

CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKMIS NEW YORK
TO DESKBY 310800Z FCO
TELNO 1778
OF 302149Z OCTOBER 90
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, PEKING
INFO PRIORITY MIDDLE EAST POSTS, ACTOR, ESC LONDON

FRANCE COPY

MIDDLE EAST ISSUES: NEXT STEPS AT THE UN

1. I TALKED OVER NEXT STEPS AT THE UN ON THE VARIOUS MIDDLE EAST ISSUES WITH THE U S PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE. PICKERING AS USUAL SPOKE VERY FRANKLY AND HIS CONFIDENCE SHOULD BE RESPECTED.

GULF CRISIS

2. PICKERING SAID THAT WASHINGTON WERE THIRSTING FOR A WHOLE SERIES OF SINGLE ISSUE RESOLUTIONS ON THE GULF, STARTING WITH THE IDEAS WE HAD ORIGINALLY SURFACED FOR USING THE FROZEN IRAQI ASSETS TO PAY COMPENSATION TO COUNTRIES, COMPANIES AND INDIVIDUALS DAMAGED IN THE CONFLICT. FOR REASONS WHICH HE FOUND HARD TO UNDERSTAND, GIVEN THE SUCCESS IN BOTH PRACTICAL AND PRESNETATIONAL TERMS OF THE LAST TWO MULTI-PURPOSE RESOLUTIONS (SCR 670 AND SCR 674) THEY NOW SEEMED DETERMINED TO SEPARATE OUT INDIVIDUAL ISSUES AND TO PROCESS THEM SEPARATELY.

3. I SAID WE COULD HARDLY ARGUE STRONGLY AGAINST A RESOLUTION TO SET THE FROZEN ASSETS TOWARDS COMPENSATION SINCE WE HAD ALREADY PROPOSED THIS OURSELVES BUT I THOUGHT WE WOULD BE A BIT WORRIED ABOUT THE RISK OF A LINKAGE WITH THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE, PARTICULARLY IF ONE WAS THINKING NOW IN TERMS OF MORE THAN ONE RESOLUTION GOING THROUGH DURING THE NEXT MONTH. WE HAD SPENT THE WHOLE OF OCTOBER SUCCESSFULLY, BUT WITH THE GREATEST DIFFICULTY, AVOIDING CROSS-LINKAGES AND HAD FINALLY GOT SCR 674 DECIDED WITHOUT HAVING TO PAY A PRICE FOR IT. WE COULD WELL BE CONFRONTED WITH WORSE PROBLEMS WITH RESPECT TO LINKAGE IN NOVEMBER.

4. PICKERING SAID HE VERY MUCH AGREED. HE WAS TRYING TO PERSUADE WASHINGTON, AND BELIEVED HE WOULD SUCCEED, THAT THEY WOULD DO BETTER WITH A MULTI-PURPOSE RESOLUTION AND THAT THEY SHOULD DO NO MORE IN THE NEXT WEEK OR TWO THAN CONSULT OVER IT WITH US AND THE REST OF THE FIVE. THEY SHOULD NOT LAUNCH ANY RESOLUTION ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS A WHOLE UNTIL A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY, CLEAR OF LINKAGES, WAS VISIBLE.

OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

5. PICKERING SEEMED TO HAVE NO CLEARER IDEA THAN WE HAVE OF THE PROBABLE CONTENTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT DUE OUT BY THE END OF THE MONTH. HE SAID THE AMERICANS WERE PRESSING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO DELAY THE REPORT AT LEAST UNTIL AFTER THE CREDENTIALS DEBATE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON 1 NOVEMBER. THEREAFTER THE BEST PICKERING COULD THINK OF WAS A SERIES OF DILATORY DEVICES SUCH AS PERSUADING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT HIS REPORT WAS ONLY A PRELIMINARY ONE WITH MORE TO FOLLOW OR MAKING A FURTHER ATTEMPT TO GET AMIE INTO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. PICKERING SAID THEY ALSO HAD SOME HOPE OF MAKING USE OF THE ISRAELI REPORT ON THE 8 OCTOBER SHOOTINGS. ALTHOUGH IT HAD NOT BEEN AS CRITICAL OF THE ISRAELI SECURITY AUTHORITIES AS ONE MIGHT HAVE HOPED, IT DID CONTAIN MATERIAL WHICH COULD BE PUT TO SOME USE WHEN IT CAME TO PRESSING THE ISRAELIS FROM THE OUTSIDE. BUT PICKERING ADMITTED THAT IN THE LAST FEW DAYS FURTHER U S/ISRAELI CONTACTS AND ALSO AN ATTEMPT BY THE MAIN JEWISH ORGANISATIONS IN THE U S TO PLEAD WITH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT FOR A MORE FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO THE UN'S ACTIVITIES HAD BOTH COME UP AGAINST A COMPLETE STONE WALL.

6. I SAID I WAS SURE WE WOULD COOPERATE IN ANY INGENIOUS IDEAS THE AMERICANS MIGHT SURFACE FOR PLAYING THESE ISSUES LONG UNLESS THE DEVICES WERE SO BLATANTLY DILATORY AS TO BE COUNTER PRODUCTIVE. I SUGGESTED IT WAS IMPORTANT TO AVOID THE SECRETARY-GENERAL COMING HIMSELF TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO PRESENT HIS REPORT. THAT OCCASION IN ITSELF WOULD TRIGGER OFF MASSIVE PRESSURE FROM OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL FOR AN EARLY RESOLUTION. IT WOULD SURELY BE BETTER FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PRODUCE A WRITTEN REPORT WHICH IT COULD BE ARGUED WOULD REQUIRE EXAMINATION IN CAPITALS FOR A REW DAYS. PICKERING AGREED THIS WAS A GOOD IDEA AND SIAD HE WOULD PRESS IT ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WHOM HE WAS GOING TO SEE LATER TODAY.

7. I SHALL BE SEEING PICKERING FOR MY SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENCY HANDOVER AT 2030Z ON 31 OCTOBER. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY POINTS ON MIDDLE EAST ISSUES (OR ON ANY OTHERS FOR THAT MATTER) WHICH YOU WOULD WISH ME TO RAISE WITH HIM THEN.

HANNAY

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