



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Tim Austin

7 September 1990

Dea Charles,

A lot of this doesn't seem like counter-propaganda

to me. My background.

IRAQ/KUWAIT: COUNTER-PROPAGANDA

My letter of 30 August contained the first of our regular Friday sitreps. This is the second.

The objectives of our overseas propaganda operations are to:

- maintain and spread more widely through Arab, non-Arab Muslim and other third world countries the arguments:
 - for the need to maintain international pressure through effective sanctions for full implementation of Security Council Resolutions;
 - against Arab/compromise solutions;
 - justifying presence of Western forces in the Gulf;
- continue to show that Saddam Hussein is a loser, a liar who cannot win, and through evidence from Kuwaitis, ex-hostages and other eyewitnesses, that the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait is destroying the country and more widely creating a major international refugee problem;
- maintain morale among British hostages;

The main instruments we are using are:

- set of 'themes' papers (enclosed at Annex I) to be regularly updated, distributed to posts overseas, Private Offices and press officers in London to provide core material;
- further guidance telegram based on these 'themes';
- interviews by Ministers with international radio and television (in particular CNN and BBC World Service);
- wide dissemination of material from the Parliamentary debate, particularly that on key overseas 'themes';
- placing in the press in target areas articles signed by



Ministers and articles commissioned through the COI;

- placing on TV stations in target areas specially prepared TV material, (the first two items will be a selection of highlights from the Parliamentary debate, with Arabic soundtrack, and a documentary based on interviews in Arabic with Kuwaiti refugees, designed to stress the damage done to ordinary people);
- increasing our supply of daily news feeds and other material from the COI radio service to stations in target areas (new daily feeds in English have been accepted in Bahrain and Qatar);
- additional BBC World Service output;
 - Arabic Service; this was extended from 9 to 10½ hours a day from 2 August: we are discussing a further extension with the BBC, additional programme material and extra frequencies to avoid jamming;
 - World Service (English); live coverage of Parliamentary debate on additional frequencies;


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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT.

- World Service (English) new 15-minute programme broadcast twice daily starting on 7 September for British citizens in Iraq and Kuwait, with messages from relatives.

In addition, Mr Waldegrave has talked to Bruce Gynge, Alastair Burnet, Peter Gummer and John Banks about how to handle public relations. Arrangements have been made for all four to be in regular contact with FCO Ministers and officials.

The Foreign Secretary discussed the campaign during his visit to the Gulf and we shall be sending material to Gulf governments and seeking their ideas. The Gulf rulers all see the need. Their experience of dealing with the Western media is limited but growing fast. They will be able to help us identify the right themes for Arab audiences. The Kuwaiti government are waking up to the propaganda war and their Planning Minister, who is shrewd and articulate, is in close touch with our Embassy in Saudi Arabia.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD), Martin Stanley (DTI), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours,

 (J S Wall)
 Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
 10 Downing Street

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

BACKGROUND

1. Kuwait: history and status
2. UN Security Council Resolutions
3. Sanctions: implementation

CURRENT ISSUES: BULL POINTS

4. Forces in the Gulf
5. Saddam Hussein
6. An International Solution
7. Hostages in Kuwait and Iraq
8. Foreign Embassies in Kuwait

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London

6 September 1990

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THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

KUWAIT: HISTORY AND STATUS

- Kuwait independent longer than Iraq. Al Sabah in continuous control since early 18th century.
- Came under Ottoman suzerainty, but not sovereignty.
- Ottoman Empire dissolved after First World War, and the disposition of its dependent territories was decided by international treaties.
- Kuwait's sovereignty, independence and international frontiers recognised by both international community and by successive Iraqi Governments, both formally and by the conduct of bilateral relations.

CHRONOLOGY

- Early eighteenth century, Kuwait established on land adjacent to, but not part of, Ottoman Empire.
- 1871: more than one hundred years later, Sheikh Abdullah Al Sabah (1866-1892) accepted title of qaimmaqam (district officer) of the qaza (district) of Kuwait in return for an Ottoman pledge that Kuwait would retain administrative autonomy.
- 1899: fear that the pledge would not be honoured resulted in an Exclusive Agreement with Britain binding the Ruler of Kuwait not to cede any of his territory without Britain's prior sanction.
- July 1913: Britain and Ottoman Empire signed Convention recognising Kuwait as autonomous and accepting that the ruler should have full administrative authority and control over tribes in surrounding areas (defined by a green line on an attached map). Convention not ratified because of First World War.
- 1914: Britain recognised Kuwait as an independent state under British protection. After First World War, Turkey renounced all rights and titles to subordinate territories of the former Ottoman Empire.
- 1921: Kingdom of Iraq created from former vilayets of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. Anglo-Iraqi relationship established under League of Nations supervision, and given effect by Treaty signed in 1922.
- 1932: British responsibility under the Treaty terminated.

