


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SIC:LDQ/I9M/U2G

FOR DIS CELL DI ROW A1A FROM AA. TEL AVIV FOR AA FCO FOR MED

SUBJ: RJAF/IRAQI ACTIVITY

- 1. GENERAL SHURDOM COMMANDER RJAF CALLED ME IN TO DISCUSS ISRAELI MISINFORMATION ON THE INVOLVEMENT OF RJAF WITH THE IRAQIS. HE SAID HE WISHED TO PLACE ON RECORD THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
 - A. RJAF HAD NOT ASSISTED IRAGIS WITH HAWK MISSILE TRAINING. HE SAID WITH ALL SERIOUSNESS WE WERE WELCOME TO EXAMINE A ROLL-CALL OF HIS HAWK AS PERSONNEL EXCLAM.
 - B.NO IRAQI AIRCRAFT WERE OPERATING FROM RJAF BASES. HE PARTICULARLY CITED THE RUMOURS ABOUT THE USE OF H4 AIRFIELD.
 - C. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT RJAF AIRCRAFT MAY BE DISPERSED TO H4 AS A NORMAL PRECAUTION IN A TIME OF CRISIS AND THAT ALL AVAILABLE BASES WERE IN USE.
 - D. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ALL RJAF RADARS WERE UP AND RUNNING AS A PROPER PRECAUTION.
- 2. I SAID THAT CLARIFICATION ON THE ROLE OF RJAF PILOTS IN IRAQ COULD CLEAR UP POSSIBLE MISAPPREHENSIONS. HE SAID THAT 30 OF HIS YOUNGER AND LESS EXPERIENCED PILOTS HAD BEEN TAKEN AWAY FROM REGULAR SQUADRON OPERATIONS BECAUSE THEY WERE GETTING INSUFFICIENT FLYING AND HAVE BEEN IN IRAQ FLYING OLD MIG 21S QUOTE SIMPLY TO KEEP THEM IN FLYING PRACTICE UNQUOTE. THEY WERE NOT AND WOULD NOT BE USED IN OPERATIONAL SORTIES.
- 3. HE STATED THAT THE ROLE OF THE RJAF AT THIS TIME WAS TO BE PREPARED AGAINST ANY ISRAELI ACTION. THAT WAS THE JORDANIAN PREOCCUPATION. THERE WAS NO POSSIBLE LIKELIHOOD OF RJAF INVOLVEMENT IN ANY CONFLICT IN THE KUWAIT AREA. THE RJAF HAD

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STEPPED UP TRAINING AND RECCE BUT THIS WAS ALL PRECAUTIONARY IN NATURE. HE WAS VERY INSISTENT THAT ISRAELI PROPAGANDISTS WERE ATTEMPTING TO BLOW UP RJAF ACTIVITY BEYOND PROPORTION AND PARTICULARLY THE IRAQI/JORDANIAN LINK.

4. HE ALSO VOICED CONCERN OVER THE DISRUPTION IN FLOW OF EQUIPMENT AND SPARES FROM THE UK OCCASIONED BY THE CURRENT POLITICAL ISSUE AND THE ATTENDANT PROBLEMS CAUSED BY INDEPENDENT CARRIERS EN ROUTE. HE ACCEPTED THAT THE MODUK WAS DOING ITS BEST TO RESOLVE THE DIFFICULTIES BUT STRESSED THAT SINCE HIS EQUIPMENT WAS CURRENTLY WORKING OVERTIME SPARES CONSUMPTION WAS HIGHER THAN NORMAL AND HIS NEEDS WERE THEREFORE THE GREATER. HE SAID THAT HE HAD PROBLEMS OF SHORTAGES OF SPARES ON ALL FRONTS. CONCERNING AIRCRAFT HE HAD AGGS WITH F5 AND MIRAGES. HE VOICED PARTICULAR PROBLEMS WITH THE FRENCH.

5. GENERAL SHURDOM WAS IN GOOD HUMOUR BUT CONCERNED ABOUT THE SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO THE ISRAELIS. HE HAS SIMILARLY BRIEFED THE AMERICANS.

REEVE

YYYY

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