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SIC I9M

PART ONE OF FOUR PARTS

TOKYO FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL MEETING, 10 SEPTEMBER: GULF  
CRISIS: BUSH-GORBACHEV SUMMIT

## SUMMIT

1. BAKER STRESSED NEED FOR NATO TO MEET OUT OF AREA THREAT. CALLS FOR MORE LIFT ASSISTANCE, PARTICULARLY TO EGYPT. THANKS UK AND FRANCE FOR LAND BASED FORCES, CALLS ON OTHERS TO PROVIDE GROUND FORCES. CALLS RUSSIANS 'RELIABLE PARTNERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION' AND SAYS THAT U S AND SOVIET UNION ARE UNITED IN FACE OF INTERNATIONAL OUTLAW. SETS OUT FURTHER MEASURES FOR NATO ALLIES TO CONSIDER. WIDESPREAD SUPPORT FOR GENERAL U S POSITION, THOUGH SOME ALLIES STRESS NEED TO ACT WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF UN. RECOMMENDATION THAT UK CONSIDER U S PROPOSALS SYMPATHETICALLY.

## DETAIL

2. WOERNER (SECRETARY GENERAL) THANKED BAKER FOR THE EARLY BRIEFING ON THE HELSINKI SUMMIT. HE RECALLED THE FREQUENT CONSULTATIONS IN NATO SINCE THE LAST MINISTERIAL MEETING ON 10 AUGUST. HE URGED CONTINUED CONSULTATION AND THE MAINTENANCE OF FULL SOLIDARITY.

3. BAKER (US) SAID THAT THE NAC WAS MEETING TO REAFFIRM ITS SOLIDARITY AND TO REASSERT ITS OBJECTIVE OF UNDOING THE INVASION OF KUWAIT. THE CRISIS WAS A POLITICAL TEST OF HOW THE POST-COLD WAR ORDER WOULD WORK. WE SHOULD SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SOLIDIFY THE GROUND RULES OF THE NEW ORDER AND TO REINFORCE THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EFFORTS IN NATO AND THE WEU WOULD BE A MEASURE OF HOW WELL WESTERN SECURITY INSTITUTIONS COULD ADAPT TO TODAY'S DANGERS AND TOMORROW'S THREATS. NATO MUST BE ABLE TO MEET

THREATS LIKE THAT POSED BY SADDAM HUSSEIN, WHO THREATENED THE NEW WORLD ORDER, OUR 'COURAGEOUS ALLY' TURKEY AND THE HEALTH OF THE WORLD ECONOMY. WE COULD NOT PERMIT A DICTATOR TO OBTAIN A DEATH GRIP ON THE ECONOMIC LIFELINE OF THE WORLD.

4. BAKER RECALLED THE TRIPS TO EUROPE, ASIA AND THE GULF BY BRADY AND HIMSELF TO PROMOTE 'RESPONSIBILITY SHARING'. THE PRESIDENT HAD DIRECTED THEM TO MOBILISE, COORDINATE AND SUSTAIN THE UNPRECEDENTED INTERNATIONAL COALITION, AND TO ADDRESS THE VITAL NEEDS OF STATES WHICH WERE PAYING THE PRICE FOR DETERRING AGGRESSION AND ENFORCING UN SANCTIONS. WE MUST STAND WITH THOSE WHO WERE BEING VICTIMISED BY AN INTERNATIONAL PREDATOR, DEFEND THE WORLD ECONOMY AND DEFEND OUR OWN CITIZENS WHO WERE BEING USED AS HUMAN SHIELDS. IN THE GULF, SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT AND THE UAE HAD MADE GENEROUS PLEDGES OF AROUND USD 12 BILLION WHICH WOULD COVER MUCH OF THE U S'S INCREMENTAL DEFENCE COSTS AS WELL AS SUPPORTING THE EGYPTIAN AND TURKISH ECONOMIES, AMONG OTHERS. DESPITE GREAT COSTS, MUBARAK AND THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE HAD MOBILISED AGAINST SADDAM. EGYPT WAS SENDING TWO GROUND DIVISIONS TO SAUDI ARABIA, BUT IT NEEDED LIFT CAPABILITY, WHICH COULD BE PROVIDED BY EUROPEAN AND ASIAN COUNTRIES, TO TRANSPORT THESE FORCES AND TO BRING HOME EGYPTIAN REFUGEES. BAKER HOPED THAT THE USD 7 BILLION DEBT WHICH THE U S WAS FORGIVING EGYPT WOULD BUILD MOMENTUM FOR STRONG INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT TO THAT COUNTRY.

5. BAKER THANKED THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT MITTERRAND FOR THE FORCES COMMITTED TO THE GULF. THE U S WAS PROUD TO STAND SHOULDER TO SHOULDER WITH THEM. ALLIES' EFFORTS TO SUPPORT THE FRONT LINE STATES WOULD BE CRITICAL. HE EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE TO THE NATIONS WHICH WERE PROVIDING NAVAL FORCES. HE URGED OTHER NATIONS TO CONSIDER ON A BILATERAL BASIS THE POSSIBILITY OF SENDING GROUND FORCES TO SAUDI ARABIA, EVEN IF THEIR PRESENCE WOULD ONLY BE SYMBOLIC. THIS WOULD HAVE A GREAT EFFECT IN BUILDING PUBLIC SUPPORT IN THE U S. THE U S GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN DELIGHTED AND SOMEWHAT SURPRISED BY THE STRENGTH AND VITALITY OF PUBLIC SUPPORT SO FAR IN THE U S: MANY REMEMBERED WHAT HAD HAPPENED IN THE PAST WHEN WE HAD FAILED TO STAND UP TO AGGRESSION.

