

**ADVANCE COPY**

SECRET  
UK COMMS ONLY  
FM RIYADH  
TO DESKBY 080900Z FCO  
TELNO 1141  
OF 080807Z NOVEMBER 90  
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PEKING  
INFO IMMEDIATE GULF POSTS, BAGHDAD, CAIRO, PARIS, ACTOR, HQBFME  
INFO IMMEDIATE JHQ HIGH WYCOMBE, SANAA

SIC AAA/I9M/A2P

MY TELNO 1137: IRAQ/KUWAIT: BAKER'S VISIT

## SUMMARY

1. BAKER'S DISCUSSIONS HERE ON FUTURE UNSC ACTION WENT FURTHER THAN US EMBASSY INITIAL ACCOUNT TO US SUGGESTED. BAKER APPARENTLY AGREED A ROUTE MAP WITH KING FAHD INVOLVING A UNSC RESOLUTION THIS MONTH, WHICH WOULD OPEN THE WAY TO MILITARY ACTION IF WITHDRAWAL HAD NOT TAKEN PLACE BY BEGINNING OF JANUARY. LATEST US SCENARIO SEES MILITARY ACTION INITIATED DURING JANUARY, COMPLETED BY END FEBRUARY, BEFORE RAMADAN ISLAMIC FACTORS START TO OBTRUDE IN MARCH.

## DETAIL

2. I HAD A WORD TODAY WITH US AMBASSADOR ON HIS RETURN TO RIYADH TO PURSUE FURTHER HOW BAKER HAD HANDLED DISCUSSION WITH SAUDIS OVER COORDINATION OF UNSC ACTIVITY IN WEEKS AHEAD WITH THE MILITARY OPTION. I EXPLAINED THIS BACKGROUND WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR MY MEETING WITH PRINCE SAUD LATER TODAY. FREEMAN SAID THAT BAKER HAD TAKEN KING FAHD THROUGH A STAGE BY STAGE SCENARIO. FREEMAN EXPECTED BAKER WOULD BE DISCUSSING THIS IN LONDON TOMORROW. THIS US ROUTE MAP TOWARDS THE MILITARY OPTION SEEKS TO HARMONISE THE RATCHETING UP OF UNSC ACTION, INCLUDING AN ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN SECURITY COUNCIL AGREEMENT TO SETTING A TIME LIMIT AFTER WHICH MILITARY ACTION COULD GO AHEAD, WITH AN OUTLINE PLAN FOR AN OFFENSIVE TO BEGIN AROUND MID-JANUARY THIS SHOULD BE COMPLETED DURING FEBRUARY BEFORE THE MOOD AND RESOLVE ON THE PART OF SAUDI ARABIA AND HER ISLAMIC PARTNERS BECAME SUBJECTED TO NEGATIVE PRESSURES WITH THE ONSET OF RAMADAN IN MARCH. WHEN I REMARKED ON THE DOWNSIDE ASPECTS OF IN EFFECT AN ULTIMATUM SETTING A SECURITY COUNCIL TIME LIMIT FOR DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC PRESSURES SO FAR IN ADVANCE, FREEMAN SAID THE AMERICANS



ACKNOWLEDGED THIS COULD PROVOKE SADDAM TO RECKLESS ACTION, BUT THEY REGARDED IT AS ESSENTIAL TO GET A RESOLUTION THROUGH THE COUNCIL BEFORE THE YEMENI PRESIDENCY IN DECEMBER. ALSO THE UNHELPFUL ZIMBABWE WOULD JOIN UNSC IN JANUARY. THERE WERE RISKS IN WAITING UNTIL JANUARY AS THEY ALSO NEEDED TO HAVE A RESOLUTION TO HAND BEFORE CONGRESS REASSEMBLED ON 20 JANUARY, LEST THE LATTER TRY TO UN-PICK THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY. A RISK MIGHT THEREFORE HAVE TO BE TAKEN OVER SETTING A TIME LIMIT. BAKER BELIEVED THE RUSSIANS AND CHINESE COULD NOW CONTEMPLATE RESORT TO FORCE IN JANUARY.

3. FREEMAN SAID THAT US THINKING ABOUT THE FORM A RESOLUTION MIGHT TAKE WAS AS YET TENTATIVE. HE THOUGHT THE AMERICANS WOULD TRY TO BRING ARTICLE 42 TO BEAR, NOT LEAST BECAUSE THE SAUDIS HAD SHOWN A PREFERENCE FOR THIS. (THIS IS AT VARIANCE WITH WHAT PRINCE SAUD INDICATED TO ME LAST WEEK ABOUT SAUDI READINESS TO ACQUIESCE IN ARTICLE 51 ACTION). THE AMERICANS ACCEPTED THAT THERE WAS NO LEGAL NEED TO INVOKE ARTICLE 42, BUT THEY SAW THIS AS POLITICALLY DESIRABLE IF IT COULD BE MANAGED. FREEMAN THOUGHT THE AMERICANS WOULD GO FOR A RESOLUTION IN PERMISSIVE TERMS WHICH NEED NOT TIE THE PROCESS SPECIFICALLY TO ARTICLE 42. (I SHALL TRY TO EXPLORE THE SAUDI POSITION HERE FURTHER WITH SAUD TODAY). FREEMAN CONFIRMED THAT IN THE LIKELY EVENT OF THE UNSC RESOLUTION STOPPING SHORT OF INVOCATION OF ARTICLE 42, THE AMERICANS SAW OUR PROPOSAL FOR A FURTHER LETTER OF REQUEST FROM THE KUWAITI GOVERNMENT COMING INTO PLAY AT SOME STAGE DOWN THE ROAD.

4. AS FOR THE PROCESS BEYOND A NOVEMBER RESOLUTION BAKER HAD FOUND KING FAHD ANXIOUS TO MOVE AHEAD TO A MILITARY OFFENSIVE, WHILE RECOGNISING THAT FURTHER MILITARY REINFORCEMENT, INVOLVING SOME WEEKS DELAY, WAS NEEDED. IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD PLAY THEIR MILITARY PART, THOUGH IN WHAT WAY DOES NOT YET SEEM CLEAR. THE KING HAD STRESSED THAT ACTION MUST BE OVER BEFORE THE ONSET OF RAMADAN IN MID-MARCH. ACCORDINGLY THE AMERICANS HAD SUGGESTED THAT MILITARY ACTION, IN THE EVENT OF IRAQ'S FAILURE TO WITHDRAW, WOULD HAVE TO START DURING JANUARY (PRESUMABLY BEFORE CONGRESS RECONVENES) TO BE COMPLETED IN THE COURSE OF FEBRUARY. PLANNING WOULD NOW GO AHEAD ON THIS BASIS.

MUNRO

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

26

ADVANCE 26

IRAQ/KUWAIT SECRET  
PS  
PS/PUS  
PS/MR HOGG  
MR FAIRWEATHER  
MR BROOMFIELD  
MR GOULDEN  
MR GORE-BOOTH  
MR YOUNG (EMERGENCY UNIT)  
HD/AMD  
HD/ISD(O)  
HD/NENAD  
HD/NPDD  
HD/PUSD  
DEPUTY HD/PUSD

HD/SECPOL D  
HD/UND  
MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)  
PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
CHIEF OF ASSESSMENTS STAFF  
(CABINET OFFICE VIA TUBE H29)  
MR REEVES CAB OFFICE  
(VIA TUBE H29)  
MR APLEYARD CAB OFFICE  
(VIA TUBE H29)  
MR D GOWAN CAB OFFICE  
(VIA TUBE H29)  
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK  
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN