



a(A-I)

MO 6/17/15S

Seen by PM  
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PRIME MINISTER

OPTIONS FOR FURTHER UK REINFORCEMENTS TO THE GULF

I have been considering with the Chiefs of Staff the best further contribution which we might make to the multi-national forces in the Gulf. A range of broad military options is summarised in the attached note for discussion at our meeting tomorrow.

2. There is strong US and Saudi pressure for the UK to supply ground forces, and I have been considering what would best meet the military requirement but at the same time be fully consistent with our declared defensive aim.

Air Forces

3. I believe that the most sensible air contribution we could offer would be a mixed squadron of 8 Tornado GR1s and 4 GR1As. These would complement the GR1 ground attack aircraft already stationed in Bahrain and the GR1A would provide a welcome improvement in the night reconnaissance capability of the allied forces in theatre. They could be in theatre in about 7 days, although we have some further work to do on basing arrangements.



### Ground Forces

4. We know that the US in-theatre commander, Gen Schwarzkopf, regards the tank imbalance between allied and Iraqi forces (likely to be 1:3 even by December) as his major military concern and would particularly value the deployment of a UK armoured unit. The options would be to send an armoured brigade (7,500-10,000 men) or an enhanced armoured brigade (12,000-14,000 men). Both would have 114 Challenger tanks but the enhanced brigade would include a second battalion of armoured infantry fighting vehicles and a second artillery regiment. Although an enhanced brigade would be more powerful, especially for offensive operations in the open desert, a basic brigade would be easier to sustain and still make a significant contribution towards alleviating the shortage of allied tanks. Unlike the enhanced brigade which could operate as an entirely independent unit, a brigade would need to be integrated with a US formation from which it would receive some combat and logistic support. Although we have undoubtedly had reliability problems with our Challenger tanks, the Army are confident that the battle availability of this relatively limited number of tanks could be satisfactorily maintained.

5. An alternative which would also provide a substantial improvement in capability responding to a clear military imbalance (about 2:1 in Iraq's favour at the beginning of November) would be a fully self-supporting artillery brigade (48 guns, approx 5000 men). This would have a clear defensive role but would equally be able to provide support for offensive operations if required. In the absence of other UK ground troops, it would need to be integrated into a larger US formation (it has interoperable equipment). The size of an artillery contribution could be varied downwards (ultimately to a single artillery regiment) by reducing either its number of guns or its integral logistic support.





6. The other main ground option of an armoured reconnaissance regiment would provide evidence of our political commitment in support of ground operations but would be of less military value in current circumstances.

7. I would not recommend either airmobile or airborne forces, as too lightly armed for this situation.

#### Naval Forces

8. Similarly, in present circumstances, there is no clear role for the special capabilities of an amphibious force. While a carrier group would provide a strengthening of our naval contribution and some potentially useful additional capabilities, given the strength of allied naval forces already deployed this does not seem a pressing requirement.

#### Command

9. Both the artillery brigade and the armoured brigade would need to be closely integrated with US forces. We would, of course, retain the right of decision over whether our forces should be committed to any US operation but, once we had taken such a decision, we would need to assign them to US operational control. This parallels the arrangements for our forces committed to NATO. A ground force contribution of this size should also ensure that we have full access to US operational planning.

#### Costs

10. It is not been possible to identify until deployment details are clearer the additional costs likely to arise, but a very broad estimate of the initial transportation costs alone of each option given in the paper makes it clear that in most cases these would be



quite substantial (and, of course, recovery costs would be similar). Other additional costs are bound to arise for the procurement or modification of equipment to suit the particular conditions of the deployment. The likely magnitude of these costs will certainly involve a call on the Reserve.

### Conclusion

11. I am happy with the Tornado GR1/LA proposals which we can action quickly. The ground forces are clearly more difficult, and I personally feel that the best answer in terms of numbers would be rather more than the Recce Regt (of 1000) and rather less than the Armoured Brigade of 7500 to 10,000, but that it should include tanks as this is precisely what they want. I am therefore urgently examining how this alternative might be achieved.

12. There is a major logistical challenge in the armoured options with the much greater manpower involved on which we shall need close consultation with both the US and Saudi Arabia and we shall also need to conduct detailed reconnaissance as soon as possible.

