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TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
TELNO 1845  
OF 250845Z OCTOBER 90

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INFO IMMEDIATE BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW

PART ONE OF TWO

MIPT: QUADRIPARTITE MEETING OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS: GULF

SUMMARY

1. AGREEMENT ON SHORT AND LONG TERM AIMS, INCLUDING NEED TO LIMIT IRAQI MILITARY THREAT AFTER CRISIS. US ATTACHES IMPORTANCE TO INTERNATIONAL APPROBATION FOR ANY MILITARY ACTION. FRANCE AND GERMANY INSIST FURTHER UN COVER FOR MILITARY ACTION LEGALLY AND POLITICALLY NECESSARY. US DISCUSSING IDEAS ON REGIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE AND ARAB/ISRAEL PEACE PROCESS WITH STATES IN REGION. FRANCE URGES RAPID PROGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARAB/ISRAEL. US WARNS OF NEED FOR CAUTION OVER ANY EUROPEAN COUNCIL STATEMENT ON INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MIDDLE EAST. AGREEMENT THAT PARTIAL IRAQI PEACEFUL WITHDRAWAL SHOULD NOT BE EXCLUDED AND WOULD POSE TRICKY PROBLEMS FOR WEST.

DETAIL

SHORT TERM

2. INTRODUCING DISCUSSION WESTON SAID HE ASSUMED ALL WERE AGREED THAT OUR SHORT TERM AIMS WERE IRAQI WITHDRAWAL, THE RESTORATION OF THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT, THE RELEASE OF HOSTAGES AND AVOIDANCE OF ISRAELI INVOLVEMENT. DUFOURCQ (FRANCE) AGREED. PRESIDENT MITTERRAND HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO SHAIKH JABER THAT OUR AIMS WERE TO ENSURE IRAQI WITHDRAWAL AND RESTORATION OF THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT IN KUWAIT. SEITZ (US) AGREED BUT ADDED ONE MORE OBJECTIVE, THE NEED TO LIMIT THE IRAQI THREAT IN THE LONG TERM. WE SHOULD GIVE GREATER PUBLIC EMPHASIS TO THE IRAQI DISMANTLEMENT OF KUWAIT.

3. KASTRUP (GERMANY) SAID HUGE GAINS HAD BEEN MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE CRISIS IN TERMS OF COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE FUNCTIONING OF THE UN. WE SHOULD DO OUR UTMOST TO PRESERVE THESE GAINS. GERMANY HAD REFUSED TO SELL ANY ARMS TO THE REGION DURING THE CRISIS, AND HAD TURNED DOWN A SAUDI REQUEST FOR EQUIPMENT. DUFOURCQ ASKED WHETHER, IN LIGHT OF PRINCE SULTAN'S COMMENTS, THE SAUDIS WERE FIRM. SEITZ SAID HE BELIEVED THEY WERE. SULTAN HAD NOT INTENDED TO SUGGEST THAT THE KUWAITIS SHOULD SEEK A COMPROMISE WITH IRAQ. AN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN KUWAIT AND IRAQ WOULD NOT REMOVE THE IRAQI THREAT TO SAUDI ARABIA.

MILITARY ACTION

4. SEITZ SAID THERE WAS NO PREDISPOSITION IN WASHINGTON TO USE FORCE. THE US WAS NOT THINKING OF TAKING MILITARY ACTION WITHIN ANY PARTICULAR TIME FRAME. THE MILITARY BUILD UP WOULD BE COMPLETE BY MID-NOVEMBER. BUT THAT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY AFFECT ANY DECISIONS ON MILITARY ACTION. THE LEGAL AUTHORITY TO USE FORCE ALREADY EXISTED IN THE VIEW OF THE US. TO RESPOND TO AN INCIDENT THE US WOULD NOT NEED TO SEEK AUTHORISATION FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT INTERNATIONAL APPROBATION FOR THE USE OF FORCE MIGHT BE IMPORTANT POLITICALLY AS A WAY OF MAINTAINING THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION. THEY HAD TAKEN NO DECISIONS ON WHAT FORM THIS INTERNATIONAL APPROBATION MIGHT TAKE, BUT HE COULD IMAGINE PRIOR ENDORSEMENT OF THE USE OF FORCE BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. THIS WOULD NOT MEAN A UN FLAG OR A UN COMMAND. DUFOURCQ SAID THAT IN THE FRENCH VIEW A FURTHER SECURITY COUNCIL

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RESOLUTION

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RESOLUTION WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR BOTH POLITICAL AND LEGAL REASONS BEFORE FORCE WAS USED. THEY DID NOT BELIEVE ARTICLE 51 COVER WAS SUFFICIENT. POLITICALLY WE MUST DO EVERYTHING TO PRESERVE THE COHESION OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL FIVE. IT WAS TOO EARLY TO SEEK SUCH A RESOLUTION NOW. FIRST WE SHOULD SEE IF THE EMBARJO WORKED. KASTRUP SAID THERE WAS NO FORMAL GERMAN GOVERNMENT POSITION ON THIS, BUT HE TENDED PERSONALLY TO AGREE WITH THE FRENCH.

LONGER TERM

5. WESTON SAID THAT THE LONG-TERM AIMS IN THE REGION WERE TO REMOVE PERENNIAL THREATS TO STABILITY THERE AND TO ENSURE RELIABLE ACCESS TO OIL. IN THE IMMEDIATE POST-CRISIS PERIOD OUR AIM MUST BE TO WIN THE PEACE. THIS WOULD INVOLVE A VIABLE SECURITY STRUCTURE IN THE GULF WHICH IN DUE COURSE SHOULD BE REINFORCED AND EXTENDED BY MEANS OF A SERIOUS EFFORT TO SOLVE THE ARAB/ISRAEL CONFLICT. MUCH WOULD OF COURSE DEPEND ON HOW THE CRISIS ENDED. WE COULD FORESEE THE FOLLOWING POSSIBLE SCENARIOS:

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A) A FULL IRAQI WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT WAR: THIS WOULD LEAVE THE IRAQI MILITARY POTENTIAL INTACT. THE WEST COULD NOT WITHDRAW ITS FORCES UNTIL ALL THE HOSTAGES HAD BEEN RELEASED AND A SATISFACTORY SECURITY STRUCTURE WAS IN PLACE. THERE WOULD NEED TO BE A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT ON OIL AND BORDERS, A NON-AGGRESSION AGREEMENT TOGETHER WITH SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, A SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE FOR CLAIMS, AND POSSIBLY A UN OR ARAB LEAGUE PEACE KEEPING FORCE BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT. BUT THIS WOULD TAKE TIME. IN THE MEANTIME WE WOULD HAVE TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON IRAQ, VIA AS MANY SANCTIONS AS POSSIBLE ESPECIALLY ON NBC, ARMS AND MISSILE TECHNOLOGY. THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE WOULD HAVE TO REMAIN AT VIABLE DETERRENT LEVELS.

B) A PARTIAL IRAQI WITHDRAWAL IN WHICH SADDAM HUSSEIN HUNG ON TO THE RUMAILIA OIL FIELD AND THE ISLANDS: IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO INSIST ON FULL WITHDRAWAL AND MAINTAIN SANCTIONS AND THE MULTILATERAL FORCE AT ITS CURRENT LEVEL. IT WAS LIKELY THAT THERE WOULD BE A SPLIT IN THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION. BUT IF ACTION WERE NOT TAKEN TO REMOVE THE IRAQIS, IF NECESSARY BY FORCE, THE WEST WOULD HAVE SUFFERED A DEFEAT.

C) FULL IRAQI WITHDRAWAL AS A RESULT OF A MILITARY ENGAGEMENT. THIS WOULD PROBABLY REMOVE THE IRAQI THREAT BUT THERE WOULD BE DIFFICULT LEGAL QUESTIONS. WOULD WE HAVE COVER TO PURSUE THE WAR AFTER THE LIBERATION OF KUWAIT? WOULD WE NEED TO SHOW UN AUTHORITY HAD NOT BEEN EXCEEDED IF WESTERN FORCES WERE TO STAY ON IN THE REGION AT SAUDI OR KUWAITI INVITATION? WAS THERE A DANGER OF PROVIDING A FOCUS FOR ANTI-WESTERN FEELING IN THE ARAB WORLD, ESPECIALLY IF ISRAEL HAD JOINED IN?

