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TO DESKBY 131200Z FCO

TELNO 1490

OF 131108Z AUGUST 90

INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, KUWAIT

ADVANCE COPY

FCO TELS 1425/26: IRAQ/KUWAIT: MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV AND SOVIET ATTITUDE

SUMMARY

1. MESSAGE CONVEYED VIA DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, BELONOGOV. BELONOGOV DISTANCES SOVIET GOVERNMENT FROM EARLIER IMPLICIT CRITICISM OF DEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES TO SAUDI ARABIA. HE ALSO CONTRADICTS WEEKEND TASS STATEMENT ABOUT EVACUATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS FROM IRAQ: NO AGREEMENT YET GIVEN BY IRAQI GOVERNMENT. SEEKS OUR VIEWS ON SITUATION OF EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT: INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED.

2. SHEVARDNADZE SAID TO BE CONSIDERING A POSSIBLE MESSAGE TO YOU ABOUT UN MACHINERY AND MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE.

DETAIL

3. I WAS GIVEN AN APPOINTMENT WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BELONOGOV EARLY ON 13 AUGUST TO DELIVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV IN TUR.

4. I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED, STRESSING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRESENCE OF BRITISH FORCES IN THE AREA AND THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 661. I UNDERLINED THE VALUE OF CLOSE CO-ORDINATION BETWEEN THE FIVE AND OTHER INTERESTED COUNTRIES, AND OUR APPRECIATION OF THE SOVIET ROLE. BELONOGOV EXPRESSED RECIPROCAL SATISFACTION AT EFFECTIVE JOINT ACTION IN NEW YORK, AND PRAISED THE ACTIVE ROLE OF THE UK PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE.

5. BELONOGOV THAN SAID THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT 'VIEWED WITH UNDERSTANDING' THE REASONS WHICH HAD LED THE UNITED STATES TO DEPLOY FORCES TO SAUDI ARABIA. HE EXPRESSED SIMILAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE DECISION BY OTHER STATES TO DO LIKEWISE, AT THE INVITATION OF THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT. AND HE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AT THE DECISIONS TAKEN BY ARAB GOVERNMENT'S AT THE CAIRO SUMMIT.

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PS/PUS
MR TOMKYS
~~MR GORE-BOOTH~~
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR GOULDEN
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/NAD
HD/EED
HD/SOVIET D
HD/SED
HD/UND
HD/ACDD
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/NEWS D
HD/NPDD

HD/SECPOL D
HD/AMD
HD/ECD(E)
MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK,
(NO 10 DOWNING ST)
CABINET OFFICE D10
(BY TUBE H29)
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
AUS (C) MODUK
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND (2)
~~EMERGENCY UNIT~~

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PS	HD/AMD
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE	HD/ECD(E)
PS/PUS	MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
MR TOMKYS	MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
MR GORE-BOOTH	MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
MR FAIRWEATHER	MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
MR GOULDEN	(BY TUBE H29)
HD/MED	PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
HD/NENAD	SIR P CRADOCK,
HD/NAD	(NO 10 DOWNING ST)
HD/EED	CABINET OFFICE DIO
HD/SOVIET D	(BY TUBE H29)
HD/SED	SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
HD/UND	AUS (C) MODUK
HD/ACDD	HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
HD/CONSULAR D	MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND (2)
HD/NEWS D	EMERGENCY UNIT
HD/NPDD	

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