13. It is obvious that whichever choice is made, this would represent a quite different scale of involvement in the Gulf situation with a much higher risk profile than at present. Ground forces will be much less flexible and mobile than the aircraft and ships that we have there at present, and I appreciate the suggestion that their deployment should be finally approved in a wider group of colleagues whether OD or Cabinet.



14. I am sending copies of this minute to the other members of OD(G) and the Chief Secretary, and to Sir Robin Butler.

Ministry of Defence  
10th September 1990



(T.K)

Approved by the Defence Secretary and initialled in his absence.





OPTIONS FOR FURTHER UK REINFORCEMENTS TO THE GULF

GROUND FORCES

1. The balance of ground forces is likely to remain in favour of the Iraqis even at the beginning of December. Thus any UK ground force contribution would be welcome militarily - and the US have also made it clear that they would value the commitment of UK ground forces politically. The ground force packages which have been considered are summarised below in order of size:

- a. Armoured Recce Regiment. (1000 men) An armoured reconnaissance regiment (with 48 Scorpions) would provide a good recce capability, but the US already has sufficient capability in theatre. An armoured reconnaissance regiment could be complemented by an attack helicopter regiment if desired. Logistic assistance from US forces would be required. Deployment time about 20 days, including sea tail. Initial transportation cost c. £6.25M.
- b. Artillery Regiment. (800 men) There is a serious artillery imbalance, and an artillery regiment (18xM 109) could help redress the balance. The guns and ammunition are fully interoperable with American artillery and thus maintenance and resupply would be relatively easy, relying on US facilities (see also option d). Deployment time 30-35 days. Initial transport cost c. £3M.
- c. 24 Air Mobile Brigade. (4500-7000 men) 24 Bde can be organised either as an air mobile brigade (primarily a defensive formation - infantry heavy with a good anti-tank



capability) or as an air mechanised brigade, relying principally on attack helicopters. In the latter role it provides a highly mobile and flexible anti-armour force with a reasonable offensive capability; however there could be difficulties in ensuring sufficient Chinook availability in desert conditions. The deployment of 24 Bde would provide a useful military capability, although the US already has a very good capability of this type. Initial deployment 12-13 days but sea tail would take 27-31 days. Initial transportation cost c. £10.5M.

d. Artillery Brigade. (c5000 men) A fully self sufficient artillery brigade of 48 M107 guns would provide a contribution towards improving the artillery imbalance (2:1 in Iraqi favour at beginning of November). This option could be adjusted downwards either by reducing the number of guns or by reducing the degree of integral logistic support and increasing reliance on US support. Deployment time would be about 38 days. Initial transportation cost c. £15M.

e. Armoured Bde. (7500-10000 men) Although not as powerful as an enhanced armoured brigade (option f), an armoured brigade with 114 tanks would be easier to sustain and would make a significant contribution towards alleviating CINCENTCOM's shortage of tanks. It would need to be integrated with a US formation and receive some combat and logistic support from them. Deployment would take 30-35 days. Initial transportation cost c. £1 5M.

f. Enhanced Armoured Bde. (12000-14000 men) An enhanced armoured brigade would have the same number of tanks but provide a formation best suited to offensive operations in the open desert; it would also be a major contribution to





meeting CINCENTCOM's principal military concern about the disparity in tank strengths. As an independent brigade it would have full combat support; a good level of availability could be achieved provided sufficient logistic support were available. It would take 30-40 days to deploy. Initial transportation cost c. £24M.

RAF

2. Tornado GR1/GR1A. (12 aircraft) A mixed squadron would complement the existing GR1 deployment in Bahrain. The Tornado GR1A is primarily an all weather day/night recce aircraft but retains the offensive capability of the GR1. Although its recce facilities are not yet fully developed, its present night capability would provide a valuable addition to the recce capability already in theatre. The squadron could be operational in theatre in 7 days, although the basing arrangements require further study. The further GR1 aircraft would also enhance the all weather and night capability of the existing force which the American Commander in theatre would welcome. Initial transportation cost c. £4.5M.

RN

3. Amphibious. One Commando Group (1500-2500 men) with LPD, CVS (in LPH role) 3 LSLs and RFA support could be in theatre in 24-28 days. There is no specific role for its specialised capability at present (and America has large marine forces in theatre). A Commando Group would nevertheless be a sign of military commitment to ground forces operations without immediate deployment ashore (although such a force could only be maintained at sea for a limited period). A full Commando Brigade of 7000 men would represent a larger contribution, but would require an additional 5 LSLs and 8-12 ships taken up from





trade. Initial transportation cost c. £6-12M.

4. CVSG Group. (5 ships) A CVSG group would consist of a carrier, 2 escorts and 2 RFAs: it would be in theatre in about 28 days. Although there are already large US (and other) naval and air forces in the Gulf area, a carrier would provide a highly flexible range of national capabilities which could be useful in responding to various contingencies. These capabilities include major command and control and surveillance facilities, which could be useful in co-ordinating multi-national naval activity or if a maritime evacuation of civilians were required. Its AAW capability would also offer extra insurance against attacks on naval forces. However, the Chiefs of Staff would not wish to maintain this commitment for more than one 6 month deployment.

10(A-0)

PRIME MINISTER

ADDITIONAL FORCES FOR THE GULF

The Defence Secretary proposes to let you have a list of options for sending additional forces to the Gulf, which I will attach to this minute when it arrives. He does not want to make a recommendation yet, but would prefer a first round of discussion at tomorrow's meeting of Ministers.

Meanwhile, the Foreign Secretary has also let you have his views from Tokyo. He now favours sending a carrier group plus between 5,000/10,000 ground forces - while arguing that the latter would need the endorsement of a full OD or Cabinet.

The only new factor is that Secretary Baker asked the European members of NATO to contribute ground forces, when he briefed them this morning on the outcome of the Helsinki meeting.

Although the Defence Secretary has not made up his mind, I am told (in confidence) that his tentative conclusions are:

- naval force. He is against sending any further ships. The Americans and Saudis are not asking for more: and the other Europeans are contributing only ships.

- air force. He is inclined to agree to the Americans' request for additional Tornado aircraft in the recce. version.

- ground forces. He is undecided about what best to send. There are three choices:

i) an armoured force. This is what the Americans want, so prima facie there is a good case for sending it. But there are doubts about the reliability of our tanks. Shifting an armoured brigade is quite a major



B

exercise (they take their own workshops and so on).  
The manpower commitment would be about 7,500.

ii) Artillery. This could fill a gap: and there is the advantage of commonality with both the Americans and Saudis (which means you can swap ammunition). But it might look a bit as though we were ducking out of sending front-line fighting troops. The manpower commitment would be about 5,000.

iii) an Armoured Recce. Force in light tanks (Scorpion). A smaller commitment than an armoured brigade, indeed might fall below the credibility ceiling; but avoids some of the risks inherent in an armoured brigade. The manpower commitment would be 3000.

Challenger ①

You could of course combine (ii) and (iii). The Defence Secretary does not favour infantry or commandos.

C.P.P.

CHARLES POWELL

10 September 1990

c:\wpdocs\foreign\gulf.dca

F 3

750 tanks

OPTIONS FOR FURTHER UK REINFORCEMENTS TO THE GULF

I have been considering with the Chiefs of Staff the best further contribution which we might make to the multi-national forces in the Gulf. A range of broad military options summarised in the attached note for discussion at our meeting tomorrow.

2. All these are entirely feasible, but it is important that our further contribution should be seen as a substantial one including a ground element, helping to meet a clear military requirement but at the same time fully consistent with our declared defensive aim. Against these criteria, I believe that some options appear rather stronger than others.

Air Forces

3. I believe that the most sensible air contribution we could offer would be a mixed squadron of 8 GR1s and 4 GR1As. These would complement the GR1 ground attack aircraft already stationed in Bahrain and the GR1A would provide a welcome improvement in the night reconnaissance capability of the allied forces in theatre. These could be in theatre in about 7 days, although we have some further work to do on basing arrangements.



Ground Forces

4. We know that the US in-theatre commander, Gen Schwarzkopf, regards the tank imbalance between allied and Iraqi forces (likely to be 1:3 even by December) as his major military concern and would particularly value the deployment of a UK armoured unit. The options would be to send an armoured brigade (7,500-10,000 men) or an enhanced armoured brigade (12,000-14,000 men). Both would have 114 Challenger tanks but the full brigade would include a second battalion of armoured infantry fighting vehicles and artillery regiment. Although a full brigade would be more powerful, especially for offensive operations in the open desert, a light brigade would be easier to sustain and still make a significant contribution towards alleviating the shortage of allied tanks. Unlike the full brigade which could operate as an entirely independent unit, a light brigade would need to be partially integrated with a US formation from which it would receive some combat and logistic support. Although we have undoubtedly had reliability problems with our Challenger tanks, we believe that the logistic support which would be provided would allow us to maintain a fully adequate level of battle availability. U