IN ANY SCENARIO WE WOULD NEED TO ENSURE VERIFIABLE NBC DISARMAMENT OF IRAQ. WE WOULD ALSO NEED TO WORK IN THE LONGER TERM FOR A LASTING SECURITY STRUCTURE BOTH IN THE GULF AND BEYOND. THIS WOULD NOT BE ATTAINABLE WITHOUT ADDRESSING PROBLEMS SUCH AS ARAB/ISRAEL, THE COLAN AND SOUTH LEBANON.

6. SEITZ BROADLY AGREED. THE OTHER SCENARIO WAS INTERNAL COLLAPSE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REGIME. THIS WAS UNLIKELY BUT WOULD REPRESENT A GOOD OUTCOME. HIGH STAKES WERE INVOLVED IN HOW THE CRISIS WAS RESOLVED. THESE INCLUDED IMPLICATIONS FOR COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UN, THE POSSIBILITY OF REACHING AGREEMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP. THE CRISIS GAVE A NEW URGENCY TO DEALING WITH NON-PROLIFERATION ON A REGIONAL AND A GLOBAL BASIS.

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THE AMERICANS WERE CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF EXTENDING THE EXISTING REGIONAL COALITION (EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA, SYRIA) BEYOND THE CURRENT CRISIS. BUT WE WOULD NEED TO ESTABLISH A REGIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE AND TO BEGIN A RE-INVIGORATED ARAB/ISRAEL PEACE PROCESS. WE COULD CONSIDER CSBMS BASED ON EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE. THE AMERICANS HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED THESE IDEAS WITH GOVERNMENTS IN THE REGION AND THE INITIAL RESPONSE WAS FAVOURABLE.

7. DUFOURCQ SAID THERE WOULD BE LONG-TERM RESULTS BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY FROM THE DEFEAT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN. THESE INCLUDED A DIVISION BETWEEN MODERATES AND RADICALS IN THE ARAB WORLD, POSSIBLE SAUDI/YEMENI CONFRONTATION, GREATER DEMOCRATISATION, PARTICULARLY IN KUWAIT AND EVEN IN SAUDI ARABIA, WHERE YOUNG PEOPLE WERE PLAYING MORE OF A ROLE, AND A NEW STRATEGIC BALANCE IN THE REGION IN WHICH THE PARTS PLAYED BY TURKEY, IRAN, SYRIA AND YEMEN WOULD ALL BE IMPORTANT.

ARAB/ISRAEL

8. KASTRUP SAID THE GERMANS WERE OPPOSED TO LINKAGE, BUT ASKED WHAT COULD BE DONE TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE ARAB/ISRAEL QUESTION. COULD THE US RESUME ITS DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO? SEITZ SAID THE UN RESOLUTION HAD SENT A TOUGH MESSAGE TO THE ISRAELIS AT SOME DOMESTIC POLITICAL COST IN THE US. THEY WERE TRYING TO GET THE ISRAELIS TO COMPLY, BUT IF THEY FAILED THE ISSUE WOULD COME BACK TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND CUT ACROSS THE FOCUS ON IRAQ. THE US COULD NOT RESUME CONTACTS WITH THE PLO IN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES. DUFOURCQ AGREED THERE SHOULD BE NO LINKAGE. BUT WE NEEDED TO SETTLE THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE URGENTLY BEFORE THE ARABS EXPLODED WITH FRUSTRATION. WE SHOULD BEGIN PREPARATIONS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. WESTON ASKED HOW THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL SHOULD APPROACH THIS IN ANY STATEMENT MADE FROM ROME. WAS THERE SCOPE FOR DEVELOPING THE THEMES THAT THE DEFEAT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD BE A VICTORY FOR MODERATION IN THE ARAB WORLD AND THAT THIS WOULD FACILITATE THE COMPLETION OF UNFINISHED BUSINESS? SEITZ AGREED THERE WAS A NEW URGENCY, AND A NEED TO BE BLUNT WITH THE ISRAELIS. BUT THE SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS REMAINED. ARAFAT WAS LESS OF AN INTERLOCUTOR VALABLE. THERE WAS A DANGER THAT IF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL CALLED OUTRIGHT FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IT WOULD BE SEEN AS A SUCCESS FOR BAGHDAD. OF COURSE SADDAM HUSSEIN SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED THE HIGH GROUND ON ARAB/ISRAEL. THE US DID NOT RULE OUT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. ISRAEL MIGHT ALSO BE PREPARED TO MOVE. PRIVATELY THE US WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT LINKAGE. BUT PUBLIC STATEMENTS RISKED BEING INTERPRETED AS SUCCESS FOR IRAQ. DUFOURCQ ASKED IF THE AMERICANS HAD ANYTHING NEW TO PROPOSE. SEITZ SAID THEY HAD IDEAS BUT HE COULD NOT ELABORATE ON THEM AT THE MOMENT. HE LATER EXPLAINED PRIVATELY THAT THE ISSUE WAS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE POLITICALLY PRIOR TO THE MID-TERM ELECTIONS.

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PS/Mr Waldegrave

PS/AUS

Mr Weston

Mr Broomfield

Mr Fairweather

Mr Goulden

Mr Greenstock

Mr Beamish

Mr Gore-Booth

Mr Jay

PS/No 10 Downing St

Mr Appleby - Cabinet office

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PART TWO OF TWO

MIPT: QUADRIPARTITE MEETING OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS: GULF

#### PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL

9. REVERTING TO HIS EARLIER REMARKS WESTON SAID PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WAS IN MANY WAYS THE LEAST UNLIKELY AND MOST DIFFICULT SCENARIO. WE MIGHT FIND THE SOVIET UNION OR OTHERS PRESSING US FOR A FACE SAVING COMPROMISE WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN. SEITZ AGREED. WE MIGHT ALSO FACE DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES. IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF WE COULD GET THE SOVIET UNION HOOKED ON FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. WE COULD USE GORBACHEV'S VISITS TO EUROPE IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS TO PRESS THIS POINT. DUFOURCQ SAID FRANCE WOULD INSIST ON COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT COULD ONLY TAKE PLACE AFTER COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL. KASTRUP SAID GERMANY WOULD INSIST ON A LEGAL SOLUTION. BUT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO KNOW HOW DOMESTIC PUBLIC OPINION WOULD REACT TO PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL. WESTON CONCLUDED AND ALL AGREED THAT PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WOULD PRESENT DIFFICULT CHOICES. WE MUST INSIST ON FULL WITHDRAWAL AND MAINTAIN SANCTIONS AND THE MILITARY PRESENCE UNTIL THIS HAPPENED.

#### HOSTAGES

10. KASTRUP SAID SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS TRYING TO DRIVE WEDGES BETWEEN THE MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION, (EG BY THE RELEASE OF FRENCH HOSTAGES). LEADERS OF ALL PARTIES WERE MEETING WITH KOHL IN BONN TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO SEND BRANDT TO BAGHDAD. HE PERSONALLY DID NOT SEE HIM GOING. DUFOURCQ SAID THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR IN PARIS INSISTED THAT A FRENCH OFFICIAL SHOULD GO TO BAGHDAD TO RECEIVE THE FRENCH HOSTAGES. ROCARD WAS MEETING WITH MEMBERS OF ALL PARTIES IN PARIS TO DECIDE HOW TO REACT. THEY HAD NO INTENTION OF NEGOTIATING WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN.

#### JORDANIAN PEACE PLAN

11. DUFOURCQ REPORTED THAT PRINCE HASSAN OF JORDAN HAD FORWARDED A NINE-POINT PEACE PLAN TO THE FRENCH LAST WEEK. THIS ENVISAGED: WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI FORCES, THE RETURN OF THE AMIR OF KUWAIT AND A DATE FOR ELECTIONS, INSERTION OF AN ARAB OR UN PEACE KEEPING FORCE IN KUWAIT, A GUARANTEE TO IRAQ OF ACCESS TO THE SEA AND THE RUMAILIA OIL FIELDS, A DECLARATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT AN AGGRESSION WOULD BE LAUNCHED AGAINST IRAQ, RELEASE OF HOSTAGES, WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED FORCES FROM SAUDI ARABIA, NEGOTIATIONS ON POLITICAL ISSUES INCLUDING ARAB/ISRAEL, AGREEMENT BY ALL OIL PRODUCERS TO ENSURE SUPPLY AND THE INDEXING OF PRICES. THE FRENCH DID NOT INTEND TO RESPOND.

#### ASSISTANCE TO AFFECTED STATES

12. SEITZ SAID THE US ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO ENSURING THAT THE AFFECTED STATES RECEIVED CONCRETE ASSISTANCE IN 1990. JORDAN DESERVED PARTICULAR CONSIDERATION GIVEN THE ATTITUDE OF THE GULF STATES. THE AMERICANS ESTIMATED THAT THE EFFECT ON TURKEY WOULD BE IN THE ORDER OF 1 1/2 BILLION DOLLARS IN 1990 AND 5 BILLION

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DOLLARS IN 1991. THE US WAS CONSIDERING OFFERING A NEW QUOTA ON TEXTILES. THEY HOPED THE COMMUNITY COULD RESPOND WITH THE FOURTH FINANCIAL PROTOCOL, POLITICAL DIALOGUE, CUSTOMS UNION AND INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION. THE AMERICANS HAD SPOKEN TO THE GREEKS. WESTON SAID THE SUBJECT WAS UNDER ACTIVE DISCUSSION IN THE COMMUNITY. KASTRUP SAID GERMANY WOULD BE PROVIDING TURKEY WITH A 2 MILLION DM MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME.

ARAB MILITARY PROFILE

13. SEITZ SAID ONE SYRIAN ARMoured DIVISION WAS STILL IN SYRIA BECAUSE OF LOGISTICAL DIFFICULTIES IN MOVING IT. THE AMERICANS HAD ASKED THE ITALIANS TO HELP AND HE HOPED THEY WOULD REPLY POSITIVELY. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET THEM TO SAUDI ARABIA QUICKLY.

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HS/SEC ACD

HS/NEAD

MA/WED

HS/NAD

PS

PS/Mr. Waldegrave

AS/AUS

Mr. Weston

Mr. Broomfield

Mr. Fairweather

Mr. Goulden

Mr. Greenstock

Mr. Beauish

Mr. Gore-Booth

Mr. Jay

PS/No 10. Downing St.

Mr. Appleby - Cabinet Office.

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QUADRIPARTITE MEETING OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS, LONDON, 24 OCTOBER

1. POLITICAL DIRECTORS OF THE UK, US, FRANCE AND GERMANY MET IN LONDON ON 24 OCTOBER. WESTON WAS IN THE CHAIR. MY 6 IFTS - NOT TO ALL - REPORT DISCUSSION OF:

- (A) GULF
- (B) FUTURE OF NATO
- (C) SOVIET UNION
- (D) EASTERN EUROPE
- (E) CSCE
- (F) EC/US

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2. POLITICAL DIRECTORS AGREED TO MEET AGAIN IN PARIS ON 4 DECEMBER.

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- EMERGENCY UNIT
- SEC POL DEPT
- NENAD
- SOVIET DEPT
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- CSCE UNIT
- ECD(E)
- ECD(I)
- WED
- NAD
- ERD
- PS
- PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
- PS/MR GAREL-JONES
- PS/PUS
- MR WESTON
- MR BROOMFIELD
- MR BAYNE
- MR FAIRWEATHER
- MR GOULDEN
- MR JAY
- MR BEAMISH
- MR TAIT
- MR GORE-BOOTH
- MR GREENSTOCK
- ADDITIONAL
- PS/NO 10.
- MR APPLEYARD, CABINET OFFICE

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