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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

13 October 1990

Dear Resident Club,

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION: KILLINGS IN JERUSALEM

You may find it helpful to have a brief summary of exchanges last night between No.10 and the White House and No. 10 and UKMIS New York, about the Security Council Resolution on the killings in Jerusalem.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr. Gore-Booth) let me know around 2300 that matters seemed to be coming to a head in the Security Council. Sir David Hannay's judgment was that the British compromise resolution had a good chance of securing sufficient votes. The Americans still had difficulties with it on certain points, in particular the failure to condemn the Palestinians, well as the Israelis, and the nature of the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council (whether there should be "conclusions" or "recommendations"). It was possible that the President might try to get in touch with the Prime Minister to discuss these difficulties.

You subsequently informed us at around 2330 that the White House were asking whether the Prime Minister could speak to the President. I briefed the Prime Minister on the lines of the preceding paragraph. The President then spoke to the Prime Minister at about midnight. The President said that he had spoken the previous day to President Mitterrand and had persuaded him to change the French position and fall in to line behind the British draft. The Americans hoped the British draft would now be pressed to a vote, but the Non-Aligned countries were stalling and insisting on priority for their resolution. He hoped that our Permanent Representative would use Presidency powers to push the British compromise resolution forward procedurally despite this. He wanted to avoid a situation where the United States had to veto the Non-Aligned draft resolution: or where the issue was allowed to drag on in the Security Council, so that it became inextricably involved with the Iraq/Kuwait problem.

The Prime Minister said she was rather puzzled by the President's account. We believed that our resolution had the necessary support and we were trying to bring matters to a head. The main obstacle seemed to be reservations still held by the United States. The points of difficulty which the Americans seemed to have did not appear to be of sufficient substance to

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
make it worthwhile holding matters up. She agreed that the worst thing would be for the United States to have to veto a Non-Aligned resolution. She suggested that the President might like to have the position checked with the US delegation in New York. The President seemed rather flustered by this and said he would indeed speak to Secretary Baker. He had been given the impression that we were reluctant to push our resolution through. The Prime Minister said this was not at all the case: we were very willing to do it but understood the Americans still had some difficulty with our text. She wanted to be absolutely sure that the President was now telling her that the Americans could accept the British compromise resolution and that we should try to clinch matters as rapidly as possible. The President said he thought this was the position but he would check.

Since Sir David Hannay was chairing an informal meeting of the Security Council, I spoke to Mr. Hum in New York. He confirmed the position was as the Prime Minister had described it. He undertook to make sure that the American Permanent Representative was aware of the President's exchange with the Prime Minister.

I then spoke to General Scowcroft at around 0045, and informed him of the position. He seemed totally unaware that the Americans had any difficulties with the British text. I said that we would do all we could to use the procedural advantage of the Presidency to get the British resolution adopted as soon as possible. General Scowcroft said we could assume this was so unless he rang me back within a short time.

Sir David Hannay then telephoned me at around 0145 at the conclusion of the informal session of the Security Council, to say that he had informed his American colleague of the President's conversation with the Prime Minister. Pickering was now confident that the United States would drop its objections to the British compromise text. There was now every prospect that it would indeed go through, probably by consensus. This seems to have been the case.

I think this illustrates once again that the White House are often quite a long way behind the game. I suspect that the "British text" to which they were referring was that of a day or so ago without the changes which subsequently had to be introduced. But all's well that ends well.



(C. D. POWELL)

The Resident Clerk,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

13 October 1990

Mr Resident Clerk,

GULF CRISIS

At the conclusion of his talk with the Prime Minister in the middle of last night about discussions in the Security Council on the killings in Jerusalem, the President said that he would like a fuller talk with the Prime Minister next week on the situation in the Gulf. He was worried about a number of developments, including the assassination of the speaker of the Egyptian Assembly. He had also looked into some of the points which the Prime Minister had raised with him in New York, for instance about weather conditions in the Gulf and the 'window' for military operations; General Scowcroft had sent No.10 some material on this. He would like to review the situation with the Prime Minister.

We will make arrangements for a talk, probably towards the middle of the week.


I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

(C. D. POWELL)

The Resident Clerk,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

This is the paper
which Brent Scowcroft
sent me, & to which
the Reader referred in
speaking to you &
the Deplone. It was
~~not~~ in your box, but
I think you may
have missed it. In practice
it confirms what

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-

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to



President.

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