

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM UKMIS NEW YORK  
TO FLASH FCO  
TELNO 1058  
OF 212345Z AUGUST 90

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PEKING, UKDEL NATO  
INFO IMMEDIATE MIDDLE EAST POSTS, EC POSTS, HELSINKI, ADDIS ABABA  
INFO IMMEDIATE ABIDJAN, KINSHASA, HAVANA, BOGOTA, KUALA LUMPUR  
INFO IMMEDIATE BUCHAREST, OTTAWA, MODUK, ESC LONDON, ACTOR

SIC

MY TELNOS 1047 - 1049: IRAQ/KUWAIT: NEXT STEPS

*This won't do.  
We must control  
Bush. It will  
reduce our existing power  
and be  
an  
obstacle  
to  
spec. of  
weakness  
which  
will  
bring  
to  
to  
Sudden  
thrust  
not*

SUMMARY

1. FURTHER MEETING OF THE FIVE. AMERICANS STRESS THEY WISH TO MAINTAIN UNITY OF THE FIVE AND OF THE COUNCIL. SOME SIGNS OF RUSSIAN AND CHINESE FLEXIBILITY. FURTHER MEETINGS ON 22 AUGUST.

DETAIL

2. AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE MET AT 1500Z ON 21 AUGUST. PICKERING (UNITED STATES) SAID THAT THE EVENTS OF THE PREVIOUS EVENING (MY TURS) HAD SHOWN THAT A DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL SOLUTION TO PROBLEMS RELATED TO SANCTIONS COULD WORK. BUT IF ACTION HAD NOT BEEN TAKEN IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THE YEMENIS MIGHT NOT HAVE GIVEN SUCH A RAPID AND POSITIVE RESPONSE. PRESIDENT BUSH HAD NOW TOLD HIM PERSONALLY THAT HE WANTED A DRAFT RESOLUTION ON WHICH EVERYONE COULD AGREE AND IN A TIMESCALE THEY COULD ACCEPT. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SECURE AS MUCH AGREEMENT AS POSSIBLE IN THE FIVE, BUT THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS MUST NOT BE EXCLUDED FROM THE PROCESS.

3. LOZINSKIY (SOVIET UNION) SAID THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS THE PREVIOUS EVENING HAD BEEN USEFUL IN SOME RESPECTS. THEY HAD HIGHLIGHTED THE NEED FOR FURTHER MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT SCR 661. WITH REGARD TO YEMEN THEY HAD SHOWN HOW EFFECTIVE A POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC EFFORT COULD BE. WHEN IT WAS CLEARLY THE VIEW OF THE COUNCIL THAT THE TIME HAD COME FOR POLITICAL, LEGAL AND MORAL REASONS TO MOVE TOWARDS ENFORCEMENT, THE FIVE SHOULD GO AHEAD WITH UNANIMOUS SUPPORT FROM THE COUNCIL. BUT THE SOVIET UNION BELIEVED IT WAS UNDESIRABLE TO JUMP OVER STEPS IN MOVING TO THE USE OF FORCE. THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE WOULD SOON RECEIVE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT, AND THEN PREPARE ITS OWN REPORT. IT WOULD BE LOGICAL TO WAIT FOR THE COMMITTEE'S REPORT. IF THIS STATED THAT THERE HAD BEEN

BREACHES OF SANCTIONS, THERE WOULD BE A CLEAR CASE FOR THE COUNCIL TO SANCTION THE USE OF FORCE. BUT FOR THE MOMENT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS NOT PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSED DRAFT RESOLUTION. IT WAS VITAL TO MAINTAIN THE UNANIMITY OF THE COUNCIL AND HE APPEALED TO THE UNITED STATES NOT TO INSIST ON VOTING AT PRESENT.

4. LI (CHINA) AGREED WITH LOZINSKIY. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO MAKE USE OF POLITICAL PRESSURE AND THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE. ON TIMING HE POINTED OUT THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPRESENTATIVES HAD JUST ARRIVED IN IRAQ TO DEAL WITH THE PLIGHT OF FOREIGN NATIONALS. HIS AUTHORITIES BELIEVED IT WOULD HELP TO REDUCE THE DIFFERENCES AMONG THE FIVE IF THERE WERE AGREEMENT NOT TO RUSH INTO A VOTE ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION AND TO BE AS FLEXIBLE AS POSSIBLE ON THE WORDING. IN THIS CONTEXT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1 COULD BE AMENDED TO READ:

''CALLS UPON ALL MEMBER STATES WHICH ARE DEPLOYING MARITIME FORCES TO THE AREA, UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SCR 661 (1990), TO VERIFY AS NECESSARY THE CARGOES AND DESTINATIONS OF ALL INWARD AND OUTWARD MARITIME SHIPPING AND TO ENSURE STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF MEASURES RELATED TO MARITIME SHIPPING LAID DOWN IN RESOLUTION 661 (1990)''.

