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SECTION ONE OF TWO

MIPT: IRAQ/KUWAIT: SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

SUMMARY

1. AT THE LAST MOMENT YEMENIS DECIDE TO ABSTAIN INSTEAD OF VOTING IN FAVOUR OF THE RESOLUTION. SHARP EXCHANGES IN THE DEBATE BETWEEN KUWAITI AND IRAQI REPRESENTATIVES. AMERICANS UNDERLINE THAT THEY WILL DO EVERYTHING NECESSARY TO PROTECT THEIR CITIZENS.

DETAIL

2. ON THE MORNING OF 29 OCTOBER AL-ASHTAL (YEMEN) TOLD PICKERING (UNITED STATES) THAT HIS AUTHORITIES HAD RECONSIDERED THEIR POSITION OVER THE WEEKEND AND HAD NOW INSTRUCTED HIM TO ABSTAIN ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. PICKERING REPORTED TO WASHINGTON AND RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS THAT IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES HE SHOULD REVERT TO THE ORIGINAL VERSION OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 12. AL-ASHTAL AGREED TO TRY AND GET HIS AUTHORITIES TO THINK AGAIN. THE NON-ALIGNED CO-ORDINATOR, RAZALI (MALAYSIA) AND I, AS PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, POINTED OUT TO AL-ASHTAL THAT IF HIS AUTHORITIES BACKED OUT OF THE AGREEMENT REACHED ON 27 OCTOBER, IT WOULD MAKE FUTURE NEGOTIATION IN THE COUNCIL VERY DIFFICULT.

3. AL-ASHTAL REPORTED BACK SHORTLY AFTERWARDS THAT HIS AUTHORITIES WERE STILL DETERMINED TO ABSTAIN. PICKERING MANAGED TO PERSUADE THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO RE-OPEN THE TEXT AND THAT THE U S EMBASSY IN SANAA SHOULD MAKE ONE LAST EFFORT WITH THE YEMENI GOVERNMENT. THE START OF THE FORMAL COUNCIL DEBATE, SCHEDULED FOR 1600Z, WAS DELAYED WHILE AL-ASHTAL MADE A FINAL CONTACT WITH SANA'A, BUT THE YEMENIS REFUSED TO CHANGE THEIR POSITION.

4. THE DEBATE RESUMED WITH A LONG STATEMENT BY AL-ANBARI (IRAQ). HE SAID THE COUNCIL HAD ADOPTED EIGHT RESOLUTIONS ON THE GULF CRISIS,

BUT HAD NOT DEEMED IT APPROPRIATE TO CONSULT IRAQ ON ANY OF THEM. THIS MEANT THE COUNCIL WAS IGNORING ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER. THE RESOLUTIONS AMOUNTED TO A DEMAND FOR CAPITULATION BY IRAQ: THEY WERE NOT AN ATTEMPT TO REACH A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. THEY SEEMED TO ASSUME THAT WAR WAS THE ONLY OPTION. THE UNITED STATES HAD AMASSED ITS TROOPS BEFORE ANY STATE IN THE REGION HAD ASKED IT TO DO SO. THE U S/BRITISH NAVAL BLOCKADE HAD BEGUN BEFORE SCR 661 WAS PASSED.

5. AL-ANBARI SAID THAT SINCE 2 AUGUST KING HUSSEIN HAD MADE GREAT EFFORTS WITH SAUDI ARABIA, EGYPT AND OTHER PARTIES TO WORK OUT A SOLUTION. SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD ISSUED HIS PEACE INITIATIVE ON 12 AUGUST. BUT THE COUNCIL HAD TAKEN NO NOTICE. IRAQ HAD HOPED THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD DRAW UP PROPOSALS TO SOLVE ALL THE PROBLEMS OF THE REGION IN A HOMOGENOUS MANNER. THE COUNCIL HAD ADOPTED 168 RESOLUTIONS ON PALESTINE AND 44 ON LEBANON: THE UNITED STATES HAD EXERCISED ITS VETO 91 TIMES. THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM WANTED TO RESOLVE THE GULF CRISIS WHILE PUTTING THE SUFFERINGS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLES INTO THE BACKGROUND. THEY ARGUED THAT LINKAGE WAS UNACCEPTABLE, BUT THEY WERE THEMSELVES CREATING A LINK BETWEEN THE POSTPONEMENT OF A SOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM AND THE SOLVING OF THE GULF CRISIS. THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM WERE NOW INSISTING ON THE DESTRUCTION OF THE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF IRAQ. ON 28 OCTOBER THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER HAD SAID THAT THE EMBARGO AGAINST IRAQ MUST GO ON UNTIL ALL ITS CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAD BEEN ELIMINATED. SHE HAD OBVIOUSLY DECIDED TAHT IRAQ HAD OBTAINED NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BUT HAD SAID NOTHING ABOUT THE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ACQUIRED BY ISRAEL. THE COUNCIL WAS APPLYING DUAL STANDARDS IN THE REGION.

