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PRIME MINISTER

THE GULF

You have a meeting tomorrow afternoon with Foreign and Defence Secretaries alone, to discuss the situation in the Gulf. The Foreign Secretary requested it, principally I think to talk about our strategic objectives. But it is also an opportunity to talk through some of the more sensitive issues such as the timing of military action and our attitude towards further diplomatic efforts to resolve the situation (e.g. the United States' plan to involve the UN Secretary General). It might also be useful to talk about business management. Some issues have to be kept in a very tight circle: but we have to be sure that this does not lead to failures in planning and preparation for military action.

Strategic Objectives

You do not see any difficulty with our objectives:

- / - Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait;
- the legitimate government to be restored;
- *to secure freedom for the hostages;*
- compensation to be paid;
- ~~those responsible for~~
- those responsible for atrocities to be accountable for them;
- Iraq's NBC capability to be eliminated or tightly constrained;
- maintenance of the widest possible alliance of Arab governments against Iraq;
- *avoidance of Israeli involvement.*
- a future regional security structure to be established.

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We do not avowedly aim to bring down Saddam Hussein: but we assume that an outcome of the crisis - whether peaceful or military - should be his disappearance (the President speaks of wiping him off the face of the earth).

If the military option is used, we envisage massive destruction of military and strategic targets in Iraq by air action, but not invasion of Iraq's territory by ground forces (although one does not know what, for instance, the Turks might do).

CDS is very keen to have a written directive setting out our strategic objectives, as the basis on which they can agree on targeting policy with the Americans. If tomorrow's meeting can agree the objectives suggested above, I will do a draft directive for you.

#### Timing of Military Action

This is not entirely in our hands. In a conversation with the Foreign Secretary some weeks ago, you spoke of giving sanctions three or four months to work, i.e. roughly until the end of the year. Since then a number of factors point towards a rather earlier resort to the military option:

- a clearer understanding of the climatic 'window';
- lack of clear indication that sanctions are working, or are likely to work, before the 'climatic window' closes again.
- Saddam Hussein's evident determination to avoid giving a specific provocation for military action;
- a feeling that opinion in Arab countries may weaken unless there is fairly early military action. The downside of the large American military presence is clearly being felt, particularly in Saudi Arabia;
- the risk of further Israeli/Palestinian incidents which could further destabilise Arab opinion;

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- concern about American (and European) opinion over the long haul;
- the danger that, if we delay too long, the Israelis may force our hand.

These factors would all point to initiating military action sometime in the period late November - mid December.

Against this, there are factors which will be cited to justify delay:

- there are some signs that sanctions are biting and should be given longer;
- the Americans continue to be attached to seeking authority from the UN for military action;
- the argument that we need to give diplomacy another chance, e.g. the US proposal to give the UN Secretary General 30/45 days to use his good offices;
- the growing number of governments (Soviet, French, other European) who are espousing the need for diplomatic efforts/negotiations;
- the American decision to send additional Abrahams MIAI tanks from Germany, which could presumably take 4-6 weeks;
- reports that some senior American military figures are talking of 12 months or more before hostilities.

The questions you will wish to address tomorrow are:

- do we wish to push the Americans towards relatively early resort to the military option?

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- if so, how do we most effectively do that? Given that they are making by far the biggest military effort and will take the largest number of casualties, the decision to resort to military action will be an American one: we have to lead them to see early action as the best decision from their point of view.

#### Attitude towards Diplomatic Efforts

Publicly we have taken a robust line to the effect that diplomacy has had a chance for 11 weeks: and that there is no need for others to pay any price for Iraqi withdrawal. We do not need to save Saddam Hussein's face or offer any blandishments.

Against this, there is mounting pressure from many sources for more diplomacy/negotiations. This includes:

- President Mitterrand's UN speech;
- Primakov's mission;
- continued efforts by several Arab governments: Jordan, Yemen, PLO;
- Mr. Heath's visit and his statement that not enough is being done on the diplomatic front;
- the President's message to you suggesting that the UN Secretary General be given more time to use his good offices;
- the reference in UNSCR 660 to settling differences between Iraq and Kuwait by negotiation (although that does not include territorial disputes).

We cannot ignore these efforts but have to decide what is the best way to handle them, without becoming isolated as the only country 'opposed to negotiations'.

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Our priority is to avoid any sort of negotiation since it would inevitably - given the inherent spinelessness of many other countries - lead to concessions. The key is the United States and keeping President Bush firmly opposed to negotiation.

But we ought, on a contingency basis, to think what would be the least bad form of diplomatic activity if the Americans weaken:

- a good offices mission by the UN Secretary General, constrained by the terms of Security Council resolutions? I doubt that he would be so constrained: his staff would urge him to insist on some flexibility;
- an independent initiative on Arab/Israel, with no ostensible link to Iraq/Kuwait? It is hard to see what form this could take: but perhaps a discussion among the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council to demonstrate their continuing deep concern with the Palestinian problem.

