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AMMAN TELNO 499: IRAQ/KUWAIT: SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MEETING WITH TARIQ AZIZ

### SUMMARY

1. SECRETARY-GENERAL BRIEFS SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS ON HIS MEETING WITH THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER IN AMMAN. PROPOSAL THAT HIS REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD VISIT KUWAIT TO CONTACT THE EMBASSIES AND LOOK INTO THE SITUATION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS THERE.

### DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BRIEFED MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON 6 SEPTEMBER. HE SAID THAT ON HIS ARRIVAL IN AMMAN HE WAS BRIEFED BY HIS REPRESENTATIVES (DAYAL AND ANNAN), WHO HAD BEEN IN BAGHDAD THE PREVIOUS WEEK TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH THE IRAQIS ON HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF THE CRISIS. HE HAD NOW ASKED ANNAN TO RETURN TO BAGHDAD.

3. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID HIS MEETINGS WITH THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER ON 31 AUGUST AND 1 SEPTEMBER HAD INCLUDED PRIVATE SESSIONS AND MEETINGS OF FULL DELEGATIONS. HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO TARIQ AZIZ THAT HE HAD COME AT HIS OWN INITIATIVE BUT WOULD BE GUIDED BY THE FIVE RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE WAS ALREADY AWARE OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT'S POSITION FROM ITS PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND FROM HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH DAYAL AND ANNAN. WHILE HE WAS AWARE OF THE NEED FOR AN ARAB SOLUTION, INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES WERE AT STAKE. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD HIMSELF LONG URGED A GLOBAL SETTLEMENT TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST. BUT THERE COULD BE NO PROGRESS ON THE OVERALL PROBLEM UNTIL THE PRESENT CRISIS WAS ON ITS WAY TO A SOLUTION. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID HE FELT IT WAS HIS DUTY TO SET OUT WHAT THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER HAD SAID TO HIM IN SOME DETAIL.

4. TARIQ AZIZ HAD EXPRESSED THE RESPECT OF HIS GOVERNMENT AND PRESIDENT FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT

WHEREAS THE COUNCIL HAD TAKEN SEVEN YEARS TO ADOPT A CHAPTER VII RESOLUTION ON IRAN/IRAQ, IT HAD TAKEN ONLY A MATTER OF HOURS TO PASS SCR 660. THE IRAQIS AS ONE OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED, HAD NOT BEEN CONSULTED. THIS REPRESENTED A DOUBLE STANDARD. THERE WERE OTHER CONFLICTS IN THE REGION WHERE BLOOD HAD BEEN SHED, TERRITORIES SEIZED AND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS IGNORED BUT NO ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN BY THE COUNCIL. HENCE SADDAM HUSSEIN'S INITIATIVE OF 12 AUGUST SUGGESTING THAT ALL QUESTIONS OF OCCUPATION IN THE REGION SHOULD BE DEALT WITH ON A SIMILAR BASIS.

5. TARIQ AZIZ HAD GIVEN A CHRONOLOGY OF INCIDENTS BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT LEADING TO THE EVENTS OF 2 AUGUST, CENTRED ON THE DISPUTE BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT OVER THE OIL MARKET. IRAQ HAD ALWAYS BEEN READY FOR AN ARAB SOLUTION OF THE CRISIS. KING HUSSEIN HAD VISITED BAGHDAD ON 3 AUGUST AND AN ARAB MINI-SUMMIT HAD BEEN PLANNED FOR 4/5 AUGUST, BUT SOME OF THE PARTICIPANTS HAD CHANGED THEIR MINDS ABOUT ATTENDANCE AT THE LAST MINUTE. ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY HAD BEEN LOST AT THE ARAB SUMMIT OF 10 AUGUST, WHEN INSUFFICIENT ATTENTION HAD BEEN PAID TO IRAQI ASSURANCES THAT IT HAD NO INTENTION OF ATTACKING SAUDI ARABIA. IRAQ ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO THE CONTINUING INITIATIVE OF KING HUSSEIN: A FORMULA TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS HAD NOT YET MATERIALIZED, BUT THE CRISIS ITSELF WAS LESS THAN A MONTH OLD.

6. TARIQ AZIZ HAD BEEN AT PAINS TO ASSURE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT IRAQ WAS NOT PLAYING FOR TIME. HE SAID THAT EVEN IF THE DOOR WAS NOT FULLY OPEN, IT WAS NOT CLOSED. IRAQ WOULD DO ALL IT COULD TO AVOID WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES. BUT IT HAD TAKEN PRECAUTIONS AGAINST AMERICAN AGGRESSION BY PLACING THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS IN STRATEGIC LOCATIONS WHERE THEY WERE BEING WELL TREATED. WOMEN AND CHILDREN HAD NOW BEEN FREED AND THOSE 'GUESTS' REMAINING WOULD NOT BE HARMED.

7. ON THE EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT, TARIQ AZIZ HAD SAID THAT POLITICALLY IRAQ COULD NOT ACCEPT THAT THEY CONTINUE AS 'AMBASSADORIAL' MISSIONS. BUT THOSE WHO AGREED TO CLOSE THEIR EMBASSIES WOULD BE ALLOWED TO KEEP TWO OR THREE STAFF IN KUWAIT TO LOOK AFTER THEIR NATIONALS AND THEIR PROPERTY.

