

CONFIDENTIAL

ADVANCE COPY

FM JEDDA
TO DESKBY 041630Z FCO
TELNO 129
OF 041542Z SEPTEMBER 90
INFO DESKBY 041700Z WASHINGTON
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

JEDDA TELNO 004 TO WASHINGTON (NOT TO ALL): SECRETARY OF STATE'S
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH JIM BAKER.

1. WE WERE GRATEFUL TO WASHINGTON FOR GETTING THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S MESSAGE TO BAKER SO PROMPTLY. HE HAD READ IT WHEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE SPOKE TO HIM AT BREAKFAST TIME (WASHINGTON TIME) TODAY.
2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THE FEELING IN THE GULF WAS PRETTY SOLID, PARTICULARLY IN SAUDI ARABIA, BUT NOT OVER-EXCITED - WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF BAHRAIN WHICH HE HAD NOT VISITED BUT WHERE THERE DID SEEM TO BE A DEGREE OF OVER-EXCITEMENT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SPOKE OF HIS MEETING THIS MORNING WITH THE AMIR OF KUWAIT (SEE SEPARATE TELEGRAM) AND HOPED THAT BAKER WOULD SEE HIM AS WELL.
3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WHAT WAS CAUSING REAL CONCERN WAS THE DEGREE OF DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY BY THE YEMENIS AND THE KING OF JORDAN. THE PRESIDENT OF YEMEN WAS BUSTLING ABOUT TRYING TO PUT TOGETHER AN ARAB INITIATIVE WHICH WOULD TURN THE PRESENT ARAB LEAGUE MINORITY INTO THE MAJORITY. THE WORRY THE SAUDIS HAD WAS NOT SO MUCH BREACHES OF SANCTIONS AS THE RISK THAT MAJORITY SUPPORT MIGHT BE BROKEN UP. THE RESIGNATION OF KLIBI, THE ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY GENERAL, WAS A WORRYING SIGN. IT NEEDED A CONSENSUS TO APPOINT A SUCCESSOR AND THAT MIGHT PROVE DIFFICULT. THE SAUDIS FELT THE NEED TO CAPTURE A BIT MORE ARAB SUPPORT, ESPECIALLY IF ANYTHING DRAMATIC WERE TO HAPPEN LATER ON. THAT WAS WHERE THE PALESTINIAN ASPECT BECAME IMPORTANT.
4. BAKER COMMENTED THAT HE WAS NOT WILD ABOUT DISCUSSION AMONG THE PERMANENT FIVE. HE DID NOT WANT TO UPSET THE ISRAELIS BUT A LOT WOULD DEPEND ON HIS CONVERSATION WITH LEVY ON 5 SEPTEMBER. HE ACCEPTED THAT, IF THE ISRAELIS STONEWALLED, HE MIGHT HAVE TO THINK AGAIN. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED HIM TO KEEP THE THOUGHT IN HIS MIND. HE HAD MENTIONED IT TO THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER BUT WOULD NOT DISCUSS IT WITH THE FRENCH OR ANYONE ELSE.

THE SAUDIS' THOUGHT THAT, IF THERE WAS SOMETHING DRAMATIC ON THE HORIZON WE SHOULD HAVE DONE SOMETHING ABOUT THE PALESTINIANS BEFOREHAND, WAS A SOUND ONE.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THERE WAS A LOT OF INTEREST IN THE GULF ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FORTHCOMING HELSINKI SUMMIT BETWEEN BUSH AND GORBACHEV. BAKER SAID THE PRESIDENT HAD OFFERED THE SUMMIT BECAUSE HE WANTED THESE ENCOUNTERS TO BECOME LESS COSMIC AND MORE ROUTINE. HE WANTED TO DISCUSS THE GULF BUT ALSO CFE, ON WHICH THERE WAS NO PROGRESS. THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN SURPRISED AT GORBACHEV'S READINESS TO MEET SO SOON. THE MESSAGE OF THE SUMMIT WAS THE INCREASING NORMALITY OF US/SOVIET RELATIONS. THE US WERE NOT LOOKING FOR ANY DRAMATIC OUTCOME. BAKER ADDED THAT WOERNER HAD PROPOSED A NATO SUMMIT TO FOLLOW THE HELSINKI SUMMIT. THE PRESIDENT, HOWEVER, COULD NOT DO THIS AND WOERNER'S MIND WAS NOW TURNING TO THE IDEA OF A MINISTERIAL MEETING FOLLOWING THE MOSCOW MEETING OF THE 2+4.

6. BAKER SAID THAT THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WHO HAD BEEN IN THE GULF WERE NOW BACK IN WASHINGTON SAYING THAT MORE GROUND FORCES WERE NEEDED IN THE GULF. BAKER WONDERED WHETHER BRITAIN COULD DO SOMETHING IN ADDITION TO WHAT WE HAD DONE ALREADY, IE IMPLYING TROOPS ON THE GROUND. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE HAD GOT A SIMILAR MESSAGE FROM PRINCE SAUD AND THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE US COMMANDER HAD ALSO PUT FORWARD SOME SPECIFIC IDEAS. WE WOULD LOOK QUICKLY TO SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE. HE DOUBTED WHETHER WE WOULD BE ABLE TO DO ANYTHING QUITE AS AMBITIOUS AS THE US COMMANDER HAD PROPOSED. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE MORE COUNTRIES THAT WERE REPRESENTED ON THE GROUND, THE MORE PROBLEMS THERE WOULD BE OF COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE EVENT OF MILITARY ACTION. THERE WOULD NEED TO BE A CLEAR SYSTEM OF COMMAND. THE SAUDIS WERE TALKING ABOUT A UN FLAG, BUT THAT WOULD CREATE REAL COMPLICATIONS. BAKER AGREED THAT THIS WAS A SERIOUS PROBLEM THAT MUST BE ADDRESSED.

COMMENT

7. WE ARE TRYING TO BRING FORWARD THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S PROGRAMME IN MOSCOW WITH A VIEW TO LEAVING ON THE EVENING OF THURSDAY 13 SEPTEMBER. IF THE IDEA OF A MINISTERIAL MEETING OF NATO THAT WEEK GAINS GROUND, WE COULD THEREFORE MANAGE FRIDAY 14 SEPTEMBER. SATURDAY 15 SEPTEMBER SHOULD BE AVOIDED, OR THE SECRETARY OF STATE WILL HAVE NO TIME AT ALL FOR HIS CONSTITUENCY

IN SEPTEMBER.

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