PRIME MINISTER

CDP 27/2.

VISIT TO POLAND

I have put to you separately a proposal that we should suggest to the Poles the postponement of your visit by one week, to avoid a clash with the US/Soviet Summit. If you have accepted this suggestion, I think it would be courteous to write to General Jaruzelski. I attach a letter.

But before deciding this, there is a further aspect which we need to settle. We proposed to the Poles that you should visit Gdansk, to lay a wreath at the shipyard workers' memorial and meet Lech Walesa on his home territory rather than in Warsaw. The Poles have rejected this as unacceptable and have said that their refusal is not negotiable. Our Ambassador's assessment is that if we insist on Gdansk, the visit wil have to be postponed indefinitely.

Its a fine judgment what best to do. Without Gdansk there is nothing in the programme which other Western leaders have not already done. The visit will not therefore break new ground. While the Russians said that you could go anywhere you wanted in the Soviet Union, the Poles are being more difficult. Arguably they should forfeit the visit (for which they have been pressing): or at the least we should keep on pressing them to let you go to Gdansk. It won't be the end of the world if the visit is postponed <u>sine die</u>. The Polish regime is morally, politically and financially bankrupt. We could make a good public case for our insistence on inclusion of Gdansk.

On the other hand, the Poles have accepted all our other demands - which are pretty stiff - for the programme. We are told by the Embassy that Solidarity would prefer you to go ahead with the visit even without Gdansk. We don't want to forfeit a chance to pursue our policy of giving encouragement to Eastern Europe, or pass up the opportunity to press the

Poles to reach an agreement with the IMF. There was no susbstantive reason to go to Gdansk: it was a presentational advantage we sought. There's not much point in visiting a country if you start by annoying your hosts.

The Foreign Secretary's clear advice is that you should go to Poland even without visiting Gdansk. He argues that the remainder of the programme is difficult enough for the Poles to accept and that a visit will exert more pressure on them on human rights issues than a refusal to go. Its really a question of how far you want to push them.

Agree to propose a visit in June, even without visiting Gdansk (in which case, agree to sign attached letter?).

or

<u>Prefer</u> to postpone visit until later and continue to press the Poles on Gdansk?

Whatshort jour 20 Gaws?

GDJ.

m

Charles Powell

25 March 1988

CONFIDENTIAL



PM43
60 P.C.

10 DOWNING STREET LONDON SWIA 2AA

From the Private Secretary

27 March 1988

De dyn.

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO POLAND

Thank you for your letters of 22 and 25 March.

First, as regards dates, the Prime Minister is amenable to our proposing 6 and 7 June to the Poles (with arrival on the evening of 5 June). She has written to Jaruzelski in this sense. I enclose the letter.

Second, as regards the programme, the Prime Minister is reluctant to yield on Gdansk but realises that, for a visit in June at least, there is no option. But if the Poles cannot manage 6/7 June, then the visit will need to be postponed until later in the year. In that event, we should not at this stage indicate to the Poles that we accept their position on Gdansk. When we know whether the Poles accept 6/7 June, I will consult the Prime Minister further on the programme, particularly the idea of a visit to Auschwitz. I am sure that points (b) - (e) inclusive of your letter of 22 March are right.

Owns Que

C. D. Powell

Lyn Parker, Esq., Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALign and Commonwealth Office London SW1A 2AH 25 March 1988 Iran Charles Prime Minister's Visit to Poland In your letter of 23 March, you asked for advice by the weekend on whether, now that dates for the Moscow Summit have been fixed for 29 May - 2 June, the Prime Minister should go ahead with a visit to Poland on the dates which the Poles had agreed (29-31 May). The Foreign Secretary is in Switzerland, and has not seen this reply. But I believe he would endorse the views set out below. The May timing would have been ideal: as you know from our letter of 22 March, the pace of political and economic reform has slowed in Poland in recent months, and the authorities high-level Western encouragement to press on. But our objectives as set out in that letter would still be valid, if the visit were now postponed and reinstated later in the year. As you know, Jaruzelski is very keen for it to take place. The Poles would certainly make every effort to accommodate any fresh dates the Prime Minister were able to suggest. We recommend therefore that the Poles should be told that, in view of the dates now fixed for the Moscow summit, the Prime Minister will unfortunately need to remain in London over that period. We would stress that she attaches importance to the visit, and to carrying it out in circumstances which will not involve any loss of the wide international impact which both sides wish to gain from it. If (in spite of the caution in your letter) the Prime Minister is able to suggest alternative dates straight away, we would then go on to propose these to the Poles. If not, we would say that fresh dates will be proposed in due course: we hope for a visit later this year. Mr Barder in Warsaw has recommended that the Prime Minister should in addition send a short personal message to Jaruzelski. enclose a draft (which assumes that it will not, in fact, be possible for you to identify alternative dates straight away). /There CONFIDENTIAL **AF3AAD**



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There are two further points which the Prime Minister will wish to bear in mind. First, Mr Barder is due to leave Warsaw in mid-June. His successor will not arrive there, on present plans, until late August. Second, consideration needs to be given, in reaching a decision on what should now be said to the Poles, to the question of a visit to Gdansk. Our view remains that it would be worthwhile for the Prime Minister to go ahead with a visit to Poland, even if Gdansk were not included, provided that the conditions set out in that letter were met. If we now speak to the Poles along the lines of the foregoing paragraph but say nothing about the visit to Gdansk, they will conclude that the Prime Minister does not intend to insist on meeting Walesa there rather than in Warsaw. If therefore the Prime Minister wishes to press for the inclusion of Gdansk, we ought to make this to make clear to the Poles now. (Mr Barder's view is that, in that case, the visit will in effect be postponed indefinitely. As you know, he believes that the Polish authorities will not be open to persuasion about Gdansk).

You will also wish to consider how a decision to postpone the visit should be explained to the press. The May dates had not been announced, but had become generally known both here and in Poland. We would propose to tell the Poles that the press here will be told that the Prime Minister unfortunately now has to remain in London in late May, but has sent a message to General Jaruzelski, and hopes to rearrange her visit to Poland before the end of 1988.

Dons on

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq 10 Downing Street LET

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: Prime Minister

Reference

Your Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

His Excellency General Wojciech

Jaruzelski

Chairman of the Council of State of

the Polish People's Republic

SUBJECT:

As you know, the Moscow summit has now been arranged for 29 May - 2 June. With real regret, I have decided that in view of this, and of President Reagan's planned visit to London on his way back to Washington, I shall not be able to go ahead with my visit to Poland on 29-31 May.

I am extremely sorry that this postponement has become necessary. It seems to me important that my visit should take place at a time when it will have the fullest international impact, in the interests of both our Governments. I hope to be in a position to propose alternativedates shortly - I hope very much that I shall be able to come before the end of this

Enclosures—flag(s).....

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year.

Meanwhile, I continue to look forward greatly to coming to Poland, and send you my best wishes.

23.11 PM TOURS: Pdard Febi8