The more one struggles to find something, the clearer it becomes there is no negotiation which does not give Saddam Hussein something.

#### Handling

The regular co-ordination meetings - your once or twice-weekly meeting of Ministers and the 11 o'clock meeting - work well and the great majority of issues can be settled there.

Where problems may arise is in the need to handle on a very restricted basis information about US military intentions and timing of possible action. This is shared with only a tiny circle of Defence Secretary, CDS and Foreign Secretary. I am not sure how real the problem is: in part, we have a lot of discontented Whitehall knights who feel they ought to be informed. I think we shall have to take decisions on how much

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information to disseminate on an ad hoc basis. When there is something of clear operational significance, I will seek your authority to pass it on to those directly concerned (in most cases CDS and the military side).

One further aspect is the position of Antony Acland who is getting a bit restless at being 'left out'. It seems to me that his task and that of the Embassy is to go gathering the best information they can on American thinking, the state of Congressional and public opinion, intentions at the UN and so on: but not to be directly involved in the most secret operational discussions and plans, which will be done directly between London and Washington.

C.D.P.

Charles Powell  
22 October 1990

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MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE GULF

We need to address some major issues in advance of any military operations against Iraq.

A. Strategic Objectives

2. Military operations must be guided by agreed strategic objectives. Our primary objective at present is to secure the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait and the restoration of the legitimate Government of Kuwait. We will also want to secure the release of all British/foreign hostages.
3. If these objectives cannot be achieved by means of the trade embargo and other economic measures, the military option then arises. Military action to free Kuwait would inevitably involve action against targets in Iraq which support their military activities in Kuwait or their operations against Allied forces. The impact on Iraq itself would, however, be a side effect of the main objective and would depend in part on how soon Iraq withdrew from Kuwait.
4. But should our strategic objectives be extended to include:
  - a. the downfall of the current Iraqi leadership;
  - b. the elimination of Iraq's capability (or potential) with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and with long-range missiles?
5. The wider our objectives, the greater the care that will be required to ensure that the means chosen are justifiable within

the limits of the collective self-defence of Kuwait in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. We will also need to keep in mind the impact of military operations on British and world opinion. We must be able to justify any military action undertaken by our forces.

6. Additional objectives might be:

- a. the development of a long term security structure in the region involving minimum Western participation;
- b. (so far as possible without inhibiting the chances of military success) the preservation of Iraq's civil infrastructure in order to minimise the post-war burden on other nations;
- c. the avoidance of Israel's involvement in any hostilities.

B. Co-ordination with Allies

7. The United States will play the predominant role in military operations against Iraq. Nevertheless it is very desirable that as many countries as possible are involved and are agreed on the strategic objectives. However, it may be optimistic to assume that all those Allies who have deployed troops will be willing to take part in offensive action, especially if this goes beyond ejecting Iraq from Kuwait or is not taken under UN sponsorship. It is important that we should not be at odds with our allies on the legal basis for any action. Given the sensitivity of the subject it may be unrealistic to expect the United States to be willing to share their thinking on specific military operations very widely. A minimum requirement for us is to agree objectives and co-ordinate planning with the United States; the support of the Saudis is also essential to us.



8. Particular issues to be discussed with the Americans are
  - a. strategic objectives (as above);
  - b. operational planning and the role and tasks to be assigned to UK forces. This will provide the basis for approving the commitment of UK forces to operations, where appropriate under US operational control. It might best be done in theatre;
  - c. the scale of operations, their likely duration and potential losses;
  - d. how to get the maximum participation of other forces with the minimum loss of effectiveness and operational security. The military operational planning Committee under Prince Khalid may help in this, though the bulk of the detailed arrangements will fall to General Schwarzkopf in accordance with directives issued by the Committee;
  - e. how is joint decision with the Saudis to be implemented (to which both the US and we are committed)? What about Bahrain, and possibly Qatar, UAE and Oman?

C. Guidance to Military Commanders

9. Tactical military planning to meet the strategic objectives will be the responsibility of the military commanders. Their military operations must avoid putting at risk British and international support: in this the length of hostilities and the scale of the losses incurred will be very important. These considerations and international law suggest that operations should conform to the following criteria:

- a. the selection of targets to be attacked must be relevant to the achievement of agreed objectives;

- b. the force used should be no more than is necessary to achieve the objective;
  - c. targets which do not provide direct or indirect support to military operations should be avoided;
  - d. collateral damage and civilian casualties should be minimised so far as possible;
  - e. care must be taken to avoid damage to locations of religious or cultural significance or creating long term environmental damage;
  - f. the risk to Western hostages must always be borne in mind but cannot finally override the selection of particular targets where their destruction is of major importance to achieving the strategic objective. It may be possible to meet this concern over hostages by alternative methods of attack.
  - g. forces under command <sup>may</sup> ~~should not~~ be used for the evacuation of British nationals if this would <sup>not</sup> detract from the success of operations <sup>to dislodge</sup> against Iraq. <sup>from Kuwait</sup>
  - h. while giving priority to achieving military aims, the importance of inflicting the minimum long term damage to Iraq's economic infrastructure should also be borne in mind.
10. If our objectives extend beyond ejecting Iraq from Kuwait we shall need to decide if the following targets should be attacked:
- a. Military research establishments and production facilities.

