



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB  
Telephone 071-21 82111/3

31A (a-h).

*Prime Minister*

MO 6/17/15D

*This draft Directive has been amended, on the basis of 31st October 1990 instructions which I issued after your meeting with the Defence Secretary.*

*Have suggested further amendments*

*Dear Charles, Foreign Secretary last week. Agree it may now be finished?*

IRAQ/KUWAIT

*attached CDD 1/Ki.*

*See proposed amendments mb*

Thank you for your letter of 23rd October following the Prime Minister's talk with the Defence and Foreign Secretaries. (A list of those who have seen it here is attached).

As you asked we have worked up the earlier note to reflect the discussion. A revised version is attached. If the Prime Minister is content we suggest this is used as a basis for discussions with the United States at the key contacts:

- |                   |                          |
|-------------------|--------------------------|
| PM/yourself       | President/Scowcroft      |
| Foreign Secretary | Secretary of State       |
| Defence Secretary | Defense Secretary        |
| CDS               | Chairman of Joint Chiefs |
| Joint Commanders  | CINCCENT (Schwarzkopf)   |

We have some worries that US thinking in these areas is not as advanced as we would like because of other preoccupations. The UK discussions have allowed the Defence Secretary to give political guidance on planning to our commanders, but it is plain that their counterparts do not yet have it.

The developed note is now quite close to the kind of directive that is given to military commanders. It could then form a basis for a joint directive if we find common ground in our discussions with the US. With this mind the Defence Secretary is minded to send a copy of the note to Secretary Cheney; and you might like to send one to the White House.

A copy of this letter goes to Stephen Wall (FCO) and Sir Robin Butler. I suggest its circulation is limited to the same group as your letter of 23rd October.

*Yours sincerely  
Steve Webb*

(S WEBB)

ANNEX

MOD OFFICIALS WHO SAW LETTER FROM C D POWELL OF 23RD OCTOBER

Defence Secretary and his Private Secretary  
CDS  
Joint Commander - Air Chief Marshal Sir P Hine  
Assistant Under Secretary(Commitments) - Mr N Bevan

IRAQ/KUWAIT

UK POSITION PAPER

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

1. Our strategic objectives are as follows:

a. To secure the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait and the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government.

b. To secure the release of all hostages held in Kuwait and Iraq.

c. To secure the payment of compensation by Iraq for losses arising from the invasion of Kuwait.

d. To bring to account those responsible for atrocities.

*by committee from heads of the Geneva Convention*

e. To eliminate the threat posed by Iraq's Nuclear, Biological and Chemical and long range missile capability.

f. To establish a long term regional security structure that involves minimum Western participation.

- g. To avoid any Israeli involvement in the crisis.

It would not be a specific objective to bring about the downfall of the present Iraqi leadership (though that would be a desirable side effect); we should aim for Saddam Hussein to face the Iraqi people as a defeated leader.

2. The strategy currently selected to achieve the most immediate of these objectives is to secure full implementation of relevant UN Security Council Resolutions and to apply additional pressure on Iraq by demonstrating that military action is an available option in the event of non-compliance.

#### MILITARY OBJECTIVES

3. If Iraq fails to comply with UN Security Council Resolutions within a reasonable timeframe, the military option will come into play. In that event our military objectives are seen as:

- a. To secure the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait;
- b. To rescue or secure the release of all hostages held in Kuwait and Iraq;
- c. To destroy Iraq's Nuclear, Biological and Chemical capability/potential and her long range missile capability;

4. No avoidable constraints should be placed on the conduct of military operations, if the duration of hostilities and associated casualties are to be minimised. Nevertheless, the means chosen to achieve the military objectives must be justifiable within the limits of the collective self-defence of Kuwait in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. Moreover the impact of military operations on domestic, Arab/Islamic and world opinion will need to be kept in mind.

5. Air operations against targets in Iraq will be an essential element in military operations but we should avoid a 'scorched earth' policy. (not least because it will be important to seek to preserve Iraq's civil infrastructure in order to minimise the post-war burden on other nations.)

*delete*

6. Land operations in Iraq should be limited to those necessary to liberate Kuwait or to rescue hostages. [There should be no intention to occupy any part of Iraqi territory.]

*we may have to in order to protect No Kuwait*

#### GUIDANCE TO MILITARY COMMANDERS

7. Tactical military planning to meet these objectives will be the responsibility of the military commanders. Planning should conform to the following criteria

- a. the selection of targets to be attacked must be

relevant to the achievement of agreed objectives;

b. the force used should be no more than is necessary to achieve the objective;

c. targets for attack may include facilities which provide direct or indirect support to Iraqi military operations or to the occupation of Kuwait (e.g. military research establishments and production facilities, oil refineries, power stations, transport systems, Government command centres);

d. civil targets which have no military connections (e.g. desalination plants) should not be attacked;

e. collateral damage and civilian casualties should be minimised so far as possible; e.g. by selecting the appropriate method of attack or giving prior warning;

f. care must be taken to avoid damage to locations of religious or cultural significance or creating long term environmental damage;

g. the risk to Western hostages must always be borne in mind but cannot finally override the selection of particular targets where their destruction is of major importance to the success of military operations. <sup>Where</sup> ~~It may be~~ possible to

~~meet this~~ <sup>concern</sup> <sup>should be met</sup> by alternative methods of attack.

h. forces under command may be used for the protection and evacuation of hostages if this would not unreasonably detract from the success of operations against Iraq.

*Some in these forces must be allocated to deal with the hostage and refugee problems.*

i. while giving priority to achieving military aims, the importance of inflicting the minimum long term damage to Iraq's economic infrastructure should also be borne in mind.

#### CO-ORDINATION WITH ALLIES

8. The United States will play the predominant role in military operations. Co-operation with them and with the Saudis is fundamental and the role and tasks of UK forces in relation to both of them will need to be determined and agreed at political level. It will be important for the French and other principal Arab forces to be involved in any operation and to be brought into co-ordination and planning. The requirement for "joint decision" will entail consultation at the highest level with the Saudis.

#### ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE UNITED STATES

9. a. Strategic objectives
- b. Military objectives

- c. The role and tasks of UK forces
- d. The scale of operations, their timing, likely duration and potential losses
- e. Targetting constraints
- f. Co-ordination of planning and operations, with particular reference to the Saudis and the French.
- g. Arrangements for securing "joint decision"
- h. Joint political directive to act as framework for tactical military planning.