

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM JERUSALEM  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 238

ADVANCE COPY

OF 161953Z OCTOBER 90  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV  
INFO IMMEDIATE MIDDLE EAST POSTS UKREP BRUSSELS, PARIS, ROME, MOSCOW

MIPT: SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO ISRAEL:  
PLENARY SESSION: GULF CRISIS

SUMMARY

1. GENERAL DISCUSSION OF CURRENT SITUATION. ISRAELI CONCERN ABOUT RISKS OF GROWING ARAB SUPPORT FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN IN ANY LONG HAUL SCENARIO. FOCUS ON PROBLEM OF CONTAINING SADDAM HUSSEIN AND HIS MILITARY ARSENAL SHOULD THEY SURVIVE THE IMMEDIATE CRISIS. WORRIES ABOUT JORDAN.

DETAIL

2. IN HIS OPENING REMARKS, LEVY CONCENTRATED ON THE GULF CRISIS. IF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S THREAT HAD BEEN AGAINST ISRAEL ONLY, ISRAEL WOULD HAVE STOOD ALONE. BUT ITS LOW PROFILE POLICY NOW MADE IT EASIER FOR OTHERS TO ALIGN THEMSELVES AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN AND HIS ARSENAL SURVIVED, ISRAEL WOULD ONCE AGAIN FACE HIM ALONE. FOR OTHERS, THE CONFLICT WAS A QUESTION OF INTERESTS SEMI COLON FOR ISRAEL IT WAS A MATTER OF LIFE AND DEATH. ISRAEL HOPED THAT THE CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION ON THIS ISSUE WITH THE UK WOULD REMAIN OPEN. ISRAEL'S VIEWS WERE IMPORTANT AS THE 'GEO-POLITICAL METEREOLOGICAL STATION FOR THE REGION.'

3. IN RESPONSE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID OUR SHARED INTEREST IN AN ORDERLY AND PEACEFUL MIDDLE EAST UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR A DIALOGUE NOW AND IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. HE UNDERSTOOD THE RISKS INVOLVED IN ISRAEL'S LOW PROFILE POLICY. BUT IT WAS A WISE POLICY AND HAD BEEN UNDERSTOOD AND APPRECIATED. THERE WERE THREE PRESSURES ON SADDAM HUSSEIN SEMI COLON DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION (UNCOMFORTABLE FOR HIM BUT NOT DECISIVE) SEMI COLON SANCTIONS (HAVING AN EFFECT, BUT INVOLVING A LONG HAUL) SEMI COLON AND THE KNOWLEDGE THAT IF HE DID NOT GO IN PEACE HE WOULD BE FORCED OUT. THIS FINAL POINT WAS PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT.

4. IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD SUDDENLY WITHDRAW FROM AT LEAST PART OF KUWAIT. BUT THIS WOULD BE NO GOOD: THERE WAS NO

QUESTION OF HIS KEEPING AN ISLAND OR TWO. ISRAEL WOULD NEED TO BE INVOLVED IN CONSIDERATION OF HOW TO REDUCE AND CONTAIN THE DANGERS IF THE OUTCOME LEFT IRAQ'S DANGEROUS POTENTIAL IN PLACE. ACCOUNTS OF CHENEY'S VISIT TO LONDON ON 15 OCTOBER SUGGESTED A U.S. EMPHASIS ON THE LONG HAUL AND AGAINST IMMEDIATE USE OF THE MILITARY OPTION. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY WAS SURE WE COULD NOT ABDICATE FROM THE MILITARY OPTION.

5. LEVY ARGUED THAT ANY LONG HAUL SOLUTION CONTAINED RISKS. THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS ON SAUDI SOIL WAS ITSELF A POTENTIAL RALLYING POINT FOR ANTI-WESTERN ARAB FORCES. ISRAEL WAS NOT GOADING ANYONE TO USE FORCE AND WAS NOT TAKING ANY INITIATIVES. BUT IF THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF 'MEDICATION' DID NOT WORK THE TIME WOULD COME WHEN BOTH DOCTOR AND PATIENT WOULD REALISE THAT OTHER OPTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE TRIED.

6. LEVY SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT MEMBERS OF THE COALITION SHOULD REALISE THAT ISRAEL'S LOW PROFILE POLICY AND THE UNPRECEDENTED NATURE OF THE THREAT CARRIED VERY GREAT RISKS FOR HER. SADDAM HUSSEIN AND ARAB COUNTRIES SHOULD REALISE THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO HURT ISRAEL WOULD PROMPT A SEVERE REACTION.

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE POINTED OUT THAT UN RESOLUTIONS ON THE CRISIS DID NOT CALL FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN TO LEAVE POWER OR BE DISARMED, AND THAT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN THE NECESSARY SUPPORT FOR A RESOLUTION WIDENING OUR OBJECTIVES IN THIS WAY.

