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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH KING FAHD: 4 SEPTEMBER

SUMMARY

1. KING FAHD MORE CAUTIOUS THAN WHEN HE SAW MR KING. SEES SIGNS THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN IS NERVOUS AND LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT. INSISTS THAT HIS WITHDRAWAL BE UNCONDITIONAL. STRONG EMPHASIS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH SHOULD ADOPT NECESSARY RESOLUTIONS TO CONVINCING SADDAM HUSSEIN THAT THE GAME IS UP. DISMISSIVE OF THOSE LIKE THE PRESIDENT OF YEMEN WHO ARE HELPING SADDAM HUSSEIN. VERY HURT BY KING HUSSEIN'S ATTITUDE BUT ANXIOUS TO SAVE HIM FROM HIMSELF.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD A MEETING LASTING AN HOUR AND THREE-QUARTERS WITH KING FAHD THIS EVENING. THE KING SPOKE (INCLUDING INTERPRETATION) FOR AN HOUR AND A QUARTER WITHOUT INTERRUPTION. HE BEGAN WITH A LONG ACCOUNT OF THE ORIGINAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THE SHAH OF IRAN OVER THE SHATT AL-ARAB AND OF THE ORIGINS OF THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR. SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD COME TO SEE HIM BEFORE THE START OF THE WAR, BLAMING IRAN FOR BORDER INCURSIONS AND FOR BOMBS IN BAGHDAD AND THREATENING TO WIPE THE IRANIANS OUT. HE HAD ASKED FOR THE KING'S ADVICE AND THE KING HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE HAD NO GROUNDS TO GO TO WAR AND MIGHT BE WASTED. BUT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD SHOWN A FINE CONCEIT. WHEN THE WAR STARTED, HIS ARMY, WELL-TRAINED AND PREPARED, HAD MADE INITIAL GAINS BUT THE IRANIANS HAD FOUGHT BACK AND AT ONE STAGE LOOKED AS IF THEY WOULD GO ALL THE WAY TO BAGHDAD. AT THAT STAGE, THE SAUDIS AND OTHERS HAD HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO GIVE HELP TO SADDAM HUSSEIN BECAUSE AN IRANIAN VICTORY WOULD HAVE BEEN EVEN MORE PROBLEMATIC THAN AN IRAQI ONE.

3. THE KING SAID THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO BELIEVE THE NEWS OF THE INVASION OF KUWAIT, NOT LEAST BECAUSE SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD SEPARATELY ASSURED PRINCE SAUD (WHOM HE HAD SENT TO BAGHDAD AS HIS ENVOY) AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK THAT, HOWEVER GREAT HIS DIFFICULTIES WITH KUWAIT, HE WOULD NEVER CONTEMPLATE AN INVASION. NATURALLY, HE HAD BELIEVED WHAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD. HE THOUGHT THE EXPLANATION FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN'S BEHAVIOUR LAY IN HIS BELIEF, AFTER THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR, THAT HIS AMBITION COULD PROCEED UNCONSTRAINED. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE INVASION, SAUDI ARABIA HAD NOTICED A HUGE BUILD-UP OF AIRCRAFT, TANKS AND TROOPS ON THEIR BORDER. SAUDI ARABIA'S OWN FORCES WERE SCATTERED AND COULD ANYWAY NOT HAVE WITHSTOOD AN IRAQI INVASION. SO HE HAD HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO ASK HIS FRIENDS TO COME TO HIS AID AND HE WANTED TO THANK ALL THE COUNTRIES, LED BY THE US AND UK, WHOSE RESPONSE HAD BEEN IMMEDIATE. HE DID NOT THINK THERE WAS ANY PRECEDENT FOR THE SPEED OF THE US/UK DEPLOYMENT. ONCE THE DEPLOYMENT HAD TAKEN PLACE, SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD OF COURSE CLAIMED THAT HE HAD NO INTENTION OF ATTACKING SAUDI ARABIA. NOW SADDAM HUSSEIN'S GAME WAS TO SHRUG OFF WHAT HE HAD DONE AS IF IT WAS OF NO CONSEQUENCE. FAR FROM ACKNOWLEDGING THAT HE HAD SWALLOWED UP AN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY, HE ACTED AS IF KUWAIT HAD BEEN A DISSIDENT PROVINCE OF IRAQ BROUGHT BACK INTO LINE.

