

COMMENT:

15B(a-b)

SECRET  
 1 WASHINGTON  
 2 DESKBY 160100Z FCO  
 3 ELNO 1936  
 4 152310Z AUGUST 90  
 5 NFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, MOSCOW  
 6 NFO IMMEDIATE RIYADH, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, CAIRO, MODUK, BONN  
 7 NFO IMMEDIATE ANKARA, AOTR

OUR TELNO 1419 (NOT TO ALL): IRAQ/KUWAIT/JORDAN  
 ODUK FOR DUS(P)  
 SUMMARY

ACTION TAKEN WITH STATE AND NSC WHO UNDERTOOK TO PASS MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT. US SEE ISSUES AND POLICY IN LARGELY SIMILAR TERMS TO OURSELVES. ACUTELY ALIVE TO ISRAELI DIMENSION AND WILL MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT WITH TEL AVIV. WILL BE FORMULATING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ON AQABA OVER NEXT 48 HOURS. INTEND TO TAKE A FIRM LINE ON SANCTIONS, WITH ANY HELP TO KING HUSSEIN CONDITIONAL ON EFFECTIVE JORDANIAN ACTION FIRST. PREPARING AGAINST A POSSIBLE NEED TO COUNTER A PEACE PLAN WHICH HUSSEIN MAY FLOAT. SWIFT READ OUT ON HUSSEIN'S VISIT PROMISED.

## DETAIL

2. WE TOOK ACTION ON YOUR TUR ON 15 AUGUST, MAKING CLEAR THAT WE WERE RESPONDING TO SCOWCROFT'S REQUEST FOR A BRITISH INPUT. I GAVE THE GIST TO KIMMITT; AND TOOK COVEY (PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, MIDDLE EAST, STATE) THROUGH THE DETAILS, LEAVING BEHIND A PIECE OF PAPER WITH THE POINTS IN PARA 3 OF YOUR TUR. COUNSELLOR (POL/MIL) TOOK ACTION IN PARALLEL WITH WELCH (NSC).

3. I ALSO SAID THAT WE WERE EXPLORING WITH THE JORDANIAN DELEGATION THE POSSIBILITY OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND KING HUSSEIN IF THE LATTER'S SCHEDULE COULD ACCOMMODATE A STOPOVER IN LONDON ON HIS WAY BACK FROM WASHINGTON (THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAS JUST CALLED TO SAY THAT THE KING WILL NOT/NOT BE ABLE TO BREAK HIS JOURNEY IN LONDON - SEE MIFT NOT TO ALL). COVEY TOOK NOTE, AND PROMISED AN IMMEDIATE REPORT ON KING HUSSEIN'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, WHETHER OR NOT THE KING WENT ON TO LONDON.

4. COVEY CONFIRMED THAT THE US WERE CONCERNED ABOUT SANCTIONS-BUSTING AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ISRAELI INTERVENTION AT AQABA. THE US HAD WORKED ASSIDUOUSLY WITH TEL AVIV TO MAKE CLEAR THAT A LOW ISRAELI PROFILE WAS ESSENTIAL. THEY SHOULD NOT TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION. SO FAR, THE ISRAELIS HAD RESPONDED WELL. INDEED, SHAMIR HAD POINTED OUT THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WERE MAINTAINING A LOW PROFILE BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY. THE AMERICANS REGARDED THIS AS EVIDENCE OF FULL ISRAELI COOPERATION AND NOT JUST GRUDGING ACQUIESCENCE. BUT THEY WOULD MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THEM.