6. TURNING TO THE HELSINKI SUMMIT, BAKER SAID THAT HE WOULD FOCUS ON DISCUSSION OF THE GULF, ALTHOUGH BUSH AND GORBACHEV HAD ALSO TALKED ABOUT START, CFE, ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, CSCE, AFGHANISTAN AND CAMBODIA. BAKER SAID THAT FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN VERY RELIABLE PARTNERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION. GORBACHEV HAD SHOWN THAT HE WOULD BACK WITH DEEDS HIS

PLEDGES TO RESPECT UNIVERSAL HUMAN VALUES. IN HELSINKI GORBACHEV HAD REASSERTED HIS COMMITMENT TO UNDOING IRAQI AGGRESSION. THERE HAD BEEN NO DIFFERENCES OF SUBSTANCE BETWEEN THE U S AND THE SOVIET UNION ON THE HANDLING OF THE SITUATION. THE RUSSIANS HAD AGREED THAT THE BOTTOM LINE WAS THAT NOTHING SHORT OF THE COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS FOR U S/SOVIET RELATIONS WERE CLEAR. THE COMMON GROUND BETWEEN THEM WAS 'SURGING AHEAD' OF THEIR DIFFERENCES. THE NATO LONDON DECLARATION HAD BEEN ONE SUCH SURGE. SO HAD THE 2+4 TALKS. THE ROOT CAUSES OF THE DIVISION OF EUROPE AND THE COLD WAR, WERE BEING DISSOLVED. OLD ANIMOSITIES WERE BEING BURIED IN THE SANDS OF ARABIA, AND THE U S AND THE SOVIET UNION WERE UNITING IN THE FACE OF AN INTERNATIONAL OUTLAW.

[?] 11 7. BAKER SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT TIME COULD BE ON THE SIDE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THIS HAD NOT BEEN THE U S VIEW AT THE OUTSET, BUT THEY NOW BELIEVED THAT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION COULD BE FOUND BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS. EFFORTS MUST BE UNSTINTING. WE MUST NOT SHIRK THE TASK OF CLOSING DOWN SADDAM'S EFFORTS TO FUEL AND FEED THE INSTRUMENTS OF HIS AGGRESSION. THERE MUST BE NO CHEATING OF THE EMBARGO. 11

8. BAKER THEN SET OUT A LIST OF ADDITIONAL MEASURES FOR NATO, THE WEU AND INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS WHICH WOULD HELP SUPPORT UN SCRS. THE US REQUESTED THAT:

(A) NATO'S SENIOR CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING COMMITTEE (SCEPC), SHOULD MEET, PERHAPS WITH THE WEU, TO COORDINATE SEALIFT AND TRANSPORT. LIFT CAPABILITY WAS VITAL TO THE MOVEMENT OF HEAVY ARMoured FORCES AND OF REFUGEES.

(B) NAVOCFORMED'S OPERATIONS SHOULD BE EXTENDED IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN TO SUPPORT ALLIES THERE.

(C) AWACS COVERAGE IN THE SOUTH EASTERN REGION, BASED ON DEPLOYMENT TO TURKEY, SHOULD BE EXTENDED.

(D) ALLIES SHOULD HELP TO ALLEVIATE TURKISH ECONOMIC DISLOCATION. THIS SHOULD BE PART OF THE EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TIES BETWEEN TURKEY AND EUROPE.

(E) ALLIES SHOULD HELP IN STRENGTHENING TURKISH MILITARY CAPABILITIES TO FACE SPECIFIC IRAQI THREATS.

(F) ALLIES SHOULD HELP EGYPT BILATERALLY, OUTSIDE THE NATO FRAMEWORK, WITH LIFT CAPABILITY AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO MOVE EGYPTIAN DIVISIONS TO SAUDI ARABIA AND OVERLAND.

(G) ALLIES SHOULD PROVIDE AIR AND SEA LIFT TO EVACUATE REFUGEES FROM JORDAN.

(H) ALLIES SHOULD EXTEND FURTHER ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN STATES WHOSE ECONOMIES WERE BEING DAMAGED BY SANCTIONS AND OIL PRICE RISES. BAKER SAID THAT HE WOULD MAKE A SIMILAR REQUEST TO DELORS AND THE TROIKA. THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE WAS A DELICATE ENTERPRISE WHICH WAS NOW IN JEOPARDY. THE LOSS OF OIL DELIVERIES FROM BOTH THE GULF AND THE SOVIET UNION WAS HAVING A SERIOUS IMPACT.

(I) ALL ALLIES SHOULD STRENGTHEN THE COMPLIANCE OF THEIR NATIONALS AND COMPANIES WITH UN SCRS.

9. BAKER SAID THAT IF THESE STEPS FAILED TO UNDO SADDAM'S AGGRESSION, IT WOULD BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ALL TO TAKE FURTHER STEPS TO REVERSE THE INVASION OF KUWAIT, RESTORE THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT AND REESTABLISH SECURITY IN THE GULF. THAT WAS ESSENTIALLY WHAT THE U S AND THE SOVIET UNION HAD AGREED IN THE HELSINKI JOINT STATEMENT. ALL OPTIONS MUST BE CONSIDERED AND NONE COULD BE RULED OUT.

10. NATIONS WOULD STILL NEED TO STAND TOGETHER, EVEN IF SADDAM WITHDREW FROM KUWAIT BUT RETAINED HIS EXCESSIVELY LARGE ARMY AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. BUSH AND GORBACHEV HAD DIRECTED BAKER AND SHEVARDNADZE TO CONSIDER WAYS OF SETTING UP REGIONAL SECURITY ORGANISATIONS TO STRENGTHEN SECURITY AND STABILITY AFTER THE KUWAIT CRISIS. ALLIES, PARTICULARLY PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, NEEDED TO CONSIDER VERY INTRUSIVE, INTERNATIONALLY-SANCTIONED MEASURES TO PREVENT AGGRESSION. ALMOST NONE OF US WAS INNOCENT OF CONTRIBUTING IN SOME WAY TO THE IRAQI WAR MACHINE: INTRUSIVE MEASURES WOULD BE NEEDED TO DEAL WITH THE INSIPIENT IRAQI NUCLEAR CAPABILITY AND THEIR CW, BW AND BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMMES.

11. BAKER CONCLUDED THAT FOR THE U S THE BOTTOM LINE WAS SIMPLE: AGGRESSION COULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO STAND IF WE WERE SUCCESSFULLY TO CONFRONT THE FIRST POST COLD WAR CRISIS. WE COULD NOT MAKE THE SAME MISTAKES WE HAD MADE BEFORE. SADDAM MUST BE MADE INCAPABLE OF FUTURE AGGRESSION.

12. DUMAS (FRANCE) SAID THAT SINCE THE MINISTERIAL MEETING ON 10 AUGUST THE CONVICTION THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY COULD NOT ACCEPT IRAQI AGGRESSION AGAINST KUWAIT HAD STRENGTHENED. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD TO REACT WITH VIGOUR AGAINST THIS CRIME. THE WORK OF THE TWELVE IN ROME ON 7 SEPTEMBER HAD BEEN VERY ENCOURAGING. HE PROCEEDED TO GIVE A SHORT OVERVIEW OF THE WORK OF THE WEU. THERE HAD BEEN CONSULTATION WITH WEU MEMBERS AND NON-MEMBERS TO COORDINATE OPERATIONS IN THE GULF. THIS HAD LED TO THE BAHRAIN NAVAL CONFERENCE, ATTENDED BY MORE THAN 20 NATIONS, INCLUDING THE U S, THE WEU AND ARAB STATES. PRIOR COORDINATION WITHIN THE WEU HAD DEMONSTRATED THE WILL TO COOPERATE AND HAD SETTLED PRACTICAL PROBLEMS. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EMBARGO WOULD REQUIRE INTELLIGENT COORDINATION. THIS WOULD CONTINUE IN THE WEU AND MORE WIDELY.

13. IN RESPONSE TO BAKER'S REQUESTS, DUMAS SAID THAT HE IMAGINED THAT THE WORK OF THE WEU AND SCEPC COULD TAKE PLACE 'WITHIN THIS CONTEXT AND IN THIS SPIRIT'. FRANCE'S POSITION OBEYED CERTAIN IMPERATIVES, BUT THESE HAD NOT HINDERED THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT. RECALLING MITTERRAND'S PRESS CONFERENCE IN PARIS ON 6 SEPTEMBER, DUMAS SAID THAT THE PRINCIPLES SET OUT THERE WERE IN ACCORD WITH THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE HELSINKI SUMMIT. FRANCE WAS INTENT ON ENSURING THAT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION WAS FOUND. THE ONLY MEANS TO ACHIEVE THIS WAS THROUGH THE COMPLETE AND EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF THE EMBARGO. IF THERE WERE ANY INADEQUACIES IN THE UNSCRS THEY SHOULD BE RECTIFIED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IF ACTIONS IN THE GULF CHANGED IN NATURE OR WE WISHED TO LEAVE THE LEGAL COURSE DEFINED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THEN WE MUST REFER BACK TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

14. DUMAS CONCLUDED THAT THE SITUATION WAS GRAVE. THERE HAD BEEN NO (NO) SIGNAL FROM IRAQ THAT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION SHOULD PREVAIL: THIS WAS AN ADDITIONAL REASON WHY IT MUST PREVAIL.

15. DE MICHELIS (ITALY) REPORTED ON THE EC MINISTERIAL MEETING IN ROME ON 7 SEPTEMBER. THIS HAD BEEN A CLEAR POLITICAL DEMONSTRATION OF THE FEELINGS OF THE TWELVE. THE MOST IMPORTANT DECISION HAD BEEN TO ACT JOINTLY AND IN CONTACT WITH OTHER ALLIES TO ENSURE STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF THE EMBARGO. THE TWELVE WERE ALSO READY TO CONSIDER MORE BINDING RULES FOR THE EMBARGO, EG EXTENDING IT TO AIR AND GROUND TRANSPORT. STRICT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EMBARGO WOULD BE IMPORTANT POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY, TO WEAKEN SADDAM'S POSITION IN THE ARAB WORLD AND WITHIN IRAQ.

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IRAQ/KUWAIT  
 PS  
 PS/MR WALDEGRAVE  
 PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
 PS/PUS  
 MR TOMKYS  
 MR GORE-BOOTH  
 MR FAIRWEATHER  
 MR GOULDEN  
 MR JAY  
 MR SLATER  
 MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)  
 HD/MED  
 HD/NENAD  
 HD/NAD  
 HD/SED  
 HD/UND  
 HD/CONSULAR D  
 HD/NEWS D  
 HD/NPDD  
 HD/SECPOL D  
 HD/AMD

HD/ECD(E)  
 MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY  
 MR APPLEYARD CABINET OFFICE  
 (BY TUBE H29)  
 MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE  
 (BY TUBE H29)  
 MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE  
 (BY TUBE H29)  
 MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE  
 (BY TUBE H29)  
 PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST  
 SIR P CRADOCK,  
 (NO 10 DOWNING ST)  
 CABINET OFFICE DIO  
 (BY TUBE H29)  
 SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE  
 AUS (C) MODUK  
 HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK  
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PART TWO OF FOUR PARTS

16. DE MICHELIS SAID THE TWELVE WERE ANSWERING POSITIVELY BUSH'S CALL FOR TRUE BURDENSARING. THERE WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT COSTS FOR ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO COUNTRIES HIT BY THE CRISIS, AND THE TWELVE HAD COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL AID TO EGYPT, JORDAN AND TURKEY. ABOUT USD 10 BILLION WOULD BE NEEDED IN THE NEXT YEAR. THE TWELVE WERE STUDYING POSSIBLE JOINT EFFORTS BY THE GCC, EC AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES TO SHARE THE COSTS.

