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INFORMATION IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV

Please deliver early on 7 September the following message from the Prime Minister to President Gorbachev.


Begins

I think it is excellent that you are to meet President Bush in Helsinki to discuss the continuing Gulf crisis and the serious implications of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait for all of us. Your own strong stand on the issues of principle and international law has been very much welcomed in Britain and has enabled our governments to work together with unprecedented closeness at the United Nations. In my speech in our current debate on the Gulf crisis in the House of Commons, I made special mention of the Soviet Union's cooperation. I went on to suggest that we were seeing the first fruits of post-Cold War diplomacy, with confrontation replaced by a new atmosphere of cooperation.

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There is be no conceivable justification for one country to march in and seize another, simply because it covets its neighbour's wealth and resources. Iraq's actions would create a lawless world, and they would affect the confidence of all small states. Both our countries have bitter memories of the consequences of failing to challenge annexation of small states in the 1930s.

I am also concerned by the economic consequences. The effect of the crisis will be to slow down economic growth worldwide. It is also bound to lead to a diversion of scarce resources towards countries which are particularly severely affected by sanctions such as Turkey, Egypt and Jordan. One result will be to pre-empt funds which we would otherwise have been able to devote to important areas such as Eastern Europe. this problem will become the more serious the longer Iraq's occupation of Kuwait continues.

Sanctions are the means which we have chosen to bring about Iraq's withdrawal. The more vigorously they are applied, the more effective they will be and the better the prospects for a peaceful solution, which both of us would prefer. But if in the event sanctions do not prove effective, it will still be essential to achieve the objectives set out in the United Nations resolution and we may have to consider other means. Otherwise the aggressor would have won.

I hope very much that your meeting with President Bush will signal to Saddam Hussein that the United States and the Soviet Union remain absolutely committed to the objectives of the

CONFIDENTIAL DESKBY070500Z United Nations resolution and utterly determined to see them achieved. I believe that such a joint declaration would have a most powerful effect and hasten a solution of the crisis. Z_{c} I send you my best wishes for the meeting. 1. There will be so so pravia program. HURD YYYY DISTRIBUTION PS. In additionarie My heater Mr. Tart An low both Energy 1 t 1:UT -Spret Texts

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THE PRIME MINISTER

6 September 1990

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special mention of the Soviet Union's co-operation. I went
on to suggest that we were seeing the first fruits of postCold War diplomacy, with confrontation replaced by a new
atmosphere of co-operation.

The implications of Iraq's action are indeed very serious. There can be no conceivable justification for one country to march in and seize another, simply because it covets its neighbour's wealth and resources. Iraq's actions would create a lawless world, and they would affect the confidence of all small states. Both our countries have bitter memories of the consequences of failing to challenge annexation of small states in the 1930s.

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It is vital to demonstrate that aggression does not pay. Sanctions are the means which we have chosen to bring about Iraq's withdrawal. The more vigorously they are applied, the more effective they will be and the better the prospects for a peaceful solution, which both of us would prefer. But if in the event sanctions do not prove effective, it will still be essential to achieve the objectives set out in the United Nations resolution and we may have to consider other means. Otherwise the aggressor would have won.

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From the Private Secretary

6 September 1990

HELSINKI SUMMIT

Richard Gozney sent me a draft message from the Prime Minister to President Gorbachev with his letter of 5 September. I enclose a revised version which the Prime Minister has approved subject to any comments from the Foreign Secretary. I should be grateful if it could be despatched tonight for delivery early tomorrow (so the Prime Minister can tell President Bush when she has sent it).

(C. D. POWELL)

J. S. Wall, Esq., L.V.O., Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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