5. An alternative which would also provide a substantial improvement in capability responding to a clear military imbalance (about 2:1 in Iraq's favour at the beginning of November) would be a fully self-supporting artillery brigade (48 guns, approx 5000 men). This would have a clear defensive role but would equally be able to provide support for offensive operations if required. In the absence of other UK ground troops, it would of necessity operate in support of US forces and need to be integrated with a larger US formation.

6. The size of an artillery contribution could be varied downwards (ultimately to a single artillery regiment - option 6) by reducing

either its number of guns or its integral logistic support. The other ground options of an armoured reconnaissance regiment or 24 Air Mobile Brigade would provide evidence of our political commitment in support of ground operations but would be of limited military value in current circumstances.

#### Naval Forces

7. Similarly, in present circumstances, there is no clear role for the special capabilities of an amphibious force. While a CVSG group would provide a strengthening of our naval contribution and some potentially useful additional capabilities, given the strength of allied naval forces already deployed this does not seem a pressing requirement.

8. Both the artillery brigade and the armoured brigade would need to be closely integrated with US forces. We would, of course, retain the right of decision over whether our forces should be committed to any US operation but, once we had taken such a decision, we would need to assign them to US operational control. This parallels the arrangements for our forces committed to NATO. A ground force contribution of this size should also ensure that we have full access to US operational planning.

#### Costs

9. It has not been possible to identify in the time available clearly the additional costs likely to arise but a very broad estimate of the initial transportation costs alone of each option given in the paper makes it clear that in most cases these would be quite substantial (and, of course, recovery costs would be similar). Other additional costs are bound to arise for the procurement or modification of equipment to suit the particular conditions of the deployment. It would not be possible to absorb costs of this



magnitude within the already hard pressed defence budget.

Consultation

10. It would, of course, be necessary to consult both the US and Saudi Arabia about anything we propose and to conduct detailed reconnaissance as soon as possible.

11. I am sending copies of this minute to the other members of OD(K) and the Cabinet Secretary.

OPTIONS FOR FURTHER UK REINFORCEMENTS TO THE GULFGROUND FORCES

1. The balance of ground forces is likely to remain in favour of the Iraqis even at the beginning of December. Thus any UK ground force contribution would be welcome militarily - and the US have also made it clear that they would value the commitment of UK ground forces politically. The ground force packages which have been considered are summarised below in order of size:

- a. Armoured Recce Regiment. (580 men) An armoured reconnaissance regiment (with 48 Scorpions) would provide a good recce capability, but the US already has sufficient capability in theatre. An armoured reconnaissance regiment could be complemented by an attack helicopter regiment if desired. Logistic assistance from US forces would be required. Deployment time about 20 days, including sea tail. Initial transportation cost c. £6.25M.
- b. Artillery Regiment. (800 men) There is a serious artillery imbalance, and an artillery regiment (18xM 109) could help redress the balance. The guns and ammunition are fully interoperable with American artillery and thus, maintenance and resupply would be relatively easy, relying on US facilities (see also option d). Deployment time 30-35 days. Initial transport cost c. £3M.
- c. 24 Air Mobile Brigade. (4500-7000 men) 24 Bde can be organised either as an air mobile brigade (primarily a defensive formation - infantry heavy with a good anti-tank



capability) or as an air mechanised brigade, relying principally on attack helicopters. In the latter role it provides a highly mobile and flexible anti-armour force with a reasonable offensive capability; however there could be difficulties in ensuring sufficient Chinook availability in desert conditions. The deployment of 24 Bde would provide a useful military capability, although the US already has a very good capability of this type. Initial deployment 12-13 days but sea tail would take 27-31 days. Initial transportation cost c. £10.5M.

d. Artillery Brigade. (c5000 men) A fully self sufficient artillery brigade of 48 M107 guns would provide a contribution towards improving the artillery imbalance (2:1 in Iraqi favour at beginning of November). This option could be adjusted downwards either by reducing the number of guns or by reducing the degree of integral logistic support and increasing reliance on US support. Deployment time would be about 38 days. Initial transportation cost c. £9M.