5. COVEY SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WAS WRESTLING WITH THE AQABA PROBLEM. IT WAS EASIER TO FRAME INSTRUCTIONS FOR NAVAL ACTIVITY IN THE GULF THAN OFF AQABA. THEY WOULD TRY TO AVOID TAKING DRAMATIC STEPS UNTIL AFTER KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT, BUT WERE IN THE PROCESS OF FRAMING APPROPRIATE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. HUSSEIN'S ATTITUDE WOULD BE CRUCIAL. THE AMERICANS WOULD GREATLY PREFER JORDANIAN COOPERATION AND PARTICIPATION IN OPERATING THE ECONOMIC EMBARGO. IF THIS HAPPENED, INTERDICTION MIGHT NOT BE NECESSARY. THEIR IMPRESSION AT THE MOMENT WAS THAT THE JORDANIANS WERE QUOTE PLODDING ALONG IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION UNQUOTE, BUT FACED A NUMBER OF PRACTICAL PROBLEMS. THESE

Prime Minister

to see. The British input

to US preparations for the  
 President's meeting with King Hussein  
 later today.

I have asked  
 FCO to get earliest  
 possible read-out from  
 the meeting

Jm

mb

This at the  
 Jordanian Ambassador's  
 suggestion.

IN DEED PRIOR CONTRACTS, A CONTINUING NEED FOR IRAQI (OR SUBSTITUTE) OIL AND INTERNAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTIES. THE KING WOULD BE LOOKING FOR GUARANTEES OF RELIEF IN CERTAIN AREAS, (PARTICULARLY OIL) BEFORE JORDAN COULD FULLY COMPLY. THE US WOULD SEE WHAT THEY COULD DO, BUT WOULD NOT MAKE ANY UNQUALIFIED COMMITMENTS. JORDAN WOULD HAVE TO EARN ITS RELIEF.

6. COVEY THOUGHT THAT THE KING WOULD INDICATE GENERAL SUPPORT FOR SANCTIONS, BUT WOULD TRY TO BRUSH THIS QUESTION ASIDE. HE WOULD WISH MAINLY TO FOCUS ON JUSTIFICATION OF HIS OWN ACTIONS. HE STILL SEEMED BITTER THAT HIS EFFORTS TO AVERT THE CURRENT CONFLICT WERE SO LITTLE SUPPORTED BY EGYPT AND THE SAUDIS. COVEY SAID THAT HE MIGHT BE BRINGING A MESSAGE FROM SADDAM. IF SO, HE WAS KEEPING IT VERY CLOSE TO HIS CHEST: THE US AMBASSADOR HAD ACCOMPANIED HUSSEIN AND THE COURT ON HIS AIRCRAFT, AND THERE HAD NOT BEEN A WHISPER OF ANY IRAQI MESSAGE. THE KING MIGHT HAVE SUGGESTIONS FOR DIPLOMATIC SOLUTIONS. THE AMERICAN RESPONSE WOULD BE THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY WAS TO CLOSE ANY HOLES IN THE SANCTIONS NET. WHEN THE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM WAS IN PLACE, THEN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD HAVE THE LEVERAGE TO CONSIDER DIPLOMATIC APPROACHES. THE US WOULD THEREFORE NOT REBUFF THE KING, BUT WOULD SUGGEST THAT HE GOT THE SEQUENCE RIGHT.

7. A SIMILAR LINE WAS TAKEN BY WELCH (DIRECTOR NEAR EAST) AT THE NSC. HE SAID THAT THE POINTS IN TUR WERE TIMELY AND WELCOME. SCOWCROFT HAD ALREADY ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOWING HIS CONVERSATION WITH POWELL THAT OUR VIEWS SHOULD BE INSERTED FIRMLY INTO THE BRIEFING FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH HUSSEIN.

