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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID AARON

FROM: The Situation Room

SUBJECT: Additional Information Items

Media Reaction to President's Visit: Reaction from both Egypt and Israel toward the President's trip is almost un-animously positive. Sadat's spokesman is quoted as saying that Sadat received news of the visit with "extreme happiness" and referred to the President's "courage" in shouldering responsibility as a partner working for a just and comprehensive peace. Akhbar notes that the visit is taking place while problems remain to be solved and asserts that whether they will be solved depends on the visit. (U)

The prevailing view in Tel Aviv is that the President's trip is intended, first and foremost, to "persuade Sadat to accept the U.S. proposals," but many speculate that Sadat will not let the President off without demanding some modifications. Commentators guess that the President may have decided to "take the gamble" because he has been assured of success or has realized this is the only way to save the negotiations. Another view asserts that the President is taking the trip to show that he has done everything humanly possible for peace and should not be the target for blame if the negotiations fail.

-- Davar remarks that the trip shows how "vital it is for the U.S. to reach a positive conclusion" of the negotiations.

-- Haaretz' Marcus recommends that those who think the cabinet "was through with facing more tough decisions" after its Monday session should "wait until Carter comes from Cairo to Jerusalem" since he will have something to tell both the cabinet and the Israeli public -- "After all, is the right to go public reserved only for Begin?"

-- Yediot's Guiney believes the "whole thing smacks of a package deal." (M)

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Cuban Views on Revolution Potential in the Third World:

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[redacted]
[redacted] Cuban leaders believe there is a strong potential for revolution in Latin America in the 1980's.

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[redacted] Cuba is supporting the formation of guerrilla groups in certain countries and is providing specific guidance pertaining to the needs of each country. Cuba believes guerrilla action is the best course to follow in overthrowing dictatorial regimes. [redacted] Cuba feels Belize is a doorway for the infiltration of Cuban communism into Central America. (S)

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[redacted] Cuban officials involved in revolutionary planning for Africa believe that within two years the blacks will have completely ousted the white rulers from South Africa. By that time, [redacted] the revolutions in Namibia and Zimbabwe will have been successfully carried out. With support from Angola and with a successful revolution in Mozambique, [redacted] South Africa will be totally isolated. This buffer will then enable Cuba to promote and support revolutionary uprising from Angola toward central Africa. [redacted] 80 percent of Eritrean territory had been "liberated," but [redacted] problems with the various ethnic groups had delayed total revolutionary in Ethiopia. (S)

Communist Support to Rhodesian Insurgents:

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[redacted] communist countries delivered about \$55 million worth of arms to Rhodesian guerrillas in 1978, an increase of 40 percent over 1977. The increase largely went for arms for new recruits and to replace supplies destroyed by Rhodesian raids. This boost also reflected Soviet-Chinese rivalry for influence with the Patriotic Front and an increase in the number of communist countries supplying arms. (S)

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