

Sierra Leone



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

31 October 1980

Dear Michael,

Visit by President Stevens of Sierra Leone

5-7 November 1980

I enclose briefs for the Prime Minister's use at the talks with President Stevens at 1200 noon on Wednesday 5 November.

yours ever

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B A lexander Esq
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

VISIT BY PRESIDENT STEVENS OF SIERRA LEONE, 5-7 NOVEMBER 1980

STEERING BRIEF

1. President Stevens has been invited to visit Britain mainly in his capacity as current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Other Western powers besides ourselves have decided that the holder of this post is worth cultivating in recognition of his year in office: thus President Stevens has also of late been invited on official visits to Paris, Washington (in September) and Bonn (visit postponed at the last moment because of the coup in Liberia).
2. It follows that Brief No 3 below, covering International Affairs, deals mainly with African issues. Our main interest is to get our views over clearly on Southern Africa, particularly on the need for the OAU to avoid any damaging action at this critical juncture in the Namibia negotiations (3(b)). It will also be a good moment to underline the serious damage that would be done to a number of Black African countries by sanctions against South Africa. It will be useful to hear from President Stevens how he is getting on in his efforts to mediate in two potentially dangerous regional conflicts in West Africa: Chad and the Western Sahara (3(c) and (d)). Neither threaten major British interests directly; but both, if allowed to fester, could destabilize the region to our detriment and possibly lead to increased outside interference (Libyans, Cubans, etc). An exchange of views on current Soviet and Cuban designs (3(f)) in Africa would be useful: President Stevens, an ex-trade unionist, is a staunch anti-marxist and harbours few illusions on this score, despite the official non-alignment of his foreign policy.
3. But although his OAU post provides the occasion for the visit, there are also bilateral reasons: Sierra Leone was one of our earliest colonies in Africa, and the third independent African Commonwealth country. Yet relations have become rather distant. President Stevens himself, despite his sentimental attachment to the UK, and position as one of the longest-serving Commonwealth Heads of Government, has never been here on an official visit. Only three British Junior Ministers have been to Sierra Leone in the last decade and no Cabinet Ministers. Our aid programme has been relatively small - even if the frustrations of administering it have been great. So the Sierra Leonean Government, and President

/Stevens



Stevens in particular, feel neglected by us and tend to draw unflattering comparisons with the solicitude shown by the French towards their ex-colonies.

4. Brief No 4 below covers bilateral issues. Our trade (4(a)) with exports currently worth some £35m a year, is hampered by Sierra Leone's chronic lack of cash - a situation common enough even in the colonial era. However, UK firms have substantial interests in diamonds. We hope to be able to sign an Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments during the visit. We also aim to give President Stevens an idea of the level of aid (4(b)) we can offer after the present tranche runs out. This is very modest (£3.5m new commitments) in view of Sierra Leone's vast needs: but it will be used to improve rural roads by providing Bailey bridges - and thus helping our own-steel industry. We can expect to be attacked over the recent increases in foreign students' fees, which fall particularly heavily on very poor countries like Sierra Leone with a long tradition of sending students to Britain. The one bilateral issue which we have been warned that President Stevens wants to discuss is Kissy Jetty (a complicated saga concerning port installations in Freetown once the property of the RN). We are arranging for this to be dealt with in bilateral talks with the Sierra Leonean Foreign and Trade Ministers.

5. The programme is fairly light. The President, although still very active, is 75 and did not wish to become too exhausted. However, the day before his official programme begins, this tough ex-miner, policeman and trade unionist, will be making a sentimental journey to Oxford to visit his old college, Ruskin - although he faces serious trouble at home with students and teachers (Background Note).



VISIT BY PRESIDENT STEVENS OF SIERRA LEONE, 5-7 NOVEMBER 1980

SIERRA LEONE: BASIC FACTS

- Area: 72,326 sq kms (ie about the size of Ireland - one of the smaller Black African countries). Scenically attractive: mountains, forests, etc.
- Population: About 3.5 million (ie rather more than Wales). Population growth: 2.5% pa. Only about 2% are Creoles (ie descendants of original freed slaves).
- Economic: GNP per head about \$200 - ie one of the poorest countries in Africa. Average annual growth since Independence has only been about 0.5%. Yet annual inflation rate over last decade has been over 10%. Economy always shaky despite promising resources.
- Resources: Diamonds; other minerals (eg iron ore, bauxite, rutile, gold and chrome); agricultural products (eg rice, coffee, palm oil, groundnuts, etc.)
- History: Freetown was 18th century British colony where slaves were freed. Protectorate proclaimed over hinterland 1896 - latter always more backward. Independence 1961 under Milton Margai. Stevens veteran trades unionist politician, came to power after military rule, in 1968.



SUMMARY PROGRAMME OF VISIT BY PRESIDENT STEVENS OF SIERRA LEONE,
5-7 NOVEMBER 1980

Monday, 3 November

- 0950 President Stevens arrives at Heathrow Airport by Flight
BA 613 (De Havilland Suite, Terminal 1)

Met by Lord-in-Waiting to Her Majesty The Queen, The Lord
Lyell, and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs, Mr Richard Luce MP.
- 1000 Leave the airport by car
(approx)
- 1100 Arrive Claridge's, Brook Street, W1
(approx)
No official engagements

Tuesday, 4 November

- 0845 Leave Claridge's
(approx)
- 0858 Arrive Horse Guards Parade

Met by the Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP
- 0900 Received by a Guard of Honour (Irish Guards)

Inspect the Guard of Honour

Leave Horse Guards Parade accompanied by the Prime Minister
via Garden entrance, 10 Downing Street

Leave Downing Street
- 1100 Private visit to the University of Oxford, Ruskin College
- 1430 Leave Ruskin College and return to Claridge's

No official engagements

/Wednesday



Wednesday, 5 November

- 0945 Leave Claridge's
- 1000 Arrive Westminster Abbey, Great West Door
Met by the Dean of Westminster, The Very Reverend Dr Edward Carpenter
The President will lay a wreath on the Grave of the Unknown Warrior
- 1030 (approx) Leave Westminster Abbey and return to Claridge's
- 1100 The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, The Rt Hon The Lord Carrington, will call on His Excellency the President at Claridge's
- 1145 Leave Claridge's
- 1155 Arrive 10 Downing Street
- 1200 Talks with the Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP
- 1300 Luncheon given by Her Majesty's Government
for Host: The Prime Minister
1315
Leave 10 Downing Street and return to Claridge's
No official engagements

Thursday, 6 November

- 1000 The President will receive a delegation from the All People's
to Congress Party at Claridge's
1200
- 1240 Leave Claridge's
- 1300 Arrive Mansion House, EC4
- 1245 Luncheon given by the Corporation of London
for Host: Rt Hon The Lord Mayor of London, Sir Peter Gadsden
1315
Leave Mansion House and return to Claridge's
- 1615 The General Manager of the Commonwealth Development Corporation, Sir Peter Meinertzhagen, will call on His Excellency the President at Claridge's
- 1645 His Excellency the President will receive calls by individual
to businessmen at Claridge's
1800
- 1950 Leave Claridge's



2000 Private supper given by the Diamond Trading Co (Pty) Ltd
Host: The Chairman, Sir Philip Oppenheimer
Connaught Hotel, Carlos Place, W1
Dress: Lounge Suit

Return to Claridge's

Friday, 7 November

1000 The President will receive further calls by individual
to businessmen at Claridge's
1200

Leave Claridge's

1300 Arrive Buckingham Palace
Privy Purse Entrance, entering by South Centre Gate
Luncheon by Her Majesty The Queen

Depart from Buckingham Palace and return to Claridge's

1630 Press Briefing at Claridge's

1715 OAU Heads of Mission call on the President

[Details of Dr Stevens' departure not yet known]

Attachment to Lyne to Alexander

31/10/80





VISIT BY PRESIDENT STEVENS OF SIERRA LEONE, 5-7 NOVEMBER 1980

SIERRA LEONE DELEGATION

President Stevens will be accompanied by:

The Hon Dr Abdulai Conteh
Minister of Foreign Affairs

The Hon Dr S S Banya
Minister of Development and Economic Planning

The Hon Mr S A J Pratt
Minister of Trade and Industry

The Hon Brigadier J S Momoh
Minister of State and Force Commander

The Hon Justice Omrie Golley
Judge

Madame Veronica
Paramount Chief

Mr Makura Konta
Paramount Chief

Mr P M Johnson
Senior Assistant Commissioner of Police (ADC to President)

Mr Gobio Lamin
Presidential Aide

Mr George E Taylor
Deputy Secretary, President's Office

Mr G S K Banya
Protocol Officer

Mrs Fashu Collier
Headmistress

Mr Jenner Metcalf-Cole
Freetown City Alderman

Miss C Wright
Confidential Secretary to the President

Master Benjamin Davies
Student representative

VISIT BY PRESIDENT STEVENS OF SIERRA LEONE, 5-7 NOVEMBER 1980

BRIEF NO 2: BACKGROUND NOTE ON SIERRA LEONE

(a) INTERNAL POLITICAL

1. Bordered by Guinea and Liberia. The first British colony in West Africa. About the size of Ireland. Most of the 3.5m population Muslim or Animist, although in Freetown (where all the Creoles live) Christian and Muslim ratio is about 50:50.

2. Independent in April 1961, under Sir Milton Margai. Succeeded in 1964 by his brother, Sir Albert Margai. Dr Siaka Stevens' All Party Congress (APC) party in power since 1968, after a short period of military rule. (Albert Margai now lives in exile in England) Increasing disenchantment with the government's economic policies, corruption and mismanagement, has resulted in short periods of military and civil unrest since then. In 1977, the President, bowing to public pressure, in particular from students, agreed to hold elections one year earlier than the due date. The APC, aided by a certain amount of force and electoral fraud, ensured its return to office, though 15 opposition MPs were returned to Parliament out of a total of 85 elected. President Stevens subsequently brought about a peaceful transition to a one-party state in 1978. He remains in complete command of the country and commands much respect. He has had some success with his policy of burying tribal differences. Nevertheless, the burden of a tottering economy, aggravated by expenditure on the OAU Summit Conference in Freetown in June/July 1980, widespread corruption and shock waves from the coup in Liberia in April 1980, have contributed to mounting uneasiness in the country.

(b) ECONOMIC

3. Considerable natural resources in agriculture, fisheries and minerals. But dependence for more than 35 years on diamonds as the mainstay of the economy, weak economic management and the rising cost of imports, particularly of fuel supplies, have hampered their exploitation. Various long-term development plans have virtually come to nought. In 1977 the IMF granted Sierra Leone a standby loan and the Western creditor countries (the Paris Club) later agreed to reschedule certain official commercial debts.

/Further



Further IMF standby arrangement agreed in 1979 and another rescheduling of debts by the Paris Club in February 1980. Sierra Leone has resisted calls by the IMF for a further devaluation, but the Leone was devalued by 5% in October 1978 and unpegged from the £, and has been floating downwards in value ever since. Most aid received from the West and from the international agencies. Britain's bilateral aid programme has been running at about £2 m. per year, including training programmes.

4. Diamonds still count for nearly 60% of all foreign exchange earnings but the mine is gradually being worked out. Only the high prices which have been paid on the world market in the past few years have continued to make production viable. Iron ore ceased to contribute to the economy since the closure of the British-owned Sierra Leone Development Company (DELCO) Mine in 1975. The country also has substantial reserves of bauxite and rutile, both of which are mined by foreign companies. There are current reports of discovery of huge gold deposits. 70% of the population are engaged in farming, mainly at subsistence level, but development of coffee, cocoa, rubber and coconuts under active consideration by various Western agencies and companies.

(c) FOREIGN POLICY

5. A non-aligned policy. Relations with the West are good. Cordial links with communist countries but apart from Chinese capital aid programme (bridges, stadium), little overt activity by them. Condemned Soviet invasion of Afghanistan but attended Moscow Olympics. A more active role in African affairs since the appointment of Dr Abdulai Conteh as Foreign Minister in 1977. Participation in Commonwealth observer team to Zimbabwe elections. President Stevens is currently Chairman of the OAU. SL belongs to the Lomé Convention, the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) and has an economic union with Liberia known as the Mano River Union (Guinea has also just joined).

6. Sierra Leone will treat with any country which might help her economically. Much recent wooing of Arab states, but without apparent success. Bilateral relations with France have blossomed of late, a result of some effort on the part of the French.

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VISIT BY PRESIDENT STEVENS OF SIERRA LEONE, 5-7 NOVEMBER 1980

BRIEF NO 3: INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

3(a) ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) GENERAL
POINTS TO MAKE

1. Congratulations on most successful arrangements for Freetown Summit in June and your skilful chairmanship. Appreciate what a burden the presidency places on smaller OAU members.
2. Gratified that Zimbabwe was able to take its seat as a full member for the first time.
3. We pay much attention to the OAU's views on African problems; so look forward to discussing some of your current preoccupations.

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3(a) OAU GENERAL: ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. The OAU chair rotates every year. Sierra Leone took over from Liberia at recent Summit at Freetown. Stevens was close to Tolbert, so was personally much shaken by latter's violent overthrow last April. Also, it posed a 'constitutional' problem: should Master-Sergeant Doe formally hand over to President Stevens? Nigeria for one threatened to walk out if so. Sierra Leone finessed the problem - and generally handled the rather ill-tempered debates that followed quite well.
2. But the presidency of the OAU is an almost guaranteed way of damaging the economies of the smaller members, as new roads, hotels and VIP villas are run up for the occasion. Sierra Leone is no exception, even though its efforts have been relatively modest and will mostly be of some use afterwards.
3. President Stevens is now much engaged in OAU mediation efforts (see below) where his 'elder statesman' position and considerable negotiating experience (first as a trade union leader) stand him in good stead. He should hand over to President Moi in June.

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VISIT BY PRESIDENT STEVENS OF SIERRA LEONE, 5-7 NOVEMBER 1980

BRIEF NO 3: INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
3(b) NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA
POINTS TO MAKE

UK POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA

1. Independence of Namibia our major short-term goal. Thereafter peaceful change in South Africa leading to a system based on the consent of all its peoples.

NAMIBIA

2. Giving full support to UN's current efforts to find an early solution. Seize opportunity created by UN mission to Pretoria. How does OAU view current situation?

POSSIBLE PRE-IMPLEMENTATION MEETING TO INCLUDE INTERNAL PARTIES

3. Raised by UN during Pretoria talks. Waldheim will report to Security Council. Could be key to retaining South African agreement to date for implementation.

RAID BY SOUTH AFRICAN AND NAMIBIAN FORCES ON ANGOLA [IF RAISED]

4. We deplore violence from whatever quarter. Regret loss of life in Angola; do not condone action of South African forces.

SOUTH AFRICA INTERNAL

5. Our abhorrence of apartheid, including homelands policy, well known. Pace of reform too slow, but best way to encourage change is through maintained dialogue. Hope new SA Cabinet and Mr Botha's Transvaal speech herald more change.