8. WELCH EMPHASISED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PRIMARY OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO BRING HUSSEIN FULLY UP TO THE MARK ON IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS. THERE WERE SOME GROUNDS FOR OPTIMISM THAT THIS MIGHT BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT THE NEED FOR AN ACTIVE BLOCKADE. LITTLE, IF ANYTHING, SEEMED TO BE GETTING THROUGH AQABA AT PRESENT (AND THE RUSSIAN ARMS SHIPMENT HAD EVIDENTLY BEEN TRANSFERRED TO AN IRAQI VESSEL AS OPPOSED TO BEING GRANTED LANDING RIGHTS AND TRANSPORTED ACROSS JORDAN). HUSSEIN WOULD NEED HELP IF HE WERE TO DO ALL THAT WAS NECESSARY AND KEEP IT UP (THE NSC ESTIMATED THAT HE STOOD TO LOSE DOLLARS 900 MILLION OR 25 PER CENT OF GNP PER YEAR). BUT HELP WOULD HAVE TO BE CONDITIONAL ON PRIOR COOPERATION WITH THE SANCTIONS EFFORT AND THE PRESIDENT WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE US WOULD ENFORCE THE BLOCKADE BY NAVAL MEANS IF NECESSARY.

9. AS REGARDS JORDANIAN OBJECTIVES, WELCH SAID THAT HUSSEIN HAD NOT BEEN CLEAR IN HIS TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH BUSH. HE HAD SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER HAD BEEN A QUOTE GOOD ONE UNQUOTE AND THAT HE WANTED TO COME AND TALK PERSONALLY. HUSSEIN HAD ADDED QUOTE SANCTIONS ARE VERY IMPORTANT BUT NOT THE MOST IMPORTANT THING AND REALLY NOT WHAT I WANT TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT UNQUOTE. THE AMERICANS SPECULATED THAT IN ADDITION TO ATTEMPTING TO JUSTIFY JORDANIAN POLICY, HUSSEIN WOULD PUT FORWARD A PLAN, EITHER OF SADDAM'S OR HIS OWN. THE NSC HAD JUST HEARD FROM A NOT NECESSARILY RELIABLE SOURCE THAT THIS WOULD INVOLVE SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI FORCES FROM KUWAIT AND AMERICAN/WESTERN FORCES FROM THE REGION, ACCOMPANIED BY THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS AND A REPLACEMENT OF EXTERNAL TROOPS BY AN ARAB PEACE KEEPING FORCE. IF HUSSEIN PROPOSED THIS, HE WOULD BE TOLD THAT NO PLAN COULD BE ACCEPTED WHICH IMPLIED THAT IRAQI AND AMERICAN FORCES WERE IN ANY WAY COMPARABLE, WHICH FAILED TO PROVIDE FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT INVOLVING THE RETURN OF THE LEGITIMATE KUWAITI GOVERNMENT OR WHICH ALLOWED SANCTIONS TO BE LIFTED PREMATURELY. THE US COULD NOT SET ITS FACE IN PRINCIPLE AGAINST A DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT, BUT ANY SUCH PLAN HAD TO BE COMPREHENSIVE, AND WITH THE VARIOUS STEPS IN THE RIGHT ORDER, PARTICULARLY GIVEN SADDAM'S DUPLICITY.

10. STATE AND THE NSC CONFIRMED THAT, AS AT NOON LOCAL TIME, HUSSEIN HAD NO APPOINTMENTS IN WASHINGTON TODAY (15 AUGUST) BEFORE THE MEETINGS IN KENNEBUNKPORT ON 16 AUGUST.

(2)

Think this is  
probably an  
Iraqi  
policy  
statement

COMMENT:

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188(A-D)

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON

TO DESKBY 160100Z FCO

TELNO 1936

OF 152310Z AUGUST 90

INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, MOSCOW *later today.*

INFO IMMEDIATE RIYADH, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, CAIRO, MODUK, BONN

INFO IMMEDIATE ANKARA, ACTOR

*Prime Minister  
to see. The British input**to us preparations for the  
President's meeting with King Hussein**I have asked  
FCO to get earliest  
possible read-out from  
the meeting**DM*YOUR TELNO 1419 (NOT TO ALL): IRAQ/KUWAIT/JORDAN  
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SUMMARY

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*This at the  
Ambassador Amman's  
suggestion.*

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*Ruby Caldwell  
This is probably over-optimistic*

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