

SECRET

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PERSONAL FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY, PS/NO 10, PS/PUS
SIR PERCY CRADOCK CABINET OFFICE

THE GULF: BAKER'S TOUR

1. AFTER HIS MEETINGS IN ROME, KIMMITT IS NOW JOINING BAKER'S TOUR. I SAW HIM ALONE THIS AFTERNOON.
2. KIMMITT SAID THAT BAKER'S ITINERARY IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE. BUT ON PRESENT PLANNING HE IS FLYING TO BAHRAIN TO SEE THE AILING RULER AND TO THANK HIM FOR HIS STAUNCHNESS AS AN ALLY OVER SOME 40 YEARS: TO TAIF TO SEE THE AMIR OF KUWAIT TO GAUGE HIS MOOD AND TO FIRM UP SOME FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS: TO RIYADH FOR IMPORTANT TALKS WITH THE KING ABOUT HOW THE SAUDIS SEE THE NEXT STEPS AND ALSO TO OBTAIN A LARGER FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION AND TO GET THEIR ASSESSMENT OF SYRIAN ATTITUDES: TO CAIRO FOR SIMILAR TALKS (BUT WITH THE FINANCIAL COMPONENT REVERSED, IN THAT THE UNITED STATES HAVE AGREED TO FORGIVE THE EGYPTIAN DEBT), AND ALSO TO SEE THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER WHO WILL BE IN THE REGION AND TO SOUND HIM OUT GENTLY ABOUT ATTITUDES TO MILITARY ACTION: TO TURKEY TO SUGGEST PROVISION OF TURKISH MILITARY FORCES TO THE COALITION: TO PARIS TO TRY TO ASCERTAIN WHAT FRENCH THINKING REALLY IS: TO LONDON FOR FRANK DISCUSSIONS ABOUT WHAT MAY BE NECESSARY IN COMING WEEKS IN TERMS OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY PREPARATION (THE FORMER RELATING TO POSSIBLE MOVES AT THE UN): AND FINALLY TO GENEVA TO SEE SHEVARDNADZE. THE EXACT ROUTE MAY CHANGE. BUT THIS WILL ENABLE BAKER TO SEE ALL FIVE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE OTHER MAIN PARTICIPANTS. KIMMITT SAID THAT, IN MANY WAYS, BAKER WOULD HAVE LIKED TO START IN LONDON. BUT THE TIMETABLE DID NOT MAKE THIS POSSIBLE.
3. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS FROM ME, KIMMITT INDICATED THAT BAKER'S MAIN PURPOSE WAS TO GET THE VIEWS OF THE COALITION PARTNERS IN PREPARATION FOR FUTURE DECISIONS. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KNOW HOW FIRM THEY WERE, FOR EXAMPLE, ABOUT THE POSSIBLE USE OF FORCE IF ECONOMIC MEASURES FAILED TO ACHIEVE THE DESIRED RESULT. IT WAS ALSO ESSENTIAL IN SAUDI ARABIA TO HAVE A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING ABOUT COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS. BAKER WAS NOT GOING TO THE AREA BECAUSE THE AMERICANS THOUGHT THAT THE COALITION WAS BREAKING DOWN (AS SOME COMMENTATORS WERE SUGGESTING). THERE WAS ADMITTEDLY SOME PROBLEM OVER THE SYRIANS, WHO SEEMED TO THINK THAT THEY HAD NOT RECEIVED ENOUGH RECOGNITION FOR THEIR SUPPORT. OTHERWISE THE COALITION BOTH ON THE GROUND AND AT THE UNITED NATIONS WAS HOLDING UP VERY WELL. BAKER WOULD ALSO BE TESTING WHETHER ANY OF THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED WOULD BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL FORCES. HE WOULD BE ENCOURAGING THE EGYPTIANS TO GET THEIR SECOND DIVISION IN QUICKLY.