SANCTIONS

6. Understand widespread impatience over pace of advance over Namibia. But doubt that sanctions work: make S.Africans more intransigent, hurt black South Africans and neighbouring Black African countries - as well as UK and Western interests. [If pressed] Cannot predict now how we would vote on sanctions in hypothetical future circumstances.

7. Is OAU aware of effect of sanctions (and S.African retaliation) on SA's neighbours? Tempting for those who are distant (and richer) to call the tune.

ARMS EMBARGO [DEFENSIVE]

8. UK carrying out its obligations. All alleged breaches carefully investigated. No need to extend embargo. Would damage prospects for early Namibia settlement. No UK evidence to suggest that SA has developed or tested nuclear weapons.

UK LINKS WITH SOUTH AFRICA [DEFENSIVE]

9. Civil trade and investment should be determined by commercial considerations. We encourage adherence to the EC Code of Conduct to promote reform and enlightened labour relations in SA. We do not collaborate militarily with SA. Under Gleneagles Agreement, we discourage sporting contact but our sports bodies are independent.

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3(b) NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA: ESSENTIAL FACTS

UK/SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONS

1. Tendency for OAU to exaggerate extent of UK influence on South Africa.

SOUTH AFRICA INTERNAL

2. P W Botha has embarked on a programme of limited reforms in the apartheid system; but last session of Parliament ended disappointingly without major legislative reforms. Botha has abandoned idea of advisory council of blacks: there are no blacks - and few coloureds of note - on the new President's Council. But his speech to the Transvaal National Party Congress (3 September) revived hope of further change. Inclusion of several new 'verligtes' in the new Cabinet should help him circumvent opposition from the NP right-wing.

3. SA hopes to involve the 'independent' and non-independent homelands in a 'Confederation of Southern African States' with separate sovereignties and citizenships but common nationality, to avoid problem of an 'independent' homeland citizen losing any entitlement to South African nationality. This is their recognition that 'independent' homelands have no prospect of economic viability.

SANCTIONS/UK ECONOMIC LINKS WITH SOUTH AFRICA

4. UK exports to SA in 1979 were £714m (15th largest market) and imports from South Africa were £534m. But this year, our exports to Nigeria alone are considerably more. UK investment in SA totals £4 to £5 billion (about 10% of all UK investment overseas; UK is largest single foreign investor in SA).

5. Our exports to Black Africa are worth about three times as much as to South Africa; investments are worth almost as much. The UN sanctions choice is thus potentially highly damaging to UK either way. Risk of African retaliation seems far less in case of a triple veto (with USA and France).

6. South Africa's neighbours (eg Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Zambia, Zaire, Mozambique) would be particularly affected. Although such countries might reasonably expect to gain exemption from having to implement UN sanctions nothing could protect them from the effects of possible South Africa retaliation. The West would be in no position to bail them out of their resulting economic difficulties.

NAMIBIA: UN MISSION TO SOUTH AFRICA, 20-25 OCTOBER

7. Some signs of progress, eg on UN impartiality. Conditional agreement on a date for implementation not ruled out. Clearly no breakdown. Mr Urquhart (UN negotiator) seems to have come away fairly hopeful.

NAMIBIA: PUBLIC SIGNS OF SOUTH AFRICAN ATTITUDE

8. Foreign Minister stated that there was now greater understanding about real problems involved, but his government were still seeking a settlement acceptable to all. Mudge (leader of Democratic Turnhalle Alliance and Chairman of the Namibian 'Council of Ministers' - a body which the Five and the Front Line States do not recognize) said Namibian independence could become feasible by the end of 1981.

UN CONTINUING SEARCH FOR NAMIBIA AGREEMENT

9. Waldheim consulted Front Line States, the Five and SWAPO during the week ending 31 Oct 1980, to explore a possible way forward. The Five continue to give maximum support to Waldheim.

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VISIT BY PRESIDENT STEVENS OF SIERRA LEONE, 5-7 NOVEMBER 1980

BRIEF NO 3: INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
3(c) CHAD
POINTS TO MAKE

1. Sad to hear that Lomé peace conference, under your chairmanship, ended without a solution on 19 October. What was the cause of the breakdown?
2. We fully support attempts by OAU, led by yourself and by General Eyedema of Togo, to bring the warring factions together and promote a peace that will stick. The continuing flow of arms from abroad for the two main factions is dangerous. We agree that this African problem should be solved by Africa.

DEFENSIVE POINTS

3. Aware of the alleged supply of Libyan and Egyptian arms, and of recent reports of unidentified aircraft (probably Libyan) bombing Ndjamená. We are certainly not supplying arms to either side. No confirmation of press reports about German, Italian and British mercenaries fighting for Goukouni and doubt their truth.

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CHAD: ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Since the outbreak of civil war on 21 March 1980, fighting has continued in the area of Ndjamena (the capital) and in many other parts of Chad. However, the south (where most of the 'African' - rather than 'Arab' - population live) remains relatively calm.
2. The two main warring factions, headed by President Goukouni Weddeye (who controls the north-west of the country) and ex-Defence Minister Habré (who holds part of Ndjamena and the north-east) are being supplied with arms and ammunition by Libya and Egypt respectively (the latter overland through Sudan). The French have withdrawn their troops and are trying to maintain a neutral stance. But they are also trying to keep the economy going in the south (loyal more to Goukouni than Habré), but yet are accused (unfairly) of helping Habré.
3. There have been recent reports of unidentified aircraft bombing Ndjamena. None of the Chad factions hold any operational aircraft (and there is no aviation fuel): so these were almost certainly Libyan. Habré's faction have also alleged that German, Italian and British mercenaries have been fighting for Goukouni. But this has not been confirmed, and may well be misinformation.
4. An early end to the fighting seems unlikely. While OAU states (particularly those in the region) are keen to find an African solution to the problem and wish to avoid UN involvement if possible, the two main protagonists (both young, fiery 'traditional leaders' from the north) seem irreconcilable.
5. President Eyedema of Togo has recently been mediating actively to resolve the conflict, with support from President Stevens. But the latest peace conference ended in failure in Lomé on 19 October. The OAU Ad Hoc Committee on Chad is to continue its search for peace, and Eyedema's special responsibility to try to end the fighting was reconfirmed.
6. Over 100,000 refugees have fled Ndjamena across the border to Kousseri in southern Cameroon; and others have gone to Northern Nigeria. The UK's disaster fund contributed £10,000 of medical supplies in April, but has been unable to meet further requests for help. The International Red Cross has recently had to withdraw from Ndjamena because it could not play an impartial role.

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VISIT BY PRESIDENT STEVENS OF SIERRA LEONE, 5-7 NOVEMBER 1980

BRIEF NO 3: INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

3(d) WESTERN SAHARA

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Our policy (and that of the European Community) is one of neutrality: European involvement would not be productive. Nevertheless we are concerned that the dispute threatens stability in North West Africa, and welcome OAU efforts to reach a peaceful solution.
2. Appreciate difficulty of neutral chairmanship of OAU Committee of Wise Men. What chance that Committee's recommendations lead to a peaceful settlement? How will it be possible to discover the real views of the Western Sahara's nomadic population?
3. We recognize danger of break-up of OAU if Morocco rejects recommendations and the OAU recognizes Sahara Arab Democratic Republic. This would be in no-one's interests.