17. DE MICHELIS SAID THAT THE TWELVE WERE NOT CONFINING THEIR AID TO THREE COUNTRIES. AT THEIR MEETING IN BRUSSELS ON 17 SEPTEMBER THEY WOULD BE CONSIDERING THE POSITION OF ASIAN AND AFRICAN COUNTRIES WHICH HAD APPLIED TO THE UN FOR AID UNDER ARTICLE 50. THEY WERE ALSO PROPOSING THAT THE G24 SHOULD CONSIDER THE SITUATION OF CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

18. DE MICHELIS SAID THAT THE TWELVE WOULD RELAUNCH THEIR COOPERATION WITH ARAB COUNTRIES, WHILE GIVING A CLEAR MESSAGE THAT THERE WAS NO DIRECT LINK BETWEEN THE KUWAIT CRISIS AND OTHER MIDDLE EASTERN AND MEDITERRANEAN PROBLEMS. THE EC HAD DECIDED TO TRY TO ORGANISE A MINISTERIAL MEETING BETWEEN THE TWELVE AND THE COUNTRIES OF THE ARAB LEAGUE, MINUS IRAQ. ONE AIM WAS TO EXERT POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE MINORITY OF STATES WITH THE ARAB LEAGUE WHICH WAS TAKING AN AMBIGUOUS POSITION VIS A VIS IRAQ. ITALY WAS ALREADY IN TOUCH WITH SOME OF THESE COUNTRIES.

19. DE MICHELIS AGREED WITH DUMAS THAT EVERYTHING POSSIBLE SHOULD BE DONE TO REACH A POLITICAL SOLUTION. THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISOLATION OF SADDAM MUST BE STRENGTHENED. IN FUTURE, PERHAPS THERE SHOULD ALSO BE COMMUNICATIONS ISOLATION. THE MILITARY OPTIONS SHOULD BE AVOIDED. WE SHOULD NOT LOSE THE CONNECTION WITH THE LEGAL

FRAMEWORK OF THE UN, BUT SHOULD BE PREPARED TO RETURN TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR NEW RULES TO SUPPORT OUR AIMS.

20. IN THE MEDIUM TERM THERE MIGHT BE A NEED TO CREATE A NEW MECHANISM TO AVOID SUCH CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE MEDITERRANEAN: SOME EUROPEAN COUNTRIES FAVOURED A HELSINKI TYPE MODEL FOR THE REGION. A SET OF RULES AND PRINCIPLES WAS NEEDED TO DEFUSE CRISES. EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WERE READY TO WORK WITH THE U S AND THE SOVIET UNION ON THIS. DISCUSSIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE WOULD BE IMPORTANT.

21. DE MICHELIS CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT ITALY WOULD STUDY THE POSSIBILITY OF GIVING A POSITIVE ANSWER TO BAKER'S REQUESTS. THERE SHOULD BE NO POLITICAL DIFFICULTY. THEY WERE LEGITIMATE AND IMPORTANT SUGGESTIONS FOR SUPPORTING COMMON AIMS.

22. FERNANDEZ-ORDONEZ (SPAIN) SAID THAT A NON-MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS WAS DESIRABLE AND POSSIBLE. THE QUESTION SHOULD NOT BE WHAT TO DO IF THE EMBARGO FAILED, BUT WHAT TO DO TO ENSURE THAT IT PREVAILED. THERE MUST BE SUFFICIENT PRESSURE AND NO 'FISSURES'. THERE MUST BE CLOSE CONTACT WITH VULNERABLE COUNTRIES LIKE JORDAN. THERE MUST BE PATIENT, UNRELENTING PRESSURE. THERE MUST BE COORDINATION OF OPERATIONS. AND THERE MUST BE CONSTANT CONSULTATION AND ALLIED UNITY.

23. THERE HAD TO BE A FAIR SHARING OF RESPONSIBILITIES, INCLUDING ASSISTANCE TO THIRD COUNTRIES AND PARTICIPATION IN MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS. THIS WAS A RESPONSIBILITY WHICH LAY ON THE WHOLE WORLD. SPAIN HAD SUPPORTED U S DEPLOYMENTS, HAD MADE A NAVAL CONTRIBUTION, WAS GIVING AID TO REFUGEES IN JORDAN AND WAS CONTRIBUTING TO EC FINANCIAL AID. THE AMOUNT AND SCOPE OF THIS EFFORT WAS A RADICAL DEPARTURE FROM SPANISH TRADITION. SPAIN WOULD CONTINUE TO RENDER SUPPORT WITHIN ITS POSSIBILITIES.

24. FERNANDEZ-ORDONEZ SAID THAT WE MUST PREVENT SADDAM BECOMING A HERO OF THE ARABS AND A FOCUS FOR OPPOSITION TO THE WEST. WHILE THERE WAS NO LEGAL LINK WITH THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, A SOLUTION TO THAT HAD ALSO TO BE FOUND. A MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY STRUCTURE WAS NEEDED.

25. HE CONCLUDED THAT A DYNAMIC APPROACH TO THE CRISIS WAS IMPORTANT: IF CURRENT STEPS FAILED TO END IT, SPAIN WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER ADDITIONAL ONES, CONSISTENT WITH THE UN CHARTER. EFFORTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UN MUST CONTINUE. WE MUST AVAIL



OURSELVES OF THE CURRENT CONSENSUS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ENSURE THAT THE UN WAS OPERATIVE, NOT DECLARATORY.

26. GENSCHER (FRG) SAID THAT THE AGREEMENT IN HELSINKI UNDERLINED THE NEED TO BUILD UP SECURITY STRUCTURES IN THE GULF REGION. THIS FITTED IN WITH EC EFFORTS TO CONTRIBUTE TO COMMON SECURITY. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT HUSSEIN GOT NO ENCOURAGEMENT FROM ANY SIDE THAT THE 'PEACE COALITION' WAS WEAKENING. GENSCHER HAD MET YESTERDAY THE INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, WHOM HE HAD ENCOURAGED TO PRESS FOR SUPPORT OF UN SANCITONS AT A FORTHCOMING MEETING OF THE NON-ALIGNED TROIKA IN BELGRADE. THE MEETING SHOULD SEND AN INFLUENTIAL, PARALLEL SIGNAL TO THAT FROM HELSINKI. THE INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE TENS OF THOUSANDS OF INDIAN NATIONALS IN KUWAIT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL COORDINATE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. GERMANY AGREED THAT ALLIES SHOULD SHARE JOINTLY BURDENS AND RESPONSIBILITIES. TO THIS END, GERMANY HAD OPENED ITS AIRSPACE, WOULD MAKE AVAILABLE AIR AND SEALIFT CAPACITIES AND WOULD PROVIDE ECONOMIC AID SPECIFICALLY TO EGYPT BUT ALSO TO TURKEY AND JORDAN. AFTER UNIFICATION, THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT WOULD AMEND THE CONSTITUTION TO ALLOW MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN OUT-OF-AREA OPERATIONS UNDER UN AUSPICES.

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PS/PUS  
MR TOMKYS  
MR GORE-BOOTH  
MR FAIRWEATHER  
MR GOULDEN  
MR JAY  
MR SLATER  
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)  
HD/MED

HD/ECD(E)  
MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY  
MR APPLEYARD CABINET OFFICE  
(BY TUBE H29)  
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE  
(BY TUBE H29)  
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE  
(BY TUBE H29)  
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE  
(BY TUBE H29)  
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST  
SIR P CRADOCK,  
(NO 10 DOWNING ST)

HD/NENAD  
HD/NAD  
HD/SED  
HD/UND  
HD/CONSULAR D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/NPDD  
HD/SECPOL D  
HD/AMD

CABINET OFFICE D10  
(BY TUBE H29)  
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE  
AUS (C) MODUK  
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK  
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND  
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PART 3 OF 4 PARTS

27. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT HUSSEIN'S AGGRESSION WAS AGAINST AN ARAB AND ISLAMIC COUNTRY. ALL THE ACTIONS TAKEN WERE TO RESTORE THE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTEGRITY OF THAT COUNTRY. THE CONSEQUENCES OF ITS AGGRESSION MUST REST SOLELY WITH BAGHDAD. GERMANY SUPPORTED THE FIRM AND UNITED STANCE OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE AND WAS PREPARED TO SHOULDER ITS SHARE OF RESPONSIBILITIES. IT WOULD WORK ESPECIALLY TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH CENTRAL/ EASTERN EUROPE.

28. VAN DEN BROEK (NETHERLANDS) SAID THAT THE EMBARGO MUST BE A SUCCESS IF THE CRISIS WAS TO BE RESOLVED BY PEACEFUL MEANS. THE NETHERLANDS WAS PLAYING ITS PART. TWO FRIGATES HAD BEEN DESPATCHED, BILATERAL AID WOULD BE GIVEN TO JORDAN AND THE NETHERLANDS WOULD TAKE PART IN EC AID PROGRAMMES FOR EGYPT, TURKEY AND JORDAN. IN ADDITION, 50 THOUSAND ITEMS OF NBC PROTECTIVE CLOTHING WERE BEING SENT TO COUNTRIES MOST DIRECTLY THREATENED.

29. THE HELSINKI SUMMIT WAS IMPORTANT IN THE LONG AS WELL AS THE SHORT TERM. WHILE ALL EMPHASIS MUST BE ON A POLITICAL SOLUTION, THIS MUST BE UNDEPINNED BY THE POSSIBILITY OF MILITARY ACTION. IT WOULD ADD TO THE PRESSURE ON HUSSEIN IF HE KNEW THAT INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY MIGHT EXTEND TO MILITARY COORDINATION. THE SECURITY COUNCIL, SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER THIS COULD BE ACHIEVED WITHIN THE UN FRAMEWORK. IF SO, IT WOULD ELIMINATE ANY HOPE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION AGAINST IRAQ WOULD SPLIT IF IT CAME TO MILITARY ACTION.

30. FROM A PR ASPECT, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO PARTNERS OUTSIDE EUROPE THAT HUSSEIN WAS THE CAUSE OF THE CRISIS. HE HAD

DEEPENED THE ARAB DIVIDE, HE HAD MADE MORE DIFFICULT ANY SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION, AND THE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES RESULTING FROM THE CRISIS WERE HIS FAULT.

31. VAND DEN BROEK THOUGHT IT ODD THAT THE PRESS AT HELSINKI HAD NOT ASKED ABOUT THE HOSTAGES IN IRAQ. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KEEP THEM IN THE PUBLIC EYE.

32. PINHEIRO (PORTUGAL) SAID THAT A SOLUTION (PREFERABLY PEACEFUL, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT EXCLUDE OTHERS) MUST BE FOUND.

