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34 (A-D)

IRAQ/KUWAIT: CONTINGENCY PLANNING

MODUK FOR DUS(P)

SUMMARY

1. AUTHORITATIVE CONFIRMATION THAT AMERICAN POLICY IS WHAT THEY SAY IT IS, EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS AND MASSIVE DEFENSIVE CONTAINMENT: BOTH DESIGNED TO INDUCE AN IRAQI WITHDRAWAL, BOTH NEEDING TIME TO WORK. NOT OVERLY CONCERNED ABOUT JORDAN OR ISRAEL MEANWHILE. OFFENSIVE MILITARY ACTION IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ STILL CONSIDERED A WORST-CASE SCENARIO, FOR WHICH NO CURRENT PLAN EXISTS, WHICH THE US WOULD NOT HAVE THE MILITARY CAPABILITY TO MOUNT FOR SOME TIME AND FOR WHICH THEY WOULD LOOK FOR UN COVER AND BROAD ARAB SUPPORT. RECOGNITION THAT PUBLIC REACTION TO - EG TREATMENT OF HOSTAGES COULD ALTER THE PICTURE. DEEP GRATITUDE FOR BRITISH ROLE.

DETAIL

2. I HAD A HALF AN HOUR ONE ON ONE WITH KIMMITT AT MY REQUEST ON 23 AUGUST. I MADE IT CLEAR IN ADVANCE I WAS NOT ACTING ON EXPLICIT INSTRUCTIONS BUT THAT MY PURPOSE WAS TO TRY TO LOOK A LITTLE FURTHER AT THE LIKELY EVOLUTION OF WESTERN POLICIES SO AS TO CONFIRM THAT WE AND THE AMERICANS WERE THINKING ON THE SAME LINES.

3. I TOLD KIMMITT THAT, FOR THE PRESENT, AND ON THE ASSUMPTION THERE WERE NO MAJOR NEW IRAQI MOVES, WE SEEMED FIRMLY ON THE TWIN TRACK OF SHORING UP THE DEFENCE OF SAUDI ARABIA AND ENFORCING AND IMPOSING UN SANCTIONS. A PATTERN WAS THEREFORE SET FOR THE NEXT 6-8 WEEKS. IT COULD STILL BE UPSET BY DIFFICULTIES IN JORDAN OR COMPLICATIONS FROM ISRAEL AS WELL AS BY POSSIBLE IRAQI MOVES. BY OCTOBER HOWEVER, THE US BUILD-UP SHOULD HAVE BEEN COMPLETED, WIDENING THE RANGE OF OPTIONS. WE SHOULD ALSO BY THEN BE ABLE TO TAKE A BETTER VIEW OF WHETHER OR NOT OUR CURRENT STRATEGY WAS LIKELY TO ACHIEVE THE TWIN

OBJECTIVES OF ASSURING THE DEFENCE OF SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES AND, SECONDLY, OF RESTORING THE INTEGRITY OF KUWAIT. THERE HAD BEEN WIDESPREAD SPECULATION THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN MIGHT NOT SURVIVE AN IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT AND/OR THAT IF HE DID HE WOULD REMAIN SUCH A THREAT THAT HIS EVENTUAL REMOVAL FROM POWER WOULD BE NECESSARY. I WOULD BE GLAD TO KNOW HOW US VIEWS WERE DEVELOPING IN THE LIGHT OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS. B

4. KIMMITT SAID THAT HE ACCEPTED THE SCENARIO I HAD PAINTED BUT WOULD PUT THREE IMMEDIATE GLOSSES ON IT. THE AMERICANS WERE CONCERNED, AS HE KNEW WE WERE, ABOUT JORDAN. THEY FULLY ACCEPTED THE NEED TO HELP THE COUNTRY ECONOMICALLY. BUT HE DID NOT THINK A JORDANIAN COLLAPSE WAS IMMEDIATELY IN PROSPECT. NOR HAD THE UNITED STATES COME TO ANY MILITARY CONCLUSIONS ABOUT

WHAT THEY SHOULD DO IF KING HUSSEIN'S REGIME CAME TO BE ENDANGERED BY THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT'S OWN VACILLATIONS. THE IMMEDIATE TASK WAS TO ENSURE THAT THE KING, IN HIS OWN LONGER TERM INTERESTS, MADE UP HIS MIND TO SUPPORT THE ARAB MAJORITY AND THE WESTERN POWERS AND THEN TO STICK TO THAT POLICY. HE THOUGHT THIS THE BEST WAY OF PROMOTING THE REGIME'S SURVIVABILITY. HE REPEATED THAT THE AMERICANS HAD NO MILITARY PLANS IN RELATION TO JORDAN. IF THE IRAQIS CROSSED THE FRONTIER WITH JORDAN WE SHOULD BE IN A WHOLE NEW AND DANGEROUS SITUATION. IN THE MEANTIME THE AMERICANS HAD, AS I WOULD KNOW, BEEN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT ABOUT THE NEED TO KEEP THEIR HEADS DOWN. HE DID NOT EXPECT TROUBLE FROM THAT QUARTER. HIS SECOND COMMENT ON MY EXPOSITION WAS THEREFORE THAT HE TRUSTED WE HAD IN PRACTICE NO PRESSING NEED TO ANTICIPATE ISRAEL COMING DIRECTLY INTO THE EQUATION.

5. KIMMITT SAID THAT THE THIRD POINT HE WANTED TO MAKE WAS THAT, IN HIS JUDGEMENT, WE SHOULD BEWARE OF ANY ASSUMPTION THAT RESTORING THE INTEGRITY OF KUWAIT WOULD NECESSARILY ENTAIL OR DEPEND ON THE DOWNFALL OF SADDAM HUSSEIN. HE HAD AFTER ALL SURVIVED THE WAR WITH IRAN, AND ALL ITS CONSEQUENCES INCLUDING WHAT AMOUNTED TO HIS RECENT SURRENDER TO THAT COUNTRY. SO KIMMITT DID NOT THEREFORE THINK WE SHOULD AT THIS STAGE TIE OUR POLICIES DIRECTLY TO SADDAM HUSSEIN'S FATE. PERHAPS I WOULD HAVE NOTED THAT US OFFICIAL SPOKESMEN HAD BEEN VERY CAREFUL TO AVOID THIS TRAP. THE INTEGRITY OF KUWAIT WAS, ARGUABLY, MAINLY A METAPHOR FOR THE FREE FLOW OF OIL.

6. THE POSITION WOULD CHANGE, KIMMITT CONTINUED, AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER OR BEGINNING OF OCTOBER. HE AGREED THAT WE OUGHT BY THEN TO HAVE A BETTER IDEA AS TO WHETHER OR NOT SANCTIONS WERE GOING TO WORK. THE PICTURE LN REGARD TO THE HOSTAGES WOULD ALSO

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LOOK VER DIFFERENT. HE PERSONALLY HAD BEEN SICKENED BY THE SIGHT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN RUFFLING THE HAIR OF LITTLE BRITISH CHILDREN ON CNN AND TELLING THEM THEY WOULD GO ON GETTING THEIR MILK AND CORNFLAKES. HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF SCENES LIKE THIS WOULD BE OVER THE NEXT 6-8 WEEKS. BUT WE COULD BE SURE THAT IF THERE WERE NO PROGRESS THE PUBLIC ATMOSPHERE WOULD WORSEN. THIS WAS A NEURALGIC POINT FOR THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN AND OTHER COUNTRIES. ITS PROBABLE DEVELOPMENT WAS HARD TO ASSESS. IT MIGHT BE THAT THOSE DIRECTLY AFFECTED WOULD GET ANGRIER AND ANGRIER BUT THAT THE REST OF THE WORLD WOULD NOT SEE IRAQI POLICY AS SUFFICIENTLY PROVOCATIVE AS TO JUSTIFY ANY FIRM OFFENSIVE ACTION.

7. KIMMITT SAID THAT IN ACKNOWLEDGING THAT BY THE BEGINNING OF OCTOBER THE US BUILD-UP WOULD GIVE THE AMERICANS THE OPTION OF A QUOTE MORE FORWARD LEANING UNQUOTE POLICY THOUGH NOT, HE THOUGHT, THE ABILITY TO MOUNT AN ALL OUT OFFENSIVE, HE DID NOT INTEND TO IMPLY THAT THIS WAS THE US PURPOSE. A SUBSTANTIAL ARAB ELEMENT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO ANY SUCH DEVELOPMENT. THE DANGERS IN THE US ACTING ALONE WERE OBVIOUS. HE COMMENTED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE HAVING DIFFICULTY EVEN IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES IN GETTING THE PROMISED TWO EGYPTIAN DIVISIONS INTO SAUDI ARABIA, WITH THE AMERICANS HAVING TO ACT AS A MARRIAGE BROKER BETWEEN SAUDI ARABIA AND EGYPT BY CONVEYING FROM ONE TO THE OTHER THAT EGYPT WOULD SAY YES IF SAUDI ARABIA ASKED. THE AMERICANS WOULD, SECONDLY, WANT UN COVER FOR A MORE AGGRESSIVE POLICY SHOULD THAT BECOME NECESSARY. KIMMITT THOUGHT THAT THEY WOULD IN ANY CASE WANT TO GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION, ONCE THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD AGREED TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS UNDER SCR 661 TO THE POSSIBILITY OF ASKING FOR A FURTHER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION TO ASSURE THE ENFORCEMENT OF SCR 660.

