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Prime Minister

PM/90/082

PRIME MINISTER

The sentiment is admirable.
But it is very hard to
avoid implying a linkage
in practice, as the last sentence

THE PERMANENT FIVE AND ARAB/ISRAEL

of the Foreign Secretary, proposed

1. One of our principal concerns in handling the Gulf crisis is to keep the Arab/Israel card out of the hands of Saddam Hussein. His efforts to grab it, however spurious, have been successful to him in propaganda terms and damaging to us. This damage is compounded by the absence of any Arab/Israel peace process and untoward developments in the Occupied Territories.

statement shows. Perhaps it would be better to say: "will

2. There is wide agreement in the multinational coalition that Arab/Israel cannot sensibly be addressed until after Iraq has left Kuwait. There is also wide agreement that Saddam Hussein cannot be rewarded on this issue, but equally that it cannot be neglected. The need to capture the Arab/Israel issue for ourselves without creating a linkage with Kuwait has exercised us greatly. That is why we have been taking the line that the Arab/Israel dispute is unfinished business and that new efforts to resolve it will be required once Iraq has withdrawn.

resume their best efforts? Agree? OK B/Ki

3. President Bush made this point in his speech to the UN General Assembly at the beginning of October (and there were earlier echoes of it in his joint communique with President Gorbachev in Helsinki). You and I have been making the point with our various Arab and Israeli interlocutors. I think there would be advantage in the

but the fact of the

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London it to the present situation. However we have little hope of getting anywhere with Shamir



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Permanent Five stating rather formally that once Saddam Hussein is out of Kuwait they will address Arab/Israel. I plan to canvass this possibility as a personal idea with Secretary Baker on 9 November - although without committing you or the Government. The Americans have been resistant to date, but the Israeli performance over the Temple Mount shootings has come as a shock and they are more than ever conscious of the danger to the solidarity of the Gulf coalition posed by Arab/Israel. The activities of Primakov and others have unsettled the coalition. A declaration of this sort is calculated to settle nerves and give us back the diplomatic initiative.

4. The timing of any such declaration (which could alternatively take the form of a US/EC Declaration, though I think this would be less good) would be for consideration. My guess is that we might want it to issue around the same time as the next Resolution in the Security Council. This would have the advantage of fending off the 'peaceniks' in the Security Council who are trying to run with damaging draft Resolutions that do imply linkage between Kuwait and Palestine.

5. I enclose a draft of what I have in mind.

(DOUGLAS HURD)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
8 November 1990

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Draft declaration of the Five to be made before the resolution of the Gulf crisis

X | "The Five Permanent members of the Security Council, have consulted about the Arab/Israel issue. They are concerned by the continuing inter-communal violence. They all agree that lasting stability in the region requires a solution of the Palestinian problem which meets the legitimate concerns and rights of all states in the region and of the Palestinians. They believe that a solution should be based on SCRs 242 and 338. They do not believe that a lasting solution can be imposed. It requires negotiation by the parties concerned, including, if they are agreed on it, the convening of an international conference at an appropriate moment. The Five do not believe it realistic to expect progress towards negotiations before the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. ~~But~~ when this is complete the Five will ~~direct~~ their best efforts towards promoting such negotiations".