

SECRET  
FM WASHINGTON  
TO DESKBY 130600Z FCO  
TELNO 1911  
OF 130248Z AUGUST 90  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, RIYADH, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, AMMAN  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS, ROME, MOSCOW, PEKING, PARIS  
INFO IMMEDIATE BONN, UKDEL NATO, MODUK, ACTOR  
INFO PRIORITY OTHER EC POSTS, UKMIS GENEVA

IRAQ/KUWAIT: US POLICY  
SUMMARY

1. A WIDE-RANGING MEETING WITH KIMMITT. AGREEMENT TO KEEP IN TOUCH ON EXCHANGES WITH KING HUSSEIN. US INTEREST IN POSSIBLE EC ECONOMIC HELP FOR JORDAN.
2. SUPPORT IN PRINCIPLE FOR A DEMARCHE IN BAGHDAD ON DETAINED FOREIGNERS, BUT AMERICAN THINKING STILL AT AN EARLY STAGE, INCLUDING ON CONTACTS WITH RUSSIANS.
3. BAKER INTERESTED IN UK IDEAS ON USING MILITARY COMMITTEE. INITIAL VIEW THAT COMMITTEE MIGHT HAVE ROLE IF IT FOCUSED ON NAVAL OPERATIONS AND HAD NO COMMAND AND CONTROL FUNCTION. US WILLING TO BE GUIDED BY UK ON WEU ROLE.
4. US DETERMINED TO WARN SADDAM OFF USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, AND AGAINST ATTACK ON JORDAN.
5. US AGREES NOT TO ISSUE FURTHER ARTICLE 51 NOTIFICATION WITHOUT UK AGREEMENT.
6. HINTS THAT US CONSIDERING EARLY THINNING OUT OF DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN KUWAIT.
7. US UNFREEZING KUWAITI ASSETS ON REASONABLE DEMAND FROM BONA FIDE KUWAITI REPRESENTATIVES.
8. US BELIEVES SCR 661 APPLIES TO ALL ACTIVITY ANYWHERE BY IRAQI AIRWAYS: KIMMITT ASKS WHAT HMG AND OTHER EUROPEANS ARE DOING.

DETAIL

9. I SPENT 45 MINUTES WITH KIMMITT (UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS) LATE ON 12 AUGUST TO COMPARE NOTES ON A NUMBER OF CURRENT ISSUES.

JORDAN

10. I TOLD KIMMITT THAT I HOPED WE COULD CONTINUE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH ON OUR DEALINGS WITH THE KING, AND GAVE HIM, ON A STRICTLY PERSONAL BASIS, A COPY OF AMMAN TELNO 410 (NOT TO ALL), REPORTING MR REEVE'S INTERVIEW WITH THE KING AND THE HANDING OVER OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE.

11. KIMMITT THANKED ME, AND GAVE INSTRUCTIONS THAT WE SHOULD BE BRIEFED ON THE OUTCOME OF AMBASSADOR HARRISON'S MEETING WITH THE KING, PROBABLY ON 13 AUGUST.

12. KIMMITT ALSO ASKED ABOUT A PRESS REPORT WHICH HE HAD SEEN EARLIER ON 12 AUGUST THAT DI MICHAELIS HAD ANNOUNCED THAT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WOULD BE WILLING TO HELP MITIGATE THE EFFECT OF SANCTIONS ON JORDAN: COULD WE ELABORATE? I SAID THAT I WAS UNBRIEFED, BUT WOULD INVESTIGATE: GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS. FOREIGNERS DETAINED IN IRAQ

13. I TOLD KIMMITT, AGAIN ON A STRICTLY PERSONAL BASIS, THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SENT A MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV, IN WHICH SHE HAD ENCOURAGED THE RUSSIANS TO CONTINUE TO STAND ALONGSIDE THE INTERANTIONAL COMMUNITY IN DEALING WITH IRAQ. IN PASSING ON MRS THATCHER'S MESSAGE, OUR AMBASSADOR HAD BEEN ASKED TO URGE THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO SHOW SOLIDARITY WITH OTHER COUNTRIES WHOSE NATIONALS WERE STILL DETAINED. WE WERE NOW CONSIDERING IN LONDON WHAT FURTHER DEMARCHE MIGHT BE MADE IN BAGHDAD TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF THOSE DETAINED IN BOTH IRAQ AND KUWAIT. EARLIER ON 12 AUGUST THE HEAD OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S IRAQ/KUWAIT TASKFORCE, AMBASSADOR MCCARTHY, HAD TOLD US THAT THE US WOULD IN PRINCIPLE SUPPORT AN APPROACH OF THE KIND SUGGESTED IN YOUR TELNO 1426 TO MOSCOW (NOT TO ALL): WE WERE CANVASSING IDEAS ON WHAT PERMUTATION OF COUNTRIES WAS MOST LIKELY TO HAVE AN EFFECT ON THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES.

14. I THEN GAVE KIMMITT A COPY OF BAGHDAD TELNO 758 (NOT TO ALL) GIVING MR WALKER'S PRELIMINARY VIEWS ON REPRESENTATIONS TO THE IRAQIS.

15. IN RESPONSE, KIMMITT INDICATED THAT AMERICAN THINKING ON A FURTHER DEMARCHE TO THE IRAQIS WAS STILL AT A FORMATIVE STAGE. PRESIDENT BUSH ATTACHED HIGH PRIORITY TO THE DEPARTURE OF FOREIGN NATIONALS FROM IRAQ/KUWAIT. THE AMERICANS HAD HAD LIMITED CONTACTS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES' EMBASSIES IN BAGHDAD AND KUWAIT: AND THERE HAD BEEN SOME CONSIDERATION OF WHAT FURTHER USE SHOULD BE MADE OF THE ICRC MECHANISM. THERE SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE NO QUESTION OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES MAKING DEALS WITH IRAQ: THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN AT PAINS TO STRESS IN PUBLIC THAT ALL FOREIGN NATIONALS, NOT JUST AMERICANS, AND CIVILIANS AS WELL AS DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL, SHOULD BE FREE TO LEAVE.

16. KIMMITT CONTINUED THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD NOW CONSIDER WHAT MIGHT BE DONE FURTHER AND THEN CONSULT US AGAIN. HE THOUGHT THAT BAKER MIGHT HAVE MENTIONED THE ISSUE TO SHEVARDNADZE, AND ASKED HIS STAFF FOR TALKING POINTS FOR BAKER TO USE WHEN HE NEXT SPOKE TO SHEVARDNADZE.

MULTINATIONAL NAVAL FORCES AND THE UN MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

17. I THANKED KIMMITT FOR ALERTING US TO BAKER'S ANNOUNCEMENT EARLIER ON 12 AUGUST THAT THE US HAD RECEIVED A KUWAITI REQUEST FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE, AND THAT IN THE US VIEW THIS PROVIDED AN ADEQUATE LEGAL BASIS FOR QUOTE INTER-DICTION UNQUOTE (MY TELNO 1908, NOT TO ALL). THE QUESTION NOW WAS WHAT IF ANY USE MIGHT BE MADE OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE.

18. KIMMITT SAID THAT BAKER HAD TAKEN A CLOSE INTEREST IN THE IDEAS IN YOUR TELNO 435 TO UKMIS NEW YORK (NOT TO ALL) WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE CONSIDERING FURTHER ON 13 AUGUST. HE PROMISED US A REACTION LATER THAT DAY OR BY 14 AUGUST AT THE LATEST. BAKER'S VIEW WAS THAT US AND UK THINKING ON THIS WAS MOVING IN VERY MUCH THE SAME DIRECTION. BAKER THOUGHT THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO OPERATIONAL ROLE FOR THE UN, DOUBTED WHETHER IT WAS NECESSARY TO GO BACK TO THE UN FOR FURTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY, AND AGREED THAT THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON THE NAVAL SIDE. THE QUESTION WAS HOW TO QUOTE OPERATIONALISE UNQUOTE THE SOVIET SUGGESTION (WHICH WAS NOT A FORMAL PROPOSAL) WHILE THE CHINESE REMAINED UNENTHUSIASTIC. KIMMITT ENDED BY REPEATING THAT THE MAJORITY VIEW IN THE US GOVERNMENT WAS TO FAVOUR AN APPROACH ON THE LINES SUGGESTED BY THE UK WHICH KEPT THE SOVIET UNION IN PLAY, FOCUSED ON NAVAL OPERATIONS, BUT HAD NO COMMAND AND CONTROL FUNCTION.

19. I THEN ASKED KIMMITT FOR AN INITIAL REACTION TO THE IDEAS ON A ROLE FOR THE WEU IN YOUR TELNO 1403 (NOT TO ALL). KIMMITT'S RESPONSE WAS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE GUIDED BY HMG'S INSIGHTS ON WHETHER INVOLVEMENT OF THE WEU WOULD BE HELPFUL. IF WE THOUGHT A WEU ROLE HELPED BRING OTHERS SUCH AS THE DUTCH AND BELGIANS ALONG, THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM FROM THE AMERICANS. THE US AND UK SAW EYE TO EYE ON NOT UNDERMINING NATO'S ABILITY TO DEVELOP A ROLE IN THE CRISIS. CLEARLY THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT WANT THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE WEU TO CUT ACROSS THAT. SUBJECT ONLY TO THAT RESERVATION, THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD GO ALONG WITH WHATEVER ROLE FOR THE WEU THE UK RECOMMENDED. KIMMITT ADDED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED ALL THIS WITH BAKER.

