESPECIALLY VIGOROUS BECAUSE WE FOLLOWED SUCH SIMILAR LINES.

FROM TORQUAY WE MOVED ON TO MY CELEBRATION OF THE 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE LIB-LAB PACT.

AGAIN THIS CAUSED SOME RAISED EYEBROWS. SOME CRITICS

/. . SAID IT WAS

SAID IT WAS OVERKILL - "LABOUR NOT THE ALLIANCE IS THE ENEMY" SAID SOME. "DON'T DRAW ATTENTION TO THE ALLIANCE" SAID OTHERS.

ODDLY ENOUGH, FEW PEOPLE NOTICED - OR REALISED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TACTIC OF CONCENTRATING THE FIRE ON THE LIBERALS AND MR STEEL, NOT THE SDP AND DR. OWEN.

THE FACT IS THAT WOBBLY TORY VOTERS WERE ATTRACTED BY DR. OWEN AND THE SDP FAR MORE THAN MR STEEL AND THE LIBERALS. WE THEREFORE HIT THE ALLIANCE BY HITTING AT ITS WEAKEST POINT - SO FAR AS OUR VOTERS WERE CONCERNED AND AVOIDED GIVING OFFENCE BY ATTACKING DR. OWEN, WHO THEY THOUGHT TO BE A RATHER NICE MAN.

PERHAPS THE MOST EFFECTIVE BLOW TO THE ALLIANCE WAS THE SUMMER '86 OPINION POLL OF THEIR CANDIDATES WHICH REVEALED HOW DEEP WERE THE POLICY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE LIBERALS AND SDP - PARTICULARLY, BUT NOT ONLY, ON DEFENCE.

I BELIEVE THAT UP UNTIL THEN MOST MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE BELIEVED THE DIFFERENCES COULD BE RECONCILED. FROM THEN ON, IT BECAME CLEAR TO THE ALLIANCE ITSELF THAT POLICY GAP COULD NOT BE BRIDGED - BUT ONLY FUDGED.

THE ALLIANCE HAD A BAD CONFERENCE SEASON. SUPERFICIALLY AT LEAST, LABOUR HAD A GOOD ONE.

/ .. But we had

BUT WE HAD BEEN AT WORK TO ENSURE THAT OUR 1986 CONFERENCE WOULD PUT THE PARTY AND GOVERNMENT INTO A POSITION FROM WHICH WE COULD SELECT OUR TIME FOR A SUCCESSFUL FINAL CAMPAIGN BETWEEN SPRING '87 AND SUMMER '88.

WITH THE THEME OF 'THE NEXT MOVE FORWARD', DEVISED WITH THE HELP OF SAATCHIS, WE GAVE TO THE CONFERENCE A COHERENCE WHICH HAD NOT BEFORE BEEN ACHIEVED. IT SATISFIED THE VOTERS' APPETITE FOR CHANGE, AND OURS FOR CONTINUITY AND IT PLAYED TO OUR STRENGTH BY EMPHASISING GOVERNMENT AND PARTY UNITY, PURPOSEFULNESS AND COMPETENCE. IT ALSO PROJECTED THE GOVERNMENT'S PLANS AND ACTIONS THROUGH, BEYOND THE FORTHCOMING GENERAL ELECTION.

FROM THEN ON WE NEVER LOOKED BACK.

INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, FOLLOWING OUR RECENT CONFERENCE AT BLACKPOOL WHICH WAS SIMILARLY GEARED TO A POSITIVE THEME, GALLUP TODAY PUTS OUR SUPPORT AT 52% - SO WE HAVE BROKEN THE 50% BARRIER FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE MARCH 1979!

AS IS WELL KNOWN, WE HAD PREPARED A VERY ADVANCED COMPUTER ANALYSIS OF THE LOCAL ELECTION RESULTS OF MAY 1987 - WHAT IS LESS WELL KNOWN IS THAT WE ALSO HAD ORGANISED A REMARKABLE SYSTEM OF REPORTING IN, NOT JUST RESULTS, BUT VOTING FIGURES, SO THAT BY THE

/ .. early hours

EARLY HOURS OF FRIDAY MORNING WE HAD A CLEAR PICTURE OF THE NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND CONSTITUENCY SWINGS WHICH WAS COMPLETED IN GREAT DETAIL BY SATURDAY. THAT GAVE A CENTRAL PREDICTION OF A GENERAL ELECTION MAJORITY OF 97.

THE PRIME MINISTER DID NOT AGONISE OVER HER DECISION.

WE WERE NOT SLOW TO MOVE INTO THE FINAL STAGE OF THE CAMPAIGN.

EVEN SUCH DETAILS AS THE ISSUE OF PRESS PASSES, THE ORGANISATION OF HELICOPTERS AND AIRCRAFT AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S "BATTLE BUS" WERE COMPLETE.