8. KIMMITT SAID THERE WAS NATURALLY SPECULATION IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE US ADMINISTRATION AS TO LONGER TERM AMERICAN PURPOSES. I WOULD NO DOUBT HAVE HEARD A VARIETY OF VIEWS. THE PRESS WAS HAVING A FIELD DAY. HE COULD ASSURE ME HOWEVER THAT NO AGREED LONGER TERM POLICIES HAD BEEN WORKED AT OR THROUGH, LET ALONE DECIDED UPON, AS TO WHAT THE UNITED STATES OUGHT TO DO IF THE PRESENT TWIN TRACK APPROACH DID NOT PRODUCE RESULTS. THE AMERICANS WERE FULLY CONSCIOUS OF THE RISKS OF GETTING STILL MORE DEEPLY INVOLVED. AND THEIR ENERGIES WERE DIRECTED TOWARDS GETTING CURRENT POLICIES IMPLEMENTED.

9. I THANKED HIM, REPEATING THAT MY MAIN OBJECTIVE IN COMING TO SEE HIM HAD BEEN TO CONFIRM THAT OUR THOUGHTS WERE RUNNING IN PARALLEL AND TO REPEAT THAT IT SEEMED TO US VERY DESIRABLE TO

THINK THROUGH OUR LONGER TERM POLICIES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES TOGETHER. HE HAD ANSWERED AS BEST HE COULD, GIVEN ALL THE UNKNOWNNS, MOST OF THE SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS I HAD PREPARED FOR MYSELF IN ADVANCE INCLUDING WHERE THE AMERICANS SAW THE BALANCE LYING BETWEEN PRESERVING THEIR FREEDOM OF ACTION AND ENSURING UNCOVER. IT SEEMED TO ME A BASIC FACT OF THE PRESENT SITUATION THAT VIRTUALLY ALL THOSE INVOLVED HAD BURNED THEIR BOATS. NO ONE AS A RESULT COULD LOOK AHEAD WITH ANY CERTAINTY. BUT I WAS GLAD TO HEAR HIM ENDORSE THE IDEA THAT THE BRITISH AND AMERICANS SHOULD CONTINUE TO SHARE THEIR INNER MOST THOUGHTS ON THESE MATTERS.

10. KIMMITT COMMENTED IN CONCLUSION THAT HE THOUGHT THE IRANIANS WOULD WANT TO GET WHAT THEY COULD OUT OF THE PRESENT SITUATION, INCLUDING AS A MAJOR OBJECTIVE THE RESTORATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM. BUT HE DID NOT EXPECT THEM TO BECOME A MAJOR CHANNEL THROUGH WHICH SADDAM HUSSEIN COULD BREACH SANCTIONS.

11. AS I LEFT, I TOLD KIMMITT THAT HIS HANDLING OF THE CRISIS HAD ATTRACTED MUCH ADMIRATION IN LONDON AND AT NEW YORK AS WELL AS IN WASHINGTON. HE SAID HE KNEW THERE HAD BEEN A LOT OF SPECULATION IN RECENT MONTHS ABOUT THE UK/US RELATIONSHIP. THE FACT WAS HOWEVER THAT WHEN PUSH CAME TO SHOVE IT ALWAYS SHOWED THAT IT WAS THE BRITISH ON WHOM THE AMERICANS COULD RELY. OTHERS WHO HAD RECENTLY LOOMED SO LARGE WERE NOWHERE TO BE SEEN.
COMMENT

12. I BELIEVE KIMMITT WAS BEING TRUTHFUL WHEN HE SAID THERE WAS NO AGREED US POLICY AS TO WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN IF THE PRESENT APPROACH DOES NOT WORK AND THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE NOT YET EVEN COME TO AN ABSOLUTELY FIRM VIEW THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN MUST GO IF A SOLUTION IS TO BE FOUND. HIS ACCOUNT ALSO SEEMED TO ME TO CHIME WITH THE ANALYSIS IN MY TELNO 2011 (NOT TO ALL). THAT SAID, THERE WAS NATURALLY A STATE DEPARTMENT FLAVOUR TO HIS COMMENTS: PERHAPS PARTICULARLY AS TO THE NEED FOR BROAD ARAB INVOLVEMENT IN ANY MORE FORWARD LEANING POLICY IN FUTURE AND THE NECESSITY FOR UN COVER IN THAT EVENT. THOSE WORKING MORE CLOSELY WITH THE PENTAGON NATURALLY EXHIBIT A MORE MARTIAL STAMP (MY TELNO 2008). THE AMERICANS WILL OBVIOUSLY NEED TO BEGIN MORE SERIOUSLY TO ADDRESS LONGER TERM ISSUES AS AND WHEN EVENTS ALLOW THEM TO LIFT THEIR EYES FROM CURRENT PRE-OCCUPATIONS. WE SHALL DO OUR BEST TO KEEP THEM UP TO THE MARK IN SHARING THEIR THOUGHTS WITH US.

WOOD

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