

SECRET

(S)

075227

MDHIAN 3837

SECRET
 FM MODUK
 TO IMMEDIATE AIG 4116
 TELNO U/N
 OF 171140Z AUGUST 90
 AND TO IMMEDIATE AIG 5705
 AND TO IMMEDIATE AIG 1125
 AND TO IMMEDIATE RAF HONINGTON
 AND TO IMMEDIATE RAF WITTERING
 AND TO IMMEDIATE RAF MARHAM
 AND TO IMMEDIATE FORY
 AND TO IMMEDIATE COMTWOATAF
 AND TO IMMEDIATE AFSOUTH

PRIME MINISTER

Para 17 concluding
 offensive action still
 unlikely in short term
 OTS.

SIC ACA/UZH/I9M
 ATTENTION INTELLIGENCE DIVISIONS PD FROM DIS, DI(ROW), IRAQ CRISIS
 CELL.
 OPERATION GRANBY INTELLIGENCE SITREP AS AT 160600Z AUG 90
 MILITARY SITUATION IN KUWAIT
 1. (S) THE SEVEN REPUBLICAN GUARD FORCE COMMAND DIVISIONS KNOWN TO BE
 IN KUWAIT ARE:
 A. ARMOURED
 (1) HAMURABI
 (2) MEDINAH
 B. MECHANISED
 (1) TAWAKALNA
 C. INFANTRY
 (1) FAO
 (2) BAGHDAD
 (3) NEBUCHADNEZZAR
 (4) ADNAN
 2. (S) HAMURABI ARMOURED DIVISION.
 A. IT IS THOUGHT TO HAVE:
 (1) 7,12 INFANTRY BRIGADES.
 (2) 15 MECHANISED INFANTRY BRIGADE.
 (3) 8,9,17 ARMOURED BRIGADES (IT IS LIKELY THAT THE 8 ARMOURED
 BRIGADE HAS BEEN REALLOCATED TO THE TAWAKALNA DIVISION).
 B. THE HAMURABI IS THOUGHT TO BE HOLDING THE WHOLE OF THE SOUTHERN
 KUWAIT BORDER.
 C. ALL BRIGADES OF THIS DIVISION WERE IDENTIFIED ON THE MOVE IN
 SOUTHERN IRAQ PRIOR TO THE INVASION.
 D. THIS DIVISION HAS BEEN REFERRED TO PREVIOUSLY AS A MECHANISED
 INFANTRY DIVISION.

3. (S) THE MEDINAH ARMoured DIVISION.
A. IT CONSISTS OF:
(1) 2,10 ARMoured BRIGADES.
(2) 11 INFANTRY BRIGADE.
(3) 14 MECHANISED INFANTRY BRIGADE.
B. ALL BRIGADES EXCEPT 14 MECHANISED INFANTRY BRIGADE WERE OBSERVED ON THE MOVE.
4. (S) THE TAWAKALNA MECHANISED DIVISION.
A. THIS DIVISION PROBABLY CONSISTS OF ITS OWN 18 MECHANISED INFANTRY BRIGADE, 8 ARMoured BRIGADE DETACHED FROM HAMURABI AND THE PREVIOUSLY UNALLOCATED 1 ARMoured BRIGADE.
5. (S) THE FAO INFANTRY BRIGADE.
A. IT CONSISTS OF:
(1) 24 MECHANISED INFANTRY BRIGADE.
(2) 25,27,28 INFANTRY BRIGADES.
B. ONLY THE 25 INFANTRY BRIGADE WAS OBSERVED.
6. (S) BAGHDAD INFANTRY DIVISION.
A. IT CONSISTS OF:
(1) 4,5,6 INFANTRY BRIGADES.
(2) 21 COMMANDO BRIGADE.
B. OF THESE BRIGADES ONLY THE COMMANDO BRIGADE WAS NOT OBSERVED PRIOR TO THE INVASION.
7. (S) NEBUCHADNEZZAR INFANTRY DIVISION.
A. IT CONSISTS OF 19,20,22,23 INFANTRY BRIGADES.
B. 19 AND 22 BRIGADES ONLY WERE OBSERVED PRIOR TO THE INVASION.
8. (S) ADNAN INFANTRY DIVISION.
A. NO INFORMATION IS HELD ON THE CONSTITUENT BRIGADES OF THIS DIVISION
9. (S) SPECIAL FORCES.
A. REPUBLICAN GUARD FORCE COMMAND HAS A SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION CONSISTING OF 3 AND 16 SF BRIGADES AND 26 MARINE BRIGADE.
B. ONLY 16 SF BRIGADE WAS OBSERVED ON THE MOVE PRIOR TO INVASION AND IT IS NOT CONFIRMED THAT ALL THIS DIVISION TOOK PART.
- REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS.
10. (S) SADDAM HUSSEINS ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HE HAS ACCEPTED THE VALIDITY OF THE 1975 ALGIERS AGREEMENT WITH IRAN IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE ENEMY OF ALL MUSLIMS HAS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONFRONTATION IN KUWAIT.
11. (S) SADDAM MAY NOW HOPE TO RELEASE A NUMBER OF DIVISIONS FROM THE IRANIAN BORDER FOR USE ON OTHER FRONTS. HE HAS NO FORMATIONS IN THE WEST OF IRAQ FACING SYRIA AND MAY NEED MORE TROOPS TO REINFORCE HIS NORTHERN BORDER WITH TURKEY. HE WILL CERTAINLY TEND TO CONCENTRATE A RESERVE FORCE SOMEWHERE IN CENTRAL IRAQ, EVEN IF ONLY FOR DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS. THE READY DIVISIONS ARE MOSTLY INFANTRY. ANY REDEPLOYMENT

WILL PROBABLY GO SLOWLY, NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF THE RESOURCES INVOLVED BUT ALSO BECAUSE IRAQ WILL LOOK FOR SIGNS OF MATCHING IRANIAN ACTION.

12. (S) NOR IS IT CLEAR HOW MANY DIVISIONS MAY BE AT HIS DISPOSAL. THE COST OF MOBILISING THE EXTRA DIVISIONS ANNOUNCED AFTER THE INVASION OF KUWAIT MAY HAVE PROVEN TO BE TOO GREAT IN ECONOMIC TERMS, MANY OF THE SKILLED MEN MAY PLAY A VITAL ROLE IN THE ECONOMY AND CANNOT BE SPARED. THE FLESHING OUT OF DIVISIONS THAT HAD BEEN PARTLY DEMOBILISED ANNOUNCED AT THE SAME TIME MAY ALSO HAVE MADE HEAVY DEMANDS ON MANPOWER.

13. (S) OVERALL WHILE THESE TROOPS COULD GIVE SADDAM MORE DEFENSIVE UNITS THEY WILL NOT NECESSARILY AFFECT THE SITUATION IN KUWAIT IN THE SHORT OR MEDIUM TERM.

14. (S) OMANS CONTRIBUTION TO THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL PENINSULA SHIELD FORCE WILL BE A BATTALION GROUP OF 1175 MEN TO INCLUDE A BATTERY OF 105MM AND JAVELIN SAM.

15. (S) QATAR HAS COMPLAINED IN FORTHRIGHT TERMS TO IRAQ AT THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPAGANDA TO IRAQIS RESIDENT IN THAT STATE. ASSESSMENT.

16. (S) IRAQ HAS NOW RENOUNCED THE GAINS WHICH IT OBTAINED FROM 8 LONG YEARS OF WAR WITH IRAN. THIS MAKES IT THE MORE IMPORTANT TO ENSURE ADVANTAGE FROM THE INVASION OF KUWAIT. SADDAM HUSSEIN CONTINUES TO SEEK TO MOBILISE ARAB SUPPORT FOR A PURPORTED ISLAMIC MOVEMENT WHILE STRENGTHENING DEFENCES IN KUWAIT.

17. (S) WE HAVE STILL TO OBSERVE THE SORT OF REINFORCEMENT OF THE IRAQI INVASION FORCE IN KUWAIT WHICH WOULD ALLOW IT TO GO ON TO THE OFFENSIVE INTO SAUDI ARABIAN TERRITORY ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE BUILD UP OF AMERICAN AND OTHER FOREIGN FORCES. WE THEREFORE ASSESS THAT OFFENSIVE ACTION IS UNLIKELY IN THE SHORT TERM

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