4. I ASKED ABOUT ALL THE SPECULATION THAT CHENEY AND POWELL WERE ASKING THE PRESIDENT FOR A FURTHER 100,000 TROOPS TO IMPROVE THE RATIO FOR THE LAND BATTLE. KIMMITT ADMITTED THAT, IN MILITARY TERMS, THE RATIO OF FORCES LOOKED UNSATISFACTORY AND INADEQUATE FROM THE AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW. BUT HE SEEMED PRETTY CLEAR THAT NO DECISION TO INCREASE FORCE LEVELS HAD YET BEEN TAKEN, AND INDEED SAID THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE DECIDED UNTIL AFTER BAKER'S REPORT ON WHAT THE COALITION WAS PREPARED TO PROVIDE AND WHAT IT SEEMED TO WANT IN TERMS OF ACTION FOR THE FUTURE. I SAID THAT IF A DECISION WERE PUT OFF UNTIL MID-NOVEMBER AND IF IT WERE AGREED THAT A FURTHER 100,000 TROOPS WERE REQUIRED, THAT WOULD SEEM TO DELAY THE EXERCISE OF THE MILITARY OPTION UNTIL MID-JANUARY AT THE EARLIEST. I ALSO COMMENTED THAT THE MORE TROOPS THAT WERE PUT IN, THE MORE LIKELY IT WAS THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE USED, UNLESS SADDAM HUSSEIN WERE TO CRACK. KIMMITT SAID THAT, IF HE DID NOT CRACK, HE WOULD HAVE TO BE CRACKED. IF MEMBERS OF THE COALITION AGREED TO HIGHER FORCE LEVELS IN THEATRE, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE IMPLICIT THAT THEY ALSO ACCEPTED THE INCREASED LIKELIHOOD OF MILITARY ACTION. KIMMITT THOUGHT THAT ADDITIONAL AMERICAN FORCES COULD BE BROUGHT IN REASONABLY QUICKLY FROM EUROPE. BUT HE AGREED THAT THE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY WOULD BE OPENING FROM MID-JANUARY. B
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5. I ASKED ABOUT THE AMERICANS HELD PARTICULARLY IN KUWAIT. I HAD NOTED THE PRESIDENT'S HARsher RHETORIC FOLLOWING THE LATEST UN RESOLUTION. DID KIMMITT EXPECT MILITARY ACTION TO BE TAKEN TO FREE THEM? KIMMITT SAID THAT, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, HE DID NOT. THE US WOULD NOT WANT TO TRIGGER A SITUATION THAT COULD LEAD TO FULL SCALE HOSTILITIES BEFORE THEY WERE READY FOR THESE. BUT THE SUBJECT WAS BEING WRESTLED WITH.

6. I ASKED ABOUT THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM. KIMMITT THOUGHT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO TIME FOR DETAILED DISCUSSIONS. BUT HE KNEW THAT BAKER WOULD HAVE THE PROBLEM IN MIND FOR HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS. IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO LINKAGE. BUT IT WAS ALSO NECESSARY TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE PROBLEM WAS NOT FORGOTTEN.

COMMENT

7. I THINK THAT IT IS CLEAR THAT BAKER WILL WANT TO REPORT VERY FRANKLY IN LONDON ON THE VIEWS OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COALITION, AND TO DISCUSS WHAT THE NEXT POLITICAL AND MILITARY STEPS SHOULD BE. BAKER'S AND KIMMITT'S INCLINATION WOULD BE TO TRY TO GET FURTHER AUTHORITY FROM THE UNITED NATIONS, BUT ONLY (REPEAT ONLY) IF AN APPROACH WOULD CLEARLY SUCCEED. THEY WILL, HOWEVER, LISTEN VERY CAREFULLY TO OUR VIEWS AND TAKE THEM INTO ACCOUNT. BAKER WILL NOT WANT TO DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF MILITARY PLANNING. BUT HE MAY BRING UP BOTH COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE FUTURE LEVEL OF FORCES. I THINK THAT HE COULD WELL ASK US FOR A FURTHER MILITARY CONTRIBUTION.

8. NEEDLESS TO SAY, KIMMITT'S FRANK COMMENTS SHOULD BE VERY CLOSELY HELD.

ACLAND