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MIPT AND YOUNG'S TELELETTER OF 27 OCTOBER: OMAN/JORDAN/SAUDI ARABIA

SUMMARY

1. OMANIS PRESSURE KING HUSSEIN TO MEND FENCES WITH THE SAUDIS. KING HUSSEIN AMENABLE. OMANIS PROPOSE TV INTERVIEW FOR KING HUSSEIN TO SHOW A CHANGE OF HEART. OMANI EMISSARY LIKELY TO PUT THIS TO SAUDIS SHORTLY FOR AGREEMENT. KING NOT ENGAGED IN ANY NEW PEACE INITIATIVES.

DETAIL

2. DURING MY CALL LAST NIGHT ON MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS I WAS ABOUT TO RAISE KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT (MY TELNO 507), WHEN YUSUF ALAWI SAID THAT HE WANTED ME TO PASS ON A MESSAGE TO YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER ABOUT THE DISCUSSIONS HERE LAST WEEK BETWEEN SHE SULTAN AND KING HUSSEIN. HE WAS PARTICULARLY KEEN THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD BE INFORMED BEFORE SHE MEETS KING HUSSEIN IN GENEVA.

3. ALAWI SAID THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT HERE WAS TO HELP KING HUSSEIN'S RELATIONS WITH THE SAUDIS. THE LATTER FELT DEEPLY WOUNDED BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO CONVINCED THEM TO FORGIVE AND FORGET BECAUSE OF THE DANGERS INHERENT IN THE SITUATION IN JORDAN. KING HUSSEIN'S POSITION WAS VERY WEAK: HE WAS BROKE AND THE ECONOMY WAS LIKELY TO COLLAPSE IN 3-4 MONTHS. IN SHORT, HE WAS FINISHED.

4. ALAWI CONTINUED THAT THE KING'S POSITION WAS LIKE THAT OF THE SHAH IN HIS LAST DAYS. HE WAS THREATENED BY THE ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS. IF THEY GAINED CONTROL OF PARLIAMENT, THEY WOULD WITHHOLD CONFIDENCE FROM THE GOVERNMENT. IF THE GOVERNMENT FELL, THEY WOULD CONTROL THE WHOLE COUNTRY. THEY WOULD MOVE CLOSER TO IRAQ AND THE IRAQIS COULD USE THEM AS THEIR 'ISRAEL CARD'. IF THE IRAQIS PLAYED THIS CARD AND ISRAEL INTERVENED, THE ARAB WORLD WOULD BE IN A DILEMMA FACING SIMULTANEOUSLY THE TWO PROBLEMS OF KUWAIT AND ARAB/ISRAEL.

5. ALAWI SAID THAT IN THEIR TALKS HERE THE OMANIS HAD INSISTED THAT THE KING'S PRESENT WAY WAS NOT RIGHT AND THAT THE DAMAGE WITH HIS NATURAL ALLIES (THE MONARCHIES) HAD TO BE REPAIRED. THERE WERE TWO ELEMENTS TO BE ADDRESSED: THE KING'S OBJECTION TO THE PRESENCE OF THE

MULTINATIONAL FORCES AND THE JORDANIAN MEDIA'S ATTACKS ON THE SAUDIS. THE OMANIS EXPLORED WITH THE KING THE POSSIBILITY OF HIS CHANGING HIS STANCE, NOT MUCH BECAUSE HE WAS ALREADY FIRMLY AGAINST THE INVASION, ALTHOUGH HE HAD NOT CONDEMNED IT, AND FOR THE RETURN OF THE STATUS QUO ANTE. PERHAPS HE COULD MAKE A NEW STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE WAS NOT AGAINST THE MULTINATIONAL FORCES OR THE SAUDIS?

6. ALAWI SAID THE KING HAD SAID HE WAS READY TO DO WHATEVER THE OMANIS SUGGESTED. THEY PROPOSED THEY SHOULD SEND A TV TEAM TO INTERVIEW THE KING WHEN HE WOULD MAKE CLEAR HIS POSITION, PARTICULARLY ON SUCH MATTERS AS HIS NON-INVOLVEMENT IN THE PLANNING ON THE INVASION AND HIS AFFINITY WITH THE GULF STATES. THE KING SAID HE WAS NOT IRAQ'S PARTNER BUT PEOPLE HAD ASSUMED THIS BECAUSE OF HIS CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH IRAQ OVER THE PAST 10 YEARS. ALAWI ADDED THAT THERE WOULD BE A QUID PRO QUO FOR SUCH A GESTURE FROM THE KING. IF THE SULTAN AGREED (ALAWI WOULD SPEAK TO HIM TODAY), AN EMISSARY WOULD BE SENT TO KING FAHD PROPOSING THIS PUBLIC RE-STATEMENT OF KING HUSSEIN'S POSITION AND, IF THIS WAS ACCEPTABLE, THE SAUDIS SHOULD PROVIDE JORDAN WITH OIL, ALLOW JORDANIAN EXPORTS OF FRUIT AND VEGETABLES TO RESUME, AND GIVE WHATEVER OTHER ASSISTANCE THEY FELT POSSIBLE. ALAWI UNDERLINED THAT THE SAUDIS HAD NOT YET BEEN APPROACHED AND THAT WE WERE THE FIRST TO HEAR OF THESE DISCUSSIONS.

7. IN CONCLUSION, ALAWI SAID THAT THE OMANIS HOPED THAT IF KING HUSSEIN MADE THIS STEP, IT WOULD CAUSE THE ALLIANCE OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES, YEMEN, SUDAN AND TUNISIA, TO CRACK.

8. I WARMLY ENDORSED THESE EFFORTS BY THE OMANIS TO BRING JORDAN BACK INTO THE FOLD AND AGREED JORDAN'S POSITION WAS CRUCIAL TO EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ. I THEN ASKED WHETHER THE KING WAS ENGAGED IN ANY NEW SEARCH FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS. WE HAD NOTED TARIQ AZIZ'S VISIT TO AMMAN IMMEDIATELY ON THE KING'S RETURN AND BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE TO MEET PRESIDENT MITTERRAND. ALAWI SMILED AND SAID THIS WAS A BLIND. THE IRAQIS WERE JUST TRYING TO MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THEY WERE CLOSE TO THE KING. IT MEANT NOTHING.

9. PL SEE MIFT.

CLARK

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