4. THE KING BELIEVED THAT THE UN EMBARGO AND THE FREEZING OF IRAQI AND KUWAITI ASSETS ABROAD, AND THE OTHER UN RESOLUTIONS, HAD PRODUCED GOOD RESULTS. BUT NOW SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS TRYING TO PUSH SOME OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES TOWARDS POLICIES HARMFUL TO SAUDI ARABIA. KING HUSSEIN, YASSER ARAFAT, PRESIDENT SALEH OF YEMEN AND THE LEADERS OF SUDAN AND MAURITANIA WERE DOTTING THE MAP WITH THEIR TRAVELS, CAMPAIGNING ON SADDAM HUSSEIN'S BEHALF. THESE COUNTRIES HAD PROVIDED THEIR SERVICES TO IRAQ BECAUSE THEY HAD BEEN PERSUADED THAT THEY WOULD GET A SHARE OF THE BOOTY ARISING OUT OF THE INVASION. WHY WAS A COUNTRY LIKE MAURITANIA, WHICH HAD ITS OWN BORDER PROBLEMS WITH SENEGAL, STICKING ITS NOSE INTO SAUDI ARABIA'S AFFAIRS? THE ARAB COUNTRIES WHICH KNEW THE TRUE FACTS HAD ATTENDED THE ARAB SUMMIT IN CAIRO AND HAD TAKEN THE SAME LINE AS SAUDI ARABIA, IE THAT IRAQ HAD ATTEMPTED TO WIPE OUT KUWAIT COMPLETELY.

5. THE KING REALISED THAT THE COMMENDABLE STAND TAKEN BY THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD NOT JUST BEEN ON SAUDI ARABIA'S ACCOUNT BUT BECAUSE IF IRAQ HAD BEEN ALLOWED TO GET AWAY WITH ITS AGGRESSION, A TERRIBLE PRECEDENT WOULD HAVE BEEN SET: THE STRONG ALLOWED TO DEVOUR THE WEAK. THAT WOULD BE

VERY DANGEROUS INDEED AND SADDAM HUSSEIN MUST NOT GET AWAY WITH IT. HE HAD TO GET OUT OF KUWAIT AND THE NATURAL STATUS QUO ANTE HAD TO BE RESTORED. THIS SHOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT. NO MATTER HOW MANY WEAPONS AND MISSILES HE HAD, HE COULD NOT STAND AGAINST THE REST OF THE WORLD, WHICH WAS DETERMINED TO PUT HIM BACK IN HIS BOX AND CORRECT THE MISTAKE HE HAD MADE. WORLD RESISTANCE WAS THE ONLY WAY TO FORCE SADDAM HUSSEIN TO WITHDRAW AND TO GIVE PAUSE TO OTHER LEADERS WHO MIGHT BE CONTEMPLATING THE SAME THING.

6. THE KING SAID THAT, NEEDLESS TO SAY, THE COUNTRIES WHO HAD SUPPORTED SADDAM HUSSEIN WERE NOT PART OF THE STAND TAKEN BY THE COUNTRIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS. HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND THEIR POSITION. WHAT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD DONE TO KUWAIT HE MIGHT ONE DAY DO TO THEM. COULD KING HUSSEIN REALLY BELIEVE THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN LIKED HIM? IF SO, HE COULD NOT BE THINKING STRAIGHT. THE KING HAD NOT EXPECTED MUCH OF LEADERS LIKE THE PRESIDENT OF YEMEN OR YASSER ARAFAT AND DID NOT MUCH CARE WHAT THEY DID. BUT HE WAS PAINED WHAT BY WHAT KING HUSSEIN HAD DONE. HE LIKED THE KING, WHO NOW FACED PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND DEATH. HE WAS ONE OF THOSE WHO HAD PROTECTED HUSSEIN. HE HAD DONE HIM NO WRONG. QUITE THE CONTRARY. SAUDI ARABIA WAS THE ONLY COUNTRY TO HAVE STOOD BY HIM ECONOMICALLY, POLITICALLY, FINANCIALLY AND SOCIALLY. SAUDI ARABIA HAD MADE AVAILABLE TO JORDAN NO LESS THAN 19 BILLION. WHEN KING HUSSEIN HAD WANTED TO BUY PLANES AND OTHER EQUIPMENT FROM THE UNITED STATES, SAUDI ARABIA HAD GIVEN HIM THE MONEY. WHEN HE HAD ASKED FOR MONEY TO IMPROVE THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF HIS PEOPLE, SAUDI ARABIA HAD PROVIDED IT. SAUDI ARABIA WAS THE ONLY COUNTRY WHICH HAD MET THE FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS TO JORDAN AGREED AT THE BAGHDAD SUMMIT. AND THAT DID NOT INCLUDE THE SUBVENTIONS FROM THE SAUDI TREASURY THAT HAD BEEN MADE TO JORDAN FROM TIME TO TIME. THE LAST TIME THE KING HAD COME ASKING FOR MONEY WAS 4 MONTHS AGO. HE HAD SAID HE WAS IN DESPERATE STRAITS. THE KING HAD SAID THAT SAUDI ARABIA WAS A BIT STRETCHED, NOT LEAST BECAUSE OF PLUMMETING OIL PRICES. BUT KING HUSSEIN HAD SAID HIS CONDITION WAS DESPERATE SO SAUDI ARABIA HAD TAKEN FUNDS FROM ITS OWN PROJECTS IN ORDER TO FIND 300 MILLION FOR HUSSEIN. JORDAN TOOK ITS OIL FROM THE SAUDI PIPELINE. THEY DID NOT PAY FOR IT BUT ALLOWED THEIR DEBTS TO RUN UP TO 2-300 MILLION AND THEN ASKED KING FAHD TO WRITE THEM OFF, WHICH HE USUALLY DID. ALL KING HUSSEIN HAD GOT FROM SADDAM HUSSEIN, BY CONTRAST, WAS A FEW MARBLE STATUES OF THE KING'S ANCESTORS. SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD COME TO BELIEVE IN THE BOOK HE HAD COMMISSIONED MAKING OUT THAT HE WAS A RELATION OF THE PROPHET. BUT HE WAS A TIKRITI AND A DELINQUENT WITH A LONG CRIMINAL RECORD. HOW COULD SUCH A MAN POSSIBLY BE

RELATED TO KING HUSSEIN WHO WAS A DESCENDANT OF THE PROPHET? THE KING REALLY SHOULD HAVE LEARNED HIS LESSON FROM NASSER, WHO HAD COST HIM THE WEST BANK.