e. Armoured Bde. (7500-10000 men) Although not as powerful as an enhanced armoured brigade (option f), an armoured brigade with 114 tanks would be easier to sustain and would make a significant contribution towards alleviating CINCENTCOM's shortage of tanks. It would need to be integrated with a US formation and receive some combat and logistic support from them. Deployment would take 30-35 days. Initial transportation cost c. £1 5M.

f. Enhanced Armoured Bde. (12000-14000 men) An enhanced armoured brigade would have the same number of tanks but provide a formation best suited to offensive operations in the open desert; it would also be a major contribution to

meeting CINCENTCOM's principal military concern about the disparity in tank strengths. As an independent brigade it would have full combat support; a good level of availability could be achieved provided sufficient logistic support were available. It would take 30-40 days to deploy. Initial transportation cost c. £24M.

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*\* fine its  
radar  
doesn't  
work!*

RN

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trade. Initial transportation cost c. £6-12M.

4. CVSG Group. (5 ships) A CVSG group would consist of a carrier, 2 escorts and 2 RFAs: it would be in theatre in about 28 days. Although there are already large US (and other) naval and air forces in the Gulf area, a carrier would provide a highly flexible range of national capabilities which could be useful in responding to various contingencies. These capabilities include major command and control and surveillance facilities, which could be useful in co-ordinating multi-national naval activity or if a maritime evacuation of civilians were required. Its AAW capability would also offer extra insurance against attacks on naval forces. However, the Chiefs of Staff would not wish to maintain this commitment for more than one 6 month deployment.

PS/NO 10

SECRET AND PERSONAL  
DEDIP

FM TOKYO  
TO DESKBY 100900Z FCO  
TELNO 772  
OF 100200Z SEPTEMBER 90

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR PS/NO 10 FROM PS/FCO

GULF: FUTURE FORCE LEVELS

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A MINUTE FROM THE FOREIGN SECRETARY TO  
THE PRIME MINISTER

BEGINS

1. WHILE I AM AWAY, YOU WILL BE DISCUSSING WHETHER TO MAKE  
A FURTHER FORCE CONTRIBUTION TO THE GULF. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR  
ME TO JUDGE WHAT WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE OPERATIONALLY WITHOUT  
KNOWING MORE OF THE SERVICE SIDE OF THE ARGUMENT AND OF US THINKING.  
BUT FROM THE POLITICAL/FOREIGN POLICY SIDE, I CANNOT SEE  
GREAT ADVANTAGE IN PUTTING IN MORE AIRCRAFT. I DOUBT IF THIS WOULD  
GIVE US AN EXTRA DIVIDEND IN TERMS OF THE AMERICAN VIEW OF OUR  
COMMITMENT OR INCREASING THE PRESSURE ON SADDAM HUSSEIN.

2 I THINK THERE IS A CASE FOR SOME NAVAL REINFORCEMENT. OUR  
SHIPS ARE VULNERABLE TO EXOCET ATTACK AND IN THE EVENT OF  
HOSTILITIES THEY MIGHT NEED THE EXTRA PROTECTION OF A CARRIER GROUP.  
I WOULD THEREFORE FAVOUR THE DEPLOYMENT OF SUCH A GROUP, IF IT IS  
THOUGHT OPERATIONALLY NECESSARY, THOUGH I REALISE THERE WOULD  
BE A LIMIT ON HOW LONG SUCH A GROUP COULD BE DEPLOYED.



