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*P. file*

*, European Political Cooperation*

EXTRAORDINARY EPC MINISTERIAL MEETING, ROME, 7 SEPT

SUMMARY

1. THE MEETING CENTRED ON THE QUESTION OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR TURKEY, JORDAN AND EGYPT, ON WHICH THE ITALIAN PRESIDENCY AND COMMISSION TRIED JOINTLY (BUT UNSUCCESSFULLY) TO BOUNCE THROUGH AN IMMEDIATE DECISION ON NEW MONEY. A SEPARATE REPORT ON THIS DISCUSSION WILL ISSUE FROM THE FCO. MINISTERS ALSO COVERED A PROPOSAL TO RELAUNCH THE EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE, A SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A JOINT EC/SOVIET DECLARATION ON THE GULF CRISIS, MEANS OF STRENGTHENING THE UN EMBARGO ON IRAQ, AND THE PLIGHT OF EUROPEAN CITIZENS IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ. A BROADLY SATISFACTORY OUTCOME ON EACH. DETAILS OF DISCUSSIONS BELOW. THE THREE DECLARATIONS ISSUED TO THE PRESS AFTER THE MEETING ARE IN MY SECOND, THIRD AND FOURTH IFTS.

DETAIL

2. APART FROM AID TO JORDAN, TURKEY AND EGYPT (TELEGRAM TO ISSUE FROM FCO, DRAFT FAXED TO GREENSTOCK, C/O FCO EMERGENCY UNIT) DE MICHELIS PROPOSED FOUR OTHER SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION:

- THE NEED TO RELAUNCH THE EURO/ARAB DIALOGUE:
- A SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A JOINT EC/SOVIET DECLARATION ON THE GULF CRISIS:
- THE POSSIBILITIES FOR STRENGTHENING THE EMBARGO AGAINST IRAQ:
- THE PLIGHT OF EUROPEAN CITIZENS AND EC EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT.

EURO/ARAB DIALOGUE

3. DE MICHELIS SAID THAT MINISTERS SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER TO RELAUNCH THE EURO/ARAB DIALOGUE. SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD GAINED CONSIDERABLE POPULAR SUPPORT IN ARAB COUNTRIES. MANY PEOPLE HAD CONTRASTED THE EUROPEAN REACTION TO HIM WITH A SUPPOSED LACK OF URGENCY IN TACKLING THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM. HE THOUGHT EUROPE SHOULD SIGNAL TO THE ARABS, BY RELAUNCHING THE DIALOGUE, THAT THEIR

COMMITMENT TO A SOLUTION TO OTHER ARAB ISSUES SUCH AS THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM WAS UNDIMINISHED. HE WAS CIRCULATING A DRAFT STATEMENT TO THIS EFFECT.

4. VAN DEN BROEK QUESTIONED THIS. THE EC SHOULD AVOID GIVING ANY IMPRESSION OF LINKING THE GULF CRISIS TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. OTHERWISE WE WOULD PLAY SADDAM HUSSEIN'S GAME. CERTAINLY, THERE WAS SCOPE FOR A RECONSIDERATION OF THE EC'S APPROACH TO THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE: BUT THERE COULD BE PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES. WOULD IRAQ PARTICIPATE AND IF THEY DID, WOULD OTHERS? AND WOULD THE MEETING LOOK AT ARAB/ISRAEL OR THE GULF/CRISIS?

5. GENSCHER SAID HE SYMPATHISED WITH SOME OF VAN DEN BROEK'S COMMENTS ABOUT THE ATTEMPTS AT LINKAGE BETWEEN IRAQ/KUWAIT AND THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. ARAB PUBLIC OPINION HAD TO BE PERSUADED THAT IT WAS IRAQ, BY HER INVASION OF KUWAIT, WHO HAD SET BACK THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE. IRAQI AGGRESSION, NOT THE WESTERN RESPONSE, WAS TO BLAME. FERNANDO ORDONEZ SAID THAT A STATEMENT ABOUT THE EC'S RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD WAS ESSENTIAL AT THIS JUNCTURE. THE EC SHOULD ALSO MOVE AHEAD WITH ITS NEW MEDITERRANEAN POLICIES. KLIBI HAD TOLD HIM JUST BEFORE HE RESIGNED THAT THE ARABS NEEDED EUROPE MORE THAN EVER BEFORE.