THE LATTER I MIGHT SAY IS A UNIQUE VEHICLE AND FULFILLED ITS PURPOSE PERFECTLY.

SO MUCH FOR PRELIMINARIES.

BY MAY 10th IT WAS MY FIRM VIEW THAT WE WERE ON TRACK TO WIN, AND THAT ONLY A TERRIBLE ERROR ON OUR PART COULD DEFEAT US.

WE DIDN'T MAKE ANY SERIOUS MISTAKES, AND THE OPINION POLLS - VINCENT HANNA AND OTHER ROGUE POLLS APART - REMAINED ROCK SOLID. THE 'ALLIANCE' DID MAKE SERIOUS TACTICAL ERRORS - AND LOST VOTES TO LABOUR IN THE PROCESS.

ON THE TIMING OF OUR CAMPAIGN - WE MADE A DELIBERATE

/.. decision to

DECISION TO KEEP IT AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE. IT DID NOT SEEM TO US THAT AN OVER-LONG CAMPAIGN, AS LABOUR AND, MORE PARTICULARLY, THE 'ALLIANCE', WERE PLANNING, WOULD BE OF ANY BENEFIT WHATSOEVER. INDEED, WE THOUGHT THE REVERSE PROBABLY TRUE. AND BESIDES THERE WAS STILL GOVERNMENT BUSINESS TO COMPLETE.

WE WORKED ON THE BASIS THAT OUR CAMPAIGN SHOULD BE A POSITIVE ONE ON BALANCE.

WE HAD SOMETHING LIKE A 60:40 OR 70:30 POSITIVE/NEGATIVE RATIO IN MIND - TO THE EXTENT THAT WE COULD MEASURE SUCH THINGS. WE ALSO TOOK THE VIEW THAT ANY POTENTIALLY NEGATIVE ISSUES SHOULD IF AT ALL POSSIBLE - BE BROUGHT OUT EARLY IN THE CAMPAIGN RATHER THAN LATER.

UNEMPLOYMENT, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS DEFUSED EARLY ON. DEFENCE - A STRONG ISSUE FOR US WE INTENDED TO PLAY STRONGLY IN MID CAMPAIGN, WITH A STRONG FINISH ON ECONOMY.

AND NIGEL LAWSON'S SHEER PERSEVERANCE ON THE ISSUES OF THE ECONOMY AND ON TAX MADE SURE THAT THE INITIATIVE REMAINED WITH US RIGHT TO THE END. TIMING WAS IMPORTANT AS IN MY VIEW IT TOOK AT LEAST A WEEK FROM RAISING THE PROFILE OF THE ISSUE TO SEEING AN EFFECT IN THE PUBLISHED OPINION POLLS.

/. . From a

FROM A PRESENTATIONAL POINT OF VIEW, THERE WAS A FEELING THAT MORE SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE OF THE PRIME MINISTER HERSELF, WHO WAS UNDOUBTEDLY ONE OF OUR GREATEST ASSETS.

HOWEVER, THERE WERE SEVERE RESTRICTIONS PLACED ON HER TOURS BY THE DEMANDS OF SECURITY. SO WE SAVED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MAJOR IMPACT THROUGH TELEVISION AND RADIO INTERVIEWS FOR THE LAST PHASE OF THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE BEST EFFECT.

ON THE WHOLE, THE CAMPAIGN WENT VERY MUCH AS WE HAD PLANNED AND EXPECTED WITH TWO EXCEPTIONS.

FIRST, THE ALLIANCE CHALLENGE NEVER MATERIALISED, SO WE HAD NO NEED TO USE THE MATERIAL WE HAD READY TO DEAL WITH ~~THAT~~

SECOND, WE DECIDED TO INTENSIFY OUR PRESS ADVERTISING OVER THE LAST WEEK. WE DID SO BECAUSE, RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, WE BELIEVED THE LABOUR PARTY WAS PLANNING A MAJOR PRESS CAMPAIGN.

WHETHER SUCH A CAMPAIGN WOULD HAVE BEEN DIRECTLY EFFECTIVE OR NOT, THERE WAS NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THAT A HEAVY PRESS ADVERTISING CAMPAIGN WOULD HAVE DEMORALISED OUR PARTY WORKERS.

FOR US IT WAS IMPERATIVE THAT THE LABOUR PARTY SHOULD NOT BE SEEN TO BE LEADING US IN PRESS ADVERTISING IN THE FINAL WEEK.

/... Interestingly

INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH CECIL PARKINSON CUT PRESS ADVERTISING
IN THE FINAL WEEK OF THE '83 CAMPAIGN BECAUSE WE WERE RIDING HIGH.

