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INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKREP BRUSSELS
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, BONN, WASHINGTON, MODUK, ESC LONDON

SIC I9M

MY TELNO 398: NATO CONSULTATIONS ON IRAQ/KUWAIT

SUMMARY

1. IMS REPORTS YEMENI FORCES ON MAXIMUM ALERT. U S OUTLINES THE TYPE OF SUPPORT NOW NEEDED FROM ALLIES. U S BRIEFS ON DEVELOPMENTS AT THE UN. LETTERS FROM SHEVARDNADZE SUPPORT U S POLICIES, AND CONDEMN IRAQI TREATMENT OF FOREIGN NATIONALS.

DETAIL

2. IN TODAY'S POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETING, THE IMS REPRESENTATIVE SAID THE FLOW OF INTELLIGENCE FROM NATIONS HAD IMPROVED. IRAQI DIVISIONS FACING TURKEY, SYRIA AND IRAN IN THE NORTH OF THE COUNTRY HAD NUMBERED EIGHT BEFORE THE START OF THE CRISIS, AND HAD NOW BEEN REINFORCED BY TWO (ONE DIVISION AVERAGES 15,000 MEN): ALL IN DEFENSIVE POSTURE. THERE HAD BEEN 35 IRAQI DIVISIONS ON THE ITALIAN BORDER BEFORE THE CRISIS, ALTHOUGH MANY OF THESE HAD BEEN PARTLY DEMOBILISED: THEY WERE ALMOST ALL INFANTRY, AND THUS OF LITTLE POTENTIAL VALUE IN ANY ATTACK ON SAUDI ARABIA. IRAQ WAS NOW BELIEVED TO HAVE 1200 TANKS, 1200 APCS, 800 ARTILLERY PIECES AND 104,000 MEN FACING SAUDI ARABIA. YEMENI FORCES HAD BEEN PLACED ON MAXIMUM ALERT, AND SAUDI ARABIA WOULD HAVE TO DIVERT SOME FORCES TO ITS SOUTH-WESTERN BORDER.

MULTINATIONAL FORCES

3. U S SAID ON INSTRUCTIONS THAT, AS REQUESTED BY SAUDI ARABIA, THE U S HAD DEPLOYED FORCES AND TAKEN STEPS TO ENFORCE SANCTIONS. THE U S WANTED THE BROADEST INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. HE COULD NOW IDENTIFY THE FORMS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE WHICH WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL AS THE MULTINATIONAL FORCES ASSEMBLED. THESE INCLUDED: MINESWEEPERS: AIR/SEA LIFT CAPABILITIES: GROUND FORCES: COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT: LOGISTICS (TRANSPORT, PORTABLE HOUSING, REFRIGERATION PLANT, POWER GENERATION PLANT, WATER SYSTEMS): PROTECTIVE CLOTHING AGAINST CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACK AND DE-CONTAMINATION EQUIPMENT. U S

ADDED THAT FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY WAS IMPORTANT: MATERIAL SUPPORT SHOULD ALSO BE GIVEN TO ARAB STATES WHICH WERE SUPPORTING THE MULTINATIONAL EFFORT.

4. IN ELABORATION, U S SAID THAT EXTRA MINESWEEPER ASSETS WERE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT, GIVEN THE KNOWN CAPABILITY OF IRAQ TO CONDUCT MINING. THERE WAS ALSO A NEED FOR MORE GROUND FORCES.

5. ON THE NAVAL EFFORT, U S SAID THAT ALL SHIPS SHOULD REMAIN UNDER NATIONAL COMMAND, BUT THERE SHOULD BE COORDINATION OF EARLY WARNING AND AIR DEFENCE.

6. IN CONCLUSION, U S SAID THAT HIS AUTHORITIES INTENDED, THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE CHANNELS, TO REQUEST SUPPORT FROM NATO'S SATELLITE FACILITY FOR THE MULTINATIONAL EFFORT. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, HE UNDERTOOK TO CIRCULATE HIS SPEAKING NOTE (BY FAX TO EMERGENCY UNIT IN DUE COURSE)

FOREIGN NATIONALS

7. UK REPORTED THE LATEST INFORMATION FROM EMERGENCY UNIT ON BRITISH NATIONALS IN THE AREA, AND ASKED FOR AS MUCH CORRESPONDING INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE FROM OTHER DELEGATIONS. ITALY SAID HIS AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD HAD REQUESTED, BUT NOT YET RECEIVED, AN APPOINTMENT WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO DELIVER THE DEMARCHE AGREED AT THE END OF LAST WEEK BY THE 12: THIS DID NOT MENTION THE QUESTION OF CLOSURE OF EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT. TOMORROW'S WEU MEETING WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY AND EPC MEETING. FOLLOWING AN ITALIAN INITIATIVE, THE YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTER HAD SUMMONED THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR AND MADE A STRONG DEMARCHE ON THE BEHALF OF THE NNA ABOUT THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN NATIONALS.

8. DENMARK SAID THAT THE IRAQI OFFER OF SPECIAL TREATMENT FOR NATIONALS OF COUNTRIES WHICH HAD NOT SENT MILITARY FORCES DID NOT APPARENTLY AMOUNT TO MUCH: LENGTHY EXIT PROCEDURES WERE INVOLVED. HE REPORTED THAT DIPLOMATS WERE NOW ABLE TO TRAVEL TO AND FROM IRAN AND KUWAIT.