8. DISCUSSING PUBLIC OPINION IN ARAB COUNTRIES, LEVY PAINTED A GLOOMY PICTURE OF THE DANGERS OF THE PRESENT CRISIS FUELLING A GROWTH IN PAN-ARAB SENTIMENT OF THE NASSER VARIETY MERGED WITH FUNDAMENTALIST FEELINGS. SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD IRONICALLY BECOME THE STANDARD BEARER OF KHOMEINISM. THE FERMENT OF ARAB FEELING WAS PARTICULARLY STRONG IN JORDAN. KING HUSSEIN, IN A POSITION OF WEAKNESS, HAD DECIDED HE HAD TO GO ALONG WITH THIS SENTIMENT. HE WAS IN A SIMILAR POSITION TO THE SHAH OF IRAN IN HIS FINAL YEARS. LEVY SUGGESTED THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD BEEN AT LEAST AWARE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S PLAN TO INVADU KUWAIT, AND HAD LAID THE GROUNDWORK BY THE DIVERSIONARY TACTIC OF SOUNDING FALSE WARNINGS ABOUT ISRAELI AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS. DESPITE INSTANCES OF IRAQI/JORDANIAN MILITARY COOPERATION. ISRAEL WANTED CONTINUED STABILITY IN JORDAN AND HAD CONVEYED THIS MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN VIA DE MICHELIS. ISRAEL WAS NOT DISCUSSING THE POSSIBILITY OF DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENTS IN JORDAN AT EVEN THE HIGHEST LEVEL, SINCE TO DO SO COULD BE SEEN AS CREATING A CLIMATE OF EXPECTATION. BUT THE SITUATION WAS DEVELOPING IN A DANGEROUS DIRECTION. SYRIA, IRAQ, THE PLO AND

IRAN ALL HAD A INTEREST IN WHAT HAPPENED IN JORDAN, AS DID ISRAEL.

9. IN EGYPT, ALTHOUGH MUBARAK WAS IN CONTROL, THERE WERE UNDERCURRENTS OF POSSIBLE UNREST WHICH COULD PROVIDE CATALYSTS FOR INSTABILITY (MUSLIM BROTHERS, NASSERITES, TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS, REFUGEES FROM IRAQ/KUWAIT). ISRAEL NEEDED TO WATCH THE SITUATION CLOSELY. PEACE WITH EGYPT WAS PRECIOUS TO ISRAEL.

10. IF SADDAM HUSSEIN SURVIVED THE PRESENT CRISIS WITH THE GROWING SUPPORT OF ARAB PEOPLES, THEN STATES SUCH AS JORDAN, SAUDI ARABIA AND BAHRAIN WOULD 'YIELD TO HIM THEMSELVES' SEEING HIM NOT AS AN INVADER BUT AS A TAX COLLECTOR. THEY WOULD PAY FOR THEIR SURVIVAL.

11. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REFERRED TO CONTACTS AT ALL LEVELS WITH THE JORDANIANS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS. WHETHER OR NOT KING HUSSEIN KNEW OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S INTENTIONS IN ADVANCE, HE HAD RAPIDLY BECOME THE APOLOGIST FOR THE IRAQI LEADER'S ACTIONS. IN OUR VIEW. JORDAN WAS NOW MAKING AN EFFORT TO IMPLEMENT SANCTIONS. BUT THE SAUDIS AND EGYPTIANS WERE NOT CONVINCED. KING HUSSEIN HAD TO WORK OUT HIS OWN SALVATION SEMI COLON THERE WAS LITTLE BRITAIN OR ISRAEL COULD DO TO HELP. LEVY SAID THAT ISRAEL TOO HAD PLAYED AN IMPORTANT PART IN ENSURING KING HUSSEIN'S SURVIVAL.

CALLAN

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

38

ADVANCE 38

IRAQ/KUWAIT  
PS  
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
PS/PUS  
MR GORE-BOOTH  
MR FAIRWEATHER  
MR GOULDEN  
MR JAY  
MR SLATER  
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/NAD  
HD/SED  
HD/UND  
HD/CONSULAR D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/NPDD  
HD/SECPOL D  
HD/...  
HD/... (E)

MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY  
MR APPLEYARD CABINET OFFICE  
(BY TUBE H29)  
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE  
(BY TUBE H29)  
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE  
(BY TUBE H29)  
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE  
(BY TUBE H29)  
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST  
SIR P CRADOCK,  
(NO 10 DOWNING ST)  
CABINET OFFICE DIO  
(BY TUBE H29)  
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE  
AUS (C) MODUK  
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK  
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND  
MR WICKS HMT  
EMERGENCY UNIT  
RESIDENT CLERK