7. REVERTING TO SADDAM HUSSEIN, THE KING THOUGHT THAT HE MIGHT NOW BE SEARCHING DESPERATELY FOR A WAY OUT BUT THAT DID NOT INCLUDE WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. HE WANTED A WAY OUT WHICH ENABLED HIM TO KEEP KUWAIT. BUT IF THAT HAPPENED, IT WOULD CREATE TREMENDOUS DIFFICULTIES FOR THE FUTURE. THE KING COULD NOT PREDICT WHAT NEW RESOLUTIONS THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD ADOPT, BUT THERE WERE PRECEDENTS FOR RESOLUTIONS WHICH ALLOWED FOR THE USE OF FORCE BY COUNTRIES TO SOLVE A PARTICULAR PROBLEM. IT WAS THAT PROVISION WHICH LED PEOPLE TO JOIN THE UN IN THE FIRST PLACE. THEY WERE SEEKING PROTECTION AGAINST THE LAW OF THE JUNGLE. THIS WAS A PROBLEM FOR THE UN AND IN PARTICULAR FOR THE FIVE, WHO WOULD, HE WAS SURE, TAKE THE NECESSARY DECISIONS. PERHAPS THESE WOULD BE ENOUGH TO MAKE SADDAM HUSSEIN REALISE THAT HE MUST WITHDRAW AND PERHAPS HE WOULD DO THAT ON HIS OWN. THE KING ALREADY NOTICED SOME SIGNS OF FEAR COMING FROM SADDAM HUSSEIN. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE WANTED TO REFER TO THE TREATMENT WHICH SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD METED OUT TO FOREIGN DETAINEES IN BAGHDAD. NO MAN WITH HUMAN DECENCY IN HIM WOULD HAVE DONE THAT. SO THE DECISIVE SOLUTION HAD TO LIE IN DISCIPLINING HIM FOR WHAT HE HAD DONE, JUST AS HITLER HAD SIMPLY NOT BEEN ALLOWED TO SURRENDER BUT HAD BEEN PUNISHED. SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS EVEN CALLING HIMSELF THE HITLER OF THE MIDDLE EAST. MR HURD WAS THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF A MAJOR POWER WHICH WAS A PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE KING COULD NOT PREDICT THE NATURE OF THE STEPS WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD TAKE BUT HE WAS SURE THEY WOULD BE EFFECTIVE AND THAT THE SITUATION IN KUWAIT WOULD BE RETURNED TO NORMAL. THE KING WAS NOT ASKING US TO SAY WHAT POLICIES WE WOULD ADOPT. THAT WAS UP TO US. HE WAS SURE THE PROBLEM HAD THE FULL ATTENTION OF THE FIVE, ESPECIALLY THE US AND THE UK.

8. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT THE ONLY SAFE RESULT OF THE CRISIS WAS FOR THE OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT TO BE BROUGHT TO AN END. HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH ALL THE GULF RULERS HAD SHOWED THAT THEY AGREED WITH THE KING. THE ONE EXCEPTION WAS THE PRESIDENT OF YEMEN, WITH WHOM HE HAD HAD A LIVELY DISCUSSION. THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED HIM TO CONVEY HIS GREETINGS TO THE KING. I DO NOT WANT THEM, INTERJECTED THE KING, WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE INTERPRETER. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED HOW PRESIDENT SALEH SAW HIMSELF AS A PEACE-MAKER, BUT HE HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE MUST INSTEAD ACCEPT

THE DECISIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE ARAB LEAGUE. THE KING ASKED WHAT SALEH'S RESPONSE HAD BEEN. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN MORE AGGRESSIVE IN PRIVATE THAN IN PUBLIC. HE WAS VULNERABLE IN SOME RESPECTS, EG HE WAS SHORT OF OIL. MUCH MORE IMPORTANT - AND SADDER - WAS THE CASE OF KING HUSSEIN. THE PRIME MINISTER HAD ALREADY SPOKEN TO HIM VERY STRONGLY AS AN OLD FRIEND WHO SPEAKS TO A FRIEND WHO HAS GONE WRONG. KING HUSSEIN HAD TO ESCAPE FROM THE CAGE IN WHICH HE HAD PUT HIMSELF AND UNDERTAKE A BIG CHANGE. IT WAS NOT YET CLEAR HE COULD DO SO. HE WAS STILL FLYING ABOUT ATTEMPTING TO PUT TOGETHER IMPOSSIBLE POLITICAL INITIATIVES. THE KING SAID THAT HUSSEIN WAS NOT PUTTING TOGETHER INITIATIVES. HE WAS JUST GADDING ABOUT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE BOTTOM LINE WAS THAT IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS FOR ALL OF US IF KING HUSSEIN WERE OVERTHROWN BY SOME PALESTINIAN REVOLUTIONARY OR IF HIS COUNTRY DISINTERGRATED WITH IRAQ WAITING ON ONE SIDE AND ISRAEL ON THE OTHER. WE HAD TO TRY TO BRING HIM BACK TO THE RIGHT WAY. THE KING AGREED READILY. HE LIKED KING HUSSEIN AND AGREED WE SHOULD TRY. HIS ONLY AIM WAS TO PROTECT HIM FROM HIMSELF. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE WOULD GIVE PRINCE SAUD AN ACCOUNT OF HIS DISCUSSIONS IN JORDAN. IF WE DID SUCCEED IN SAVING KING HUSSEIN FROM HIMSELF, DID FAHD THINK THAT HE AND THE OTHER GULF STATES WOULD BE WILLING TO GIVE HIM SOME HELP? THAT DEPENDED, REPLIED THE KING, ON HUSSEIN TAKING UP A STRAIGHTFORWARD AND CLEAR POSITION.