9. U S SAID THE HUNGARIANS HAD DECIDED TO CLOSE THEIR KUWAIT EMBASSY: THE EGYPTIANS WOULD NOT DO SO. HE CONFIRMED THE DANISH INFORMATION ABOUT MOVEMENTS OF DIPLOMATS: THE U S WMBASSY WAS TRYING TO GET DEPENDENTS ON TO FLIGHTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. 'HIGH PROFILE' MEMBERS OF THE NON-DIPLOMATIC U S COMMUNITY HAD BEEN GIVEN REFUGE IN THE U S AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE IN BAGHDAD. AT TWO MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON WITH THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR, ON 16 AND 18 AUGUST, THE

U S POSITION ON THE TREATMENT OF U S CITIZENS, ESPECIALLY RELATING TO CONSULAR ACCESS AND THE ORDER ON ASSEMBLY, HAD BEEN SPELT OUT, WITHOUT CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE. A LETTER FROM SHEVARDNADZE TO BAKER HAD STATED THAT THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO TELL THE IRAQIS THAT THEIR TREATMENT OF FOREIGN NATIONALS WAS UNACCEPTABLE. IT APPEARED THA THE IRAQIS WERE INSISTING THAT SOVIET EXPERTS IN IRAN CONTINUE TO WORK. THE SOVIET EMBASSY WAS TELLING THEM NOT TO. IT SEEMED THAT SOVIET CITIZENS IN IRAN (AS DISTINCT FROM THOSE FROM KUWAIT) WERE NOT BEING PERMITTED TO LEAVE.

POLITICAL SITUATION

10. U S DESCRIBED, WITHOUT GOING INTO DETAIL, RECENT MEETINGS AT THE UN ABOUT ACTIVATING THE MSC. DESCRIBING THE STEPS TAKEN TO HALT TWO IRAQI TANKERS, HE SAID THAT THE U S BELIEVED THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD MOVE TO AUTHORISE THE USE OF MINIMUM FORCE (ALTHOUGH THE U S REMAINED CONVINCED THAT ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 51 WAS JUSTIFIABLE). IT WAS NOT THE U S'S INTENTION TO RELY ON ARTICLE 42, SINCE THIS RELATED TO UN FORCES, OF WHICH THERE WERE AT PRESENT NONE.

SOVIET VIEWS

11. U S SAID THAT SHEVARDNADZE HAD WRITTEN TO BAKER EXPRESSING STRONG SUPPORT FOR U S ACTIONS TO DATE, ADDING THAT UN SOLIDARITY MUST BE MAINTAINED. FOR THE SOVIET UNION, THE FIRST PRIORITY REMAINED A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT: BUT IF THIS COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED, IT WOULD BE RIGHT TO LOOK FOR WAYS IN WHICH MILITARY ACTION COULD BE COORDINATED THROUGH THE UN.

IRAN

12. ITALY SAID THAT THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD TOLD REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWELVE, EFTA AND CANADA THAT IRAN WOULD SUPPORT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND WOULD EXAMINE ANY REQUEST TO SEND TROOPS TO SAUDI ARABIA. THERE HAD BEEN NO CRITICISM OF THE U S.

YUGOSLAVIA

13. ITALY SAID THAT YUGOSLAVIA REMAINED CONCERNED ABOUT TRADE SANCTIONS. 50,000 JOBS DEPENDED ON TRADE WITH IRAQ, ESPECIALLY SMALL BUSINESSES IN SLOVENIA. THERE WERE 10,000 YUGOSLAVS IN IRAQ/KUWAIT, AND YUGOSLAVIA DEPENDED HEAVILY ON IRAQI OIL. U S BELIEVED THAT YUGOSLAVIA WOULD CONTINUE TO USE ITS LEADERSHIP ROLE IN THE NNA MOVEMENT, AND WOULD GRADUALLY MOVE TO IMPLEMENT SANCTIONS.

TERRORISM

14. FRG SAID THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT

IRAQ HAD POSSIBLY CAPTURED A LARGE NUMBER OF BLANK KUWAITI PASSPORTS: THESE COULD BE USED IN TERRORIST OPERATIONS.

SYRIA

15. U S SAID HIS AMBASSADOR IN DAMASCUS HAD HAD A MEETING WITH THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER WHO HAD VISITED TEHRAN. THE LATTER HAD PRESSED THE IRANIANS TO TREAT THE KUWAIT INVASION, AND THE IRAQI CONCESSIONS, AS TWO SEPARATE ISSUES. IRAN HAD CONFIRMED ITS SUPPORT FOR RESOLUTION 661. GREAT PRESSURE WAS BEING BROUGHT TO BEAR ON SYRIA AND IRAN TO RELAX THE ENCIRCLEMENT OF IRAQ, BUT SYRIA WOULD REMAIN FIRM. IRAN SHOULD BE TOLD THAT THE WEST HAD CONFIDENCE THAT TEHRAN WOULD ALSO BE STEADFAST.

16. THE COMMITTEE WILL RE-CONVENE TOMORROW 20 AUGUST AT 0800Z.

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