- b. Civilian targets with military connections (e.g. oil refineries, power stations, transport systems)
- c. Government command centres.
- d. Targets in or near Baghdad.

D. Conclusion

11. On all these issues we need to agree policy with the Americans and have regard also to the position of the Saudis. The best way to do this, if it could be achieved, would be to have a joint political directive. This would then provide the framework within which tactical planning could proceed in theatre.

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IRAQ/KUWAIT: POSITIVE INFORMATION CAMPAIGN

1. Key objectives this week are:

- to continue to demonstrate the brutality of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, as new accounts of atrocities emerge;
- to emphasise that Saddam Hussein must leave Kuwait one way or another: the use of force remains a real option; and
- to counter linkage with the Arab-Israel dispute.

2. The Iraqis are now trying to divert international attention from these themes to the plight of their Western hostages. The Amir of Kuwait's visit on 23 October is a useful peg for us to offer the overseas media material on our own themes.

3. We are maintaining close contact with the Association for Free Kuwait (AFK) and the Campaign for Free Kuwait in London. These organisations are becoming more effective at public relations and have been helpful in providing speakers and film for our television output. Mr Waldegrave will take part in an AFK photo-call outside the House of Commons on 25 October, to underline Government and Parliamentary support for the Kuwaiti cause.

4. The Kuwait Government have not yet taken up our offer of advice about mobile broadcasting equipment probably because of the limited range of such equipment. Probably this is because the Kuwaitis have been given time on a Saudi transmitter and offered time by the Egyptians.

5. Feedback on our information campaign in the region has been positive; the local media in the UAE and Egypt, among others, have made wide use of our output, commented favourably on it, and suggested further material which we shall provide.

6. Briefing Material

In the week beginning 15 October we circulated:

- a) a new edition of the FCO briefing notes :
- b) a background brief refuting Iraq's claims to Kuwait:
- c) texts of the Foreign Secretary's speeches and interviews during his visit to the Middle East for distribution by posts overseas.

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7. Television

a) The third programme in our series about the occupation of Kuwait was distributed last week. It concentrates on atrocities, taking account of the Amnesty International report, and incorporates recent amateur footage of destruction inside Kuwait made by an Iraqi refugee who also gives his eye-witness account of the murder by Iraqi soldiers of a Jordanian trying to protect his family. The whole series is being shown on the main evening news in Egypt and has been widely used elsewhere. We shall add to the series as new material becomes available.

b) We are suggesting to British TV companies that Panorama or World in Action might consider making a programme based on material from the series.

8. Radio

a) We have made a study of broadcasting and listening patterns in the Gulf area; this will help ensure as far as possible that our message reaches target audiences, particularly in Iraq and Kuwait, as the situation develops.

b) In response to a request for further material by Radio Monte Carlo, a popular Arabic language station in the Gulf, we have supplied a piece about the looting of art treasures and the destruction of cultural life in Kuwait by the Iraqis. More will follow.

Foreign & Commonwealth Office  
23 October 1990

THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

CURRENT ISSUES: BULL POINTS

1. Key points
2. List of points for use with Arabs and other Muslims
3. Effects of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
4. What happens if sanctions do not work
5. Chronology of main events
6. Reference papers

NOTE: Papers 3-5, 7 and 8, and Annexes 1-3 from the last edition of these notes are not being reissued until there have been significant developments which make changes to them necessary. Posts should retain papers from the edition of 11 October for reference purposes until amended versions are issued.

(Revision)

18 October 1990

## THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

## 1. KEY POINTS

- Iraqi occupation of Kuwait illegal.
- Saddam Hussein must withdraw completely from Kuwait: the legitimate government must be restored. No compromise solution acceptable - there can be no reward for aggression.
- "You don't negotiate with someone who marches into another country, devastates it, killing whoever stands in the way. You get him out, make him pay, and see that he is never in a position to do these things again" (Prime Minister, Bournemouth, 12 October).
- Iraq condemned by international community: some countries originally sympathetic to Iraq now committed to sanctions.
- Saddam Hussein cannot win: a record of failure. Invasion of Kuwait a miscalculation like 8 years war with Iran, which left Iraq with 100,000 dead and 250,000 wounded, a \$80 bn deficit and ultimately no gains at all.
- Armoury of international pressures in place: they are formidable, and will grow to become even more comprehensive.
- If peaceful pressures do not work, the international community will have to take further measures to remove Iraq from Kuwait.
- Western forces in the Gulf at the request of Gulf states as part of international force; they will leave when asked to do so.
- Iraq's action against Kuwait damaged Palestinian interests by diverting international and particularly US attention from Arab/Israel.
- Shootings in Jerusalem on 8 October refocussed world attention on Arab/Israel. But, contrary to Iraqi claims, no linkage between Iraq/Kuwait and Arab/Israel.
- International consensus on Iraq/Kuwait unshaken by events in Jerusalem.
- "Our Arab partners feel anxiety, feel anger ... but they are not deflected from the task of reversing the aggression against their Kuwaiti brothers" (Mr Hurd, speaking to the Egyptian Diplomatic Club, Cairo, 14 October).
- PLO's initial support of Iraqi aggression undermined their international standing by putting them at odds with their own resistance to Israeli occupation, acceptance of SCR 242 and principle of non-acquisition of territory by force.