33. EYSKENS (BELGIUM) SAID THAT A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE PRESTIGE AND THE FUTURE OF THE UN. FAILURE WOULD CONSIGN IT TO THE FATE OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. U S DIPLOMACY HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN THE APPROVAL OF UN RESOLUTION 665, BUT THIS MUST BE EXTENDED TO COVER AIRLIFT. BELGIUM WELCOMED THE INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY AND IN PARTICULAR THE EFFORTS OF THE WEU WHICH CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED THE BENEFITS OF EUROPEAN COORDINATION. FOR THE EMBARGO TO WORK IT MUST BE WATERTIGHT, EVEN THOUGH THIS MEANT SOME COUNTRIES WOULD SUFFER. FOR THE FUTURE, HE SUPPORTED BAKER'S CALL FOR A REGIONAL SECURITY POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IN PARTICULAR THE WEST SHOULD ENCOURAGE AID FROM THE RICHER TO THE POORER ARAB NATIONS AS WELL AS AID TO ALLEVIATE THE ECONOMIC BURDEN ON EASTERN EUROPE. THE WESTERN WORLD MUST BE PREPARED TO CARRY THE GLOBE 'LIKE ATLAS'. EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO STRENGTHEN THE WESTERN ECONOMIES. BELGIUM HAD CONTRIBUTED THREE SHIPS, PLANES FOR USE BY EGYPT TO EVACUATE REFUGEES AND 20 THOUSAND TONNES OF WHEAT TO EGYPT.

34. BONDEVIK (NORWAY) SAW IN THE SUMMIT A CLEAR MESSAGE TO IRAQ THAT AGGRESSION WOULD NOT PAY. THE ROLE OF THE UN IN DEALING WITH THE CRISIS WAS ESSENTIAL AND SHOULD BE CONTINUED. THIS WAS A CLEAR TEST OF HOW THE WORLD AFTER THE COLD WAR WOULD WORK. SANCTIONS WERE THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO MILITARY ACTION, AND AIR SANCTIONS MERITED CLOSE ATTENTION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. NORWAY WAS TAKING CONCRETE STEPS WITH THE PROVISION OF NAVAL UNITS IN THE NATO AREA TO COMPENSATE FOR UNITS SENT BY OTHERS TO THE GULF, AS WELL AS THE DESPATCH OF NBC EQUIPMENT, A NAVAL SUPPLY SHIP AND HUMANITARIAN AID INCLUDING LOGISTIC SUPPORT. NORWAY WOULD ALSO PROVIDE NAVAL TRANSPORT FOR EQUIPMENT. THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT WAS STUDYING THE U S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL HELP AND WOULD REPLY IN DETAIL AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH PARLIAMENT.

35. SAMARAS (GREECE) POINTED OUT THE FINANCIAL IMPACT ON THE GREEK ECONOMY OF THE GULF CRISIS. GREECE HAD LOST A SUBSTANTIAL ORDER OF

OIL FROM IRAQ, BOUGHT AT A HIGHLY PREFERENTIAL PRICE, AS WELL AS HAVING TO WRITE OFF IRAQI DEBTS AND TO FACE THE CANCELLATION OF ORDERS FROM IRAQ. A FRIGATE WAS ON THE WAY TO THE GULF REGION, AND THREE VESSELS OF GREEK OWNERSHIP HAD BEEN OFFERED TO PROVIDE SEALIFT CAPABILITY. GREECE HAD MADE ITS AIR AND PORT FACILITIES AVAILABLE FROM THE OUTSET.

36. ELLEMANN-JENSEN (DENMARK) WAS ALSO STRUCK BY THE LACK OF MEDIA INTEREST IN THE HOSTAGE ISSUE. DENMARK WAS, LIKE THE OTHER ALLIES, READY TO SHOULDER ITS RESPONSIBILITIES. A CORVETTE WOULD BE SENT TO THE GULF AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND DENMARK WAS PREPARED TO OFFER SEA TRANSPORT FOR EGYPTIAN AND SAUDI TROOPS, SOME SEALIFT CAPACITY FROM THE EAST COAST OF THE UNITED STATES, AND IF NECESSARY WOULD EQUIP A HOSPITAL SHIP. THE UN SHOULD PLAY A CRUCIAL ROLE IN COORDINATING ANY FUTURE STEPS THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN. HE AGREED THAT AID SHOULD BE DIRECTED AT COUNTRIES HARDEST HIT. DENMARK HAD COMMITTED AN IMMEDIATE USD 5 MILLION TO THIS END.

37. POOS (LUXEMBOURG) AGREED THAT PATIENCE AND FIRMNESS WOULD CONTINUE TO BE NEEDED. NATO WAS AN APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR CONSULTATION AND DISCUSSIONS SHOULD CONTINUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION. EVERYONE PREFERRED A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION, BUT THIS DEPENDED ON THE REESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATUS QUO ANTE AND THE UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. LUXEMBOURG WOULD MAKE 'AN ADEQUATE' FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE EC AND WEU, AND WOULD CONSIDER UNILATERAL AID PACKAGES TO EGYPT, JORDAN AND SAUDI ARABIA. POOS SUGGESTED A MIDDLE EASTERN EQUIVALENT OF THE CSCE IN THE MEDIUM TERM TO GIVE TO THE MEDITERRANEAN ARAB WORLD THE BENEFITS EUROPE HAD REAPED FROM CSCE.

38. MR GAREL-JONES (UK) PAID TRIBUTE TO THE U S ROLE AND AGREED THAT HUSSEIN MUST NOT SUCCEED. THE UN RESOLUTION MUST BE UPHELD IN FULL. THIS WAS NOT SIMPLY BECAUSE OF THE EFFECT ON WESTERN ECONOMIES OF UNCERTAIN OIL SUPPLIES, BUT ALSO TO UPHOLD THE PRINCIPLE THAT AGGRESSION MUST NOT BE SEEN TO SUCCEED. ALL COUNTRIES MUST SHARE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ACTION. THE UK WAS GIVING ACTIVE CONSIDERATION TO PROVIDING GROUND FORCES IN ADDITION TO ITS ALREADY SUBSTANTIAL COMMITMENT TO THE GULF.

39. EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO ENSURE THAT SANCTIONS SUCCEEDED, BUT IF THESE WERE TO BE EFFECTIVE THE OPTION TO USE OTHER MEANS MUST REMAIN AND MUST NOT (NOT) BE DEPENDENT ON FURTHER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE FOR THE WEST TO DEPRIVE ITSELF OF THE RIGHT TO USE FORCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

EXPLICITLY STATED IN RESOLUTION 661. MR GAREL-JONES AGREED WITH GENSCHER THAT EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES COULD BE HARD HIT BY THE SANCTIONS. HE HOPED THAT WEALTHY EUROPEAN NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES WOULD PLAY THEIR FULL PART IN RESPONSIBILITY SHARING.

40. THE HELSINKI SUMMIT WAS A SYMBOL OF THE NEW WORLD, FULL OF OPPORTUNITIES. THE COOPERATION OF THE SOVIET UNION WAS OF ENORMOUS SIGNIFICANCE. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE WORLD SHOULD NOT FAIL THE FIRST TEST OF THE POST COLD WAR ERA.

41. HANNIBALSSON (ICELAND) AGREED THAT ALL COUNTRIES WERE UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO SHARE THE COSTS. ICELAND WOULD DO ITS BIT AND WAS CONSIDERING VARIOUS OPTIONS. WHILST THE IMMEDIATE AIMS WERE NOW CLEAR AFTER THE HELSINKI SUMMIT, THE ALLIANCE MUST RECOGNISE THAT IN THE LONGER TERM IT COULD NOT EXCLUDE A MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS.

42. BOZER (TURKEY) WAS CONVINCED THAT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WERE THE MOST EFFECTIVE WEAPON AGAINST HUSSEIN AT THIS STAGE. HE THANKED THE ALLIES FOR THEIR SOLIDARITY AND AFFIRMED THAT, DESPITE THE SERIOUS ECONOMIC HARDSHIPS AS WELL AS THE SECURITY RISK THAT HIS COUNTRY WOULD ENDURE, THE TURKISH ATTITUDE WOULD REMAIN FIRM. HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD CONSIDER CAREFULLY BAKER'S PROPOSALS.

43. SMITH (CANADIAN PERMREP) SAID HE AGREED WITH BAKER ON NEW REGIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURES AND ON INTRUSIVE MEASURES. HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD GIVE CAREFUL EXAMINATION TO THE OTHER U S PROPOSALS. IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO SUPPORT THOSE COUNTRIES FACING THE PRINCIPAL RISKS AND COSTS: THIS INCLUDED EASTERN EUROPE. CANADA NOW HAD THREE SHIPS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN EN ROUTE FOR THE GULF.

44. BAKER MADE A FURTHER INTERVENTION IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS FROM PORTUGAL, DENMARK AND BELGIUM. HE BELIEVED THAT THE EMBARGO WAS WORKING, THAT NO GOODS WERE BEING EXPORTED FROM IRAQ, THAT ALL FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING IRAQ HAD BEEN FORECLOSED WORLDWIDE AND THAT THERE WAS A GOOD RESPECT FOR THE EMBARGO ON IMPORTS. SOME LEAKAGE OF FOOD WAS GETTING THROUGH BY AIR, AND BY LAND FROM JORDAN. THE REFERENCE IN THE HELSINKI STATEMENT TO FOODSTUFFS WAS BECAUSE OF CONFUSION OVER WHETHER FOOD WAS INDEED EMBARGOED. THE U S VIEW WAS THAT ALL FOOD IMPORTS WERE UNDER EMBARGO AT THIS STAGE. IRAQ WAS NOT YET AT A POINT WHERE HUMANITARIAN AID WAS APPROPRIATE. IN PARTICULAR, THE COMMERCIAL SALE OF FOODSTUFFS WAS NOT A MATTER OF HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATION. GOVERNMENTS WISHING TO

PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN AID SHOULD DO SO IN A HUMANITARIAN WAY. THE UN SANCTIONS COMMITTEE WAS WORKING TO DEFINE PRECISELY WHAT EXEMPTIONS THERE MIGHT BE TO THE SANCTIONS.

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PART 4 OF 4 PARTS

45. BAKER UNDERLINED THE DESIRABILITY OF COOPERATION WITH THE ARAB LEAGUE. THE MAJORITY OF ARAB LEAGUE COUNTRIES SUPPORTED THE U S ACTIONS. THOSE COUNTRIES OF 'INTERESTS' OPPOSING WERE YEMEN, THE PLO, TUNISIA (IN ABSENTIA) AND JORDAN. JORDAN WAS A SPECIAL CASE. KING HUSSEIN HAD MANY PROBLEMS OF HIS OWN MAKING BUT AT THIS STAGE THE U S SAW 'NO ALTERNATIVE TO KING HUSSEIN'. THE U S WAS DOING ALL IT COULD TO ENHANCE THE ARAB COMPONENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE. THAT WAS WHY HEAVY LIFT CAPACITY WAS NEEDED, ESPECIALLY TO TRANSPORT TANKS. SYRIA WAS BEING SUPPORTIVE AND SENDING ADDITIONAL HELP, AND PUBLIC SUPPORT IN MOST ARAB COUNTRIES (ACCORDING TO MUBARAK) WAS GROWING. SADDAM HUSSEIN'S CALL FOR A HOLY WAR HAD FALLEN ON DEAF EARS.