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IRAQ/KUWAIT

- 1923: Britain recognised green line of 1913 Convention as boundary between Kuwait and Iraq.
- 1932: Exchange of letters between Sheikh Ahmad Al Sabah (1921-50) for Kuwait and Prime Minister Nuri al Said for Iraq accepted definition of Kuwait-Iraq boundary similar to 1913 green line.
- 1958: Iraqi monarchy overthrown.
- 19 June 1961: Exchange of notes between Britain and Kuwait terminating 1899 Exclusive Agreement but confirming Britain's readiness to assist Kuwait if requested. British troops sent to Kuwait after renewed Iraqi claims, but subsequently replaced by an Arab League Security Force. (British troops withdrew on 19 October 1961, Arab League forces remained until 1963).
- October 1963: Signature by Iraq of an agreed minute recognising Kuwait's sovereignty and independence within the frontiers defined in 1932 exchange of letters.

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THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

- Between 2-25 August, UN Security Council adopted five mandatory resolutions concerning the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August. Of the 15 Security Council members only Yemen and Cuba abstained on SCR 661 and 665. Resolution 660 was adopted by 14 votes with none against or abstaining (Yemen was absent). SCR 662 and 664 were adopted unanimously.

Resolution 660 (1990) - adopted 2 August

- condemned Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
- demanded that Iraq withdraw "immediately and unconditionally" all its forces to their positions on 1 August 1990.

Resolution 661 (1990) - adopted 6 August

- called for (1) the import of "all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait" and (2) the sale or supply to Iraq or Kuwait of any commodities or products except "supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs" to be strictly prevented by all States, including non-members of the United Nations.
- established a committee of the Security Council to examine reports by the Secretary General on the implementation of the Resolution and to seek information on action taken by States to implement it.
- nothing in the Resolution should prohibit assistance to the legitimate Government of Kuwait whose assets should be protected.

Resolution 662 (1990) - adopted 9 August

- decided that the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq was null and void.
- called upon all States to refrain from any action that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of the annexation.

Resolution 664 (1990) - adopted 19 August

- recalled the obligations of Iraq under international law in regard to third State nationals in Iraq and Kuwait.
- demanded that Iraq permitted the immediate departure of such nationals from Kuwait and Iraq, granted immediate and continuing consular access and took no action to jeopardise their safety, security or health.
- demanded that Iraq rescind its orders for the closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait.

Resolution 665 (1990) - adopted 25 August

- called upon those states cooperating with the Government of Kuwait and deploying maritime forces to the area "to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council" to halt inward and outward shipping to verify cargoes and ensure strict implementation of the provisions in Resolution 661.

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

UN SANCTIONS

- On 6 August 1990 Security Council of the United Nations adopted Resolution (SCR) 661 imposing sanctions on Iraq. 13 votes for the Resolution; Yemen and Cuba abstained.
- SCR 661 prohibits the import of Iraqi or Kuwaiti products and the sale or supply or transshipment of goods to Iraq or Kuwait (other than medical supplies and, in humanitarian circumstances, food stuffs. Nature of these items and circumstances in which their supply would be admissible still to be defined.) SCR 661 also forbids the transfer of funds to Iraq or Kuwait.
- SCR 661 is binding upon all members of the United Nations.
- Vital that international community presents a united front on implementation of sanctions. Without this they cannot and will not work.
- 25 August, Security Council adopted SCR 665 (13 votes, 2 abstentions - Yemen and Cuba) authorising naval support of sanctions using "measures commensurate to the specific circumstances" to inspect cargoes and ensure strict implementation of SCR 661.
- Security Council has established UN Sanctions Committee to monitor compliance with SCR 661. Nearly 100 countries have recorded positive responses to the UN. One or two still considering what domestic measures to take. Many can comply easily since they have no history of trade with Iraq.
- Evidence that some countries are breaking sanctions.
- Sanctions Committee currently considering applications from Jordan, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, India, Tunisia and Lebanon, under Article 50 of the UN Charter, connected with the special domestic economic problems which the full implementation of the sanctions will bring.
- To date sanctions have been largely effective in depriving Iraq of oil revenues and of access to Iraqi and Kuwaiti financial assets.

UK IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS

- Necessary orders to bring sanctions into effect quickly put into place (8 August):
 - o Export of Goods (Control) Order - prohibits exports without a licence
 - o Amendment to the Open General Import Licence - prohibition on imports

- o Iraq and Kuwait United Nations Sanctions Order - prohibits (except when licensed) activities in connection with the export of goods from Iraq and Kuwait. The Order applies to activities of UK nationals and companies abroad as well as within the UK.