- Iraqi or other proposals designed to trade withdrawal (or a fortiori a mere commitment to withdraw) for progress on eg Arab/Israel, are unacceptable. Iraq cannot be allowed to claim credit for progress on other issues as result of its aggression.
- Once present crisis over, a solution must be found to Arab/Israel. SCR 672 demonstrates international resolve to tackle Arab/Israel problem.
- "The aggression against Kuwait is now the main obstacle to sensible diplomacy ... over the Arab/Israel dispute" (Mr Hurd, speaking to Egyptian Diplomatic Club in Cairo, 14 October).
- British government deeply shocked by violence when 21 Palestinians shot in Jerusalem on 8 October. We and EC partners have strongly deplored use of excessive force by Israelis. Need now for restraint on both sides.



## THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

## 2. POINTS FOR USE WITH ARABS AND OTHER MUSLIMS

## ILLEGALITY OF IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT

- Cause of crisis Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
- Security Council Resolutions (SCRs 660 and 662) condemned Iraqi invasion and state that its annexation of Kuwait is null and void. Arab League and Islamic Conference Organisation have also condemned invasion.
- Ridiculous for Iraq to claim Kuwait always part of Iraq: up to invasion Iraq government dealt with Kuwait as a separate sovereign state

## SADDAM HUSSEIN: A LOSER - AND ISOLATED

- Iraq has been at peace in only two of Saddam Hussein's eleven years as President. He has gained nothing and weakened Iraq.
- Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in 1980. A major miscalculation. Eight years of war resulted in the deaths of 100,000 Iraqi and 250,000 Iranian soldiers, and foreign debts for Iraq of \$80,000 mn.
- In August 1990 Saddam Hussein threw away all Iraq's gains from the war with Iran, dropping his claims against Iran and reverting to the 1975 agreement on the Shatt al Arab.
- Saddam Hussein's hostages have not fought against him. He has deliberately exposed them to danger (transport to sites). Shamed into freeing women and children but still deprives sick and elderly of freedom. Denied food to Asian workers in Kuwait.

## IRAQ ISOLATED IN FACE OF INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS ON FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF SCRs (660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 670)

- Saudi Arabia, the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Oman, Bahrain), Egypt, Syria and other members of the Arab League (Morocco, Somalia, Djibouti, Lebanon) have called for Iraqi withdrawal and UN sanctions.
- Only possible solution for Arabs and everyone else is that endorsed by Security Council. Arab solution tried before, during and after invasion: not successful. Anything short of SCR requirements will reinforce Saddam Hussein's disregard for sovereignty and independence of his neighbours.
- Many Arab and Muslim countries showing great steadfastness in implementing sanctions. Over 100 members of UN have informed UN they are taking steps to implement sanctions.

## EFFECT OF SANCTIONS ON IRAQ

- Iraqi economy vulnerable - based almost totally on export of oil. Iraq heavily dependent on imports: Iraq potentially rich in resources but financial reserves badly depleted by war on Iran (in debt by Dollars 80 billion before invasion of Kuwait).
- Sanctions will work if full support of international community is maintained and objectives of SCR resolutions steadfastly held.

## FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES

- SCR 661 makes an exception to the embargo for "supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs."
- But reports from Iraq indicate that while some individual scarcities (eg increased prices for cooking oil, queues at bakeries) Iraq at present has plenty of food in stock. Markets being stocked from pillaged Kuwait.
- Iraqi Government saying priority will go to armed forces and that foreigners may have to find their own food. This falls particularly hard on Arab and Asian workers in Iraq. Attempted blackmail of their governments (no evacuation ships accepted without food) cynical. But some 5,000 Asian workers have been prevented from leaving Kuwait, so that essential services in the city are maintained in operation.
- Obligations of SCR 664 and international humanitarian law give Iraq full responsibility for welfare and safety of third country nationals in Iraq and Kuwait: Iraq should observe this responsibility.
- Iraq has rejected an offer by the International Committee of the Red Cross (neutral independent body in a position to ensure relief supplies go where they are needed) to provide humanitarian assistance in Kuwait and to investigate whether any residents in Iraq or Kuwait are suffering from food shortages.
- Iraq has similarly refused permission for the visit of the UN Secretary General's representatives to find out whether there is a humanitarian need for emergency food shipments and to check on the condition of Kuwaitis, diplomats and foreign nationals.
- Claims of being champions of Islam from Iraqi Baathist leadership, notably Saddam Hussein himself, deplored by Kuwaiti Muslims in exile: reports of desecration of Korans by Iraqi soldiers.

## WESTERN FORCES IN THE GULF

- International force in response to request from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States.

- Purpose of deployments assisting Gulf States entirely defensive.
- Only reason force is there is Iraqi aggression against Kuwait.
- SCR 665 enables forces with Security Council authority to use measures "commensurate to specific circumstances to enforce trade embargo."
- Over 25 nations involved including Arab contingents from all GCC states, Egypt, Morocco, Syria. Also Senegal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Argentina, Poland and Czechoslovakia.
- No wish to keep international force in area longer than necessary to do its job of getting Iraq out of Kuwait. Expensive: Western public opinion will want it to return as soon as job done.
- Holy places are Mecca and Medina. International force far from them - over 1,000 kms.

#### PALESTINIAN DIMENSION

- Iraq the main obstacle to progress.
- "I do not think that new initiatives over Palestine can take place until Saddam Hussein has been driven out of Kuwait ... This is unfinished business to which we must return as soon as the aggressor has withdrawn or been expelled. Saddam Hussein has set back by his act the cause of peace between Israelis and Arabs, but we cannot afford to abandon it" (Foreign Secretary to Diplomatic and Commonwealth Writers' Association, London, 4 October).
- British government shocked by violence in Jerusalem on 9 October.
- With EC partners have issued statement deploring "use of excessive force by Israeli occupying forces ...".
- UN SCR 672 demonstrates international condemnation of excessive force by Israeli police, and authorises Secretary General to send mission to Israel to investigate incident and developments in occupied territories.
- "There is only one man who, in his warped way, might have taken satisfaction from the events in Jerusalem, and that is President Saddam Hussein ... He sees the plight of the Palestinians as ... a weapon which he can pick and let fall at whim ... The aggression against Kuwait is now the main obstacle to sensible diplomacy ... over the Arab-Israel dispute" (Mr Hurd to Egyptian Diplomatic Club, Cairo, 14 October).
- Should remember Iraq an unreliable supporter of Arab causes.
- Saddam Hussein has killed his own colleagues in government; he has used guns and gas on the Kurds.

- Iraq has done little since 1948 to help the Palestinians. Iraq has not honoured its obligations to contribute to PLO under Baghdad Arab Summit of November 1978.
- Only after Western criticism of Iraq's development of chemical weapons that Saddam assumed the mantle of defender of the Arab world against the Israelis.
- Loss of Kuwaiti funds following invasion deeply felt in occupied territories.
- Only solution in sight to Palestinian problem remains international based on SCR 242. PLO's acceptance of SCR 242 in 1988 a major step forward.
- For Palestinians to throw in their lot with Saddam Hussein plays into hands of Israeli opponents of withdrawal and international settlement, alienates moderates in Israel with whom Arabs/Palestinians will have to talk.
- Palestinians aspire to an independent state. The whole purpose of international action against Iraq is to assure the independence of small states close to powerful expansionist neighbours. "The PLO cannot possibly be in favour of the usurpation by force of one country by another" (Bassam Abu Sharif of the PLO in Tunis on 19 September)

#### MECCA CONFERENCE ON GULF CRISIS

- The World Islamic Conference on the Gulf crisis organised by the Muslim World League ended in Mecca on 12 September, and expressed:
  - o strong condemnation of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. It was inadmissible that Muslims should commit acts of aggression against each other;
  - o a call for Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal and restoration of legitimate government;
  - o a call to the Iraqi government to abide by international law in respect of persons, property and foreign Embassies in Kuwait;
  - o Saudi Arabia's request for foreign military assistance was justified by necessity, and thus in accordance with Islamic law. When Iraq withdrew and the threat to the Kingdom receded, the foreign forces must be withdrawn;
  - o a call for the establishment of a permanent Islamic force within the framework of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference to deal with future crises between Islamic countries. Young people in Islamic countries should receive military training to enable them to participate in the defence of Islam;

- o a call to governments and Islamic organisations to do all they can to prevent the outbreak of war and achieve Islamic unity.

#### THE FUTURE

- If and when the Saudis, the Bahrainis, any others, ask us to leave, we will leave. "It is impossible to say now how long it will be for but our forces will stay there obviously while the host states want them to stay and while we judge the danger remains" (Foreign Secretary, 14 September).
- When Iraq has withdrawn from Kuwait as it must and the legitimate government is restored a need for arrangements involving UN to ensure Kuwait's security and that of other countries of the region.
- King Fahd of Saudi Arabia on 22 September stressed to a group of French Senators the necessity of immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troop concentrations on the Saudi border, and for guarantees that the Iraqi regime would not repeat its aggression against any Gulf state (Saudi Press Agency).
- Kuwaiti National Conference on "Liberation: our slogan, cause and aim" in Jedda from 13-16 October united Sabah family, Ministers, officials, journalists, academics and representatives of opposition groups in a commitment to solidarity in the interest of recovering Kuwait with the prospect of a more representative system of government.

## THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

## 3. EFFECTS OF IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT

- Kuwait a ghost town under curfew. Invasion has resulted in collapse of public order.
- Iraq attempting to wipe the existence of Kuwait from the map. Kuwaiti passports, vehicle licence plates, identity cards and currency invalid from 1 October.
- Amnesty International reported on 3 October that Iraqi forces have executed and tortured scores of people in Kuwait, and hundreds more were being detained. Repressive measures include killing in streets and in presence of victims' families, summary executions, random mass arrests, destruction of homes.
- Amnesty testified to US Congressional Human Rights caucus (10 October). After summarising organisation's concerns about Iraq's human rights record prior to invasion, gave further account of repression in Kuwait. People being tortured by Iraqi military and intelligence personnel said to include Iraqi Shia muslims with suspected links with opposition group al-Dawa Al Islamiyya (membership of this group is capital offence in Iraq). Many individual cases of torture, abuse, summary execution cited. Victims include boys as young as 13. Reported group executions including shooting at peaceful protest group of about 35 women and young people in early August.
- Iraqis have changed the face of Kuwait, renaming districts and buildings and neglecting maintenance. The city is littered with burnt-out cars and debris from fallen buildings. Rubbish is piled high in the streets but giant portraits of Saddam Hussein erected around the city.
- Iraqis have stripped Kuwait of everything they can remove, including equipment and spare parts for industries hit by sanctions. Medical equipment and supplies (and even street lights and traffic signals) have been removed, and the contents of the Kuwait National Museum, Kuwait University and the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research pillaged.
- Kuwaiti Oil Minister has said Iraqis have mined oil installations and refineries.
- Iraqis have now organised formal requisitioning system, so that goods from Kuwait continue to flow to markets in Iraq.
- But Iraqi News Agency reported that Saddam Hussein, on 3 October, walked about in the streets of Kuwait city "familiarising himself with its landmarks which were resplendent, reflecting pride in the city's return to the homeland".
- All Kuwaitis hiding foreign nationals from the occupying forces or displaying the Kuwaiti flag or a portrait of the Amir incur a death penalty.

- Kuwaiti resistance scaled down due to Iraqi reprisals, but Kuwait airport temporarily closed to civilian traffic following rocket attack on Iraqi aircraft.
- Kuwaiti banks were early target for invading Iraqi command. (\$1.6 bn in gold and foreign exchange reported plundered from Central Bank.) Iraq has forced through a one-for-one exchange of Iraqi and Kuwaiti dinars, effectively a ten-fold devaluation and ordered that the Kuwaiti dinar is no longer legal tender.
- Saddam Hussein's treatment of foreign workers inhumane and barbarous. He has treated Asian workers without any human dignity, and is now using their circumstances to attempt to blackmail governments into breaching the embargo.
- Iraq has encouraged the emigration of Kuwaitis, whose homes and positions have reportedly been given to Iraqis and Palestinians. Of 700,000 Kuwaitis in the Emirate at the time of the August invasion, only 300,000 are thought to be left.
- Amir of Kuwait told the United Nations General Assembly on 27 September that Iraq's aggression against Kuwait was unique in post-World War II history. Not only had Iraq overrun a sovereign independent member state of the UN and attempted to annex it by force, it had also tried to erase the name and existence of Kuwait from the world political map and destroy its political, economic and social structures. "Rape, destruction, terror and torture were the Iraqi rule of the day in Kuwait".
- Iraq is doing little to help thousands of people blocked at its borders. But it has rejected offer from International Committee of the Red Cross (neutral independent body in a position to ensure relief supplies go where they are needed), to provide humanitarian assistance both in Kuwait and to investigate whether any residents in Iraq or Kuwait are suffering from food shortages. Private Iraqis, especially Kurds, have however, been helpful.
- Similarly Iraq has refused permission for visit of UN to find out whether there is an humanitarian need for emergency food shipments, and to check on condition of Kuwaitis and foreign nationals in Kuwait (including diplomats).
- Kuwaiti National Conference on "Liberation: our slogan, cause and aim" in Jeddah from 13-16 October united the Sabah family, Ministers, officials, journalists, academics and the opposition in a commitment to solidarity in the interest of recovering Kuwait, with the prospect of a more representative system of government.
- Crown Prince Saad said that the leadership would respond to the hopes and aspirations of the people to follow liberation, including a major role for women.

## THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

## 4. WHAT HAPPENS IF SANCTIONS DO NOT WORK

- Sanctions can work if full support of international community is maintained and objectives of SCR resolutions steadfastly held.
- Hope to achieve objective peacefully, but use of force cannot be ruled out. "We are not precluded by reason of the SCR from exercising the inherent right of collective self-defence in accordance with the rules of international law - I am not prepared to limit our legitimate freedom of action" (Prime Minister in Parliament on 6 September).
- "If there is some kind of provocation against US forces or our friends in the area, there is no question but that the President has all the authority he needs to defend our forces and defend our interests" (Mr Cheney on "Newsmaker Saturday" on 6 October).
- Bush-Gorbachev Helsinki Summit statement "we are determined to see this aggression end, and if the current steps fail to end it, we are prepared to consider additional ones consistent with the UN Charter. We must demonstrate beyond any doubt that aggression cannot and will not pay".
- "If Iraq does not meet these non-negotiable conditions (immediate withdrawal of forces from Kuwait, restoration of the Kuwaiti government and release of foreign hostages), then its isolation will not end. We are prepared to take additional steps if sanctions and the quest for a political solution do not work" (President Bush in San Francisco on 19 September).
- "In the context of recent events I should remind those who regard aggression an acceptable form of behaviour that the United Nations has the power "to suppress acts of aggression. There is already ample evidence that this right can be exercised" (Mr Shevardnadze to the UNGA on 25 September).
- "Saddam Hussein will withdraw from Kuwait. He does not have a choice ... the only choice is whether to leave of his own free will or to leave at the point of a gun" (Mr Hurd to Egypt's Diplomatic Club in Cairo on 14 October).
- "I know we have to be ready for any contingency, and we shall be ... that man must leave Kuwait, the legitimate government must be restored, and he must pay for the damage and harm he has done in Kuwait and elsewhere ... there is no more room for negotiation now" (Mrs Thatcher in New York on 1 October).
- "The growing certainty there should be in his (Saddam Hussein's) own mind that he is going to have to go, one way or the other, and what we will have to do is take stock whether those pressures are actually going to do the job or whether the military option should be pursued" (Mr Hurd on Breakfast TV on 11 October).



## THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

## 5. CHRONOLOGY OF MAIN EVENTS

- 17-18 Jul Saddam Hussein accuses Kuwait and other Gulf states of deliberately depressing the price of oil and of going against OPEC quota arrangements; demands Kuwait compensate Iraq for \$2,400 million of oil allegedly stolen from the disputed Rumaila oilfield.
- 24 Jul Iraq sends 30,000 heavily armed troops to the Kuwait border.
- 27 Jul OPEC settle on \$21 a barrel target price.
- 31 Jul Iraqi and Kuwaiti delegations meet for talks in Saudi Arabia.
- 1 Aug Iraq walks out of talks.
- 2 Aug Iraqi troops invade Kuwait: claims that it intervened in Kuwait in response to a request from "democratic government of Kuwait" which had overthrown the Al Sabah family
- 2 Aug "Provisional Free Kuwait Government" issues communique dismissing the Emir and dissolving the National Council; the Emir of Kuwait flees to Saudi Arabia.
- 2 Aug United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopts Security Council Resolution (SCR) 660 condemning Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
- 3 Aug Arab League Foreign Ministers condemn Iraqi aggression against Kuwait by majority vote.
- 4 Aug Islamic Conference Organisation condemns Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
- 6 Aug UNSC adopts SCR 661 imposing sanctions on Iraq (13:0:2, Yemen and Cuba abstaining).
- 7 Aug "Provisional Free Kuwait Government" proclaims Kuwait a republic; decrees parity between Kuwaiti and Iraqi dinars, implying devaluation of Kuwaiti dinar to one-twelfth of its former value.
- 7 Aug US deploys troops and aircraft to Saudi Arabia.
- 8 Aug Iraq announces "unification" of Iraq and Kuwait (ie annexation of Kuwait).
- 9 Aug Kuwaiti-drafted SCR 662 unanimously adopted - declares Iraq's annexation of Kuwait as null and void.

