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MIDDLE EAST SITUATION: EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS' VIEWS

## SUMMARY

1. ABDUL MAGID EXPRESSES EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT'S GRATITUDE FOR HMG'S RECEPTION OF MUBARAK AND PARTY IN LONDON ON 17 MAY AND FOR OUR POLICIES (EG IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL) THEREAFTER. CURRENT TENDENCY IN ARAB/ISRAELI RELATIONS WAS UNFORTUNATELY TOWARDS RADICALISM, BUT EGYPT DETERMINED TO PURSUE PEACE PROCESS AND MODERATION. MUCH CRITICISM OF RECENT AMERICAN DIPLOMACY: LESSONS TO BE LEARNED. NEED FOR EXERCISE OF HMG'S INFLUENCE IN WASHINGTON.

## DETAIL

2. I SAW DR ABDUL MAGID AT 1100 HOURS LOCAL TIME ON 2 JUNE EXPLAINING THAT YOU WOULD LIKE AN AUTHORITATIVE EGYPTIAN READ-OUT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION WHILE YOU WERE STILL IN THE REGION. I SAID THAT HMG HAD BEEN VERY PLEASED WITH THE MUBARAK/ABDUL MAGID VISIT TO LONDON. ON THE BAGHDAD SUMMIT, REPORTS FROM HM EMBASSY BAGHDAD HAD PAID TRIBUTE TO EGYPTIAN EFFORTS TO OBTAIN MODERATE RESULTS: I KNEW YOU WOULD WISH ME TO EXPRESS THANKS FOR THAT. WE HAD DONE OUR BEST TO CALM DOWN ARAFAT IN ADVANCE OF THE SUMMIT. MEANWHILE WE HAD VOTED IN FAVOUR OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION REGARDING A SECURITY COUNCIL MISSION TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES BUT, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE DIABOLICAL SEA-BORNE RAID ON ISRAEL, WE HAD INSISTED ON A PREAMBLE DEPLORING DELIBERATELY PLANNED ACTS OF VIOLENCE. OUR VIEW, AND THAT OF THE AMERICANS, WAS THAT THE PLO MUST CONDEMN THE RAID EXPLICITLY AND IN PUBLIC. IT WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SAY, AS THE PLO HAD SAID TO HM AMBASSADOR TUNIS, THAT THE ATMOSPHERE IN THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE WAS TO CONDEMN THIS INDIVIDUAL ACT. MEANWHILE I NOTED THAT THE ENTOURAGE OF COL GADDAFI (WHO PAID A LIGHTNING VISIT TO CAIRO ON 1 JUNE) HAD CLAIMED THAT LIBYA WAS IN NO WAY RESPONSIBLE.

3. DR ABDUL MAGID SAID THAT FOR ALL THE REASONS I HAD MENTIONED HE WAS GLAD TO SEE ME AT THIS TIME. HE WISHED TO EXPRESS HIS APPRECIATION TO YOU FOR THE ARRANGEMENTS MADE IN LONDON. IT HAD BEEN AN EXCEPTIONALLY USEFUL, FRIENDLY AND WARM VISIT. HE HAD PARTICULARLY ENJOYED HIS TALKS WITH YOU AND MR WALDEGRAVE. AS HE HAD SAID IN A BBC INTERVIEW, EGYPT AND BRITAIN WERE ON THE SAME WAVE LENGTH ON MANY ASPECTS OF THEIR FOREIGN POLICIES. EGYPT VALUED THE POSITION OF HMG AND THE CAIRO/LONDON DIALOGUE FOR THE BENEFIT OF PEACE. EGYPTIANS PARTICULARLY APPRECIATED THE BRITISH STAND IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 31 MAY.

4. MEANWHILE EGYPT AND THE REGION WERE ENTERING A DIFFICULT PHASE. EGYPT WOULD BE STUBBORN IN CONTINUING HER PEACE PROCESS EFFORTS. SHE HAD INVESTED A GREAT DEAL IN THESE EFFORTS AND IT WOULD BE A GREAT PITY TO PUT AN END TO THEM NOW. HE HOPED THAT HMG WOULD HELP TO CONVINCE THE AMERICANS OF THE NEED FOR FURTHER EFFORTS.

