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FM BAHRAIN  
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*mf*

OF 141430Z AUGUST 90

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SIC I9M

RIYADH PASS TO AIR VICE MARSHALL S WILSON (ADC)

IRAQ/KUWAIT: BAHRAIN

SUMMARY

1. AMIR AND CROWN PRINCE INSISTENT THAT BRITAIN SHOULD MAKE SOME DEPLOYMENT TO BAHRAIN. NO REPLY TO PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE. WELCOME FOR BLOCKADE. NO BAHRAINI DEPLOYMENT TO ARAB FORCE IN SAUDI ARABIA. EXPECTATION THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WILL BE DISLODGED BY US MILITARY ACTION.

DETAIL

2. I SAW THE AMIR AND (WITH FOF2, CO YORK AND LEADER BMAT) THE CROWN PRINCE TODAY. I HAVE REPORTED SEPARATELY THEIR VIEWS ON THE NEED FOR MORE UK HELP TO BAHRAIN AND MY ATTEMPTS TO DAMPEN EXPECTATIONS (MY U/N 141350Z AUG TO MOD).

3. THE AMIR DID NOT GIVE ME THE EXPECTED REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE. HE THANKED ME FOR IT BUT, AS THERE IS NO CURRENT UK DEPLOYMENT TO BAHRAIN, HE CLEARLY FELT HE HAD NOTHING TO SAY IN WRITING. I EXPLAINED WHY I THOUGHT OMAN HAD BEEN CHOSEN FOR THE JAGUARS AND STRESSED THAT BOTH RAF AND RN DEPLOYMENTS WERE FOR THE DEFENCE OF BAHRAIN AS OF OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES. THAT CUT NO ICE.

4. THE AMIR MADE THE FOLLOWING OTHER POINTS:

(A) HE WELCOMED OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE BLOCKADE OF IRAQ BUT ASKED WHAT FORCE THERE WAS IN THE CLAIM THAT IT WAS ILLEGAL. I SAID THAT WE HAD BEEN ASKED BY THE KUWAITIS AND THAT WAS ENOUGH.

*Prime Minister*  
*Alan Clark will report further after his visit. If he confirms the Bahraini view, we shall have to find some more aircraft.*  
*CA*  
*14/8*

(B) HE WAS SURE, THOUGH HAD NOT BEEN TOLD, THAT THE US WOULD FIND A PRETEXT TO MOUNT AN OPERATION AGAINST THE IRAQIS IN KUWAIT AS SOON AS THEIR FORCES WERE READY. I STRESSED THAT UK DEPLOYMENTS WERE PURELY DEFENSIVE.

(C) BAHRAIN DID NOT (NOT) INTEND TO SEND TROOPS TO THE ARAB FORCE IN SAUDI ARABIA BEYOND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE PENINSULAR SHIELD.

(D) HE HOPED NO MORE BRITONS WOULD LEAVE: I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THOSE WHO INTENDED TO GO HAD GONE.

5. THE CROWN PRINCE ALSO EXPECTED SADDAM HUSSEIN TO BE FORCED OUT OF KUWAIT BY MILITARY ACTION. I ASKED IF HE MEANT THE ARAB FORCE: HE SNORTED - OF COURSE NOT, BY THE AMERICANS. HE WELCOMED UK DEPLOYMENTS. THE AMERICANS NEEDED THAT, BOTH AS SUPPORT AND TO KEEP THEM IN CHECK. HE LOOKED FORWARD TO THE PERIOD AFTER THE CONFLICT. WHAT SORT OF IRAQ WOULD THERE BE? IT MIGHT DISINTEGRATE. I SAID THAT A STABLE STRONG IRAQ UNDER MODERATE LEADERSHIP WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO A DESTABILISING DISINTEGRATION. SHAIKH HAMAD SAID THAT THE GCC WOULD NEED TO TAKE ITS DEFENCE MORE SERIOUSLY IN FUTURE AND WOULD BE LOOKING FOR FORMAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH WESTERN COUNTRIES: THEY WOULD NOT ALLOW THEMSELVES IN FUTURE TO BE PUT OFF BY THE NOISES OF THE RADICALS. HE (LIKE THE AMIR) LAMENTED KING HUSSEIN'S TOTAL LOSS OF GRIP, SYMBOLISED BY HIS USE OF THE TITLE SHERIF, AND ACKNOWLEDGED THE RISK INHERENT IN THE POTENTIAL COLLAPSE OF JORDAN.

SHEPHERD

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