- 9 Aug Secretary of State for Defence gives details of British forces to be deployed to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region.
- 9 Aug Iraqis announce that diplomatic missions in Kuwait must close and move their activities to Baghdad by 24 August.
- 10 Aug Emergency Arab Summit meets in Cairo: tough resolution calling for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, military assistance for Saudi Arabia and sanctions against Iraq; Iraq, Libya and PLO vote against, Algeria and Yemen abstain, Jordan, Sudan and Mauritania enter reservations.
- 12 Aug Saddam Hussein announces "peace initiative" (Iraq will withdraw from Kuwait if Israel withdraws from the Occupied Territories and if Israel and Syria withdraw from Lebanon).
- 14 Aug Saddam Hussein offers to accept Iranian terms for a comprehensive settlement of Iraq's conflict with Iran; proposes withdrawal of all Iraqi troops from Iranian territory starting 17 August, full exchange of POWs and resolution of the dispute over sovereignty over Shatt Al-Arab waterway on basis proposed by Iran.
- 18 Aug SCR 664 unanimously adopted, condemning Iraqi actions against the foreign communities in Kuwait and Iraq.
- 25 Aug UNSC adopts SCR 665 on the enforcement of sanctions against Iraq (13:0:2, Yemen and Cuba abstain).
- 28 Aug Iraqi authorities declare that Kuwait has been made the nineteenth province of Iraq, with Kuwait city renamed Kadhima; northern Kuwait incorporated in Basra liwa.
- 30 Aug President Bush announces plan for "burden sharing".
- 4-5 Sept US Secretary Baker calls for new regional security structure in Gulf to contain aggressors and recognises need for progress on Arab/Israel dispute.
- 12 Sept UN Secretary General appoints Sadruddin Aga Khan his "personal representative for humanitarian assistance" (relief co-ordinator).
- 13 Sept UNSC adopts SCR 666 on food supplies to Iraq and Kuwait under strict international control and supervision (13:2:0, Cuba and Yemen vote against).
- 14 Sept UK decides to send 7th Armoured Brigade to Saudi Arabia and additional RAF units (18 Tornado aircraft) to Gulf.

- 14 Sept Iraqi troops enter French Ambassador's residence in Kuwait. Had earlier entered Dutch Ambassador's residence (12/9) and Canadian Embassy (13/9). EC statement and demarche.
- 16 Sept UNSC adopts SCR 667 condemning Iraqi intrusions into Embassies in Kuwait.
- 17 Sept UK orders expulsion of Iraqi Military Attaché and staff and deportation of 23 other Iraqis.
- 19 Sept Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan abandons UN aid mission after Iraq refuses him entry.
- 21 Sept Iraq orders the expulsion of some 40 diplomatic staff from Baghdad, including Military Attachés of the EC, US and Egypt.
- 23 Sept Iraqis threaten action against Middle East oilfields and Israel if sanctions stifle Iraq.
- 23 Sept Iraqi authorities withdraw the Kuwaiti dinar from circulation.
- 24 Sept President Mitterrand addresses UN General Assembly, puts forward four-stage peace plan.
- 25 Sept UNSC adopts SCR 670 imposing air embargo on Iraq.
- 25 Sept Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze addresses UNGA: indicates that the Soviet Union will back the use of force if Iraq does not withdraw from Kuwait, proposes formation of a "rapid response force" under the Security Council.
- 26 Sept Foreign Secretary addresses UNGA, mentions idea of a new regional security system in the Gulf after Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.
- 1 Oct President Bush addresses UNGA, talks of opportunity to settle Arab/Israel dispute as well as for Iraq and Kuwait to settle differences.
- 1 Oct EC Foreign Ministers agree in New York on financial assistance to countries most affected by crisis.
- 3 Oct Saddam Hussein visits occupied Kuwait.
- 4 Oct Foreign Secretary, speaking to Diplomatic and Commonwealth Writers' Association in London, says no hope of progress on Palestinian issue until Saddam Hussein is driven out of Kuwait, but it must be tackled as soon as Gulf crisis is resolved.
- 7 Oct Some 21 Palestinians are shot by Israeli security forces in Jerusalem.

8 Oct

Saddam Hussein, in statement about Palestinian deaths, warns that Iraq has missiles capable of striking targets well within Israel "when the time of reckoning comes".

13-17  
Oct

Foreign Secretary visits Cairo and Tel Aviv/Jerusalem.

## THE GULF CRISIS: BRIEFING NOTES

### 6. REFERENCE PAPERS

#### Verbatims

- VS 41/90 Extracts from transcript of Prime Minister's interview to "Frost on Sunday" programme, TV-AM, 2 September
- VS 42/90 Prime Minister's speech to House of Commons, 6 September
- VS 43/90 Foreign Secretary's speech to House of Commons, 7 September
- VS 48/90 Passage in Foreign Secretary's speech to UNGA, New York, 26 September
- VS 50/90 "Palestine: the other Middle East problem": speech by Foreign Secretary to Diplomatic and Commonwealth Writers' Association, London, 4 October

#### Guidance

- No 47/90  
50/90  
52/90  
61/90

#### Retracts

Extensive daily coverage of Ministerial statements, spokesman etc. Following are some recent key pieces:

- Foreign Secretary's various briefings, interviews in New York, 25 September
- "Options available": transcript of Foreign Secretary's discussion with Arab journalists, New York, 27 September
- Statement and press conference by Defence Secretary, 1 October
- Transcript of interviews given by Foreign Secretary in New York to BBC Radio and IRN, 2 October

#### Survey of Current Affairs

August 1990, p.277: Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait

#### The Gulf Crisis: Briefing Notes

- Saddam Hussein's record
- International reactions to Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
- Kuwait: consequences of the Iraqi invasion
- Iraqi claims to Kuwait

#### Video Material

- Kuwait refugees
- Inside Kuwait
- Kuwait: the atrocities