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3(d) WESTERN SAHARA: ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Former colony of Western Sahara was carved up between Morocco and Mauritania when Spain withdrew in 1975. Mauritania has since withdrawn its claims over its third; so Morocco now occupies and claims it all. The Algerian- and Libyan-backed Polisario Front demand independence for the territory; have formed a government in exile, the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic (SADR); and have mounted an increasingly successful guerilla war against Moroccan occupying troops, as well as Southern Morocco itself. Efforts at mediation have so far proved fruitless. The OAU's 'Committee of Wise Men', now under SL chairmanship, met in Sept. 1980. They called for a ceasefire and a referendum under UN auspices.
2. Britain, in line with the Nine, has neither accepted Moroccan claims to the Western Sahara nor recognized the Polisario Front or the SADR. British aims have been to avoid any direct involvement; to maintain good relations with both Algeria and Morocco; and to encourage a peaceful solution.
3. So far, Morocco has rejected the Wise Men's call for a referendum. It argues that the views of the Western Saharan people were obtained in Jan. 1976 when the Yemaa (an assembly appointed by the Spanish in colonial days) approved the Madrid Agreement which divided the former colony between Morocco and Mauritania. But the Moroccan position may be moving. Mr Hurd was told in confidence in Rabat that they would accept a referendum but on their terms. Pres. Stevens may not be aware of this development. Moroccan reactions to Wise Men's meeting may have been influenced by absence of any condemnation of Morocco by the Committee or of demands for military and/or administrative withdrawals from the Sahara. Also, the Committee agreed for first time to hear the views of representatives of pro-Moroccan groups in the Sahara (not just the Polisario). Its recommendations have yet to be endorsed by a full OAU summit - and meanwhile the fighting continues. King Hassan may attend such a summit in person to argue his case. His own political survival could be affected by the outcome of this problem.
4. Algeria's public line is that the dispute should be settled by self-determination. Yet in practice, they recognize the Polisario Front as the sole representatives of the people of the area. Like the OAU Wise Men, they have not faced up to the great practical difficulty of ascertaining the wishes of its nomadic

/population

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population (variously estimated at between 60,000 and 150,000) spread over an area rather larger than the UK, nearly all desert. Even the Polisario is composed of Malis, Mauritians and other Saharans, as well as natives of W. Sahara itself.

5. Polisario depend on surprise attacks and great mobility. British land-rovers, acquired indirectly, have been their main war-horse (or -camel).

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VISIT BY PRESIDENT STEVENS OF SIERRA LEONE, 5-7 NOVEMBER 1980

BRIEF NO 3: INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

3(e) THE HORN OF AFRICA

POINTS TO MAKE

1. We are concerned about continued tension in the Horn. While Ethiopia/Somalia dispute is obviously root cause, civil wars in Eritrea and Tigray are adding to the instability. Recent state of emergency in Somalia show strains imposed on President Barre by economic disarray and internal dissatisfaction with conduct of foreign policy.
2. Presence in region of large numbers of Soviet military advisers and Cuban troops a destabilizing factor which HMG deplors.
3. HMG acknowledges OAU doctrine of integrity of boundaries. Need for disputes to be resolved by peaceful negotiation, preferably through OAU. But as Pres. Stevens said at recent UN General Assembly, efforts of OAU Good Offices Committee to mediate in the dispute seem to have had little success.
4. How does Pres. Stevens see situation? What are OAU plans for further action?

[DEFENSIVE]

5. US/Somalia Defence Access Agreement is a logical and legitimate American response to Afghanistan and recent events in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. HMG supports it. The Agreement is not aimed at Ethiopia. On the contrary, it could contribute to stability in the Horn. Ethiopian protests, when their country has been full of Soviet military advisers, and even troops, for years now, ring slightly hollow.

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3(e) THE HORN OF AFRICA: ESSENTIAL FACTS

ETHIOPIA/SOMALIA

1. In July 1977, Somali regular armed forces invaded the Ogaden region of Ethiopia in support of ethnic Somali insurgent movements. The switch of Soviet and Cuban support from Somalia to Ethiopia caused Somalia to abrogate in November 1977 Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union. By early 1978, the Somalis had withdrawn in defeat. Since then they have continued to give the insurgents in the Ogaden both political and military support in bitter period of undeclared war. During the first part of 1980 several regular Somali units were deployed well inside Ethiopia. By August virtually all these had been withdrawn in face of strong Ethiopian counter-offensive. The Ethiopians subsequently mounted two probing ground attacks, probably in hot pursuit, into Somalia. The Somalis attempted to project these as invasions which they claim is Ethiopian objective. There is no evidence that Ethiopia has any such intention.

ERITREA AND TIGRAY

2. Eritrea and Tigray provinces still dispute central government control. Ethiopian Government recovered most of Eritrea in 1978; but since then, military operations against the Eritrean liberation movements have failed to achieve a complete military solution. Much of Tigray is not under Addis Ababa's control despite recent military operations using sophisticated Soviet equipment which has caused considerable casualties among civilian population.

3. Mengistu seems unwilling to countenance any political solutions acceptable to the secessionists. He has, however, improved relations with Sudan from where the secessionists had been permitted to operate and obtain supplies via Port Sudan. This rapprochement may curb secessionist operations.

SOMALIA

4. President Barre declared nationwide state of emergency on 21 October (Anniversary of Revolution Day). Cause of decision unclear but it is almost certainly connected with growing disillusion with Barre's régime. More hawkish elements in ruling hierarchy may have been considering ousting Barre. But atmosphere in Mogadishu is apparently relaxed.

/SOVIET

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SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE HORN

5. Main role of approx. 15,000 Cuban troops in Ethiopia is to relieve Ethiopians of garrison duties especially in the Ogaden and provide logistic support. Russians have 1,000-2,000 military advisers at all levels. They have no formal bases; but have access to Ethiopian military facilities including the Dahlak Islands in the Red Sea, where they have naval repair facilities including a floating dock. East Germans have about 500 advisers in Ethiopia, working for the media and state security.

OAU DOCTRINE

6. OAU Charter provides for territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers as defined at decolonization. Whilst boundaries in Africa were often drawn regardless of ethnic considerations, any breach of this doctrine obviously has serious implications for stability of continent.

7. The OAU Good Offices Committee (chaired by Nigeria) charged with mediating in the Ethiopia/Somali dispute, last met in Lagos from 18-20 August. Upholding OAU doctrine, Committee confirmed the existing frontier in a resolution that discomfited Somalia.

8. In his speech to the General Assembly in New York on 24 September President Stevens pointed out that this had done nothing towards resolving the dispute.

UNITED STATES/SOMALIA

9. The conclusion of the US/Somali Defence Access Agreement last August was an American response to Soviet expansionism in Afghanistan and the Indian Ocean, and to instability in the Middle East. It was not stimulated by the situation in The Horn. Some US officials remain concerned that the US could become embroiled in Somali activities in the Ogaden. The Americans have told us that the agreement, which includes a \$45m grant for defensive military equipment and economic assistance, is similar to those reached with Kenya and Oman. In a confidential side letter, Somalia undertakes not to deploy regular forces in the Ogaden. Ethiopia sent delegations to some 19 capitals including London to protest that the agreement posed a threat to their security. It is difficult to think that they seriously believe this and that the Americans will allow any adventurism by the Somalis. Indeed, the US presence should act as a curb. They were probably put up to it by the Russians (see above).

EXTRACT FROM
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE EIGHTH MEETING
OF 24 SEPTEMBER 1980

(President Stevens)

As if we did not have enough problems in the continent, the tension between Somalia and Ethiopia over the Ogaden continues to increase. This has been seriously complicated by the situation in the Middle East in general and in the Gulf in particular and the build-up of the presence of major Powers in the Indian Ocean.

To lessen these tensions and to prevent the conflict over the Ogaden from becoming the fuse for igniting a major super-Power confrontation, the Good Offices Committee established by the Organization of African Unity in 1973 to try to effect a reconciliation between Ethiopia and Somalia met in Lagos from 18 to 20 August 1980. At the conclusion of that meeting, at which both Ethiopia and Somalia were represented, the Committee recommended that a peaceful solution to the Ogaden dispute could be arrived at on the basis of the following principles, which are already enshrined in the Charter and relevant resolutions of the Organization of African Unity: recognition of territorial integrity, non-interference in domestic affairs, peaceful settlement of disputes, prohibition of subversion and inviolability of borders inherited on decolonization. It further recommended that the two States should resume diplomatic relations so as to facilitate the restoration of peace in this troubled area. Unfortunately, the efforts of the Good Offices Committee do not seem to have been successful and, if anything, tension appears to have increased of late.

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VISIT BY PRESIDENT STEVENS OF SIERRA LEONE, 5-7 NOVEMBER 1980

BRIEF NO 3: INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

3(f) ROLE OF CUBA IN AFRICA

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Understand that Dr Conteh has just visited Cuba. Interested to know his impressions about future Cuban policy towards Africa.
2. Cuba remains the main military front in Africa for the Soviet bloc. We do not accept that the presence in the Continent of over 30,000 Cuban troops is justified. Their presence does nothing for the stability of the area. It understandably causes us anxiety about communist intentions, especially in the light of Afghanistan.

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3(f) ROLE OF CUBA IN AFRICA: ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. BBC Monitoring reported arrival in Cuba of Sierra Leonean Foreign Minister on 9 October. We have no report of our own yet of Dr Conteh's visit. Cuba used to be involved in training para-military units in Sierra Leone; and her troops staged through Freetown on way to Angola in mid-70s. But they now keep heads down.

ANGOLA

2. Of the estimated 34,000 Cuban troops in Africa, about 19,000 are in Angola. There are also about 6,000 Cuban civilian advisers there. Angolans argue that their security continues to depend on the Cuban presence. The Cuban troops have a garrison rather than a forward role. A key task is, ironically, the protection of American Gulf Oil installations (Angola's major earner of foreign exchange) in the Cabinda enclave.

3. Angolan Ministers have said publicly (and privately to FCO Ministers in the past) that they expect Cuban troops to be withdrawn once a Namibian settlement has been reached.

ETHIOPIA

4. See above. About 15,000 Cuban troops remain (2,000 have been withdrawn in the past two years). Their main use is garrison duties in the Ogaden. Their logistical aid role in Eritrea has been low key because of earlier Cuban support for the other side - the Eritrean liberation movements. No further significant withdrawals seem planned. A large number of Cuban civilians also work as aid personnel. Mengistu's régime depends on the Soviet/Cuban presence for its survival.

UGANDA

6. Communist interest in Uganda is growing. Muwanga, President of the Military Commission, visited Cuba at the end of September. He received high-level treatment. A scientific and technical agreement was signed. But we have no evidence to confirm speculation that the real purpose of Muwanga's visit was to seek Cuban military support. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union and North Korea are busily cultivating, and quite probably helping to finance, Obote.

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VISIT BY PRESIDENT STEVENS OF SIERRA LEONE, 5-7 NOVEMBER 1980

BRIEF NO 3: INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

3(g) THE COMMONWEALTH

POINTS TO MAKE

1. The Commonwealth can be proud of its contribution to the settlement in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. Grateful for Sierra Leone participation in Commonwealth Observer Group.
2. Hope it will prove possible for Commonwealth to assist over Uganda elections.
3. Look forward to next Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Melbourne which Senior Officials are currently discussing in Nicosia.

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3(g) THE COMMONWEALTH: ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Sierra Leone is a moderate, committed but not very prominent member of the Commonwealth, generally non-aligned but identified with G77 on North/South issues. Provided representative for the Commonwealth Observer Group for the Rhodesian elections.
2. Commonwealth currently considering providing financial assistance and observers for Ugandan elections scheduled for 10 December, subject to ground rules being established and agreed by all parties.
3. Commonwealth Senior Officials now meeting in Nicosia to review progress since Lusaka Heads of Government Meeting and prepare for next one in Melbourne 1981.

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VISIT BY PRESIDENT STEVENS OF SIERRA LEONE, 5-7 NOVEMBER 1980

BRIEF NO 3: INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
3(h) NORTH/SOUTH DIALOGUE
POINTS TO MAKE

1. Regret we were unable to reach consensus at UN Special Session on procedures for Global Negotiations. But result was not final breakdown. Discussion of agenda and procedures will continue during General Assembly later this month. We will continue to work for successful launch of Global Negotiations on a generally acceptable basis.
2. Disagreement turns on important issue of principal. We are determined to preserve integrity of Specialized Agencies (eg IMF). Cannot accept that decisions of these Agencies should be overridden by a UN Conference. Significant that the countries responsible for the three major international currencies took same view.
3. North/South Summit (if raised). Mexicans have enquired whether we would accept an invitation, if offered; we replied that we would be willing to attend. But careful preparation would be essential.

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NORTH/SOUTH DIALOGUE: ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Sierra Leone is not prominent in N/S discussions. But as OAU Chairman, Pres. Stevens can be expected strongly to support G77 position. At UN General Assembly, he expressed regret at the outcome of the Special Session, and called for renewed application on the part of Western countries, Communist countries and oil producers to problems of developing world.
2. Special Session (25 August-15 September) concentrated on procedures for Global Negotiations. Main issues were preservation of competence of Specialized Agencies, especially IMF and IBRD, the nature of the final agreement and how it would be reached. After much discussion a text emerged which most developed countries were prepared to accept. But Americans rejected it as not sufficiently protecting integrity of the International Financial Institutions. UK and Germany supported them; rest of Community joined majority in favour. Agenda and procedures will be further discussed in General Assembly, starting 17 Nov.
3. Special Session agreed on International Development Strategy for the decade. But may have to wait to be adopted by General Assembly until outstanding issues on Global Negotiations have been settled.
4. UK has been criticized along with US and FRG (though relatively mildly at recent Commonwealth Finance Ministers and IMF/IBRD meetings). We have tried to play down failure of Session, expressing hope that quiet diplomacy will provide a solution, while remaining firm about the issue of principle.
5. Cuts in UK aid programme have had a considerable effect, especially in recipient countries, on our reputation on North/South matters. UK was singled out, albeit inaccurately, by McNamara at IMF/IBRD meetings. (He claimed UK aid would fall from 0.52% of GNP in 1979 to 0.38% by 1985. Apart from his questionable assumptions about rate of GNP growth, we have taken no decisions on aid spending that far ahead.)
6. In general the Bank/Fund meetings produced a reasonable response to the economic difficulties provoked by the latest oil crisis and showed that the two organizations can adapt quickly. But underlying difficulties remain, particularly over whether IMF should move towards a role as an aid institution. Major Western countries, including the UK, are not prepared to accept this.

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7. North/South Summit. Date currently envisaged is March 1981. However some potential participants would like it postponed; the Mexicans have suggested that without progress on launching the Global Negotiations, there will be little point in holding the Summit. Date may therefore slip. Meeting of sponsors (Mexico, Austria, Canada, Sweden, India, Nigeria, Algeria, Yugoslavia, FRG and France) will take place in Vienna on 7 November. Other countries on the Mexican invitation list for the Summit itself are Brazil, Jamaica, Venezuela, Philippines, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Japan, US and UK. From Africa, Tanzania and a francophone African country, possibly Senegal, are included.