5. BLANC (FRANCE) ENDORSED WHAT THE OTHERS HAD SAID ABOUT THE NEED TO MAINTAIN THE COHESION OF THE FIVE. FRANCE WAS READY TO VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE DRAFT AS IT STOOD.

6. I REFERRED TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S PRESS CONFERENCE EARLIER ON 21 AUGUST. I SAID THE HARD QUESTION WAS WHERE WE WENT NEXT. IN PRINCIPLE I WAS NOT AGAINST GOING THROUGH THE MACHINERY OF THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE, ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO ASK IT TO ACT VERY QUICKLY. WE COULD ACCEPT THE DRAFT TEXT AS IT STOOD. THE PROPOSED CHINESE AMENMENT TO OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1 WOULD NOT MEET OUR REQUIREMENTS. BUT I WONDERED WHETHER IT WOULD HELP TO EASE THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA IF WE LOOKED MORE CAREFULLY AT THE MECHANISMS THROUGH WHICH THE COUNCIL MIGHT ACT, INCLUDING THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE (MSC) AND THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS COMMITTEE. WE NEEDED TO ESTABLISH UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES FORCE COULD BE USED. IF LOZINSKIY COULD LET US HAVE DETAILED THOUGHTS ON OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4, WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO DEAL WITH THESE POINTS WITH MORE PRECISION, THEREBY MAKING THE DIFFICULTIES IN OPERATIVE PARA 1 LESS ACUTE.

7. I SAID THIS BROUGHT US ON TO THE QUESTION OF THE INFORMAL

CONSULTATIONS OF THE MSC DUE TO TAKE PLACE ON THE AFTERNOON OF 22 AUGUST. IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO DEAL WITH SOME OF THE ISSUES THERE. IT MIGHT THEREFORE BE USEFUL IF AMBASSADORS, RATHER THAN POLITICAL COUNSELLORS, ATTENDED THIS MEETING. THIS WAS AGREED. I ALSO SAID THAT ONCE BROAD AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED AMONG THE FIVE, (EVEN IF THERE WAS STILL SOME LOOSE ENDS) IT WOULD BE WISE FOR THE CO-ORDINATOR OF THE FIVE TO BRIEF THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL.

8. PICKERING SAID THERE APPEARED TO BE AGREEMENT THAT THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE SHOULD PLAY A PART. HE WOULD CONSULT WASHINGTON TO SEE IF HE COULD MAKE A PRESENTATION ON BREACHES OF SANCTIONS. THIS WOULD TAKE AT LEAST 24 HOURS. HE THOUGHT THAT MY SUGGESTION OF LINKING THE PROBLEMS IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 4 WOULD BE A USEFUL WAY OF TAKING THE DISCUSSION FORWARD. HE WONDERED WHETHER IT MIGHT HELP THE CHINESE POSITION IF THE WORDS 'MINIMUM FORCE' WERE ELIMINATED FROM OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1. LI SAID THIS WAS AN INTERESTING SUGGESTION: HE WOULD NEED TO SEEK INSTRUCTIONS.

*How do they expect to enforce sanctions*

9. LOZINSKIY SAID HE HAD NO SPECIFIC LANGUAGE TO SUGGEST AT PRESENT ON OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4. BUT THE SOVIET UNION'S ESSENTIAL CONCERN WAS NOT TO GIVE CARTE BLANCHE TO THE NAVIES IN THE AREA. PICKERING INTERJECTED THAT THE UNITED STATES HOPED THAT THE THREAT OF FORCE WOULD BE A DETERRENT AND THAT IN PRACTICE FORCE WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE USED. LOZINSKIY SAID THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT CLARIFICATION. THE TEXT AS IT STOOD APPEARED TO AUTHORIZE THE USE OF FORCE WITHOUT ANY LIMITS. THIS WOULD BE SEEN BY IRAQ AS A DECLARATION OF WAR. THERE SHOULD BE A GRADUATED APPROACH TO THE USE OF FORCE: IT SHOULD BE CLEAR TO SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS AND TO THE IRAQIS. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO AVOID PROVOKING A DISPROPORTIONATE REACTION BY SADDAM HUSSEIN. FIRST THERE SHOULD BE A RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR MINIMAL USE OF FORCE. THIS SHOULD ACT AS A CLEAR WARNING. THEN THERE SHOULD BE PROVISION TO MOVE TO A SECOND STAGE IN WHICH THERE WOULD BE A MORE WIDE-RANGING USE OF FORCE. THIS COULD BE DONE THROUGH A MECHANISM IN THE RESOLUTION, OR BY MEANS OF A SECOND RESOLUTION.

