

MEMORANDUM

25X1

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

2153-XX  
Add-On

10

INFORMATION

June 5, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI/  
DAVID AARON

FROM:

WILLIAM E. ODOM WO

SUBJECT:

Soviet-Cuban Military Relationship (C)

You tasked the DCI to prepare an in-depth Intelligence Community analysis of Soviet-Cuban military relations for review by the SCC. (See your tasking memo at Tab A.) The reponse has arrived in draft form. It will not be completed as an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum until after the summit (per David's request a few days ago). In the meanwhile, it has become unclear what we intend to do as preparation for the summit -- review the issue at an SCC meeting, ignore Cuba at the summit, or other. The attached draft study (Tab B), however, makes it clear to me that we are in no position to force the Soviets to make commitments at the summit; yet the Soviet-Cuban activities are too significant to be ignored at the summit. I have prepared another memo, using this study as well as other material to suggest a tactic for dealing with Cuba at the summit. This memo, therefore, merely summarizes the study's key findings for your cursory perusal:

-- 1975 marked the beginning of a new trend in Soviet-Cuban military relations.

-- Cuban forces were transformed from home defense forces into a military power with formidable offensive capabilities.

-- Cuba sees the relationship as beneficial, as a means of gaining influence with the Soviet leadership. Non-aligned Movement criticism has not significantly diminished Cuban NAM influence as a result of the Soviet connection.

-- The Soviet Union accomplishes two objectives:

- a. It adds Cuban military power to its own power projection capability.
- b. It provides Soviet military capabilities in the Caribbean -- SIGNINT, naval deployments, aerial reconnaissance staging, combined naval training, and some signs of Soviet ground force deployments in Cuba.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Derivative Classification by CIA/  
Review on June 1, 1999

Reason for No Objection To Declassification 2008/04/30 : NLC-17-83-1-2-9

[REDACTED]

-- The outlook is for:

- a. Continued Cuban force modernization, including aircraft, air defense, naval forces, and naval and ground facilities.
- b. Soviet access to Cienfuegos Bay.
- c. Increased ASW and reconnaissance.
- d. Cuban activity in Grenada, Jamaica, Belize, Guyana, and possibly elsewhere.
- e. Moscow won't fight to save Cuba. [REDACTED] 25X1

This study should be used in an SCC meeting on Cuba after the summit. (S)

25X1

[REDACTED]

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

3A

TOP SECRET

April 10, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Soviet-Cuban Military Relationship (C)

Please prepare an in-depth Intelligence Community analysis of Soviet-Cuban military relations for review by the Special Coordination Committee. The analysis should:

- provide a brief historical account of Soviet-Cuban military relations;
- elaborate the development of organizational ties;
- provide all available information on Soviet military equipment, facilities, and capabilities in Cuba;
- examine the Soviet role in developing and improving the defense of Cuba;
- explain the Soviet-Cuban techniques of projecting military power to Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere;
- assess the threat to U.S. security posed by Soviet use of Cuba for military operations in the Western Hemisphere;
- speculate on the implications for future development of the Soviet-Cuban military relationship. (TS)

This analysis should be available by May 20. (C)



Zbigniew Brzezinski

TOP SECRET

Review on April 10, 1999

Classified by Z. Brzezinski

Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)