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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1966

OF 140320Z NOVEMBER 90

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, PEKING

ADVANCE COPY

YOUR TELNO 936: IRAQ/KUWAIT: NEXT STEPS AT THE UNITED NATIONS

SUMMARY

1. INSTRUCTIONS CARRIED OUT WITH U S PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE. CONTINUED SHARED PREFERENCE FOR ACTION IN CAPITALS OF OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS TO EXPLAIN MOVE TO MILITARY OPTION AND SECURE AGREEMENT ON TEXT OF RESOLUTION. I EMPHASISE DESIRE TO MOVE AHEAD WITHOUT DELAY.

IRAQ/KUWAIT

2. I DULY CARRIED OUT THESE INSTRUCTIONS WITH THE U S PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE ON THE EVENING OF 13 NOVEMBER.

3. PICKERING, WHO HAD BEEN DOWN IN WASHINGTON DURING THE MORNING, WAS STILL NONE THE WISER ABOUT THE FOLLOW-UP TO BAKER'S TOUR. BAKER AND KIMMITT HAD BOTH GONE OFF TO BERMUDA FOR A MEETING WITH THE CANADIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND HAD ONLY CARRIED OUT A VERY CURSORY DE-BRIEF SO FAR. PICKERING DID NOT KNOW WHETHER BAKER AND THE PRESIDENT HAD YET DISCUSSED THE NEXT STEPS. PICKERING WAS RETURNING TO WASHINGTON TOMORROW FOR ANOTHER DISCUSSION, AMONG OTHERS WITH KIMMITT, FROM WHICH HE HOPED TO GET A CLEARER PICTURE OF U S INTENTIONS.

4. I EXPLAINED TO PICKERING WHY WE DID NOT THINK IT WAS WISE TO BUILD A 'PEACE' ELEMENT INTO THE RESOLUTION. WE MIGHT WELL NEED TO CONCEDE SOMETHING IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS, BUT IT WAS BETTER TO HOLD IT BACK RATHER THAN TO PROFFER IT AT THE BEGINNING. PICKERING TENDED TO AGREE AND SAID THAT HE WAS IN ANY CASE HAVING DIFFICULTY DRAFTING ANYTHING ACCEPTABLE FOR THIS ELEMENT.

5. I ALSO EXPLAINED OUR DISLIKE OF THE SETTING OF ANY FUTURE TIME LIMIT EITHER FOR THE ENDING OF PEACE PROCESSES OR FOR THE SANCTIONING OF THE MILITARY OPTION. PICKERING TOOK NOTE.

6. WE DISCUSSED AGAIN THE SUBSEQUENT HANDLING OF ANY UK/U S TEXT OF A RESOLUTION AGREED BETWEEN US THIS WEEK. WE BOTH REMAIN FIRMLY OF

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THE VIEW THAT THE INITIAL JOB OF SELLING A MOVE TO THE MILITARY OPTION AND GETTING AGREEMENT ON AN ACCEPTABLE TEXT WITH THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE PERMANENT FIVE WILL HAVE TO BE CARRIED OUT IN THEIR CAPITALS. GOOD THOUGH THE SOVIET AND CHINESE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES HERE ARE (THE SAME CANNOT BE SAID OF THE FRENCH), WE BOTH BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL SIMPLY NOT BE ABLE TO HANDLE AS MAJOR AN ISSUE AS THIS WITHOUT THE DETAILED INVOLVEMENT OF THEIR CAPITALS, AND THAT THE LATTER WILL BE NEGATIVE UNLESS THE PRINCIPLE AND THE TEXT HAVE BEEN SQUARED WITH THEM AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. WE ARE NEITHER OF US AT ALL TAKEN WITH THE IDEA OF MEETINGS OF THE FOUR (WITHOUT THE CHINESE). IT WOULD IN OUR VIEW BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE BOTH SO FAR AS THE PRESENT ISSUE IS CONCERNED AND EVEN MORE FOR THE FUTURE COOPERATION OF THE PERMANENT FIVE.

7. I URGED ON PICKERING AGAIN, AS I HAD DONE YESTERDAY, THE NEED WHEN APPROACHING THE OTHER THREE OF THE PERMANENT FIVE IN THEIR CAPITALS TO TAKE A VERY TOUGH LINE ABOUT OUR RELUCTANCE TO MOVE AWAY FROM AN ARTICLE 51 APPROACH. IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE WERE ONLY EVEN CONTEMPLATING SUCH A MOVE AS A RESPONSE TO THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIONS OF THEIR GOVERNMENTS AND NOT BECAUSE OF ANY LEGAL REQUIREMENT. WE SHOULD WARN THEM THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO LOAD UP THE TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION WITH UNACCEPTABLE PARAPHERNALIA WOULD DRIVE US (UK/U S) STRAIGHT BACK TO AN ARTICLE 51 APPROACH. PICKERING SAID HE VERY MUCH AGREED WITH THIS. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE THREE OTHER PERMANENT FIVE MEMBERS WERE KEEN TO SHIFT THE UK/U S AWAY FROM ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 51 PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTIES THAT IT WOULD PRESENT THEM INsofar AS THE POSITION THEY WOULD HAVE TO TAKE UP THEREAFTER. IT WAS THEREFORE A CREDIBLE THREAT TO HOLD OVER THEIR HEADS THAT WE WOULD REVERT TO AN ARTICLE 51 APPROACH IF THEY INSERTED UNATTRACTIVE FEATURES IN THE DRAFT RESOLUTION.

8. I UNDERLINED OUR DESIRE TO MOVE ON THE NEXT STEPS WITHOUT DELAY. PICKERING AGREED TO MAKE THIS POINT CLEAR IN WASHINGTON AND TO DISCUSS THE MATTER FURTHER WITH ME IN THE MARGINS OF THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CALLED FOR THE AFTERNOON OF 14 NOVEMBER.

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