

CONFIDENTIAL
FM ABU DHABI
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 358
OF 012053Z SEP

ADVANCE COPY

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEWYORK, PARIS, DOHA
INFO PRIORITY RIYADH, JEDDA, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, SANAA, MUSCAT,
INFO PRIORITY CAIRO, TEL AVIV, TUNIS

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE MEETING WITH SHAIKH ZAYED

SUMMARY

1. SHAIKH ZAYED LOOKING FOR, BUT NOT PRESSING, A MILITARY SOLUTION. HIGHLY CRITICAL OF THOSE WHO HAVE SUPPORTED SADDAM HUSSEIN BUT PREPARED TO HELP KING HUSSEIN IF HE MENDS HIS WAYS. CONFIDENT IN, AND GRATEFUL FOR, BRITAIN'S SUPPORT.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SPENT ABOUT AN HOUR AND A HALF WITH SHAIKH ZAYED THIS EVENING. SHAIKH ZAYED WAS, NOT SURPRISINGLY, UTTERLY FIRM IN HIS REJECTION OF IRAQ'S AGGRESSION. HE MUST WITHDRAW COMPLETELY FROM KUWAIT AND ONLY THEN WOULD ANY IRAQI CLAIMS BE LOOKED AT. THIS MUST BE DONE THROUGH THE ARAB LEAGUE. THE GCC STOOD FIRMLY BEHIND KUWAIT. ALL THOSE WHO WERE RUNNING AROUND ON HIS BEHALF WERE SIMPLY PROCRASTINATING. HE HAD TOLD ENVOYS FROM THE YEMEN, JORDAN AND ARAFAT THAT THEY SHOULD LOOK TO THEIR OWN AFFAIRS. THE COUNTRIES DIRECTLY INVOLVED LIKE THE UAE WERE NOT MEDIATING. THE ONLY MESSAGE TO SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS TO RETURN TO BAGHDAD. HE HAD MADE CLEAR TO THE YEMENIS THAT, WHILE THEY HAD RECEIVED HELP FOR THEIR UNIFICATION, THEY COULD NOT EXPECT ANY MORE HELP WHILE THEY WERE ON THE SIDE OF THE AGGRESSOR. HIS MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN HAD BEEN SIMILAR. KING HUSSEIN SHOULD ABANDON HIS SUPPORT FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN BEFORE IT WAS TOO LATE. THE KING COULD FIND HIMSELF WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN DEAD AND BURIED AND WITH NO OTHER FRIENDS TO TURN TO. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REFERRED TO KING HUSSEIN'S MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER IN LONDON AND OUR ATTEMPTS TO CONVINCE HIM TO CHANGE HIS WAYS. WE HAD TO SHOW HIM THAT HIS INTERESTS LAY IN OBSERVING SANCTIONS. SHAIKH ZAYED SAID THAT KING HUSSEIN WAS NOW SO TIED TO SADDAM