46. THE ISSUE OF SOVIET MILITARY ADVISERS WAS THE ONLY ONE ON WHICH THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES. THE RUSSIANS WERE REDUCING NUMBERS GRADUALLY, IN ORDER, BAKER BELIEVED, NOT TO PUT SOVIET CITIZENS AT RISK. ALTHOUGH NUMBERS OF UNIFORMED ADVISERS HAD DECLINED FROM 193 AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS TO 150, THIS WAS NOT A TRUE REFLECTION OF THE PICTURE. AT THE OUTSET, OVER 8000 (MOSTLY NON-UNIFORMED) SOVIET ADVISERS HAD BEEN IN IRAQ, OF WHOM AROUND 1000 WERE INVOLVED IN SOME MILITARY ACTIVITY.

47. AS FOR THE FUTURE, ALL MUST BE DILIGENT IN ENFORCING SANCTIONS. THE U S DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF OTHER POLITICAL MOVES, BILATERALLY, UNILATERALLY OR WITHIN THE UN AUSPICES. OPTIONS MUST BE KEPT OPEN. ONE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER UN INVOLVEMENT WOULD BE THE IMPOSITION OF AN AIR BLOCKADE. ANOTHER WOULD BE TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS AGAINST THOSE COUNTRIES NOT OBSERVING THE SANCTIONS

AGAINST IRAQ.

48. AS FOR THE SIGNIFICANCE OF IRAQI ATTEMPTS AT A RAPPROCHEMENT WITH IRAN, THE U S UNDERSTOOD THAT IRAN INTENDED TO CONTINUE TO ENFORCE THE EMBARGO. BAKER AGREED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN MUST NOT PROFIT FROM HIS AGRRESSION AND MUST NOT, EVEN IN DEFEAT, BE SEEN AS AN ARAB HERO. THE LINKING OF THE ARAB/ISRAELI CONFLICT TO THIS CRISIS WOULD BE A SAD MISTAKE. FINALLY, BAKER APPRECIATED THE COMMENTS OF HIS COLLEAGUES IN RESPONSE TO HIS SPECIFIC REQUEST AND PROPOSALS, AND LOOKED FORWARD TO RESPONSES FROM GOVERNMENTS IN DUE COURSE.

49. SUMMING UP, THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THAT MINISTERS WERE UNANIMOUS IN WELCOMING THE RESULTS OF THE SUMMIT, WHICH HAD STRENGTHENED THE SOLIDARITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION. THE COUNCIL HAD REAFFIRMED ITS DETERMINATION TO SEE THE CRISIS THROUGH AND WOULD NOT SETTLE FOR ANYTHING LESS THAN THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN SANCTIONS. THE ALLIANCE PREFERRED A PEACEFUL SOLUTION BUT RECOGNISED THAT THIS COULD ONLY WORK IF SANCTIONS WERE WATERTIGHT. ALL AGREED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF SHARING RESPONSIBILITIES (WOERNER SPECIFICALLY ASKED THAT THIS PHRASE BE USED TO AVOID ANY CONFUSION WITH THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF BURDENSARING, AND ALL ALLIED GOVERNMENTS WOULD STUDY FAVOURABLY THE U S PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER COOPERATION.

50. WOERNER ASKED FOR THE COUNCIL'S AGREEMENT TO THE THREE PRINCIPAL REQUESTS FROM THE U S AFFECTING THE WORK OF SCEPC, THE DEPLOYMENT OF NAVOCFORMED, AND AWACS. ROBIN (FRANCE) SAID THAT NOT ALL THESE ISSUES AFFECTED FRANCE. ON SCEPC, ROBIN SAID THAT HIS MINISTER HAD ONLY AGREED TO CONSIDER THE PROPOSAL: IT WAS PREMATURE TO MAKE ANY FIRM DECISION ON THIS.

COMMENT

51. BAKER TOLD MR GAREL-JONES PRIVATELY THAT HE WAS NOT HAPPY WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF, IN PARTICULAR, THE JAPANESE ON 'RESPONSIBILITY SHARING'. HE WARMLY ENDORSED THE MINISTER'S COMMENT THAT THE WEALTHIER EUROPEAN NNA STATES SHOULD BE ASKED TO DO MORE BUT ADDED THAT THE U S HAD NOT YET GOT ROUND TO RAISING THE QUESTION WITH THEM: HE WOULD HOWEVER BE APPROACHING BONN AGAIN. BAKER ALSO SAID HE WOULD BE LOOKING FOR A GROUND FORCE PRESENSE, EVEN IF ONLY SYMBOLIC, FROM EUROPEAN ALLIES. HE KNEW THAT WE WERE WILLING: THE DUTCH, THE FRENCH AND THE ITALIANS SHOULD ALSO BE READY TO CONSIDER IT.

RECOMMENDATION



52. INVIEW OF THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE ATTACHED BY THE U S TO NATO'S ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN THE GULF CRISIS AND THE POTENTIAL LONGERN TERM ADVANTAGES TO THE ALLIANCE OF ITS READINESS TO ADDRESS OUT-OF-AREA QUESTIONS, SIR M ALEXANDER RECOMMENDS THAT SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE THREE U S REQUESTS FOR COLLECTIVE NATO ACTIONS. NATO'S EXTENSION OF THE NAVOCFORMED DEPLOYMENT AND, IN PARTICULAR, USE OF THE NATO AWACS FORCE COULD BE PRESENTED AS ACTIONS OF SOLIDARITY WITH TURKEY. THE U S ENVISAGE THAT THE AWACS FORCE WILL CONTINUE TO BE BASED IN TURKEY BUT THE INTENSITY OF ITS OPERATIONS WILL BE INCREASED AND IT WILL BE DIRECTED TOWARDS ACTIVITIES IN THE GULF RATHER THAN THE SOVIET UNION. SCEPC, WHICH IS PURELY AN ADVISORY BODY, COULD PROVIDE USEFUL PRACTICAL ASSISTANCE ON LOGISTIC QUESTIONS.

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