THAT WAS A SENSIBLE DECISION BUT AS YOU WILL KNOW,
WHEREAS OUR POLL EXACTLY MATCHED THE OPINION POLL FORECASTS IN '87
IT FELL A COUPLE OF POINTS SHORT IN '83.

APART FROM A NUMBER OF ADVERTISEMENTS TARGETED AGAINST
THE 'ALLIANCE' SOME NEGATIVE, SOME POSITIVE, WHICH NEVER SAW THE LIGHT
OF DAY, WE HAD SOME OTHER ADVERTISEMENTS - DIRECTED MORE AT LABOUR -
WHICH WERE CONTROVERSIAL TO SUCH A DEGREE THAT I WOULD HAVE USED
THEM ONLY IF THE CONTEST LOOKED CLOSE. THEY REMAINED FIRMLY IN THE
LOCKER.

AT THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN WE ALSO HAD AN EXTRA PPB
IN THE CAN - WHICH WAS ~~PERHAPS~~ BETTER THAN ONE OF THE ONES WE USED.

ONE OTHER UNUSUAL FEATURE OF THE CAMPAIGN AND THE
MANIFESTO WAS THAT IT MADE NO ATTEMPT TO APPEAL TO PARTICULAR
INTEREST GROUPS. THE MANIFESTO DIDN'T HAVE SECTIONS OF PROMISES
TO BLACKS, WOMEN, THE OLD, THE YOUNG AND SO ON. IT WAS AN APPEAL
TO THE NATION AS A WHOLE, IN TERMS OF WHAT UNITED PEOPLE RATHER
THAN OF WHAT DIVIDED THEM. I DO NOT THINK WE LOST BY THAT TACTIC.

I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT STRESSING THE KEY OF THE ECONOMY
AND DEFENCE WE WON OVER MANY WORKING -CLASS VOTERS WHO HAD VOTED

/.. Labour before

LABOUR BEFORE 1979.

WE LOST SOME SUPPORT AMONG MIDDLE-CLASS PUBLIC SECTOR WORKERS, BUT WE HAD TO ACCEPT THAT THAT WAS A RISK OF NOT SINGLING OUT PARTICULAR GROUPS FOR SPECIAL ATTENTION.

THE BIGGEST WEAKNESS IN OUR CAMPAIGN WAS A LACK OF A DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS. I HAD TO FULFIL THE ROLES OF LARRY WHITTY, PETER MANDELSON AND BRYAN GOULD.

BUT PERHAPS THE PROFESSIONALISM OF LABOUR'S CAMPAIGN APPEALED MORE TO ADVERTISING AND POLITICAL PROFESSIONALS THAN TO MY OLD FRIENDS, THE MAN IN THE PUB AND HIS WIFE.

I SAID EARLIER THAT WE DIDN'T MAKE ANY SERIOUS MISTAKES DURING THE CAMPAIGN.

I DON'T THINK THE IMPORTANCE OF THAT CAN BE OVER-EMPHASISED. WE DID PRESENT BRAND NEW TARGETS TO THE OTHER PARTIES, BECAUSE WE SET OUT RADICAL NEW PROPOSALS IN OUR MANIFESTO; RATHER THAN DISHING UP SOMETHING BLAND AND CONTROVERSIAL AND JUST SITTING TIGHT. AND THROUGHOUT THE CAMPAIGN I WAS VIGOROUS ABOUT THE ACCURACY OF ALL THE CLAIMS WE MADE ON OUR BEHALF AND CHARGES WE MADE AGAINST THE OPPOSITION.

WE WENT TO GREAT LENGTHS TO PROVIDE THE SOURCES OF THE

/.. quotes and policy

QUOTES AND POLICY STATEMENTS WHICH WE USED IN OUR PPBS AND OUR
ADVERTISING. I ONLY WISH ~~THAT~~ THE OTHER PARTIES HAD OBSERVED THE
SAME STANDARDS.

BUT THIS IS ALL WATER UNDER THE BRIDGE NOW. AS FAR AS
WE WERE CONCERNED, THERE WAS NO NEED TO PICK OVER THE BONES OF THE
CAMPAIGN BECAUSE THERE WAS NO CORPSE IN THE FIRST PLACE.

BUT, AS POLITICIANS ALWAYS SAY, THERE IS NO CAUSE FOR
COMPLACENCY. WE WILL HAVE MANY LESSONS TO LEARN FOR THE NEXT TIME.
NOT LEAST THAT TOO MANY COOKS CAN ALWAYS SPOIL THE BROTH - ESPECIALLY
IF SOME OF THEM ARE INTENT ON TRYING THEIR OWN RECIPES WITHOUT
TELLING THE CHEF.

BUT I'VE ALREADY BEGUN THE WORK FOR '91 OR '92 BECAUSE
ELECTIONS ARE MORE ABOUT FOUR YEARS THAN FOUR WEEKS.

ENDS