

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
 FM UKMIS NEW YORK
 TO DESKBY 130800Z FCO
 TELNO 1623
 OF 130700Z OCTOBER 90
 INFO DESKBY 130800Z CAIRO
 INFO IMMEDIATE OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, EC POSTS, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON
 INFO IMMEDIATE PEKING
 INFO PRIORITY BUCHAREST, HELSINKI, OTTAWA, KUALA LUMPUR, ABIDJAN
 INFO PRIORITY ADDIS ABABA, KINSHASA, BOGOTA, HAVANA, ACTOR

CAIRO PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATELY TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

MIPT : OCCUPIED TERRITORIES : SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE

SUMMARY

1. EVENTS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 12 OCTOBER LEADING UP TO THE ADOPTION OF SCR 672 ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

DETAIL

2. I HAD PLANNED TO BEGIN THE MORNING OF 12 OCTOBER BY INTRODUCING OUR REVISED DRAFT RESOLUTION IN TURN TO THE NON-ALIGNED GROUP, THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL BEFORE MOVING TO INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE. IN THE EVENT THE NON-ALIGNED WENT INTO A PROLONGED CAUCUS, AND IT WAS ONLY WITH THE GREATEST DIFFICULTY THAT I COULD EVEN GET IN TO THEM TO PRESENT MY NEW TEXT. CLEARLY THE ATMOSPHERE WITHIN THE GROUP WAS ALREADY BAD: I WAS HEARD IN SILENCE, NO QUESTIONS WERE ASKED, AND MEMBERS AVOIDED MY EYE.

3. THE NON-ALIGNED CO-ORDINATOR (RAZALI OF MALAYSIA) PRIVATELY TOLD ME THAT THE THREE AFRICAN MEMBERS OF THE GROUP WERE CLEARLY PREPARED TO VOTE FOR MY TEXT. BUT AT THAT STAGE IT WAS NOT AT ALL CLEAR WHETHER ALL THE SPONSORS OF THE NON-ALIGNED DRAFT WOULD REFRAIN FROM PUTTING IT TO THE VOTE, OR WHETHER THE AFRICANS WOULD SUPPORT A PROCEDURAL MOTION GIVING MY OWN DRAFT PRECEDENCE. THERE WAS ALSO CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION IN THE GROUP OVER THE AMENDMENTS TO BE SOUGHT ON MY TEXT.

4. WHILE THE NON-ALIGNED CONTINUED TO AGONISE I INTRODUCED MY DRAFT TO THE NON-ALIGNED AND TO THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE FIVE. THE CANADIANS, FINNS AND ROMANIANS WERE ALL VERY SUPPORTIVE, AND WISHED ME WELL. BUT NEITHER THEY NOR I WERE CERTAIN AT THAT STAGE THAT A

DEAL COULD BE ACHIEVED, GIVEN THE TENSION AND DISSENSION BETWEEN THE NON-ALIGNED.

5. WITH THE FIVE, THEREFORE, I SPENT SOME TIME DISCUSSING THE FALL-BACK SCENARIO WHERE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD SEND HIS MISSION TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF HIS OWN ACCORD AND THE COUNCIL WOULD PASS ONLY A BRIEF, DECLARATORY RESOLUTION ON THE EVENTS OF 8 OCTOBER. BUT DURING THE AFTERNOON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS STAFF GREW INCREASINGLY NERVOUS ABOUT A MISSION WHICH DID NOT HAVE THE COUNCIL'S BACKING. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SPOKE DIRECTLY TO BAKER TO SEEK HIS ASSURANCE THAT IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES THE ISRAELIS WOULD RECEIVE THE MISSION: AND WAS TOLD THAT NO SUCH ASSURANCE COULD BE GIVEN. IN THE EVENT THESE CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT ARISE. AT THE REGULAR UN PRESS BRIEFING ON 12 OCTOBER THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S DECISION TO SEND THE MISSION WAS BRIEFLY MENTIONED, AND THE DETAILS WILL BE ANNOUNCED ON 13 OCTOBER. IT WILL NOT AFTER ALL BE LED BY SPIERS, AS THE AMERICANS INSISTED THAT HIS U S NATIONALITY WOULD COMPOUND THEIR DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES. INSTEAD THE LEADER WILL BE AIME, WHOM THE SECRETARIAT BELIEVE IT WILL BE PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT FOR THE ISRAELIS TO TURN DOWN.

6. WHEN THE NON-ALIGNED EMERGED FROM THEIR FOUR-HOUR CONCLAVE I WAS PRESENTED WITH A FURTHER VERSION OF MY TEXT, REVISED IN A NUMBER OF UNHELPFUL WAYS. THE NON-ALIGNED VERSION WOULD HAVE REAFFIRMED THE APPLICABILITY OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION TO ALL THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 'INCLUDING JERUSALEM' (A NEURALGIC POINT FOR THE AMERICANS): CONDEMNED ONLY THE ISRAELI SECURITY FORCES: AND EXPANDED THE ACCOMPANYING STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO REFER MUCH MORE SPECIFICALLY TO THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION.