8. TARIQ AZIZ HAD SAID THERE WOULD BE SEVERE HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS IN IRAQ IF FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES WERE CUT OFF. HE UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF HIS LETTER OF 13 AUGUST, CIRCULATED AS A UN DOCUMENT (S/21503) IN WHICH HE HAD DRAWN ATTENTION TO THE NEED FOR IRAQ TO EXPORT A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF OIL TO PAY FOR FOOD AND MEDICINES. TARIQ AZIZ HAD ASKED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAKE THREE POINTS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL:

(A) IRAQ WOULD NOT ESCALATE MILITARY HOSTILITIES. THOSE GOVERNMENTS WHICH HAD DEPLOYED FORCES TO SAUDI ARABIA SAID THAT THEY HAD DONE SO TO PREVENT AN ATTACK ON THAT COUNTRY. IF BOTH SIDES MAINTAINED A DEFENSIVE POSTURE THERE WOULD BE NO WAR.

(B) THERE MUST BE AN ARAB SOLUTION. THIS WAS IN THE MAKING AND ONCE READY WOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

(C) THE HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OF IRAQ SHOULD BE ADDRESSED. PARAGRAPH 4 OF SCR 661 SHOULD BE INTERPRETED IN A HUMANITARIAN WAY. IRAQ NEEDED TO SELL OIL TO BUY FOOD AND MEDICINE.

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

10. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD EXPRESSED HIS SUPPORT FOR THE PARAGRAPH OF SCR 660 WHICH CALLED ON IRAQ AND KUWAIT TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS FOLLOWING AN IRAQI WITHDRAWAL. HE HAD ASKED TARIQ AZIZ WHETHER AN ARAB SOLUTION WOULD BE FEASIBLE GIVEN ARAB DIFFERENCES. THERE WERE ALSO WIDER INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS TO THE CRISIS: THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED, THE PLIGHT OF THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS AND THE BUILD UP OF FORCES. WHILE HE HAD WELCOMED THE DECISION TO LET WOMEN AND CHILDREN AND SOME MEN LEAVE IRAQ AND KUWAIT, THE RESTRICTIONS ON ALL FOREIGN NATIONALS SHOULD BE LIFTED IMMEDIATELY. THE UNITED NATIONS BELIEVED THAT FOREIGN EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT SHOULD REMAIN OPEN. HE HAD TOLD TARIQ AZIZ THAT HE WOULD BE INFORMING THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE DISCUSSIONS: HE REGRETTED THAT HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO MAKE A POSITIVE REPORT. HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO TARIQ AZIZ THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO STAY LONGER IN AMMAN AND MEET HIM LATER IN THE WEEK IF THIS WOULD HELP. BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO RESPONSE.

11. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL COMMENTED THAT HE HAD NOT EXPECTED TO BE ABLE TO RESOLVE THE IRAQ/KUWAIT CRISIS IN A MATTER OF HOURS. BUT

HE HAD HOPED TO BE ABLE TO START A DIPLOMATIC PROCESS LEADING TO THE BEGINNING OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 660. THIS HAD NOT COME TO FRUITION. TARIQ AZIZ HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE DID NOT CONSIDER THE TALKS A FAILURE AND HE WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR FURTHER CONSULTATIONS. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE TOO WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR FURTHER TALKS IF THIS COULD BE USEFUL.

12. ALL MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL CONGRATULATED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON HIS EFFORTS. MOST EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT HIS TALKS HAD NOT PROVIDED AT LEAST AN OPENING FOR A SOLUTION. BUT THEY THOUGHT HIS EFFORTS AND OTHER DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS SHOULD CONTINUE.

13. PICKERING (UNITED STATES) THANKED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR HIS REPORT AND COMMENDED THE LINE HE HAD TAKEN WITH TARIQ AZIZ. HE NOTED THAT ANNAN WAS STILL IN BAGHDAD. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL IF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL COULD ARRANGE FOR ANNAN TO VISIT KUWAIT TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH THE EMBASSIES THERE AND TO ENQUIRE INTO THE CONDITIONS OF FOREIGN NATIONALS IN LINE WITH SCR 664. HE MIGHT THEN REPORT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

14. I SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD GONE TO AMMAN AT HIS OWN INITIATIVE, HE HAD PERFORMED EXACTLY AS THE COUNCIL WOULD HAVE WISHED. SOMETIMES DISAPPOINTMENT WAS A NECESSARY PART OF PROGRESS. BUT SANCTIONS SEEMED TO BE WORKING: IT WAS ENCOURAGING THAT TARIQ AZIZ DID NOT LIKE WHAT WAS HAPPENING. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PURSUE A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE FIVE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. I SUPPORTED THE AMERICAN SUGGESTION THAT ANNAN SHOULD VISIT KUWAIT. WE WERE ALL HORRIFIED BY THE INFORMATION THE KUWAITI AMBASSADOR HAD PROVIDED ON IRAQI BEHAVIOUR THERE. WE SHOULD APPLAUD THE COURAGE OF THOSE HOLDING OUT IN THE EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT.

15. BLANC (FRANCE), RAZALI (MALAYSIA), FORTIER (CANADA), PENALOSA (COLOMBIA) AND TADESSE (ETHIOPIA) ALL SUPPORTED THE PROPOSAL THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD SEND ANNAN TO KUWAIT.

16. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THANKED COUNCIL MEMBERS FOR THEIR SUPPORT. HE SAID HE WAS READY TO ASK ANNAN TO GO TO KUWAIT AS LONG AS THIS HAD THE CLEAR SUPPORT OF THE COUNCIL. AS SECRETARY-GENERAL HE DID NOT WISH TO APPEAR TO BE VIOLATING SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. BUT HE WOULD FIRST LIKE TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH THE KUWAITI AMBASSADOR. HE WOULD CONTACT THE (SOVIET) PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL AFTER EXPLAINING THE OBJECTIVES OF ANNAN'S MISSION TO THE KUWAITIS.

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