6. MR WALDEGRAVE SAID THAT HE TOO SYMPATHISED WITH VAN DEN BROEK. THE IDEA NEEDED CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. THE ARAB LEAGUE WAS DIVIDED, AND WE SHOULD NOT DEEPEN THEIR DIVISIONS. THE EC SHOULD OF COURSE REAFFIRM ITS COMMITMENT TO A SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. BUT WE SHOULD NOT BE SEDUCED BY THE IDEA OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO CONSIDER A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION TO ALL ARAB PROBLEMS - ARAB/ISRAEL, LEBANON, IRAQ/KUWAIT ETC.

7. POOS (LUXEMBOURG), AND CONNER (IRELAND) AGREED THAT THE ARAB/ISRAEL AND IRAQ/KUWAIT PROBLEMS SHOULD NOT BE LINKED. CONNER ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT A NEW EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE COULD BE A FORUM FOR GETTING ACROSS THE MESSAGE THAT THE GULF CRISIS WAS NOT A PROBLEM CREATED BY THE WEST. DUMAS THOUGHT THE DIALOGUE SHOULD BE STIMULATED. THERE WERE OBVIOUSLY DIFFICULTIES, BUT THE POTENTIAL REWARDS EXCEEDED THESE.

8. THERE WAS SOME DEBATE ABOUT THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT STATEMENT ON EC-ARAB RELATION THAT DE MICHELIS HAD CIRCULATED, WITH THE DUTCH ARGUING THAT IT SUGGESTED A LINKAGE BETWEEN IRAQ/KUWAIT AND ARAB/ISRAEL. IT WAS THEREFORE REDRAFTED BY POLITICAL DIRECTORS OVER LUNCH AND AGREED BY MINISTERS IN THE FORM THAT IT APPEARS IN



THIRD IPT.

EC/SOVIET DECLARATION

9. DE MICHELIS SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD PROPOSED, AS A FURTHER SIGN OF SOLIDARITY, A JOINT STATEMENT ON THE GULF CRISIS TO BE DISCUSSED AND ISSUED DURING THE EC/SOVIET MEETING IN THE MARGINS OF THE UNGA. HE HAD NOT DISCUSSED THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL BUT HAD IN PRINCIPLE WELCOMED THE IDEA.
10. VAN DEN BROEK WAS NOT SURE THIS WAS A GOOD IDEA - IT COULD SET A PRECEDENT. WOULD THERE BE EC/US DECLARATION? IF NOT, WOULD THE EC APPEAR CLOSER TO THE SOVIET POSITION THAN THE AMERICANS? HE WOULD PREFER TO SEE A US/SOVIET/EC DECLARATION INCLUDING ALSO CHINA. THAT WOULD DEMONSTRATE REAL SOLIDARITY.
11. GENSCHER ARGUED THAT THE EC RESPONSE SHOULD DEPEND IN PART ON EVENTS AT THE NEXT US/SOVIET SUMMIT. IF THEY AGREED ON SOME JOINT ACTION OR DECLARATION, THEN IT WOULD BE RIGHT FOR THE EC TO DO SO ALSO WITH THE RUSSIANS. SAMARAS (GREECE) SAID HE ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO AN EC/SOVIET DECLARATION.
12. MR WALDEGRAVE SAID HE DID NOT FEEL STRONGLY ON THIS POINT. THE PROBLEM WITH VAN DEN BROEK'S PROPOSAL WAS THAT IT WAS REINVENTING THE UN. THE IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION IN ANY DECLARATION WOULD BE THAT IT DID NOT EXPOSE ANY LIGHT BETWEEN EC AND US VIEWS. THIS MEANT TREATING WARILY ANY IDEAS ABOUT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES.
13. THE PORTUGUESE AND IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER SUPPORTED A JOINT DECLARATION. DUMAS AGREED, BUT SAID THERE SHOULD BE NO HINT OF SUPPORT FOR A COMPREHENSIVE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE.
14. DE MICHELIS, SUMMING UP, SAID THAT, THOUGH AS THE DUTCH HAD IDENTIFIED, THERE WERE PROBLEMS, BUT HE DID NOT THINK HE COULD GO BACK TO THE RUSSIANS WITH A STRAIGHT REFUSAL. IN THE NEW CLIMATE, THIS WOULD NOT BE UNDERSTOOD. THERE WOULD BE MANY OPPORTUNITIES FOR JOINT DECLARATIONS WITH THE AMERICANS. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE MATTER BE DISCUSSED FURTHER AT THE FAC ON 17 SEPTEMBER.