7. NEGOTIATIONS ON THESE OUTSTANDING ISSUES CONTINUED INTO THE EVENING. GRADUALLY POSITIONS WERE BROUGHT CLOSER TOGETHER. THE NON-ALIGNED MODERATED THEIR POSITION ON A NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT POINTS, IN THE PROCESS AT LAST PARTING COMPANY WITH THE PLO. SIMILAR CONCESSIONS WERE MADE BY MY U S COLLEAGUE (WHO DELAYED REFERRING THE TEXT BACK TO WASHINGTON FOR HIS INSTRUCTIONS UNTIL THE LAST POSSIBLE MOMENT).

8. IN THE TEXT THAT FINALLY EMERGED THE REFERENCE TO THE APPLICABILITY OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION WAS TONED DOWN TO THE SATISFACTION OF THE AMERICANS, WHO AGREED AS THE PRICE THAT I SHOULD MAKE A SHORT STATEMENT AS PRESIDENT CONFIRMING THE COUNCIL'S UNDERSTANDING THAT JERUSALEM WAS INCLUDED. THE CONDEMNATION OF

VIOLENCE WAS REFORMULATED SO THAT IT COULD BE READ AS ACKNOWLEDGING IMPLICITLY THAT THE ISRAELI SECURITY FORCES WERE NOT EXCLUSIVELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BLOODSHED ON 8 OCTOBER. THE REFERENCE TO THE PURPOSE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION IN THE RESOLUTION WAS A LITTLE EXPANDED: AND THAT IN THE STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL SIGNIFICANTLY ELABORATED TO REFER TO THE SUBMISSION OF RECOMMENDATIONS ON "WAYS AND MEANS FOR ENSURING THE SAFETY AND PROTECTION" OF PALESTINIAN CITIZENS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. MY U S COLLEAGUE COULD ACCEPT THAT LATTER POINT ONLY ON THE BASIS THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN CONSULTED AND THAT WASHINGTON NEED NOT KNOW ABOUT THE CONTENT OF A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS NOT VERY HAPPY ABOUT THE REQUIREMENT THAT HE SHOULD MATCH THE EXPANDED PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT, PURPORTING TO REPORT WHAT HE HAD SAID, BY MAKING A REVISED STATEMENT OF HIS OWN: BUT LIKE THE SEASONED TROUPER HE IS HE DID WHAT WAS EXPECTED OF HIM.

9. ONE FLATTERING SIDE-LIGHT. THE PALESTINIANS INSISTED AT A LATE STAGE THAT THE REFERENCE IN THE RESOLUTION TO THE SUBMISSION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT ON HIS MISSION "BEFORE THE END OF OCTOBER 1990" BE CLARIFIED IN THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT TO READ "BY 24 OCTOBER 1990". THEY EXPLAINED THAT THEY WANTED THE REPORT TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE COUNCIL UNDER THE BRITISH PRESIDENCY, GIVEN OUR SYMPATHY FOR THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE, RATHER THAN UNDER THE U S PRESIDENCY IN THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER.

10. FINALLY IT WAS POSSIBLE TO HOLD INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE IN THE EVENING. AS A FURTHER GESTURE OF REASSURANCE TO THE ARABS THE U S PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE STATED THAT IN THE VIEW OF HIS AUTHORITIES THE PHRASE "ALL THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL SINCE 1967" INCLUDED JERUSALEM. THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS CONFIRMED THAT MY RESOLUTION COULD NOW BE FORMALLY PUT TO THE VOTE. DESPITE DARK RUMOURS OF CUBAN OR POSSIBLY YEMENI SKULLDUGGERY NO ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO SEEK A VOTE ON THE EARLIER NON-ALIGNED DRAFT. BY THE TIME THE FORMAL SESSION BEGAN AND THE RESOLUTION WAS ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY JUST BEFORE MIDNIGHT WE HAD GATHERED THE CO-SPONSORSHIP OF CANADA, COTE D'IVOIRE, FINLAND, FRANCE, THE SOVIET UNION AND ZAIRE, A VERY SATISFACTORY SPREAD OF COUNTRIES.

11. FOR A DETAILED REPORT ON THE FORMAL SESSION, SEE MIFT

HANNAY

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION


16

ADVANCE 16

.ARAB/ISRAEL
PS (2)
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
~~MR FAIRWEATHER~~
MR GORE-BOOTH
HD/NENAD

HD/MED
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/PUSD
HD/NEWS D
HD/UND (2)
NO 10 DOWNING ST
CABINET OFFICE DIO
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN



CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 October 1990

See Steele.

**OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: SECURITY
COUNCIL DEBATE**

The Prime Minister has followed the telegrams about the Security Council Debate on the Occupied Territories, leading up to the adoption of SCR 672. She has commented that it is a very good piece of work.

Yours sincerely,

CHARLES POWELL

J S Wall Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL