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INFO PRIORITY PARIS, MOSCOW, PEKING, UKMIS NEW YORK

Secret

YOUR TELNO. 936 TO UKMIS NEW YORK: IRAQ/KUWAIT:
NEXT STEPS AT THE UN

SUMMARY

1. AMERICANS AGREE ACTION PREFERABLY TO BE CONCLUDED BY THE END OF NOVEMBER AND THAT IT IS BETTER TO LOBBY IN CAPITALS THAN IN NEW YORK. THEY WILL CONFIRM LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS WITH US. BAKER WILL WANT TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBLE RESOLUTION WITH YOU ON 18 NOVEMBER.

DETAIL

2. I SAW KIMMITT ON 14 NOVEMBER TO GO THROUGH THE POINTS IN YOUR TELNO. 925 TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND SUBSEQUENT TELEGRAMS. I STRESSED THE URGENCY AND THE NEED TO GET THE KUWAITIS AND THE OTHER GULF COUNTRIES TO TAKE ACTION SOON. THE MATERIAL WHICH THEY PRODUCED HAD TO BE DRAMATIC IF THE PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO THE AREA WAS NOT TO OVERSHADOW ITS IMPACT. A DEBATE SHOULD TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE END OF NOVEMBER, AND LEAD IN TO THE APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION. I EXPLAINED WHY WE WERE OPPOSED TO INCLUDING A DEADLINE. I SUGGESTED WE SHOULD CONSULT OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL IN CAPITALS RATHER THAN IN NEW YORK. IT WOULD BE BETTER TO APPROACH THE FRENCH (PARIS TELNO. 1377 TO YOU) AS THOUGH THERE HAD BEEN NO PRECOOKING BETWEEN OURSELVES AND WASHINGTON. I CONCLUDED MY INITIAL REMARKS BY REMINDING KIMMITT THAT WE ALREADY HAD LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 51: THERE COULD BE TACTICAL ADVANTAGE IN REMINDING OTHERS WHO MIGHT WANT TO AMEND A LEAN RESOLUTION OF THE FACT THAT WE COULD ALWAYS GO BACK TO IT (UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1966, PARA. 7).
3. KIMMITT SAID HE AGREED WITH WHAT I HAD SAID. ALTHOUGH NO FORMAL DECISION HAD YET BEEN TAKEN THE AMERICANS WOULD LIKE A RESOLUTION AUTHORISING THE USE OF FORCE, EXPRESSED IN SPARE LANGUAGE, TO BE ADOPTED BY THE END OF THIS MONTH. THE PRESIDENT WAS REFLECTING UPON WHAT BAKER HAD TOLD HIM AND FOLLOWING HIS CONTACTS WITH CONGRESS. THE STATE DEPARTMENT WERE HOWEVER TO ANNOUNCE SHORTLY THAT BAKER WOULD BE MEETING IN GENEVA WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF ZAIRE, COTE D'IVOIRE AND ETHIOPIA ON 17 NOVEMBER AND ON THE FOLLOWING DAY WITH HIS ROMANIAN AND

FINNISH COUNTERPARTS. THAT WOULD MEAN THAT HE WOULD HAVE CONSULTED ALL BUT FOUR OF THE CURRENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY 18 NOVEMBER. HE HOPED TO MEET YOU AS WELL AS DUMAS AND SHEVARDNADZE TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBLE TEXT OF A RESOLUTION. THE CSCE MEETING PROVIDED THE OPPORTUNITY TO CLARIFY THE PROSPECTS FOR APPROVING A RESOLUTION BY THE END OF THE MONTH. THERE WAS STILL SOME QUESTION MARK OVER THE CHINESE ATTITUDE WHICH HAD TO BE RESOLVED. ACTION OUGHT ALSO TO BE TAKEN WITH THE NON-ALIGNED. HE AGREED IT WAS BETTER TO LOBBY IN CAPITALS THAN NEW YORK. THE AMERICAN DEADLINE FOR COMPLETING THIS ACTION WAS SUCH AS TO ALLOW A DEBATE TO BEGIN IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 26 NOVEMBER.

4. KIMMITT SAID THAT HE AGREED IT WOULD BE RIGHT TO INTRODUCE A RESOLUTION FOLLOWING A DEBATE ON KUWAIT INITIATED BY THE KUWAITIS. THE AMERICANS HAD NO FIXED IDEAS AS TO HOW SUCH A DEBATE SHOULD BE SET UP, THOUGH IT WAS OBVIOUSLY IMPORTANT THAT IT SHOULD NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN STAGE MANAGED BY THEM OR BY US. THE KUWAITIS WOULD HAVE TO BE TOLD TO GET THE BEST ADVICE THEY COULD. HE HAD NOT YET THOUGHT THROUGH A WESTERN DIVISION OF LABOUR ON SETTING MATTERS IN TRAIN. SUCH A DEBATE COULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL IMPACT AS WELL AS INFLUENCING THE COUNCIL ITSELF, AND CONGRESS HERE.
5. KIMMITT SAID HE ALSO AGREED THAT, ON REFLECTION, IT WOULD BE BETTER TO LEAVE A DEADLINE OUT OF ANY RESOLUTION. HE WAS UNSURE HOWEVER WHAT THE SOVIET OR CHINESE POSITION ON THIS MIGHT BE. HE RECALLED THE POINT MADE BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND OTHERS DURING BAKER'S LONDON VISIT THAT IT WOULD BE WRONG TO OFFER A CLEAR TARGET FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN OR FOR THOSE WITH QUOTE PEACE UNQUOTE PROPOSALS TO PEDDLE. HE WAS NOT ENTIRELY SANGUINE AS TO THE CHANCES OF AVOIDING LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD ARGUE FOR DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES AND/OR SANCTIONS TO BE GIVEN A FURTHER CHANCE. THOUGH IT WAS OF COURSE BEST TO AVOID THIS IF POSSIBLE, WE MIGHT HAVE TO CONSIDER WAYS FOR SUCH PRESSURES TO BE CONTAINED. THE AMERICANS WERE IN GENERAL SYMPATHY WITH THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WE HAD PUT TO THEM, BUT THEY HAD SOME MINOR POINTS ON THE PREAMBULAR LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE BETTER NOT TO REFER SPECIFICALLY TO THE SUBSTANCE EACH OF THE PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS: THE LIBERATION OF KUWAIT, FOR EXAMPLE, STRUCK NO VERY RESPONSIVE CHORD IN FRANCE OR EVEN IN THE UNITED STATES WHEREAS THE NEED TO UPHOLD INTERNATIONAL LAW MIGHT PROVE A MORE PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT. BUT THESE WERE MINOR POINTS: THE MAIN THING WAS TO GO FOR A TIGHT RESOLUTION.
6. KIMMITT SAID WE HAD TO CONVEY A POWERFUL SIGNAL TO SADDAM HUSSEIN. THAT MEANT AVOIDING OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS OR ANY SUGGESTION THAT PARTIAL SOLUTIONS WERE POSSIBLE. BAKER WOULD

WANT TO TALK OVER A TEXT WITH YOU ON 18 NOVEMBER. HE WOULD THEN WANT TO SPEAK TO THE FRENCH (HE SAID HE TOOK MY POINT THAT THE FRENCH SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO THINK SOMETHING HAD BEEN PRECOOKED WITH LONDON FIRST) AND THEN THE RUSSIANS AND THEN THE CHINESE.

7. I REPEATED THAT WE HAD TO BUILD IN TIME FOR THE KUWAITIS TO GET THEIR ACT TOGETHER. IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO LET WORD GET OUT ABOUT A RESOLUTION BEFORE A DEBATE ABOUT KUWAIT HAD BEEN SET UP. KIMMITT SAID PICKERING HAD ALREADY SET ASIDE THE THREE DAYS LEADING UP TO A POSSIBLE VOTE ON 29 NOVEMBER FOR THIS EXERCISE. HE WAS TRYING TO KEEP 30 NOVEMBER CLEAR, PARTLY FOR REASONS OF FLEXIBILITY AND PARTLY BECAUSE THERE WERE A NUMBER OF OTHER AGENDA ITEMS TO BE CLEARED. HE AGREED THAT THE KUWAITIS WOULD HAVE TO BE ENERGISED THIS WEEK. THE AMERICANS WOULD GET BACK TO US WITH IDEAS AS TO HOW THIS MIGHT BE DONE. HE WOULD BE SPEAKING TO THE KUWAITI AMBASSADOR LATER THAT DAY, 14 NOVEMBER. THE US AMBASSADOR DESIGNATE TO KUWAIT, GNEHM, MIGHT BE THE MAN TO MASTERMIND THE APPROACH TO THE KUWAITIS ON THE AMERICAN SIDE. HE THOUGHT HOWEVER THAT WE MIGHT BE AHEAD OF THE AMERICANS IN OUR THINKING. HE WANTED US TO WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER. I REPEATED HOW IMPORTANT IT WAS THAT THE PROPOSED DEBATE IN NEW YORK SHOULD BE SEEN TO HAVE BEEN AT KUWAITI INITIATIVE. WE SHOULD CONSIDER FOR EXAMPLE WHETHER OR NOT THE AMIR HIMSELF SHOULD ATTEND.

8. THE MINISTER SUBSEQUENTLY FOLLOWED UP WITH BOLTON, WHO HAD ALSO BEEN PRESENT AT MY CONVERSATION WITH KIMMITT. BOLTON SAID HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE AMOUNT OF DETAIL WHICH HAD TO BE GOT RIGHT IN A SHORT TIME. HE SENSED THAT MINISTERS WANTED TO PUT A PACKAGE TOGETHER THEMSELVES. THERE MIGHT NEVERTHELESS BE SOMETHING TO BE SAID FOR TALKS AT OFFICIAL LEVEL FIRST. HE WOULD BE WILLING TO COME TO LONDON AND PARIS IN ADVANCE OF THE CSCE MEETING IF NECESSARY. WE WERE ATTEMPTING TO TREAD A COMPLEX AND TREACHEROUS PATH. THE YEMENIS, WHEN THEY TOOK OVER THE PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL, WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO FRUSTRATE THINGS EVEN IF THE PASSAGE OF A RESOLUTION SLIPPED INTO DECEMBER, PROVIDED WE HAD BEEN ABLE TO GET AGREEMENT IN THE MAIN CAPITALS AND TO ESTABLISH THE RIGHT MOMENTUM. WE MIGHT HAVE A GREATER PROBLEM HOWEVER IF THERE APPEARED TO BE A POSSIBILITY OF A RESOLUTION NOT BELNG PUT TO THE VOTE UNTIL THE MIDDLE OF DECEMBER. WOOD SAID WE SHARED THIS ASSESSMENT, HENCE OUR DESIRE TO GET THINGS THROUGH BY THE END OF NOVEMBER. HE THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE RISKS IN BOLTON GOING FIRST TO LONDON, IF WE WERE TO PREVENT THE FRENCH FROM SEEING A DRAFT TEXT AS A UK/US AFFAIR RATHER THAN SOMETHING ON WHICH THEY WERE BEING ASKED TO WORK FROM THE BEGINNING. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF HE WENT TO PARIS

FIRST HE MIGHT FIND WE WERE NOT MAKING THE INITIAL PRESENTATION AT A SENIOR ENOUGH LEVEL.

9. BOLTON SAID HE WOULD GET BACK TO US AS SOON AS THE AMERICANS HAD DECIDED WHO WOULD BE THE COORDINATOR FOR ACTION WITH THE KUWAITIS AND THE GULF STATES ON THEIR SIDE. WOOD STRESSED HOW IMPORTANT IT WAS FOR THE KUWAITIS AT LEAST TO HAVE ASKED FOR A DEBATE BEFORE THE NEWS LEAKED THAT WE WERE CONSIDERING A RESOLUTION. BOLTON AGREED IT WAS DESIRABLE TO KEEP THE TWO QUESTIONS SEPARATE, BUT HE THOUGHT THAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT TO BE MADE ON 14 NOVEMBER THAT BAKER WOULD BE SEEING THE AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD ENABLE ALL TOO MANY PEOPLE TO PUT 2 PLUS 2 TOGETHER. IT MIGHT BE AS WELL TO SUGGEST TO THE KUWAITIS THAT THEY SHOULD ASK FOR A DEBATE SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. HE AGREED IT WAS IMPORTANT TO AVOID ANY SUGGESTION THAT IT HAD BEEN THE AMERICANS OR OURSELVES WHO HAD PRECOOKED A KUWAITI INITIATIVE. THE TROUBLE WAS HOWEVER THE KUWAITIS WERE REMARKABLY PASSIVE. HE FEARED, TOO, THAT THEIR PROPAGANDA EFFORT MIGHT IN PRACTICE BE THIN GRUEL. THEY HAD NOT DONE VERY WELL AT TAIF. SINCE THEN BOLTON'S OFFICE HAVE CALLED BACK WITH THE NEWS THAT THE BBC AMONG OTHERS HAVE PUT OUT THE STORY THAT PICKERING HAS HAD ORDERS TO PRODUCE A RESOLUTION BY THE END OF THE MONTH AND THAT THERE MAY BE A MINISTERIAL LEVEL MEETING TO COMPLETE THE PROCESS. THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE SAYING THAT NO SUCH ORDERS HAVE BEEN ISSUED.

10. BOLTON CONFIRMED THAT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH THE AMERICANS HAD EARLIER BEEN CONSIDERING WAS NOW VERY MUCH ON ICE.

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