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THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

FORCES IN THE GULF

- International force present in the Gulf in response to request from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States.
- Following SCR 665, the naval forces present are now enabled under Security Council authority to use measures "commensurate to specific circumstances" to enforce trade embargo.
- Purpose of deployments is entirely defensive
- Forces of over 20 nations, including several Arab ones, are deployed or are to be deployed on land, sea and air.
- The international force will remain in the area so long as the host countries believe it has a job to do.
- The international force is not deployed in the Holy Places - Mecca and Medina: it is well over 1,000 kms away from them.

BRITISH CONTRIBUTION

- Total UK forces committed are 4,000. These include:
 - one destroyer, two frigates, already in Gulf, three mine clearance vessels and one destroyer on way. Support ships in attendance.
 - one squadron Tornado air defence aircraft, one squadron Tornado strike aircraft, one squadron Jaguar aircraft (ground support). Backed up by VC10 tanker aircraft and Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft.
- Our response was speedy; and the greatest need for deterrence was at the start.
- Gulf crisis has shown need for NATO members to reassess their readiness to undertake collective, defensive action outside NATO area.

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

SADDAM HUSSEIN

- The sole cause of the problem is Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait.
- Saddam Hussein a loser and a failure. Major miscalculations in: attacking Iran (eight years' suffering for his people: 100,000 Iraqi soldiers killed) and then throwing away winnings; attacking Kuwait; internment of foreigners.
- Saddam's brutality. Gassed his own people. Introduction of "political reforms" in 1989 a cynical gesture with no substance. Iraq a police state where dissent means death. (Note: the Hitler analogy is unsuitable for Arabs, inflating Saddam's importance. He (and his military prowess) need cutting down to size).
- The first Arab in history to shelter behind women and children; imprisoning people who came to the Middle East to work for Arab interests; turning on his guests. Shameful behaviour in Arab world.
- Iraq too is a major oil producer (highest reserves in Middle East after Saudi Arabia) but revenues have gone into a lost war and a failed economy. Saddam Hussein has not used Iraq's wealth to benefit its people, but to build an aggressive military machine which has oppressed Iraqis, attacked neighbours, and bankrupted the country. Foreign debt of 880 billion dollars.
- Saddam does not appear in public. His speeches are read by an official. He is afraid even of his own people, but manages to appear on TV with defenceless foreign hostages.
- A liar. Said explicitly he had no intention of invading Kuwait, protestations that he did not intend to continue his conquests, or place any trust in his so-called initiatives not credible.
- International subversion. Saddam sponsored terrorism in the 1970s. Baghdad still home to several terrorist organisations. Murders his own dissidents overseas, including in the UK.

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THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

AN INTERNATIONAL SOLUTION

- Iraq powerful heavily armed nation, attacked, invaded and now claims to have annexed Kuwait. Attempt by one nation to wipe another clean off map unprecedented in recent times. Iraqi claims to Kuwait without legal basis.
- Only possible solution for Arabs and everyone else unconditional withdrawal of Iraq and restoration of legitimate government of Kuwait in accordance with Security Council Resolutions (SCR) 660, 661 and 662.
- Arab solution tried before, during and after invasion: not successful. Can be no compromise on SCR resolutions: anything short of their requirements will reinforce Saddam Hussein's disregard for the sovereignty and independence of his neighbours.
- Saddam Hussein is a liar. His initiatives and promises cannot be trusted. For example he said explicitly that he had no intention of invading Kuwait.
- The world has chosen through the UN comprehensive economic sanctions, collectively and effectively implemented with full UN authority for their enforcement.
- Saudi Arabia, the other members of the Gulf Cooperative Council, Egypt, Syria and other members of the Arab League (Morocco, Somalia, Djibouti, Lebanon) have called for Iraqi withdrawal and UN sanctions. Many Arab and Muslim countries have already shown great steadfastness and courage in implementing sanctions.
- In all 95 members of the UN have informed the UN that they are taking steps to implement sanctions. (Of those taking no action many have negligible trade with Iraq.)
- Saddam Hussein consequently faces united action from the World Community. His quarrel is with the world as a whole, not as he claims with the US and Britain.
- Iraq a basically wealthy country - not a "have not". Major oil producer. Economy failed because of fruitless war against Iran and diversion of wealth to build up military machine which oppresses Iraqis and threatens neighbours.
- The UN is proving its worth. Sanctions will work if full support of international community is maintained and objectives of SCR resolutions steadfastly held.
- Iraq economy vulnerable - based almost totally on export of oil. Iraq heavily dependent on imports: financial reserves badly depleted by war with Iran.