6. TURNING TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION, AL-ANBARI SAID THAT PART A HAD BEEN PREPARED BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM AND PART B BY THE NON-ALIGNED. IRAQ WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TWO SEPARATE DRAFT RESOLUTIONS SO THAT EACH STATE COULD MAKE PLAIN ITS AGGRESSIVE OR PEACEFUL LONG-TERM INTENTIONS. WHILE IRAQ WELCOMED THE APPEAL FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN PART B, IT WAS INAPPROPRIATE TO LIMIT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S FREEDOM OF ACTION. THE RESOLUTION IMPLIED THAT HIS GOOD OFFICES COULD ONLY BEAR FRUIT IF IRAQ CAPITULATED. THE RESOLUTION COMPLAINED ABOUT THE SUFFERING OF FOREIGNERS IN IRAQ, WHEN THE IRAQI PEOPLE WERE SUFFERING FROM THE INTERNATIONAL BLOCKADE. THE IRAQI PEOPLE WERE THE TRUE HOSTAGES IN THIS SITUATION. THE COUNCIL WAS NOT COMPETENT TO RULE ON COMPENSATION ARISING FROM A CONFLICT. THE COUNCIL OUGHT TO RECOMMEND WAYS FOR THE FORMER

COLONIAL POWERS TO PAY COMPENSATION TO THEIR FORMER COLONIES.

7. ABULHASAN (KUWAIT) SAID IRAQ HAD VIOLATED EVERY LETTER OF THE CHARTER AND OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WHEN IT INVADED KUWAIT. IRAQ COULD NOT TALK ABOUT THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES WHEN SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD DECEIVED ARAB AND INTERNATIONAL LEADERS BY HOLDING ONLY ONE ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH KUWAIT HOURS BEFORE HIS FORCES INVADED THE COUNTRY. PRIMAKOV'S VISIT TO BAGHDAD HAD LED TO THE VOTE ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION BEING PUT OFF. BUT IRAQ WAS ONLY TRYING TO DIVIDE THE ALLIANCE AGAINST IT AND PRIMAKOV HAD COME AWAY EMPTY-HANDED. AL-ANBARI HAD NOT MENTIONED KUWAIT ONCE DURING HIS SPEECH.

8. IN A STATEMENT BEFORE THE VOTE TADESSE (ETHIOPIA) SAID IRAQ HAD REJECTED THE EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE ARAB LEAGUE TO SOLVE THE CRISIS BY PEACEFUL MEANS. THE COUNCIL HAD SHOWN ITS FLEXIBILITY BY DEFERRING THE VOTE ON 27 OCTOBER, BUT PRIMAKOV HAD BEEN FRUSTRATED BY IRAQI INTRANSIGENCE.

9. VOTING THEN TOOK PLACE AND THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS ADOPTED AS SCR 674 BY 13 VOTES TO NONE WITH TWO ABSTENTIONS (YEMEN AND CUBA).

10. IN A STATEMENT AFTER THE VOTE AL-ASHTAL (YEMEN) SAID THAT OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 12 OF THE RESOLUTION DID NOT GIVE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FULL FREEDOM TO TAKE INITIATIVES INDEPENDENTLY. THE RESOLUTION INCLUDED OTHER CONSTRAINTS ON STATES WHICH WISHED TO MAKE EFFORTS TO REACH A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. THOSE WHO WISHED TO DESTROY THE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF IRAQ WERE WORKING TO SUPPORT THE EXPANSIONIST POLICIES OF ISRAEL. THESE STATES WANTED TO MAKE THE FOREIGN PRESENCE IN THE REGION PERMANENT. YEMEN HAD LOST DOLLARS 1.4 BILLION BY IMPLEMENTING SCR 661 AND MORE THAN ONE MILLION YEMENIS HAD LEFT NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES AND LOST ALL THEIR PROPERTY. YEMEN WAS A DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY WHICH WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

11. ALARCON (CUBA) MADE SARCASTIC REFERENCE TO THE WAY THE COUNCIL HAD JUGGLED WITH NUMERALS, LETTERS AND ASTERISKS IN NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE RESOLUTION. WHILE ALL THIS HAD BEEN GOING ON THE UNITED STATES HAD DECIDED TO SEND ANOTHER 100,000 SOLDIERS TO THE REGION. THE STATES DEPLOYING MARITIME FORCES IN THE REGION HAD STILL NOT PRODUCED THE FIRST REPORT CALLED FOR UNDER PARAGRAPH 4 OF SCR 665. THE RESOLUTION ITSELF MADE THE MISSION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL MORE DIFFICULT AND THE COUNCIL HAD NO POWER TO DECIDE ON QUESTIONS OF LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE COUNCIL HAD BEEN

DILATORY ABOUT DEALING WITH ARTICLE 50 APPLICATIONS WHERE IT DID HAVE OBLIGATIONS. THE VIOLATION OF KUWAITI HUMAN RIGHTS WAS A LEGITIMATE CONCERN BUT CUBA OBJECTED TO THE ''IMPERIAL AIR'' WITH WHICH OTHERS USED THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

12. RAZALI (MALAYSIA) SAID THAT THE RESOLUTION REPRESENTED A TWIN-TRACK APPROACH. IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO CLOSE THE DOOR ON DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES. THE ROLE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS REFLECTED IN PARAGRAPH 12. SOME WOULD HAVE LIKED THIS TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE, BUT THE COUNCIL HAD GREAT FAITH IN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. IRAQ SHOULD START WORKING WITH THE EXISTING DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. IT MUST SEND THE RIGHT SIGNAL TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

13. ANET (COTE D'IVOIRE) CONGRATULATED ME ON RECONCILING THE IRRECONCILABLE. THE TEXT ADOPTED SHOWED THE COHESION OF THE COUNCIL IN DEMANDING IRAQ'S WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT.

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