10. PICKERING SAID THE DISCUSSION HAD BEEN EXTREMELY USEFUL FOR HIM. HE THOUGHT THE UNITED STATES COULD ACCEPT THE NOTION OF A GRADUATED RESPONSE. DETERRENCE WOULD BE A KEY ELEMENT IN ANY RESOLUTION, AND SHOULD ENCOURAGE A POLITICAL APPROACH TO PROBLEMS OF SANCTIONS-BUSTING. HE AGREED WITH LOZINSKIY THAT THE OBJECTIVE MUST BE TO PROVOKE AN INTELLIGENT AND RATIONAL REACTION FROM SADDAM HUSSEIN.

*I don't like this & am surprised the Americans seem willing to accept it. We wd. be giving up existing powers under Art. 51 with only a vague promise of getting them all back again.*

11. IT WAS AGREED THAT AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE WOULD MEET AGAIN AT 1430Z ON 22 AUGUST. LOZINSKIY AND I WOULD REFLECT ON THE PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4. LI WOULD OBTAIN FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. PICKERING WOULD HAVE A WORD WITH THE (FINNISH) CHAIRMAN OF THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE ABOUT THE ROLE IT MIGHT PLAY.

## COMMENT

12. THIS WAS A USEFUL DISCUSSION. PICKERING AND LOZINSKIY WERE BOTH ANXIOUS TO RE-ESTABLISH COOPERATION AND COURTESIES BETWEEN THEM, AND ALL AGREED THAT THE UNITY AND COHESION OF THE FIVE MUST BE MAINTAINED. FOR THE FIRST TIME THE CHINESE PLAYED AN ACTIVE ROLE, AND EVEN PUT FORWARD A DRAFTING AMENDMENT (HOWEVER UNSATISFACTORY). ONCE OR TWICE PICKERING WAS ALMOST TOO CONCILIATORY. WE HAVE YET TO SEE WHETHER LOZINSKIY AND LI CAN BE BROUGHT TO ANYTHING NEAR OUR POSITION.

13. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL AT OUR MEETINGS TOMORROW IF WE COULD CONTRIBUTE SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT HOW WE SEE FUTURE PROCEDURES. SPEAKING PERSONALLY I HAVE SAID THAT THOSE WITH NAVAL FORCES IN THE REGION WOULD HAVE TO COORDINATE ON THE SPOT (WHILE ACCEPTING THAT SOME MIGHT HAVE TASKS WHICH WENT BEYOND IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 661). THE RESULTS OF SUCH COORDINATION WOULD THEN GO TO THE MEMBERS OF THE MSC AND/OR TO THE MSC ITSELF. WE WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE WHAT MECHANISMS OF THE MSC WOULD BE USEFUL AND APPROPRIATE IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. THE MSC WOULD THEN SUBMIT REPORTS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND/OR THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS COMMITTEE. OBVIOUSLY IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT THAT OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL FELT THAT THEY WERE PROPERLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE MSC'S WORK. WITHOUT IT WE COULD SOON GET INTO POLITICAL TROUBLE. AT THE SAME TIME WE COULD NOT PERMIT THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ATTEMPT DAY-TO-DAY MANAGEMENT OF OPERATIONS OR DEPEND ON ITS AUTHORITY IN SPECIFIC SITUATIONS.

14. IN BROAD TERMS THE OTHERS AGREED WITH THIS ANALYSIS. BUT WE NEED TO LOOK CAREFULLY AT THE IMPLICATIONS. THEY ARE OF COURSE NO MORE THAN AN EXTRAPOLATION OF THE LANGUAGE WE OURSELVES PUT FORWARD IN PARA 4 OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION.

TICKELL

YYYY

*But an extrapolation that could be  
fatal to enforcement  
the embargo*

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