9. REVERTING TO THE SITUATION IN THE UN, THE KING AGAIN URGED THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS TO ADOPT THE KIND OF POLICIES AND RESOLUTIONS WHICH WOULD MAKE THE PICTURE CRYSTAL CLEAR TO SADDAM HUSSEIN. SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD TO BE FORCED - THROUGH DIPLOMATIC MEANS IF POSSIBLE - TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT. THAT ALONE WOULD BRING ABOUT HIS DOWNFALL. ONCE HE HAD WITHDRAWN, HE WOULD BE FINISHED INTERNALLY. IF SADDAM HUSSEIN RESISTED A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, THEN THERE WERE OTHER SOLUTIONS WHICH WOULD FORCE HIM OUT. WHAT WE MUST NOT DO WAS TO ACCEPT ANY CONDITIONS ON HIS WITHDRAWAL. SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS TRYING TO IMPOSE CONDITIONS BUT WE MUST RESIST ABSOLUTELY. HE MUST NOT ENJOY THE FRUITS OF HIS ADVENTURE OR PROFIT FROM IT. KUWAIT MUST BE RETURNED TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ENTIRELY AGREED. THIS WAS THE HEART OF THE MATTER. WE MUST TRY TO PROCEED THROUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE COUNCIL MIGHT WANT A LITTLE TIME FOR THE EXISTING PRESSURES TO WORK. MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON THE RUSSIANS AND, AT THE HELSINKI SUMMIT, PRESIDENT BUSH WOULD WANT TO KEEP THEM TO THE LINE THE KING HAD DESCRIBED. WE MUST ALL WORK TO THAT END. THE KING SAID IT WAS NATURAL TO EXPECT SANCTIONS TO TAKE A

LITTLE TIME TO WORK BUT THERE MUST BE A LIMIT. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT GORBACHEV WOULD STAND OUT AGAINST THE OTHER FOUR MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IF HE DID SHOW RESISTANCE, THEN THIS MIGHT BE AN INDICATION THAT HE HAD A CONTINUING INTEREST IN KEEPING SADDAM HUSSEIN. IF THAT WAS THE CASE (AND THE KING DID NOT BELIEVE IT), THEN OUR RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV MUST BE VERY FIRM.

COMMENT

10. SIR ALAN MUNRO WAS STRUCK BY THE MORE CAUTIOUS TONE ADOPTED BY KING FAHD THAN WHEN HE SAW THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE, WITH MORE EMPHASIS ON A GRADUAL APPROACH, ALLOWING SANCTIONS THEIR CHANCE. THE KING WAS IN GOOD HUMOUR, WITH A FINE LINE OF INVECTIVE AGAINST SADDAM AND HIS SUPPORTERS. HE IS GENUINELY PERPLEXED BY KING HUSSEIN'S ATTITUDE AND GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF BEING EQUALLY GENUINE IN HIS DESIRE TO BRING KING HUSSEIN BACK INTO THE FOLD. THIS COMMENT ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL SUGGESTS HE MAY BE TOO SANGUINE ABOUT THE POSITION OF CHINA.

