

WASHINGTON — Next January, the new president of the United States will confront complicated and demanding challenges to national security policy. Although internal changes in the Soviet Union may offer new opportunities, Soviet military power continues to grow. Arms control negotiations will become more complicated. We face new threats from terrorism and other forms of unconventional warfare. Defense budgets will become even tighter.

These challenges call for thoughtful and innovative approaches on every front, from policy to negotiations to internal management. Answers will require strong leadership by the new president, bipartisan congressional support and a new spirit of cooperation and commitment from allies.

Despite the shift in relative economic power to America's allies, the cost of defense has remained disproportionately on American shoulders. Adjustments are long overdue.

Each allied country should play the instruments it plays best rather than trying to stage an entire symphony orchestra. The United States must give priority to contributions that no ally can easily duplicate. These include a survivable nuclear deterrent, a navy capable of controlling the seas and conventional forces that can respond flexibly to challenges around the world. These army and marine units should be mobile and well-armed with modern anti-tank weapons, not tied to the heavy armor that is principally useful in Europe but difficult and expensive to transport.

The United States should also play

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the principal role in assuring regional air superiority by emphasizing tactical air forces equipped with modern standoff, conventional weapons.

These changes will still leave gaps in the alliance's forward defense posture. America's allies must fill them or explain to their own citizens why territory cannot be defended without the use of nuclear weapons in the first few days of any European war.

If the Europeans wish to avoid explaining the unexplainable, they must take on the principal role of providing heavy armored forces; the necessary ammunition and equipment to sustain their own forces for NATO's 30-day requirement; effective reserves; and shelters and support facilities for U.S.-based aircraft to be dispatched to Europe in a confrontation.

The goal of these improvements is to make NATO's doctrine of flexible response truly flexible — to move away from dependence on the early use of nuclear weapons in response to a Soviet conventional attack.

Japan should be held accountable for its own announced goal of defending the air and sea lanes east to a thousand miles. It should be firmly told that it is its turn to fund a "Marshall Plan" of military and economic aid to key nations that support Western defenses, like the Philippines, Pakistan and Turkey. The Japanese also must take the lead in a multinational effort to ease heavy Third World debts

— economic threats today which, if left unattended, will become the source of military threats tomorrow.

America's most basic defense task will continue to be to provide a survivable and effective nuclear deterrent. We face a fundamental question as technology decreases missile flight times and increases their accuracy: Do we rely principally on our ballistic missile submarines and nuclear-armed bombers, or continue to pay for the additional insurance provided by a land-based intercontinental ballistic missile force that cannot be largely destroyed in a surprise attack?

The next president will have to decide on the next generation of ICBMs. Should he cancel the small mobile Midgetman ICBM and rely instead on MXs parked on trains at military bases (which need several hours' warning for escape)? He will have to ask whether the current American position at the START talks would worsen or improve strategic stability.

In particular, he should carefully review the concept that the United States proposed to the Soviets at the Moscow summit to restrict each side's mobile ICBMs to 10 square miles. Instead of spending billions on mobile missiles and then corralling them into a small, vulnerable area, why not propose a ban on all land-based mobile multiple-warhead ICBMs (such as the Soviet SS-24 and the American rail-mobile MX), along with incentives to move toward single-warhead ICBMs?

A START accord that can greatly reduce the incentive for a first strike is within reach, but only if it is combined with sensible force deployments. The Reagan administration deserves credit for paving the way for this treaty, but in its efforts to promote and pay for space-based defenses it has lost sight of the forces needed for a stabilizing agreement. Unless the "fatal flaws" in our arms control proposals and strategic plans are corrected, our national security is better served if no START agreement is signed by this administration.

Despite all of the attention and money that has been focused on the Strategic Defense Initiative in the last five years, the administration still has not established a realistic timetable for development and deployment, sound cost estimates or even credible goals.

The next administration must develop a sensible defensive research program. One aim should be to determine the affordability and feasibility of a system offering some protection against an unauthorized or accidental launch or a missile fired by one of the worst some number of countries that may be acquiring long-range missiles.

A second aim should be to develop survivable, cost-effective defensive options for enhancing the survivability of U.S. retaliatory forces, and systems for command, control and communications. Deployment of such options would depend on a number of factors, including Soviet weapons developments and the START negotiations.

We need to worry more about unconventional threats — for example Third World nations with weapon having chemical, biological or conventional warheads, such as those being used in the Iran-Iraq war. The superpowers have a clear mutual interest in preventing this proliferation.

We also need to plan countermeasures and defenses against sabotage or terrorism of our command and control facilities and the fragile infrastructure of our civilian society.

In conventional forces, the Soviet Union and its allies have a substantial advantage in Europe, both in numbers and in equipment. Even more troubling is their capability for a potentially decisive short-warning attack. NATO's priority should be substantial, disproportionate reductions in the forward-deployed Soviet armor and artillery units that would be used in a "blitzkrieg" attack.


Conventional arms control can play a major role in reducing the threat of war in Europe. Over time it can also lead to reduced arms spending in NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Our first step in these negotiations should be to seek an early data exchange (tanks, artillery, etc.) for all relevant NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. Second, to reduce the possibility of surprise attack, we should propose interim on-site inspection by monitoring teams for all military mobilization centers such as airfields, rail junctions and perhaps even military headquarters. Third, at the outset we should propose a series of verification experiments, perhaps performed by the same monitoring teams that would guard against surprise attack.

We must not only have the right forces, we must manage them effectively and efficiently. The immediate challenge for the Pentagon is to work with the Justice Department in pursuing vigorously the investigation of the Defense Department procurement scandal. At the same time, Congress and the next administration must work together to correct any systemic flaws in the Pentagon's procurement system and restore public confidence.

Over the longer term, defense managers must increase military capabilities without large increases in defense spending. This will require stable, predictable levels of defense spending; improving the quality and authority of senior civilian acquisition managers in the Pentagon; increasing the standardization and commonality of weapons and equipment among our allies and our own military services; buying weapons at efficient production rates, even if it means cutting the number of systems in production; and closing unneeded military bases abroad and at home.

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Prime Minister
 An imperialist
 — in effect the Democrat
 defense manifesto.
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