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- Western military deployments provide a defensive deterrent to further aggression. An extreme sense of danger caused the Gulf states to seek help. Western forces are part of an international effort including several Arab countries and others.
- Full UN authority (SCR 665) has been given for enforcement of sanctions by force if necessary.
- Recognise Jordan's acute difficulties in implementing sanctions: ready to help if Jordan commits itself to full support of sanctions. But Jordanian interests do not lie in reinforcing Saddam Hussein's disregard for sovereignty and independence of his neighbours.
- PLO made serious mistake in failing to condemn this aggression: they above all have interest in upholding territorial integrity and opposing illegal annexation. Ambivalent PLO response has set back prospects for peaceful settlement of Palestine problem.
- Issue effects confidence of all small states in face of unchallenged annexation.
- Iraq/Kuwait and Arab/Israel fundamentally different. 1967 war followed period of intense Arab hostility towards Israel; 1973 war began with Arab attack on Israel. Arabs only recognised Israel's right to exist, and then implicitly, in 1982. The PLO did not accept SCR 242 until 1988. Since then we have repeatedly stressed that it is for Israel to match moves for settlement made on Arab side.
- When Iraq has withdrawn from Kuwait and legitimate government restored arrangements involving UN will be necessary to ensure Kuwait's security and that of other countries in the region.

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

HOSTAGES IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ

- Universal condemnation of Iraqi government decision to use foreign nationals as hostages, to deport them from Iraqi-occupied Kuwait to Iraq, and to place some at strategic sites as a human shield against a possible attack.
- The release of women and children does not mitigate the fact that no hostages of either sex should have been taken.
- These actions flout long-established standards of international law.
- SCR 664 (adopted unanimously on 18 August) demands that Iraq allow foreign nationals to leave Iraq and Kuwait. This is most welcome.

CURRENT SITUATION

- Ambassador and staff unable to leave Embassy premises in Kuwait to assist in evacuation effort, but warden system established by Embassy operating well.
- Evacuation of 306 British women and children from Kuwait to Baghdad completed successfully on 4 September.

LEGAL POSITION

- Fourth Geneva Convention, 1949 (The Civilian Convention) applies to situation in Kuwait. Both Iraq and Kuwait are parties to the Convention.
- This Convention applies to those who find themselves, in the case of a conflict or an occupation, in hands of a party to the conflict or an occupying power of which they are not nationals. These are "protected persons".
- Most important provisions are:
 - o right to humane treatment and protection from violence
 - o protected persons may not be used to render areas immune from military operations
 - o protection from reprisals
 - o taking of hostages prohibited
 - o right to leave the territory (restrictions on security grounds must not be exercised in arbitrary manner)
 - o individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the occupying power are prohibited, regardless of motive

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- The killing of hostages, whatever the motive, and the use of civilians to provide a shield against military operations are contrary to customary international law, and under the terms of the Geneva Convention individuals are held personally responsible for such crimes. Reference Prime Minister's reply on TV-AM's "Frost on Sunday" programme, 2 September:

"... If anything happened to those hostages, then sooner or later, when any hostilities were over, we could do what we did at Nurenberg and prosecute the requisite people for their totally uncivilised and brutal behaviour."

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THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

FOREIGN EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT

Chronology

- 8 August 1990: Iraqi government announced the "unification" of Iraq and Kuwait, ie Iraqi annexation of Kuwait.
- 9 August: UN Security Council adopted unanimously SCR 662, declaring Iraqi annexation of Kuwait as null and void.
- SCR 662 also calls upon all States not to recognise annexation and to refrain from any action that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of annexation (paragraph 2).
- 9 August: Iraqi announcement that diplomatic missions in Kuwait must close and move their activities to Baghdad by 24 August.
- 24 August: Iraqi order to close embassies defied by all members of European Community, USA, Canada, Japan and others (nearly 30 countries), in accordance with paragraph 2 of SCR 662.
- Despite severe harrassment, we shall maintain collective stand against Iraq's violation of international law for as long as physically possible.

LEGAL POSITION

- The privileges and immunities of diplomatic mission staff and their premises are regulated by the terms of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961.
- 153 States are parties to the Vienna Convention. Iraq is one of them.
- Preamble to the Convention declares that

"... the purpose of such privileges and immunities [accorded to all categories of diplomatic mission staff] is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions ..."
- Immunities provided for in the Convention include:
 - personal inviolability and freedom from arrest and detention (Articles 29 and 37);
 - immunity from criminal (and most civil) jurisdiction (Articles 31 and 37);
 - the inviolability of the premises of the mission including the head of mission's residence and of the residences of members of the staff (Articles 22, 30 and 37);

- the inviolability of the archives and documents of the mission, wherever they may be (Article 24);
- the right of free communication on the part of the mission for all official purposes (Article 27(1));
- the exemption from all personal services, from all public service of any kind and from military obligations such as those connected with requisitioning, military contributions and billeting (Articles 35 and 37).

The Convention also confirms that persons enjoying privileges and immunities under the Convention must, even in the case of armed conflict, be granted facilities in order to enable them to leave the State in which they are based at the earliest possible moment (Article 44).