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CHRONOLOGY OF THE IRAQ/KUWAIT CRISIS

<u>Date</u>	<u>Iraqi actions</u>	<u>International reactions</u>
1 Aug	Iraq/Kuwait talks in in Jedda end abruptly	Oil price begins to rise from \$19.70 pb (Brent)
2 Aug	Iraq invades Kuwait; mobilises its Popular Army "Provisional Free Kuwait Government" (PFGK) dismisses the Amir and dissolves National Council (2)	United States & UK announce freeze on Kuwaiti assets: US also freezes Iraqi assets & suspends purchases of Iraqi oil United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopts SCR 660 condemning Iraqi invasion EC Presidency condemns invasion & calls for withdrawal Arab League Foreign Ministers hold emergency meeting in Cairo
3 Aug	Iraqi forces arrive close to Saudi border	Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Ministerial Council holds emergency session in Cairo: condemns Iraqi aggression Arab League Foreign Ministers condemn Iraqi aggression against Kuwait by majority vote Islamic Conference Organisation (ICO) condemns Iraqi invasion
4 Aug	PFGK announced under Colonel Ala Hussain Ali who proposes immediate talks with Iraq on border & announces formation of a popular army	Iranian President Rafsanjani instructs Foreign Ministry to re-establish political ties with Britain UK freezes Iraqi assets EC imposes trade embargo on Iraq
5 Aug	Iraq claims to withdraw some troops from Kuwait	Amir of Kuwait broadcasts to Kuwaiti people on Saudi TV
6 Aug	Iraq halves flow of oil through Turkish pipeline Iraq moves large number of foreigners from Kuwait to Baghdad	United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopts Resolution (SCR) 661 imposing sanctions on Iraq (13-0-2: Cuba & Yemen abstain)

6 Aug		Bahrain invokes Treaty of Friendship with UK
7 Aug	PFKG proclaims Kuwait a republic	Turkey closes Iraqi oil pipelines
	PFKG decrees parity of Kuwaiti & Iraqi dinars	Oil price surges to almost \$30 pb but ends day at \$26.10 pb (September Brent)
		US announces deployment of troops and aircraft to Saudi Arabia
8 Aug	Iraq annexes Kuwait	President Bush confirms despatch of US troops to Saudi Arabia to deter Iraqi aggression against that country
		UK announces deployment of British forces to defend Saudi Arabia and the Gulf
9 Aug	Iraq threatens massive retaliation against any foreign aggression.	UN Security Council unanimously adopts SCR 662 declaring Iraq's annexation of Kuwait as null and void
	Iraq closes its borders to foreigners	France announces despatch of aircraft carrier to the Gulf region.
	Iraq orders diplomatic missions in Kuwait to close and move to Baghdad by 24 August.	
10 Aug	Saddam Hussain calls for Jihad against the United States and corrupt Arab leaders; urges Arabs to protect Mecca "imprisoned by Americans and Zionists"	Emergency Arab summit in Cairo: resolution passed (15-3-2) calls for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait & positive response to Saudi request for Arab troops for her defence; Iraq, Libya & PLO voted against, Algeria & Yemen abstained & Jordan, Sudan & Mauritania entered reservations
		Australia announces despatch of two guided missile frigates and one replenishment tanker to the Gulf
11 Aug		Squadron of RAF Tornados deployed to Dhahran.

