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TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

TELNO 1463

OF 212132Z AUGUST 90

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, BONN, PEKING, TOKYO
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, RIYADH, BAGHDAD, CAIRO, UKDEL NATOIRAQ/KUWAIT: CALL BY SOVIET AMBASSADOR, 21 AUGUST
SUMMARY

1. SOVIET AMBASSADOR DELIVERS MESSAGE FROM SHEVARDNADZE REPORTING TALKS IN MOSCOW ON 20 AUGUST WITH SAADOUN HAMMADI, IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER.

DETAIL

2. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR CALLED ON ME ON 21 AUGUST TO DELIVER A MESSAGE FROM SHEVARDNADZE, GIVING AN ACCOUNT OF THE TALKS IN MOSCOW ON 20 AUGUST WITH IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER (TEXT IN MIFT).

3. I SAID THAT I WANTED TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IN THIS COMPLICATED AND ANXIOUS SITUATION. I EXPRESSED THANKS FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S MESSAGE WHICH I WOULD STUDY CAREFULLY. I HOPED THAT THE POWERFUL SOVIET REPRESENTATIONS OVER FOREIGN NATIONALS IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ WOULD HAVE AN EFFECT. I GAVE THE AMBASSADOR A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE WEU MEETING IN PARIS EARLIER TODAY.

4. TURNING TO THE SITUATION IN NEW YORK I SAID THAT I BELIEVED THAT IF WE WERE TO AVOID WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST WE SHOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT THE SANCTIONS ALREADY IMPOSED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE COHESION WHICH HAD BEEN SUCH A FEATURE OF THE UN'S RESPONSE TO IRAQI INVASION SHOULD BE MAINTAINED. THERE HAD BEEN DISCUSSION OF A FURTHER RESOLUTION YESTERDAY IN NEW YORK. THOSE WHO HAD WILLED THE END SHOULD ALSO WILL THE MEANS. IT WAS NOT ENOUGH TO MONITOR AND TRACK SHIPS: COUNTRIES WITH FORCES IN THE AREA, OR WHO MIGHT SEND FORCES THERE, HAD TO HAVE THE MEANS TO STOP SHIPS. IF WE WANTED A PEACEFUL ENDING TO THE CRISIS, WE NEEDED A RESOLUTION WHICH GAVE THE LEGAL MEANS TO ENFORCE THE EMBARGO. I ASKED THE AMBASSADOR TO CONVEY THE STRONG HOPE TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT THAT A NEW RESOLUTION COULD BE PASSED ON THE LINES UNDER DISCUSSION. THE PROSPECTS FOR EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS WOULD BE GREATLY ENHANCED.

5. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED A NUMBER OF PROBING QUESTIONS ABOUT THE

BASIS FOR, AND SCOPE OF, THE NEW RESOLUTION. I MADE CLEAR THAT I WAS CONCERNED MORE ABOUT THE BASIC POLITICAL QUESTION THAN THE PRECISE DRAFTING, WHICH WAS A MATTER FOR OUR DELEGATIONS IN NEW YORK. WE WERE CONFIDENT THAT WE HAD CLEAR LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR USE OF MINIMUM FORCE IN THE GULF IN PURSUANCE OF SCR 661. BUT SOME COUNTRIES FELT THAT THEY NEEDED THE ADDITIONAL COVER OF A UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION. WE WERE PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH THAT. INDEED, THE WEU COMMUNIQUE, ISSUED TODAY, HAD CALLED ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO TAKE FURTHER USEFUL STEPS IN THAT DIRECTION. WHAT WAS THE SOVIET DIFFICULTY?

6. THE THRUST OF THE AMBASSADOR'S RESPONSE APPEARED TO BE THAT HE WAS WORRIED THAT A NEW RESOLUTION WOULD GIVE THE AMERICANS COVER FOR ATTACKING IRAQ, OR IRAQI FORCES IN KUWAIT. I MADE CLEAR THAT THIS WAS NOT THE PURPOSE OF THE EXERCISE. RATHER, WE WERE CONCERNED TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF THE UN EMBARGO. IN CONCLUSION, THE AMBASSADOR MADE REASSURING NOISES ABOUT SOVIET SUPPORT FOR A FURTHER RESOLUTION IN THIS SENSE.

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