3. THE AMERICANS - AND THE SAUDIS - HAVE ASKED US TO PUT IN GROUND FORCES. I THINK THERE IS A GOOD CASE FOR DOING SO, EITHER REPLACING AMERICANS BY ROULEMENT, OR SEPARATELY. THE HELSINKI SUMMIT, THE SAUDI ATTITUDE AND PRESIDENT BUSH'S OWN INSTINCTS MAY MEAN THAT THE SITUATION CONTINUES AS IT IS NOW FOR QUITE SOME TIME. IF SADDAM HUSSEIN IS TO BE PERSUADED TO WITHDRAW, WE HAVE TO KEEP BUILDING UP THE PRESSURE SO THAT HE FEELS THE SCREW TIGHTENING, CANNOT RELY ON SANCTIONS BEING OUR ONLY OPTION AND IS MADE INCREASINGLY AWARE THAT, IF HOSTILITIES BREAK OUT, HE WILL NOT WIN. WE HAVE RIGHTLY GOT A LOT OF CREDIT FOR THE SPEED OF OUR RESPONSE BUT AS WE BUILD UP THE PRESSURES ON SADDAM HUSSEIN, AND AS WE FACE THE POSSIBILITY OF COMBAT, THEN I DO NOT THINK THAT OUR PRESENT FORCE LEVELS OR THE ADDITION OF A CARRIER GROUP WOULD BE ENOUGH TO ENSURE THAT WE WERE REGARDED BY ALL AS A DECISIVE CONTRIBUTOR WHO SHOULD BE CLOSELY INVOLVED AT ANY STAGE. WE SHOULD PUT TROOPS IN ON THE GROUND. PRECISELY WHAT FORM THAT TAKES MUST BE A QUESTION OF WHAT FITS BEST WITH THE AMERICAN DEPLOYMENT AND WHAT WE CAN DO MOST EFFECTIVELY. BUT AN ARMoured BRIGADE WOULD BE A SENSIBLE COMMITMENT, PROVIDED WE CAN BE CONFIDENT THAT OUR EQUIPMENT, PARTICULARLY TANKS WILL WORK EFFICIENTLY. THE NUMBERS SHOULD AGAIN BE A MATTER OF OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS. BUT MORE THAN TEN THOUSAND COULD STRIKE PUBLIC OPINION AT HOME AS EXCESSIVE. LESS THAN 5,000 WOULD LOOK LIKE TOKENISM

4. DEPLOYING TROOPS ON THE GROUND WOULD CREATE A NEW DIMENSION TO OUR RESPONSE. IF THAT IS THE RECOMMENDED DECISION, I THINK IT WOULD BE PRUDENT FOR IT TO BE ENDORSED BY A WIDER GROUP OF MINISTERS, EITHER OD OR CABINET. IN MY ABSENCE, I WOULD BE CONTENT FOR THIS MINUTE TO GO TO OTHER MINISTERS IF YOU WISH.

5. WE ARE LIKELY TO COME UNDER PRESSURE ON COSTS. ANY FRESH BUILD-UP WILL COINCIDE WITH A NECESSARILY HARSH PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ROUND. STRINGENCY ON SCHOOLS AND HOSPITALS WILL BE CONTRASTED WITH THE MILLIONS SPENT IN THE GULF, ONCE THE OPPOSITION HAVE RETURNED TO NORMAL FORM. IT WOULD BE HARD TO DEFEND A POSITION WHERE US MILITARY COSTS ARE TO A SIZEABLE EXTENT CARRIED BY THE SAUDIS, JAPANESE AND PERHAPS OTHERS, WHILE OURS ARE NOT. NO-ONE CAN ACCUSE US OF GOING THERE IN A MERCENARY SPIRIT AND I HOPE WE COULD INSERT OUR MILITARY COSTS INTO THE BURDEN-SHARING EXERCISE. WITHOUT MAKING A REQUEST AT THIS STAGE, I WILL PROBE THE JAPANESE IN THIS AREA TODAY.

6. IF WE TAKE A DECISION TO DEPLOY GROUND FORCES, THERE ARE ADVANTAGES IN ANNOUNCING IT UNILATERALLY. BUT THERE WOULD ALSO BE ADVANTAGE IN LETTING THE FRENCH, AS THE OTHER MAJOR EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTOR, KNOW WHAT WE WERE DOING. WE DO NOT WANT TO START A COMPETITIVE AUCTION BETWEEN US AND IT IS IN OUR LONGER TERM INTEREST TO WORK WITH THEM WHEN WE CAN. WHEN A DECISION IS TAKEN, I RECOMMEND THAT YOU SHOULD PHONE PRESIDENT MITTERRAND VERY SHORTLY BEFORE IT IS ANNOUNCED. YOU MIGHT CONSIDER TELLING ANDREOTTI ON THE SAME BASIS. YOU HAVE DISCUSSED THESE ISSUES WITH HIM BEFORE. AS PRESIDENCY HE WILL BE CHAIRING THE MEETINGS OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL WHERE THESE MATTERS ARE BOUND TO COME UP, AND THERE IS SOMETHING TO BE SAID FOR KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH HIM. WE SHOULD ALSO TELL KING FAHD.

7. I AM COPYING THIS MINUTE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE.

ENDS