STRENGTHENING THE EMBARGO

15. DE MICHELIS SAID THAT THE EMBARGO AGAINST IRAQ WAS THE ONLY

ALTERNATIVE TO THE MILITARY OPTION, WHICH WAS DANGEROUS AND FULL OF UNKNOWN. EC MINISTERS SHOULD CONSIDER HOW THE EMBARGO SHOULD BE MAINTAINED AND STRENGTHENED. HE PERSONALLY FAVOURED EXTENDING IT TO AIR TRAFFIC.

16. ALL SPEAKERS EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR MAINTAINING AND IF POSSIBLE, STRENGTHENING THE EMBARGO. EYSKENS (BELGIAN) SUGGESTED THAT THE TWELVE ACT IN CONCERT TO MONITOR THE ACTIVITIES OF THE UN SANCTIONS COMMITTEE. GENSCHER SAID HE SUPPORTED AN AIR BLOCKADE. ELLEMAN-JENSEN SAID THAT THE EMBARGO SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED IN A WAY IN WHICH ENCOURAGED RESPECT FOR THE UN. MR WALDEGRAVE AGREED THAT THE EMBARGO SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED AND THAT AN AIR BLOCKADE BE CONSIDERED. HE NOTED THAT THIS MIGHT WELL AFFECT RELATIONS WITH SOME MAGHREB COUNTRIES, WHO WERE KNOWN TO BE ALLOWING FLIGHTS TO IRAQ.

17. DE MICHELIS SUMMED UP THAT THERE WAS A CONSENSUS THAT THE EMBARGO WAS THE PRIORITY INSTRUMENT FOR BRINGING ABOUT IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. THE TWELVE WOULD MONITOR THE ACTIVITIES OF THE UN SANCTIONS COMMITTEE. FOOD AND MEDICINES WOULD BE CONSIDERED IN RELATION WITH UN RESOLUTION 661.

#### EC CITIZENS IN KUWAIT

18. THIS WAS DISCUSSED OVER LUNCH. THE DISCUSSION WILL BE REPORTED SEPARATELY BY GREENSTOCK, DEPUTY POLITICAL DIRECTOR. THE DECLARATION IN SECOND IFT WAS AGREED.

EGERTON

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ADVANCE

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IRAQ/KUWAIT  
PS (4)  
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
PS/PUS  
MR TOMKYS  
MR GORE-BOOTH  
MR FAIRWEATHER  
MR GOULDEN  
MR JAY  
MR SLATER  
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/NAD  
HD/SED  
HD/UND (4)  
HD/CONSULAR D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/NPDD  
HD/AMD  
NNNN

HD/ECD(E)  
HD/WED  
MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY  
MR APPLEYARD CABINET OFFICE  
(BY TUBE H29)  
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE  
(BY TUBE H29)  
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE  
(BY TUBE H29)  
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE  
(BY TUBE H29)  
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST  
SIR P CRADOCK,  
(NO 10 DOWNING ST)  
CABINET OFFICE D10  
(BY TUBE H29)  
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE  
AUS (C) MODUK  
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK  
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND (4)  
~~EMERGENCY UNIT.~~  
RESIDENT CLERK