5. AT THE SUMMIT ABDUL MAGID HAD TRIED AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL TO SOFTEN THE LANGUAGE AND THE ATTITUDE OF CERTAIN ARAB COUNTRIES. THE EGYPTIANS HAD ENJOYED GOOD COOPERATION WITH THE SAUDIS AND HAD BEEN ABLE TO CHANGE SOME EXTREME WORDING. AS REGARDS IRAQ, THE EGYPTIANS HAD URGED THE IRAQIS NOT TO NAME NAMES IN PASSAGES DEALING WITH THEIR DISPUTES WITH WESTERN COUNTRIES. THIS HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL. IN WORDING CRITICISING THE UNITED STATES, THE EGYPTIANS HAD OBTAINED THE DELETION OF SPECIFIC ATTACKS ON THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION - THOUGH THEY HAD HAD TO ACCEPT WORDING CRITICISING THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS PARTICULARLY FOR THEIR VOTE ON JERUSALEM. IT WAS TRUE THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD NOT OBTAINED SPECIFIC REFERENCES TO UN RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 BUT, IN DR ABDUL MAGID'S VIEW, THIS POINT WAS COVERED BY THE REFERENCE TO THE CASABLANCA SUMMIT OF MAY 1989 WHICH EXPLICITLY ENDORSED THESE TWO RESOLUTIONS. SOME CONCERN HAD BEEN EXPRESSED ABOUT THE PHRASE RELATING TO THE OCCUPATION OF QUOTE PALESTINE AND THE OTHER OCCUPIED TERRITORIES UNQUOTE. ABDUL MAGID CLAIMED THAT THIS PHRASEOLOGY IMPLIED NO CHANGE OF POSITION AND THAT THE PHRASE ABOUT THE OTHER OCCUPIED TERRITORIES REFERRED TO THE GOLAN HEIGHTS.

6. MOST UNFORTUNATELY AMERICAN DIPLOMACY HAD NOT BEEN HELPFUL TO EGYPT. THE ANNOUNCEMENT (DURING THE SUMMIT) OF THE ALLOCATION OF US DOLLARS 400 MILLION EXTRA AID FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF SOVIET JEWS HAD HAD A NEGATIVE EFFECT. EVEN WORSE HAD BEEN THE BADLY DRAFTED NOTE BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO THE ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARIAT STATING THAT THE LEAGUE QUOTE SHOULD UNQUOTE DO THIS AND THAT. STRICTLY

FOR MR HURD'S INFORMATION, THE ALGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD EXPLOITED THIS BY ENQUIRING, WITH OBVIOUS REFERENCE TO CAIRO, WHETHER DELEGATIONS WERE RECEIVING INSTRUCTIONS FROM FOREIGN POWERS. ABDUL MAGID HAD REPLIED THAT HE RECEIVED NO INSTRUCTIONS FROM OTHER GOVERNMENTS, BUT THAT HE WAS ACCUSTOMED TO EXAMINING PROPOSALS ON THEIR MERITS. EGYPT HAD NOT HESITATED TO CRITICISE AMERICA WHEN SHE ATTACKED LIBYA. THE PARALLEL NOTE FROM THE SOVIET UNION TO THE ARAB LEAGUE HAD BEEN FAR LESS CLUMSY IN TONE AND SUBSTANCE. THE AMERICAN MISHANDLING OF THE PROPOSAL TO SEND A UN MISSION TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES HAD ALSO CAUSED RESENTMENT AS, OF COURSE, HAD THEIR UNWARRANTED VETO. IT WAS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR THE AMERICANS TO SAY THAT THE PROPOSAL IN THE ARAB DRAFT RESOLUTION WOULD NOT BE SUPPORTED BY ISRAEL. IT WAS NOT FOR THE AMERICANS TO SUPPORT ISRAELI POSITIONS IN ADVANCE. AMERICAN POSITIONS HAD THEIR OWN VALUE, IRRESPECTIVE OF ISRAELI REACTIONS. ABDUL MAGID ALSO CRITICISED THE AMERICAN STATE DEPARTMENT FOR THEIR PUBLIC WARNING TO AMERICAN CITIZENS ABOUT THEIR SECURITY IN THE AREA. TRAGICALLY, THE CURRENT TREND IN THE REGION WAS TOWARDS RADICALISM, BUT THIS KIND OF AMERICAN WARNING ONLY CONTRIBUTED TO TENSION.

7. DR ABDUL MAGID COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE AMERICANS HAD TREATED THEIR EGYPTIAN FRIENDS IN THIS WAY. WHAT WERE FRIENDS FOR UNLESS ONE DISCUSSED AND CONSULTED WITH THEM IN ADVANCE? THE AMERICANS MUST LEARN THAT THERE WERE LESSONS TO BE DRAWN FROM THEIR CLUMSY BEHAVIOUR, PARTICULARLY THEIR HANDLING OF THE BAGHDAD SUMMIT. HE CLEARLY HOPED THE BRITISH COULD FIND A WAY OF INFLUENCING THEM. HE MADE AN UNFAVOURABLE CONTRAST BETWEEN AMERICAN BEHAVIOUR AND THAT OF HMG WHICH HAD DISCUSSED IN ADVANCE WITH THE EGYPTIANS THEIR PROBLEMS WITH THE IRAQIS AND GIVEN THE EGYPTIANS AN OPPORTUNITY OF USING THEIR INFLUENCE IN BAGHDAD. I SAID WE WERE GRATEFUL FOR THIS.

8. TURNING TO JORDAN, DR ABDUL MAGID SAID HE HAD REGISTERED IN BAGHDAD AN ATTITUDE OF GREAT ANXIETY ON THE PART OF THE KING AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER. THEY SEEMED TO EXPECT AN ISRAELI ATTACK AND MEANWHILE THE IRAQIS HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES THEY WOULD RETALIATE. MEANWHILE THE AMERICANS MUST BE MORE SENSITIVE ABOUT THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF THE EMIGRATION OF SOVIET JEWS ON THE PEOPLE OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (AND INDIRECTLY ON JORDAN) ALTHOUGH OF COURSE ABDUL MAGID WAS NOT OPPOSING THE EMIGRATION TO ISRAEL AS SUCH.

9. AS REGARDS THE SEA-BORNE RAID AGAINST ISRAEL (WHICH ABDUL MAGID IMPLIED WAS THE ACT OF ABOLU ABBAS), HE SHARED THE BRITISH VIEW

THAT THIS WAS A MOST UNFORTUNATE DEVELOPMENT. HE COULD ASSURE ME THAT NO SIGN OF THE OPERATION HAD SHOWN UP ON EGYPTIAN RADAR SCREENS. AS I HAD MENTIONED, THE LIBYANS HAD CLAIMED IN CAIRO ON 1 JUNE THAT THE ALLEGATION THAT THEY WERE INVOLVED IN THE RAID WAS COMPLETELY BASELESS. (ABDUL MAGID DID NOT COMMENT ON THIS OR ON MY REPEATED INSISTENCE THAT THE PLO MUST MAKE AN EXPLICIT DENIAL). THE EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER THOUGHT IT LIKELY THAT THE AMERICA/PLO DIALOGUE WOULD BE SUSPENDED BUT IT WAS VITAL THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE BROKEN. HE HOPED THE BRITISH WOULD MAKE THIS POINT IN WASHINGTON. ONCE THIS DIALOGUE WAS BROKEN IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO REINSTATE.

10. IN CONCLUSION DR ABDUL MAGID SAID HE WOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL FOR BRITISH ASSISTANCE TO MAINTAIN THE PEACE PROCESS AND, MORE IMMEDIATELY, NOT TO ALLOW THE SITUATION TO BECOME MORE RADICALISED AND MORE DIFFICULT. HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD USE OUR INFLUENCE WITH THE AMERICANS. I SAID THAT YOU WOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL TO HAVE ABDUL MAGID'S VIEWS AND THAT I KNEW YOU INTENDED TO REINSTATE YOUR VISIT TO CAIRO WHEN THIS BECAME POSSIBLE. MEANWHILE I KNEW YOU FELT OUR ESSENTIAL TASK WAS TO KEEP THE AMERICANS ENGAGED. YOU BELIEVED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WAS ULTIMATELY THE RIGHT ANSWER BUT THAT THIS COULD NOT HAPPEN IMMEDIATELY SINCE THE ISRAELIS WOULD INEVITABLY PREVENT IT FROM TAKING PLACE. I THOUGHT THAT, AS THE EGYPTIANS HAD THEMSELVES ADVOCATED IN EARLY 1989, WE WOULD CONTINUE TO TRY TO DO SOMETHING WITH THE PERMANENT FIVE.

## COMMENT

11. IN MY TWO AND A HALF YEARS IN CAIRO, I HAVE NEVER KNOWN THE BLAND AND FUNDAMENTALLY PRO-AMERICAN EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SPEAK WITH SUCH DISAPPOINTMENT OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT HE WILL HAVE SAID ALL THIS TO MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE WHOM HE SAW ON 31 MAY. ABDUL MAGID WAS CLEARLY NOT VERY HAPPY WITH HIS EXPERIENCE IN BAGHDAD. HE SAID RATHER MOURNFULLY THAT IRAQ HAD BEEN THE MAIN BENEFICIARY. HE CONFIDENTLY EXPECTED THAT THE NEXT SUMMIT - TO BE HELD IN EGYPT IN NOVEMBER - WOULD BE BETTER PREPARED. HE PARTICULARLY COMMENDED THE ARAB DECISION (AN OLD EGYPTIAN OBJECTIVE) OF HOLDING REGULAR, ROUTINE ANNUAL SUMMITS IN FUTURE.

12. ABDUL MAGID DID NOT MENTION HIS LIGHTNING VISIT WITH MUBARAK TO DAMASCUS ON 30 MAY (NOR APART FROM THE ABOVE BRIEF REFERENCES) TO GADDAFI'S BRIEF VISIT TO CAIRO ON 1 JUNE, THOUGH THE LATTER IS INCIDENTALLY SOMETHING OF A DIPLOMATIC COUP FOR THE EGYPTIANS. GADDAFI HAS HITHERTO DECLINED TO VISIT THE EGYPTIAN CAPITAL BECAUSE

OF THE PRESENCE OF THE ISRAEL EMBASSY HERE.

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