HUSSEIN THAT, IF SADDAM HUSSEIN COLLAPSED, HUSSEIN WOULD PROBABLY COLLAPSE AS WELL. WHAT COULD YOU DO WITH A MAN WHO INSISTED IN PUTTING A HOLE IN HIS OWN BOAT? THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID YOU TRIED TO GET HIM TO STOP UP THE HOLE AND THEN HELPED HIM TO BAIL OUT AND SAIL THE BOAT IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. ZAYED SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT HUSSEIN WAS GOING THE WAY OF HIS FATHER AND HIS BROTHER. IT WAS A CASE OF BAD GENES. NOTHING COULD SAVE HIM. HE DID, HOWEVER, AGREE WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE THAT WE MUST TRY.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE NEEDED TO SHOW PEOPLE THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS A LOSER. HE HAD LOST OUT ON IRAN, HE HAD DAMAGED THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE AND ONE WAY OR ANOTHER HE WOULD LOSE KUWAIT. ARAFAT HAD MADE A BIG MISTAKE. THE ARGUMENTS OF THE PALESTINIANS WERE NOT BEING HELPED BY SADDAM HUSSEIN. ON THE CONTRARY, ZAYED COMMENTED THAT THE ARAB/ISRAEL QUESTION WOULD HENCEFORTH HAVE TO BE TACKLED BY SOMEONE OTHER THAN ARAFAT. HE WAS FINISHED. THERE WERE OTHERS WHO COULD TAKE HIS PLACE.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REFERRED TO OUR PRACTICAL AND POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR THE UAE. WE WOULD WILLINGLY FILL ANY GAPS. ZAYED SAID THAT HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE TRAIL GOING COLD AND A STALEMATE BEING REACHED. IF SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS SIMPLY ALLOWED TO DRIFT BACK HOME WITH HIS MILITARY FORCES INTACT, HE WOULD RETURN STRONGER IN DUE COURSE. HE HAD THROWN AWAY EVERYTHING HE HAD FOUGHT AGAINST IRAN FOR IN ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE HIS HOLD OVER KUWAIT. THAT HAD BEEN A MISTAKE BUT IT SHOWED HIS DETERMINATION TO STAY THERE. HE WOULD ONLY BE BUDGED BY FORCE. HE WOULD HAVE TO BE HUMILIATED. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT IT WAS CLEARLY NECESSARY FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN TO BE SEEN TO BE DEFEATED. THERE COULD BE NO DIGNIFIED COMPROMISE FOR HIM. BUT THERE WERE TWO ROUTES TO DEFEAT. ONE WAY WAS THE MILITARY, WHICH WAS NOT EXCLUDED BUT THE US WERE CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE READY FOR SOME WEEKS AND THERE WERE BIG RISKS IN THE MILITARY OPTION, NOT LEAST THE BREAK UP OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS. THE SECOND ROUTE WAS THE STRANGULATION OF IRAQ. IT SEEMED TO US WORTH TRYING TO TIGHTEN THE NOOSE SO AS TO PARALYSE IRAQI TRADE. THAT DEPENDED ON INTERNATIONAL WILL BUT HE BELIEVED WE COULD KEEP UP THE DETERMINATION OF OUR PEOPLE.

5. ZAYED SAID HE HAD NO DOUBTS ABOUT BRITAIN. HE KNEW US BETTER THAN ANYONE ELSE AND WAS CONFIDENT OF OUR FIRMNESS, SINCERITY AND FRIENDSHIP BUT HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE RESOLVE OF OTHER NATIONS. HE COULD ASSURE US, THE AMERICANS AND THE FRENCH THAT ANY

MILITARY PERSONNEL WE SENT HERE WOULD BE TREATED AS HIS OWN CHILDREN. THEY WOULD BE BROTHERS IN ARMS OF THE UAE. HE HAD CALLED ON MEN BETWEEN 15 AND 40 TO JOIN UP FOR TRAINING. THE RESPONSE HAD BEEN OVERWHELMING, RANGING FROM 60 YEARS OLD TO 12 YEARS OLD. WHEN THE 12 YEAR OLDS HAD BEEN SENT HOME, THEIR MOTHERS HAD BROUGHT THEM BACK INSISTING THEY BE TRAINED. 300 WOMEN HAD JOINED UP WANTING TO BE SOLDIERS RATHER THAN NURSES.

6. TOWARDS THE END OF THE MEETING, SHAIKH ZAYED WAS GIVEN A NOTE CONTAINING QADHAFI'S LATEST PEACE PROPOSALS. THESE, SAID ZAYED, HAD BEEN COOKED UP WITH ARAFAT AND KING HUSSEIN AND MUST BE COMPLETELY REJECTED. NO-ONE WOULD GO TO QADHAFI'S PROPOSED SUMMIT. ZAYED HAD REMINDED QADHAFI THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD KICKED HIM OUT OF THE ROOM AT THE BAGHDAD SUMMIT. IF SADDAM HUSSEIN WON IN KUWAIT, HE WOULD BE EVEN MORE BRUTAL. QADHAFI WAS LIKE A CHILD (A DANGEROUS CHILD SAID THE SECRETARY OF STATE).

BURTON

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

35

ADVANCE 35

IRAQ/KUWAIT
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR GOULDEN
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/NAD
HD/SED
HD/UND
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/NEWS D
HD/NPDD

MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
MR APPEYARD CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK,
(NO 10 DOWNING ST)
CABINET OFFICE DIO
(BY TUBE H29)
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
AUS (C) MODUK
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK

PAGE 3

HD/SECPOL D
HD/AMD
HD/ECD(E)

MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND
EMERGENCY UNIT
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN