



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

file  
to

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T238/90

SUBJECT α MASTER  
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27 October, 1990.

Dear Mr. President

I was glad to have the opportunity to talk to Mr. Primakov on 20 October. His account of what he learned in Baghdad was valuable, but disturbing. Saddam Hussein's attitude gives me little confidence that he understands the realities of the situation.

According to Mr. Primakov, Saddam Hussein is trying to portray himself as under threat, and needing some face saver in order to withdraw. Mr. Primakov said that he was left with the impression that some "flexible linkage" with the Arab Israeli problem might secure Iraqi agreement to withdraw. This cannot be: Saddam Hussein cannot be allowed to bargain over withdrawal. The international community has demanded complete withdrawal through a mandatory Security Council Resolution. It is not a matter for negotiation. Saddam Hussein must not benefit from his aggression, otherwise we shall encourage his political ambitions, and he will remain a threat to the rest of the region. He must be allowed no choice but unconditional withdrawal.

Talk of face savers or negotiated settlements will simply encourage him to hang on, in the illusion that time is on his side. Such talk also gives encouragement to those who seek to undermine the unity of the international community. I made these points to Mr. Primakov.

We have all admired the strong position which the Soviet Union has adopted towards the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Your

41

role has been crucial in maintaining the unanimity of the Five Permanent Members and of the Security Council as a whole. It is of the utmost importance that the international consensus ranged against Saddam Hussein remains united and steadfast. We have seen only this week how the Iraqis are trying to exploit the hostage issue to drive wedges between European countries. We intend to resist this firmly.

I hope you will feel able to use your channels of communication to Saddam Hussein to continue to convey the simple message that the world will not let him win, and that no compromise is available on the Security Council requirements. I hope in particular that Mr. Primakov will do so when he returns to Baghdad. I believe Saddam Hussein may listen to a message from Moscow.

*Warm regards,*

*Yours sincerely*

*Raymond Thatcher*

His Excellency Mr. M.S. Gorbachev



*File*

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*From the Private Secretary*

27 October, 1990.

*De Stefan.*

THE GULF: MESSAGE TO MR. GORBACHEV

The Prime Minister has agreed to sign a message to President Gorbachev about Mr. Primakov's mission to the Middle East. I enclose the version which she has signed, and should be grateful if it could be delivered as soon as possible. You might also ask the Embassy in Washington to give General Scowcroft a copy at my request.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sir Robin Butler.

*Yours sincerely,*

C.D. POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.