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VISIT BY PRESIDENT STEVENS OF SIERRA LEONE, 5-7 NOVEMBER 1980

BRIEF NO 4: BILATERAL RELATIONS

4(a) TRADE

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Sierra Leone one of our oldest trading partners in West Africa. Glad to heard Pres. Stevens will be having talks with British businessmen during visit.

INVESTMENT

2. Britain lives on its world trade: so obviously we encourage mutually profitable private investment overseas. But remittance difficulties are a problem, as are current commercial debts. Glad to know of specific investment opportunities in SL.

ECGD [IF RAISED]

3. Short- and medium-term cover unfortunately restricted because of delays in transfer of foreign exchange (at present 5-6 months). In these circumstances, like all other credit insurers, ECGD have no option under world-wide rules but to take cautious view at present.

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4(a) TRADE: ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. The UK is still SL's major trading partner. We supplied 20% of the country's imports in 1979; and bought one-half of her exports. Our exports are mainly foodstuffs, industrial raw materials and machinery. Our imports include diamonds, bauxite and agricultural produce (eg coffee, cocoa).
2. 36% increase in our exports so far this year attributable to OAU conference expenditure. However, short-term prospects are poor because of the depressed state of the SL economy. In the medium- and longer-term, SL's agricultural and mining potential could lead to a better economic performance. Reported discovery recently of apparently large deposits of gold have raised hopes of life-line.
3. Latest figures available show the value of UK investment in SL to be about £18.5m. The main British companies operating there include UAC, Shell, BP, Selection Trust, British-American Tobacco, British Caledonian, Elder Dempster, Guardian Royal Exchange, Standard Chartered and Barclays Banks.
4. ECGD short-term cover available only against Confirmed Irrevocable Letter of Credit. Medium- and long-term cover not available since 1976 because of debt reschedulings and SL's poor economic performance. There have already been two debt reschedulings in 1978 and 1980 covering 1975 to 1981 maturities. A third rescheduling may prove necessary. BP and Shell have both had difficulties recently in getting paid for oil deliveries.

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VISIT BY PRESIDENT STEVENS OF SIERRA LEONE, 5-7 NOVEMBER 1980
BRIEF NO 4: BILATERAL RELATIONS
4(b): AID

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Understand present programme going quite well. Despite cuts in overall Aid Programme, hope to do more now with new aid of £3.5m to be spent in next three years on Bailey bridging for roads up-country and perhaps road-making equipment. Trust things will now go smoothly.
2. Despite our own financial problems, we wrote off £10.4m of aid ^{debt} last year.

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VISIT BY PRESIDENT STEVENS OF SIERRA LEONE, 5-7 NOVEMBER 1980

4(b) AID: ESSENTIAL FACTS

PRESENT PROGRAMME

1. Emphasis currently on technical cooperation mainly manpower assistance (ie supplementation of salaries of British staff in public services and university; provision of directly-recruited Technical Cooperation Officers and Consultants, particularly in agriculture and education; and training in UK).
2. This assistance complements small capital aid programme of £1.8m under the UK/Sierra Leone Development Loan/Grant 1974. It is now all committed. Under Retrospective Terms Adjustment Agreement 1979 the loan converted to a grant (and £10.4m of existing aid debt cancelled).
3. Two capital projects financed under the grant still active. One an Agricultural Extension Training Scheme, only started this year after very long planning period. Object is to increase quality of training of Agricultural Extension Staff at technician and instructor level. The second project under way for 2-3 years provides for static and mobile workshops for repair and maintenance of farm machinery.
4. Notable features of Technical Cooperation Programme are assistance to the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board, Guma Valley Water Corporation and a TCO Principal for the Para-Medical Training School at Bo (part of the Integrated Medical Education and Training Project financed by the Canadian International Development Agency and the European Development Fund). Trained personnel from the school will concentrate on preventative health measures mainly in rural areas. Technical Cooperation programme also finances about 100 trainees in the UK annually. A team to review our manpower assistance is to visit Sierra Leone in December.
5. Aid expenditure in the calendar year 1979 was £1.64m; Technical Cooperation £1.55m and capital aid £0.09m. In 1980 expenditure about £2m.

VOLUNTARY SERVICE OVERSEAS

6. SL is priority country for VSO. Intends to continue at the present level. About 50 volunteers in SL in teaching, agriculture, rural development and health.

/COMMONWEALTH

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COMMONWEALTH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

7. CDC are involved in projects with Guma Valley Water Company and SL Investments Ltd. With other potential investors, CDC is seeking ways to help agricultural investment. Actively considering an investment of £2.5m in rubber development project.

FUTURE AID

8. Ministers have recently agreed that an offer of new capital aid of £3.5m may be made to the Government of SL, the offer to be made to Pres. Stevens during visit. Aid intended to be spent over period 1981/2-1983/4. How it is to be spent has not been precisely determined but it is likely to be put to development of transport sector. Dr Banya, Minister of Development, having talks at ODA on 6 November. SLG would welcome the provision of Bailey bridging to link up rural feeder roads (good for our steel industry). There is also need for road-building machinery for feeder-road construction. These projects arise from findings of ODA mission to SL late in 1978. Because of cuts in Aid Programme during last 2 years, not possible to carry out more costly recommendations (although we have implemented several of the cheaper ones). SLG has been disappointed by our apparent inaction and compare our efforts unfavourably with that of France in their ex-colonies.

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VISIT BY PRESIDENT STEVENS OF SIERRA LEONE, 5-7 NOVEMBER 1980

BRIEF NO 4: BILATERAL RELATIONS

4(c) DEFENCE SALES

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Hope our traditionally good links in defence field will be maintained and developed. Glad to continue making places available on training courses in UK for members of SL armed forces. Part of cost can be met under UK Military Training Assistance Scheme (UKMTAS).
2. Understand a contract has recently been signed with UK firm for a Fast Patrol Craft.

4(c) DEFENCE SALES: ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. The SL Armed Forces are properly modest in size: overall strength of army is about 3,000 (about 140 officers). There is no separate navy or air force. Most recent (1977-8) sales of UK equipment consisted of Racal radios, Bedford trucks and Land Rovers. A British entrepreneur, claiming to be acting on behalf of SL Government, recently asked for a quotation from RSAF Enfield for sizeable supply of rifles and pistols.
2. SL makes good use of her small allocation (currently £50,000) of UKMTAS funds. In 1979/80, nine members of the Armed Forces attended training courses in the UK. SL is finding it more and more difficult to find sufficient funds for UK courses, which now have to be paid in advance.
3. Major item of Defence Sales interest is a Tracker Fast Patrol Craft Mk II manufactured by Fairey Marine. Although Fairey have received signed contract to the value of £600,000 from the Port Authority, payment not yet made. Craft due for acceptance in December.

VISIT BY PRESIDENT STEVENS OF SIERRA LEONE, 6-7 NOVEMBER 1980

BRIEF NO 4: BILATERAL RELATIONS

4(d) OVERSEAS STUDENT FEES

POINTS TO MAKE [DEFENSIVE ONLY]

1. Much regret fees for University students entering first time 1980 to be raised to realistic level. Forced on HMG as part of overall economies. All Commonwealth countries equally affected.

4(d) OVERSEAS STUDENTS FEES: ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. SL has about 1,000 students in British universities. Possibly about two to three hundred new entrants will have to pay full rate this year. Major number of students affected by the decision are evidently from Commonwealth. Cases of particularly poor countries, like SL, to be studied as part of the overall survey of the effects of new measures.

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VISIT BY PRESIDENT STEVENS OF SIERRA LEONE, 5-7 NOVEMBER 1980

BRIEF NO 4: BILATERAL RELATIONS
4(e) OTHER ISSUES
POINTS TO MAKE

KISSY JETTY [DEFENSIVE]

1. Grateful for SLG agreement to our proposals to surrender Admiralty leased lands at Kissy (with exception of two oil tanks and the land on which they stand). Understand SL Ministers are having separate talks with Ministry of Defence about the details. Keen to reach mutually agreeable solution as soon as possible.

BBC [DEFENSIVE]

2. As Pres. Stevens knows, HMG does not control BBC. One of prices of free press and radio is that they sometimes go off the rails. (Indeed, a BBC reporter who happens to be from SL has just caused us problems in two other African countries). But in general, BBC is much respected for its objectivity and freedom. Hope minor irritations are forgotten.

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4(e) OTHER ISSUES: ESSENTIAL FACTS

KISSY JETTY [DEFENSIVE]

1. We have been warned that Pres. Stevens will raise this point, about which he feels strongly.
2. An oil jetty was built by the Admiralty in Freetown in 1928 to help bunker RN ships. Little used after the war; and progressively fell into disrepair in the 60s and 70s. Replaced early in 1979 by a modern jetty constructed by a Dutch firm (for an astronomical sum).
3. Pres. Stevens has long believed that the MOD should have either repaired the old jetty or contributed to the cost of a new one. But RN interest in Freetown is now minimal: extensive lands leased by the Admiralty at Independence in 1961 are in the process of being surrendered. Only exception is two oil storage tanks for emergency use by RN. Outstanding fees to the MOD by the Ports Authority will be waived; and the SLG know that they can realistically expect no other further contribution to the (exorbitant) cost of the new jetty. The SL Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Industry are to have separate discussions with Mr Luce and Mr Speed about the details.

BBC

4. Pres. Stevens complained to our High Commissioner in 1977 and expressed concern to a British Parliamentary delegation last year over 'the BBC's constant negative reporting of events in SL'. Several members of the BBC African Service have recently visited SL: according to the Head of Service, BBC/SL relations are again very good. BBC say their audience in SL is among biggest per capita in the world. An SL national (Hylton Fyle) presents the daily 'Network Africa' programme, widely heard in SL.
5. But BBC reporter of SL origin (John Coker) recently arrested etc in both Ghana and Zimbabwe!

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VISIT BY PRESIDENT STEVENS OF SIERRA LEONE, 5-7 NOVEMBER 1980

BRIEF NO 5: PERSONALITY NOTES

HE DR SIAKA PROBYN STEVENS GCRSL DCL

President and Leader of the All People's Congress.

Officially born 24 August 1905 but generally supposed to be older. A Limba, of mixed Limba/Vai parentage. Brought up in Creole surroundings. Speaks fluent Mende and Temne but in public normally speaks either English or Krio. Educated at American (EUB) Mission Schools in Moyamba and Freetown. Attended Ruskin College at Oxford 1947-49. Served with Sierra Leone Police Force 1923-30, retiring with rank of Sergeant. Employed at Marampa iron ore mines 1931-46. Founder member of the United Mine Workers Union, and General Secretary for 15 years. Secretary-General Sierra Leone Trades Union Congress 1948-50. Served on Moyamba District Council for several years and on Freetown City Council for six years. Mayor, Freetown City Council 1964-65 being unseated after re-election in November 1965, following judgement given in Supreme Court that election was null and void on procedural grounds. (This was a political manoeuvre by the Margai Government). Awarded Honorary Doctorate of Civil Law by University of Sierra Leone in February 1969 and has subsequently used the title. Became Prime Minister on the return to civilian rule in 1968 and President two days after Sierra Leone became a Republic in April 1971.

Appointed Sierra Leone's first Minister of Lands, Mines and Labour 1951-56. Successfully contested 1957 elections as an SLPP candidate but deprived of seat for election malpractice. In 1958 joined Mr (now Sir) Albert Margai and several other SLPP defectors in forming People's National Party of which he became General Secretary. Attended 1960 Constitutional Conference in London but alone of the Sierra Leone delegation refused to sign the Conference Report, objecting both to the proposed Defence Agreement with Britain and to the decision not to hold a General Election before Independence. He also strenuously opposed PNP participation in the United Front Government formed after the 1960 Conference under Sir Milton Margai's leadership and was expelled by his party. Stevens then founded the 'Elections before Independence Movement' out of which grew the All People's Congress, of which he has always been Leader.

Along with several other leading members of his party, Stevens was imprisoned at the time of Independence under emergency powers invoked by the Government to counter APC threats to sabotage the celebrations. The APC adopted the pan-African, anti-colonial attitude of Ghana and Guinea at the time and were believed while in opposition (1962-67) to have received financial and other help from both these countries as well as from Cairo and Iron Curtain sources. Stevens has visited several Communist capitals, but he has never been a Communist and whilst maintaining an East-West balance to get all possible aid he has come increasingly to mistrust the Soviet Union.

/Stevens



Stevens is the most able of Sierra Leone politicians, and achieved his main political ambition when he became President of the Republic in April 1971. He has a strong personality, concealed usually behind a rather impassive exterior. He is a lucid and persuasive political speaker who puts himself over well at grass-roots level and a tough and pragmatic politician, with a particular flair for playing off the conflicting factions within his Cabinet and the Party against each other. Although he has the Cabinet firmly under control he can be indecisive and he seems also to be easily panicked on occasion, when he takes precipitate action without due consideration. He can be charming, and has a good sense of humour, but also has an almost ungovernable temper when aroused.

The disturbances at Freetown University in January 1977 were a severe blow to his authority. He nevertheless steered the APC to victory in the elections which those disturbances forced upon him. Visited London for the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in the same year. He was elected President for a second term of office on 20 April 1976, and brought about the introduction of a One-Party State in 1978, when his term of office was renewed for a further 7 years. In spite of his age he tends to take more and more upon himself. Little can be done without his authority and everybody, including the Vice-Presidents, go in awe of him. Contractor finance deals, involving profits for his personal bank account, have added appreciably to the country's economic problems.

Talks increasingly of retiring, presumably after his Chairmanship of OAU, 'to the Hills' (he is building a large house on a Freetown hill-top) and becoming an eminence-grise on the lines of Bustamente of Jamaica.

Married with several grown children.



VISIT BY PRESIDENT STEVENS OF SIERRA LEONE, 5-7 NOVEMBER

BRIEF NO 5: PERSONALITY NOTES

HON DR ABDULAI CONTEH

Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Born 5 August 1945 at Pepel, Northern Province. A Susu. Education locally at Primary and Secondary Schools and Albert Academy, Freetown. 1966 Kings College, London, obtained the LL B degree with Honours 1969. Barrister at Law 1970 (Lincoln's Inn). Master of Law 1971. PhD Kings College, Cambridge 1974; obtained several academic prizes.

In 1974 he became State Counsel at Law Officers' Department. From 1975-77 he was a lecturer at Fourah Bay. In May 1977 he was returned unopposed for Kambia West constituency and appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs.

A considerable athlete who represented Cambridge at athletics and appeared at the Commonwealth Games in Jamaica. He now has some consequent back trouble which requires regular treatment.

It is still not clear how he was induced to run for election. He was reportedly opposed to the APC and was in private legal practice with a Creole named Terry who continued after the election to present SLPP electoral petitions in the High Court. Was originally appointed Attorney-General but exchanged posts with Francis Minah when it was discovered that he was time-barred from serving as Attorney-General.