12 Aug	Saddam Hussain announces "peace initiative" (Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait & Israeli withdrawal from Occupied Territories).	Squadron of RAF Jaguars deployed to Thumrait
13 Aug		The Dutch government decides to send two frigates to the Gulf region.
		Bahrain and the UAE request British military assistance.
14 Aug	Saddam Hussein accepts Iranian terms for comprehensive settlement of Iran/Iraq dispute	First Syrian military units arrive in Saudi Arabia.
		HMS York arrives in Bahrain.
		Belgium agrees to send two mine hunters and a support ship to the Mediterranean
15-18 Aug		Mr Clark, Minister (DP), visits Qatar, Bahrain & UAE
16 Aug	Iraqi authorities tell British and American nationals to assemble at Regency Palace & International Hotels in Kuwait: threat of "trouble" if they do not comply	Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, calls on Mr Hurd.
		Six USAF B52s arrive in Diego Garcia, bringing total there to twenty
17 Aug	Speaker of Iraqi parliament says that western nationals in Iraq are to be interned	
18 Aug	Iraq claims that US & allied blockade is an act of war & warns that foreigners living in Iraq would suffer	SCR 664 passed (15:0:0) condemning Iraqi actions against the foreign communities in Kuwait and Iraq.
19 Aug		US warships (USS Reid & Bradley) fire across bows of two Iraqi tankers
20 Aug	Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, Saadoun Hammadi arrives in Moscow.	Two Dutch frigates sail for the Gulf.
	Iraq announces "severest punishment" for people sheltering foreigners	UAE agrees to deployment of friendly forces on its soil (US troops first arrived on 10 August)

20 Aug		Greece decides in principle to send a frigate to the Gulf
		Germany to send destroyer to join mine hunters in Eastern Mediterranean
21 Aug	Tariq Aziz says Iraq is ready to talk to US	Prime Minister rules out negotiations with Iraq while it holds hostages
	Press reports that Iraq has moved Scud missiles into Kuwait	RN ships given permission to enforce embargo
	Iraqi tanker Ain Zaleh unloads cargo at Aden refinery	France announces deployment of ground forces to Saudi Arabia & UAE
22 Aug	Iraq claims RSAF intrusion over Iraq	Prince Bandar visits Moscow as a special envoy
		President Bush calls up military reservists.
		Syria announces troops sent to Saudi Arabia
		Jordan closes its border with Iraq at midnight.
23 Aug	Saddam Hussein's first televised meeting with British hostages	Oil price rises to \$30.75 pb (October Brent); IEA says oil supply shortfall modest in Sept & October
		Defence Secretary announces the deployment of Tornado squadron (GR1 strike aircraft) to Bahrain
24 Aug		UK, EC, USA, Canada and other Embassies in Kuwait defy deadline for closure of Embassies
		UN Human Rights Commission Chairman appeals for rights of foreigners in Iraq and Kuwait
25 Aug	Saddam Hussein threatens "columns of dead bodies" if Iraq is attacked	UN Security Council adopts SCR 665 on the enforcement of sanctions against Iraq (13-0-2, Yemen & Cuba)
		President Waldheim of Austria visits Iraq; leaves with 95 Austrians

25 Aug		HM Consul General Aden ordered to leave Yemen due to "activities incompatible with his diplomatic Status": HMG protests
25-26 Aug		French Foreign Minister Dumas visits the Soviet Union
26 Aug		Iran opens border with Iraq to refugees
27 Aug		Yemen agrees HMG Aden may stay until end of his tour
28 Aug	Kuwait renamed Kadhima and made Iraqi province Saddam Hussein announces on TV that all foreign women & children may leave Iraq & Kuwait	US forces arrive in Qatar Oil price falls to \$26.25 pb (October Brent)
28-30 Aug		Mr King visits Saudi Arabia (28), Bahrain (28-29), Oman (29-30)
29 Aug	Iraq says men too will be allowed to leave Iraq & Kuwait if US promises not to attack	HMG announces that HMS Gloucester is to be deployed to the Gulf. OPEC agrees to increase production (Iraq, Libya absent; Iran dissents)
30-31 Aug		Japan announces \$1 bn contribution to MNF plus aid to front line states & refugees Arab League meeting in Cairo
31 Aug		UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar meets Tariq Aziz in Amman King Hussein visits Britain
31 Aug - 5 Sept		Mr Hurd visits Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, Yemen & Jordan