

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKMIS NEW YORK
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1687
OF 200430Z OCTOBER 90
INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, PARIS, MIDDLE EAST POSTS, ROME
INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS, PEKING, HAVANA, BOGOTA, OTTAWA
INFO IMMEDIATE HELSINKI, BUCHAREST, KUALA LUMPUR, ADDIS ABABA
INFO IMMEDIATE ABIDJAN, KINSHASA

SECTION ONE OF TWO

MY TELNO 1680 (NOT TO ALL): SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION TO ISRAEL

SUMMARY

1. ATTEMPTS TO NEGOTIATE A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT. COUNCIL MEMBERS AGREED ON SUBSTANCE, BUT GROWING PRESSURE FOR A RESOLUTION. SECRETARY-GENERAL BRIEFS COUNCIL MEMBERS ON HIS CONTACTS WITH THE ISRAELIS AND HIS DECISION NOT TO SEND HIS MISSION. DRAFT RESOLUTION CIRCULATED BY SOME NON-ALIGNED. FURTHER INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON 22 OCTOBER. AMERICANS HOPE ISRAELIS WILL REVISE THEIR APPROACH FOLLOWING CABINET MEETING ON 21 OCTOBER.

2. EARLY ON 19 OCTOBER, AS FORESHADOWED IN TUR, I SHOWED TO MY U S COLLEAGUE OUR DRAFT OF A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT, ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION TO ISRAEL. I HAD REMOVED FROM THE DRAFT FAXED TO THE DEPARTMENT THE REFERENCE TO THE EVENTS AT RAFAH REFUGEE CAMP, WHICH WERE CLEARLY CAUSING LESS CONCERN AMONG COUNCIL MEMBERS THAN WE HAD ORIGINALLY ANTICIPATED. PICKERING SAID HE WAS HAPPY FOR ME TO CIRCULATE THE DRAFT AT THE MEETING OF AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE CALLED FOR LATER IN THE MORNING. AT THAT MEETING PICKERING SUGGESTED A SLIGHT TONING-DOWN OF THE LANGUAGE. LOZINSKIY (SOVIET UNION) ACCEPTED MY GENERAL APPROACH. LI (CHINA) DID NOT COMMIT HIMSELF, WHILE BLANC (FRANCE) SUGGESTED THAT A COUNCIL RESOLUTION MIGHT BE MORE APPROPRIATE. IN THE MEANTIME THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WERE MEETING. THEIR CO-ORDINATOR (RAZALI OF MALAYSIA) CAME TO TELL ME THAT THEY BELIEVED A COUNCIL RESOLUTION WAS NECESSARY. I URGED HIM TO SETTLE FOR A STATEMENT, AND OUTLINED THE POINTS WHICH I BELIEVED IT SHOULD COVER.

3. IN THE AFTERNOON MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL MET IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS TO HEAR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT ON 13 OCTOBER HE HAD MET THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR

AND ENQUIRED ABOUT THE FACILITIES THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WOULD MAKE AVAILABLE TO HIS MISSION TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. BEIN HAD SAID ISRAEL REJECTED SCR 672: THE FOLLOWING DAY HE HAD GIVEN HIM THE TEXT OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT DECISION.

4. PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD ASKED HIM FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE STATEMENT THAT 'ISRAEL WOULD NOT RECEIVE' THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S DELEGATION. DID THIS DECISION IMPLY THAT THE DELEGATION WOULD NOT BE RECEIVED BY THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT OR THAT THEY WERE BARRED FROM ENTRY TO ISRAEL? BEIN HAD UNDERTAKEN TO OBTAIN CLARIFICATION, WHICH HE EVENTUALLY PROVIDED ON 18 OCTOBER. HIS GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARED TO CO-OPERATE OVER THE REQUEST IN SCR 672 FOR A REPORT BY THE END OF OCTOBER. ISRAEL'S OWN COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY WOULD SOON CONCLUDE ITS WORK. THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WOULD THEN BE PREPARED TO SEND AN EMISSARY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PROVIDE A COPY OF THE REPORT AND DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH HIM. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS, THE UN MISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE INCIDENT WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY.

5. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID HE HAD RESPONDED THAT THE ISRAELI COMMISSION'S REPORT WOULD BE AN INSUFFICIENT BASIS ON WHICH TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE NEEDED TO GATHER FIRST-HAND INFORMATION FROM ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS. BEIN HAD SAID THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET DECISION WAS UNCHANGED: HIS GOVERNMENT DID NOT WISH THE MISSION TO COME.

6. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDED THAT SCR 672 HAD BEEN THE PRODUCT OF PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO A CONSENSUS. HIS DECISION TO SEND A MISSION HAD BEEN INTENDED TO BE HELPFUL. HE CONTINUED TO BE DEEPLY CONCERNED WITH THE PLIGHT OF PALESTINIANS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND THEIR NEED FOR SAFETY AND PROTECTION, WHICH HAD AGAIN BEEN ILLUSTRATED BY THE LATEST INCIDENTS IN THE GAZA STRIP. THESE INCIDENTS ALSO RAISED THE QUESTION OF ISRAELI OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION. HE WAS PREPARED TO REPORT FURTHER IF THE COUNCIL WISHED.

7. PICKERING (UNITED STATES) SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WISHED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT FURTHER, IN LINE WITH SCR 672. A MISSION WAS VERY IMPORTANT: IT WAS THE PRIMARY REASON THE UNITED STATES HAD SUPPORTED SCR 672. A REPORT WITHOUT A MISSION WOULD BE INCOMPLETE. PICKERING WELCOMED ISRAEL'S DECISION TO COMPLETE ITS OWN REPORT QUICKLY AND GET IT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BUT THIS WAS NOT ENOUGH. THE UNITED STATES WOULD DO ITS BEST THROUGH ITS CONTACTS WITH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO FACILITATE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION.

8. RAZALI (MALAYSIA), SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE ISRAELI DECISION, WHICH HE SAID BELITTLED THE COUNCIL. ISRAEL MUST NOT BE ABOVE THE STRICTURES APPLIED TO OTHERS IN THE COUNCIL: OTHERWISE THERE WOULD BE ACCUSATIONS OF DOUBLE STANDARDS. HE WELCOMED THE ASSURANCE OF THE UNITED STATES THAT IT HAD WORKED HARD TO GET ISRAEL TO ACCEPT THE MISSION. THE COUNCIL MUST NOW INSIST THAT ISRAEL ALLOW THE MISSION TO GO.

9. FORTIER (CANADA), LI (CHINA), LOZINSKIY (SOVIET UNION) AND BLANC (FRANCE) STRONGLY CRITICISED THE ISRAELI POSITION. IT WAS VITAL THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL REPORTED TO THE COUNCIL AS REQUESTED IN SCR 672. FORTIER SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS TO THE ISRAELIS TO GET THEM TO RECONSIDER. THE COUNCIL SHOULD TAKE FURTHER ACTION EITHER THROUGH A STATEMENT OR A RESOLUTION.

10. SPEAKING AS PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, I SAID THERE APPEARED TO BE FOUR ELEMENTS ON WHICH ALL MEMBERS WERE AGREED:

(A) THAT WE SHOULD EXPRESS OUR DISPLEASURE AT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE AND ITS STATEMENT THAT IT WOULD NOT RECEIVE THE MISSION:

(B) THAT WE WOULD NOT TAKE NO FOR AN ANSWER. WE MUST FIRMLY ASK THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO RECONSIDER:

(C) THIS SHOULD NOT DELAY OR UNDERMINE THE COUNCIL'S REQUEST TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAKE A REPORT IN THE TERMS I HAD DESCRIBED ON 12 OCTOBER:

(D) ONCE THE REPORT HAD BEEN PROVIDED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, IT WOULD BE GIVEN URGENT CONSIDERATION.

11. SINCE THE MALAYSIANS HAD REQUESTED A BREAK FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED, I SAID I WOULD MAKE AVAILABLE LANGUAGE ON THE FOUR POINTS I HAD SUMMARIZED, WITHOUT PREJUDGING IN WHAT FORMAT IT WOULD BE USED BY THE COUNCIL. I THEN SUSPENDED THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS AND DISTRIBUTED OUR PROPOSED TEXT OF A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT (COPIES FAXED TO NENAD, UND AND EMERGENCY UNIT). WITH EQUAL ALACRITY THE NON-ALIGNED (WHO HAD SOMEHOW PROCURED THE TEXT AT AN EARLIER POINT IN THE DAY) CIRCULATED ESSENTIALLY THE SAME LANGUAGE IN THE FORM OF A COUNCIL RESOLUTION. THERE FOLLOWED SOME THREE HOURS OF INTENSIVE INFORMAL NEGOTIATIONS. IT RAPIDLY

BECAME CLEAR THAT THERE WAS NO PROSPECT OF ACHIEVING AGREEMENT AMONG COUNCIL MEMBERS. PICKERING TOLD ME (AND OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS) THAT HIS INSTRUCTIONS DID NOT ALLOW HIM TO ACCEPT EITHER A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT OR A COUNCIL RESOLUTION (ALTHOUGH IT IS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THE NON-ALIGNED FULLY BELIEVED HIM): BETTER TO WAIT OVER THE WEEKEND AND SEE WHETHER THE APPEALS BY THE U S ADMINISTRATION AND OTHERS TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAD ANY EFFECT. FOR THEIR PART THE NON-ALIGNED, WITH THE HELP OF THE PLO, WERE TOUGHENING UP THEIR TEXT.

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