An intelligent and agreeable but clearly ambitious man who since his election has taken an increasing part in OAU affairs. Clearly relishes his role in Sierra Leone's Chairmanship of the OAU. He tends to tailor his attitudes to his audience, for example making unhelpful remarks in the OAU about Rhodesia, but tempering them in conversation with us. A possible future Head of State, with President Stevens' covert backing. The latter has described him as having the necessary 'charisma'. His tribal background goes against him.

Married with children.



VISIT BY PRESIDENT STEVENS OF SIERRA LEONE, 5-7 NOVEMBER

BRIEF NO 5: PERSONALITY NOTES

HON DR SAMA SIAMA BANYA OR

Minister of Development and Economic Planning.

Born Kailahun District 10 June 1931. A Kissi speaking Mende rather than a Kissi. Educated at Bo School Bristol University and West London Hospital Medical School MRCS (Eng) LRCP (Lond). Medical Officer in the Sierra Leone Ministry of Health in 1963. Senior Medical Officer. Private practice in 1968. Left the SLPP for the APC in about 1974 in the apparently sincere belief that only the APC was capable of integrating the various disparate elements in the country. Stood for Parliament as an APC Candidate for Kailahun South in the General Elections of May 1977 but was defeated after being ambushed and shot in the head, allegedly by his political opponent. One, and possibly two, of his brothers were killed in the incident. Returned as unopposed APC candidate for Kailahun South in February 1978 following unseating of the SLPP incumbent. Appointed Resident Minister Eastern Province April 1978.

A member of one of the ruling families in Kailahun; respected for his integrity but not particularly popular among his own (SLPP) people on account of his defection to the APC. He has a private clinic in Kenema.

One of the few ministers genuinely interested in the future of Sierra Leone, rather than self-interest. Probably incorrupt. Occasionally mentioned as a future Head of State. A pleasing prospect, but his tribal background and diffidence make it unlikely.

Married in February 1977 to Kadi Bangura. Previous wife died in 1975. One child.



VISIT BY PRESIDENT STEVENS OF SIERRA LEONE, 5-7 NOVEMBER 1980

BRIEF NO 5: PERSONALITY NOTES

HON SOLOMON ATHANASIOS JAMES PRATT, CR

Minister of Trade and Industry.

Born at Bathurst (now Banjul) The Gambia, on 25 December 1921. Of Creole descent. Educated at Sierra Leone Grammar School, Fourah Bay College, Durham University, St Catherine's, Oxford, the LSE, and the Inner Temple. Holds degrees of MA, BCL, BSc Honours, MSc Economics, LL B and Bachelor of Letters, and Diploma in Agricultural Economics.

Formerly a lawyer in private practice, General Manager of the Railway and the former SLPP Government's unofficial economic adviser. From 1952 to 1958 was on the staff of the ILO in Geneva. Attended the UN General Assembly in 1963, is President of the SL United Nations Association and once led the SL Delegation at the UN Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva. Appointed Minister of External Affairs in May 1971.

Originally close to Sir Albert Margai and the SLPP Government, he broke with both and stood, successfully, as an APC candidate in the 1967 abortive general elections for the Mountain Rural District near Freetown, where he lives in the village of Regent. During the NRC period Pratt was close to Siaka Stevens and subsequently led the APC team in the Civilian Rule Committee. He became Minister of Development in Stevens' Government when civilian rule was restored in April 1968 but was dropped from the Government in April 1969. Appointed successively Minister of External Affairs in May 1971 and Minister of Development and Economic Planning 1973. 1975 became Attorney-General. Appointed Minister of Development and Economic Planning in 1977 and Minister of the Interior in August 1979. Minister of Trade and Industry since February 1980.

Has intelligence and ability - of his broad spectrum of degrees - but he is regarded by most people who have dealt with him as a slippery customer, self-centred and 'too clever by half'. Unhelpful during his involvement in Delco (iron ore) liquidation proceedings 1976/77.

Married with a number of children. One of his main hobbies is singing and he is choirmaster at his local church - St Charles, Regent.

VISIT BY PRESIDENT STEVENS
SIERRA LEONE, 5-7 NOVEMBER

BRIEF NO 5: PERSONALITY NOTES

HON BRIGADIER JOSEPH SAIDU MOMOH, OR OBE

Force Commander, RSLMF, and Minister of State.

Born 26 January ¹⁹³⁷ in Bombali District, Northern Province. A Limba. Joined the army as a private in August 1958 when the RSLMF was part of the Royal West African Frontier Force. He attended Regular Officers Training School in Ghana and School of Infantry at Hythe. In 1960 he attended another cadet course in Nigeria and, in 1962, he completed the course at Mons. From this he was commissioned. He was imprisoned at the time of the mutiny in 1968, was released on 18 November that year, and reinstated within the army to become the Commanding Officer of the First Battalion RSLMF.

Momoh is of the same tribe as President Stevens. During the national crisis in October 1970, when the newly formed UDP was banned and a state of emergency declared, Momoh proved an enthusiastic supporter of the measures which the government ordered the army to take. These included the arrest of some former cabinet ministers and numerous other influential persons. Momoh was aware, at the time, that these arrests were illegal but he genuinely believed that they were necessary to maintain law and order in Sierra Leone. Took over Acting Command of the RSLMF when Brigadier Bangura was jailed in March 1971. Made substantive Colonel and appointed Force Commander on 29 September 1971. Promoted to Brigadier after the 1973 elections, a rise from Lieutenant to Brigadier in eleven years. Together with the Commissioner of Police, he was appointed an MP and Minister of State by President Stevens in 1974.

He seems to enjoy his parliamentary responsibilities immensely but is unlikely to be seriously interested in a political career. Would not himself lead a coup except, possibly, if S I Korma, First Vice-President, whom he dislikes, took over the Presidency, but he might not be able to restrain some of his junior officers.

Momoh was a keen athlete in his youth and still plays tennis regularly, but he has gone to fat lately and become something of an old woman. He must share the blame for the widespread corruption, and consequent property ownership, among the senior officers of the army but may not himself be as corrupt as some.

A good mixer and more conscientious than some about his social commitments. Married with one daughter.

VISIT BY PRESIDENT STEVENS
OF SIERRA LEONE, 5-7 NOVEMBER 1980

BRIEF NO 5: PERSONALITY NOTES

HE VICTOR EMMANUEL SUMNER

High Commissioner of Sierra Leone.

Born 17 April 1929 in Freetown. A Sherbro. Educated locally (Fourah Bay College Teacher Training Department 1950-1951) and in the United States and Canada; Otterbein College, Westerville, Ohio 1955 (BA), Laval University, Quebec, 1959-61 (MA).

Appointed to Sierra Leone Commonwealth and Foreign Service in December 1961. Posted to Permanent Mission in New York as Third Secretary. 1963-64 took course in diplomacy at the Institute of International Affairs Columbia University, New York. In 1965 took courses in Protocol and International Relations at the French Foreign Ministry and the Institute of Higher International Studies of the University of Paris. 1965 Chief of Protocol. 1966 posted to the Prime Minister's Office. 1968 promoted Assistant Secretary to the Prime Minister. Posted as Counsellor to the Sierra Leone Embassy, Washington 1969-70 and to the Sierra Leone Embassy, Bonn, December 1971 - January 1972. Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1977. September 1980 Sierra Leone High Commissioner to the United Kingdom.

Competent and helpful but diffident.

Married with three children.