US REACTION TO IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

20. I THEN ASKED KIMMITT IF HE COULD ELABORATE ON GENERAL SCOWCROFT'S AGREEMENT, IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION ON TELEVISION ON 12 AUGUST (SEE MIFT, NOT TO ALL), THAT IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS WAS TANTAMOUNT TO A NUCLEAR ATTACK. THERE MIGHT BE PRESS INTEREST IN THIS REMARK.

21. STRESSING THAT HE WAS UNSIGHTED ON SCOWCROFT'S REMARKS, KIMMITT SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS PUT DOWN A SERIES OF MARKERS THAT IRAQI USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION WOULD INVITE A SEVERE US RESPONSE. KIMMITT HAD

EARLIER ON 12 AUGUST READ INTELLIGENCE WHICH SUGGESTED THAT THE IRAQIS HAD BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AVAILABLE TO THEM. THE INTENTION WAS TO MAKE SADDAM THINK TWICE OR THREE TIMES ABOUT USING ANY SUCH WEAPONS. BUT, TO KIMMITT'S KNOWLEDGE (WHICH HE SAID WAS INCOMPLETE, SINCE HE WAS NOT PRIVY TO EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE DEFENCE DEPARTMENT AND THE PRESIDENT ON NUCLEAR POLICY), THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION ON POSSIBLE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST IRAQ: AND HE VERY MUCH DOUBTED WHETHER IT HAD EVEN BEEN CONSIDERED.

US REACTIONS TO IRAQI ATTACK ON JORDAN.

22. I THEN ASKED ABOUT SCOWCROFT'S COMMENT THAT AN IRAQI ATTACK ON JORDAN WOULD BE REGARDED IN THE SAME WAY AS THE INVASION OF KUWAIT. KIMMITT SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD SEEN NO SIGNS THAT IRAQ WAS PLANNING TO MOVE AGAINST JORDAN, BUT WERE ANXIOUS TO DO WHATEVER THEY COULD TO PREVENT THIS BECOMING A US/ISRAEL/THE WEST VERSUS THE ARABS DISPUTE.

ARTICLE 51 NOTIFICATION

23. I SAID THAT THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN SOME CONFUSION ABOUT ARTICLE 51 NOTIFICATION (MY TELNO 1909, NOT TO ALL): THE AMERICANS WERE NOW APPARENTLY CONSIDERING A SECOND LETTER, REFLECTING THE KUWAITI REQUEST. WE HAD NOT LODGED OUR NOTIFICATION, AND DID NOT EXPECT TO RECEIVE OUR REQUEST FROM KUWAIT UNTIL 13 AUGUST AT THE EARLIEST.

24. KIMMITT, WHO WAS UNAWARE OF THE PLAN FOR A SECOND AMERICAN LETTER, IMMEDIATELY GAVE INSTRUCTIONS (WHICH THE STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISERS HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED TO US) THAT THE SECOND LETTER SHOULD NOT BE SENT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNTIL THE QUOTE BRITS UNQUOTE HAD SIGNED ON. IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE TWO SIDES MOVED IN STEP, AND THE AMERICANS SHOULD PROBABLY NOW WAIT UNTIL WE HAD RECEIVED OUR REQUEST FROM THE EMIR: IN ANY EVENT, THEY WOULD NOT MOVE WITHOUT OUR SAY SO.

DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN KUWAIT

25. I GAVE KIMMITT, ON A STRICTLY PERSONAL BASIS, A COPY OF KUWAIT TELNO 354. KIMMITT PROMISED TO LET US HAVE US VIEWS ON THIS AS SOON AS THEY HAD BEEN REFINED.

26. HE THEN ASKED ME MORE GENERALLY WHAT BRITISH THINKING WAS ON MAINTAINING A DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN KUWAIT. THE US INSTINCT WAS TO MOVE OUT AS MANY DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL AND DEPENDENTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, LEAVING ONLY A CORE BEHIND. THE AMERICAN CONCERN WAS THAT DIPLOMATS PRESENTED A MORE ATTRACTIVE TARGET FOR HOSTAGE-TAKING/TERRORISM THAN ORDINARY CIVILIANS. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION, KIMMITT SAID HE THOUGHT THE US PRESS WOULD UNDERSTAND IF THE US DECIDED TO MOVE DIPLOMATS OUT IF ITS BEST

EFFORTS TO SECURE FREE PASSAGE FOR US NATIONALS HAD FAILED. WE AGREED TO KEEP IN TOUCH ON THIS.

FREEZING OF KUWAITI ASSETS

27. I THEN ASKED KIMMITT WHAT THE US HAD BEEN DOING ABOUT UNFREEZING KUWAITI ASSETS TO BE USED BY KUWAITI MISSIONS ETC (YOUR TELNO 1405, NOT TO ALL).

28. KIMMITT SAID THAT THE BASIS FOR US THINKING WAS THAT THE FREEZE WAS PROTECTIVE. IF THE LEGITIMATE KUWAITI AUTHORITIES WISHED TO USE THOSE ASSETS FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES, IT WAS NOT FOR THE US AUTHORITIES TO QUESTION WHETHER THAT USE WAS JUSTIFIED. THEY HAD THEREFORE GIVEN A GENERAL EXEMPTION FOR THE RUNNING OF KUWAITI MISSIONS. THEY WERE DISCUSSING WITH THE KUWAITI AMBASSADOR HERE (WHOM THE AMERICANS HAD FOUND A RELIABLE INTERLOCUTOR) HOW MUCH NEEDED TO BE RELEASED FOR OTHER KUWAITI GOVERNMENT PURPOSES. THE US TREASURY (KIMMITT MENTIONED THE DEPUTY SECRETARY, ROBSON) HAD BEEN TOLD TO UNFREEZE FOR THE KUWAITIS WHATEVER THEY ASKED FOR WITHIN REASON. THE TREASURY WOULD, HOWEVER, REPORT ANY EXTRAORDINARY REQUEST.

29. KIMMITT ALSO MENTIONED THAT THE IRAQI DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK HAD BEEN EXEMPTED FROM THE GENERAL FREEZE ON IRAQI ASSETS.

IRAQI AIRWAYS

30. FINALLY, STRESSING THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, I MENTIONED TO KIMMITT THAT AIRLINE SOURCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAD PICKED UP A SUGGESTION THAT THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES WERE PRESSING IRAQI AIRWAYS AND THE IRAQI EMBASSY IN LONDON TO TRY TO TRANSFER CASH TO IRAQ.

31. KIMMITT SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD PICKED UP SIMILAR REPORTS, AND WERE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED AT ONE THAT IRAQI AIRWAYS WERE PLANNING TO MOVE A SUBSTANTIAL SUM IN STOLEN LIQUID KUWAITI ASSETS OUT OF IRAQ. THE US VIEW WAS THAT UNSCR 661 PROHIBITED ALL ACTIVITY BY IRAQI AIRWAYS IN ANY COUNTRY. AN INTER-AGENCY GROUP WAS CONSIDERING A SEPARATE ENFORCEMENT PLAN FOR MOVING AGAINST IRAQ AIRWAYS: AND THE FBI HAD ALREADY CLOSED IRAQI AIRWAYS OFFICES IN THE UNITED STATES. KIMMITT ENDED BY SAYING THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE VERY CONCERNED BY ANY REPORTS THAT IRAQI AIRWAYS WERE CONTINUING TO OPERATE IN BRITAIN OR ANY OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRY: WHAT WAS THE POSITION? GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

32. SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

MEYER

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DISTRIBUTION

34

MAIN 34

NO DISTRIBUTION  
 PS  
 PS/MR WALDEGRAVE  
 PS/PUS  
 MR TOMKYS  
 MR GORE-BOOTH  
 MR FAIRWEATHER  
 MR GOULDEN  
 HD/MED  
 HD/NENAD  
 HD/NAD  
 HD/EED  
 HD/SOVIET D  
 HD/SED  
 HD/UND  
 HD/ACDD  
 HD/CONSULAR D  
 HD/NEWS D  
 HD/NPDD

HD/SECPOL D  
 HD/AMD  
 HD/ECD(E)  
 MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY  
 MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE  
 MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE  
 MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE  
 (BY TUBE H29)  
 PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST  
 SIR P CRADOCK,  
 (NO 10 DOWNING ST)  
 CABINET OFFICE DIO  
 (BY TUBE H29)  
 AUS (C) MODUK  
 HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK  
 MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND  
 EMERGENCY UNIT  
 RESIDENT CLERK  
 (PASSED TO EMERGENCY UNIT)

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